USA v. Ingram

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. CR-25-393-G
)
LETICIA ANNETTE INGRAM, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
ORDER
Now before the Court is a Motion to Suppress (Doc. No. 21) filed through counsel
by Defendant Leticia Annette Ingram. The Government has responded in opposition (Doc.
No. 24). On February 2, 2026, the Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the Motion.
The Government appeared through Assistant U.S. Attorney Stephen Hoch. 	Defendant
appeared through appointed counsel Brett Behenna. The Court heard the testimony of U.S.
Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) Agent Matt Wyckoff, Oklahoma City Police
Department (“OCPD”) Officer Darion Richards, and OCPD Officer Noah Estrem. 1
I. 	Standard of Review
“The 	purpose 	of 	a 	suppression 	hearing 	is 	‘to 	determine 	preliminarily 	the
admissibility of certain evidence allegedly obtained in violation of defendant’s rights under
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.’” United States v. Maurek, 131 F. Supp. 3d 1258, 1261-
62 (W.D. Okla. 2015) (quoting United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1269 (10th Cir.
1 Based on the Court’s observations of the witnesses, the Court finds the testimony relied
upon herein to be credible.
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1982)). “‘The proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of adducing facts at the
suppression hearing indicating that his own rights were violated by the challenged search.’”
Id. at 1262 (quoting United States v. Eckhart, 569 F.3d 1263, 1274 (10th Cir. 2009)). The
Government must then prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the search or seizure
that occurred was lawful—e.g., that an exception to the warrant requirement existed or that
the evidence sought to be suppressed was not “fruit of the poisonous tree.” 	See United
States v. Burciaga, 687 F.3d 1229, 1230 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. Matlock, 415
U.S. 164, 177 n.14 (1974); see also United States v. Chavez, 985 F.3d 1234, 1240 (10th
Cir. 2021) (“Though the defendant bears the burden of proving whether and when the
Fourth Amendment was implicated, the government then bears the burden of proving that
its warrantless actions were justified by an exception.” (alterations and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
II. 	Background
On September 8, 2025, agents with the DEA and the Oklahoma Bureau of Narcotics
were surveilling a suspected drug trafficker in Oklahoma City. At around 5:25 p.m., the
agents observed the suspect travel by car to a parking lot. Shortly after the suspect arrived,
a dark green Chevrolet Suburban arrived and parked in the suspect’s vicinity. Agents next
observed a female, later identified as Defendant Leticia Annette Ingram, exit the Suburban
and enter the suspect’s vehicle. About two minutes later, Defendant exited the suspect’s
vehicle with a large brown box, which she placed in the Suburban. Both vehicles then left
the parking lot.
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The DEA agents believed that the box contained controlled substances. 	Agents
followed both vehicles as they left the parking lot. 	A DEA agent requested that OCPD
officers follow the Suburban and conduct a traffic stop after observing a traffic violation.
Agent Wyckoff testified that the DEA requested OCPD’s assistance in an attempt to have
the OCPD’s stop of the Suburban be “walled off” from any action taken by the DEA based
upon a suspicion that the Suburban had been involved in a drug deal. 	In the course of
communicating with OCPD, the DEA conveyed the suspicion that controlled substances
were in the vehicle.
Around 5:48 p.m., OCPD officers drove their patrol vehicles onto southbound
Interstate 235, positioning the vehicles in the flow of traffic behind the Suburban. 	The
patrol vehicle driven by OCPD Officer Darion Richards was closest to the Suburban. The
Suburban changed lanes, moving left into the center lane. Officer Richards testified that
at this point he observed a traffic violation: specifically, that the Suburban’s turn signal
was activated simultaneously with the lane change, rather than—as required by an
applicable traffic law—at least 100 feet prior to the lane change.2 	Officer Richards then
moved his vehicle behind the Suburban and initiated a traffic stop.3
2 The Government has not identified the specific traffic law at issue. Defendant does not
dispute the Government’s characterization of applicable law, however. 	The Court has
previously recognized that Oklahoma law “requires that a ‘vehicle shall not be moved from
the lane until the driver has . . . given a signal, not less than the last one hundred (100) feet
traveled by the vehicle, of his or her intention to change lanes.’” United States v. Ramdial,
717 F. Supp. 3d 1118, 1127 (W.D. Okla. 2024) (quoting Okla. Stat. tit. 47, § 11-309(2)),
aff’d, No. 24-6213, 2025 WL 2682624 (10th Cir. Sept. 19, 2025).
3 The OCPD officers in pursuit of the Suburban were communicating via radio with DEA
agents who, reportedly, were already on the highway. 	Some such communications were
captured by the OCPD officers’ dashcam videos, including a statement apparently made
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The Suburban pulled over on the interstate shoulder between Northwest 23rd Street
and Northwest 36th Street. 	Officer Richards approached the Suburban and encountered
Defendant, the vehicle’s sole occupant. He asked Defendant for her driver’s license, but
she said she did not have it on her. Officer Richards then asked Defendant to exit the car,
which she did. He handcuffed her. Defendant was asked whether there were any drugs in
her vehicle. 	In Officer Richards’ assessment, Defendant would not answer the question
and appeared nervous and evasive.
During this exchange, Defendant stated that the vehicle was not hers and that she
did not know whose it was—she was just driving it. Shortly thereafter, law enforcement
learned that Defendant’s driver’s license was suspended and that she was driving a vehicle
with a fake paper license tag over a real license plate. Defendant was arrested for driving
with a suspended driver’s license and ultimately placed in an OCPD vehicle.
A wrecker was called to the scene to impound the Suburban. 	When the wrecker
arrived, OCPD officers began inventorying the contents of the Suburban. 	Shortly after
beginning the inventory search, OCPD Officer Noah Estrem and others located a brown
by a DEA agent at the time the Suburban changed lanes. 	See Def.’s Ex. 1, Woodall
Dashcam at 1:33-1:39. The recorded audio is difficult to discern and the parties disagree
as to what was said. Acknowledging room for disagreement, the Court finds that the DEA
agent stated, in relevant part: “. . . failure to signal. There’s a traffic violation.” Defense
counsel, suggesting that Officer Richards did not actually see a late signal but was merely
acting on the basis of what he was told by the DEA, argues that the DEA agent stated,
“Failure to signal is your traffic violation.” The Court does not find this distinction material
to the determinations made herein. Officer Richards testified that he personally observed
the tardy signal. 	Even if defense counsel’s interpretation of the DEA agent’s statement
were correct, it does not follow that Officer Richards did not independently observe the
traffic violation.
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cardboard box sitting on the back seat. The box contained a substance that later field-tested
positive for the presence of methamphetamine.
Defendant was indicted on one count of possession of methamphetamine with intent
to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). See Indictment (Doc. No. 14).
III. 	Discussion
Defendant argues that the “physical evidence and oral statements” obtained by law
enforcement officers on September 8, 2025, must be suppressed because both the traffic
stop and inventory search of the Suburban were unlawful. Def.’s Mot. to Suppress at 1-4.
The Government responds that both the initial stop and resulting search were conducted
pursuant to and in compliance with the Fourth Amendment, such that the relevant evidence
and statements are not subject to exclusion. See Gov’t’s Resp. at 4-10.
A. The Traffic Stop
Defendant contends that Officer Richards did not actually observe a traffic violation
by Defendant and so the traffic stop of the Suburban was infirm from its inception. 	See
Def.’s Mot. to Suppress at 3. 	In support, Defendant points to the dashcam footage from
Officer Richards’ police vehicle and from another OCPD vehicle that was with Officer
Richards on Interstate 235. 	See Woodall Dashcam; Gov’t’s Ex. 1, Richards Dashcam.
Officer Richards’ dashcam footage commences when his patrol car merges onto Interstate
235. 	Clearly visible at the outset of the video is the green Suburban changing from one
lane to another ahead of Officer Richards’ vehicle. See Richards Dashcam at 00:00-00:05.
The video exhibits do not capture when, if at all, the Suburban’s turn signal was
activated. See id.; Woodall Dashcam at 01:30-01:40. At the evidentiary hearing, Officer
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Richards testified that he saw the Suburban change lanes and that the signal was activated
simultaneously with the lane change. 	Officer Richards further testified that he issued a
citation to Defendant for failing to signal 100 feet prior to the lane change. 4
A traffic stop is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment “and is subject to review for
reasonableness.” 	United States v. Mayville, 955 F.3d 825, 829 (10th Cir. 2020). “To be
reasonable, a traffic stop must be justified at its inception and, in general, the officer’s
actions during the stop must be reasonably related in scope to the mission of the stop itself.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 	Whether a traffic stop is justified at its inception
depends upon “the totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Salazar, 609 F.3d 1059,
1068 (10th Cir. 2010).
The Tenth Circuit has explained that “a traffic stop is valid under the Fourth
Amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has
reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is
occurring.” 	United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995); see also
United States v. Ingram, 721 F. App’x 811, 816 (10th Cir. 2018) (“If police officers witness
a traffic violation, then the traffic stop is justified at its inception.”).
Further, the constitutionality of the stop does not depend on whether the
driver did, in fact, commit a traffic violation. 	The standard is reasonable
suspicion of wrongdoing. 	If an officer reasonably thinks he saw a driver
commit a traffic infraction, then that is enough to pull him over. 	See, e.g.,
United States v. Reyes, 202 F. Supp. 3d 1209, 1213 (D. Kan. 2016)
(explaining that the “propriety of a stop does not depend on whether the
suspect is actually guilty of committing a traffic offense; rather, the relevant
question is whether it was reasonable for the officers to believe the offense
had been committed”) (citing United States v. Eckhart, 569 F.3d 1263, 1271
4 Defendant’s counsel represented that the citation was later dismissed.
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(10th Cir. 2009) and United States v. Cashman, 216 F.3d 582, 587 (7th Cir.
2000)).
Ramdial, 717 F. Supp. 3d at 1126-27.
The 	Court 	credits 	Officer 	Richards’ 	unequivocal 	testimony, 	which 	is 	not
contradicted by any video or other evidence, and finds that it is “sufficient to meet the low
reasonable suspicion bar.” 	United States v. Anderson, 62 F.4th 1260, 1267 (10th Cir.
2023). The possibility that a few seconds’ additional dashcam footage might show more
of the event does not undermine or discredit Officer Richards’ sworn testimony as to what
he observed. Further, while it is clear from the evidence that the DEA agents had a strong
interest in learning what was in the cardboard box in the Suburban, and did not refrain from
expressing that interest to the OCPD officers, the fact of an additional motive for stopping
Defendant is immaterial in light of Officer Richards’ reasonable suspicion of a traffic
violation. Although Officer Richards knew of the DEA’s suspicions, it is “irrelevant” for
Fourth Amendment purposes “that the officer may have had other subjective motives for
stopping the vehicle.” Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d at 787.
The Court therefore concludes that the traffic stop was justified at its inception, as
“the facts available to” Officer Richards “warranted an officer of reasonable caution in
believing the action taken was appropriate.” 	United States v. McHugh, 639 F.3d 1250,
1256 (10th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).5
5 The Court therefore need not consider the parties’ alternative arguments regarding
whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause justified the traffic stop based upon the
DEA agents’ observations of events at the parking lot that arguably were consistent with
drug trafficking.
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B. The Inventory Search
Defendant challenges the inventory search of the Suburban as not performed “for
legitimate non-pretextual reasons pursuant to [the OCPD officers’] community caretaker
responsibilities.” Def.’s Mot. to Suppress at 4.
1. 	Relevant Standards
“One exception to the warrant requirement is a search or seizure conducted pursuant
to police officers’ ‘community-caretaking functions.’” United States v. Venezia, 995 F.3d
1170, 1175 (10th Cir. 2021).
This exception allows law enforcement to impound an automobile and, in
connection with the impoundment, inventory the vehicle’s contents. Such an
impoundment, however, must be based on something other than suspicion of
evidence of criminal activity, such as protecting public safety and promoting
the efficient movement of traffic.
United States v. Ramos, 88 F.4th 862, 867 (10th Cir. 2023) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
An inventory search is reasonable “only if conducted according to standardized
procedures.” 	United States v. Tueller, 349 F.3d 1239, 1243 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal
quotation marks omitted). 	In addition, the inventory search “must be justified by the
administrative purposes of such searches,” rather than being “investigatory in nature.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]n inventory search may be justified by a legitimate
inventory purpose despite an officer’s subjective desire to uncover criminal evidence,”
however. United States v. Cecala, No. 99-4049, 2000 WL 18948, at *2 (10th Cir. Jan. 12,
2000).
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2. 	Discussion
The undisputed record reflects that Defendant being placed under arrest left the
Suburban unoccupied on the shoulder of Interstate 235. The impoundment of the Suburban
was therefore authorized by OCPD procedure, which prescribes that “[v]ehicles may be
impounded when . . . [t]he driver is arrested . . . under circumstances which leave[] or will
leave a vehicle unattended on any street or highway.” 	Def.’s Ex. 2, OCPD Operations
Manual § 5-405.2(J); see also South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976) (“The
authority of police to seize and remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic or
threatening public safety and convenience is beyond challenge.”).
As for the inventory search, such a search was likewise authorized by the OCPD
Operations Manual, which prescribes:
All vehicles impounded will be subjected to a routine custodial inventory.
The inventory will be conducted by the impounding officer at the scene of
the impoundment (whenever this can be reasonably accomplished) in the
presence of the wrecker driver. Contents of the vehicle will be recorded in
the appropriate space provided on the impound report.
OCPD Operations Manual § 5-405.4; see also Gov’t’s Ex. 5, Impound Report.
As support for her contention that this was an unlawful investigative search,
Defendant points to Officer Estrem’s alleged failure to fully comply with OCPD
procedures in completing the inventory search and associated paperwork, as well as the
fact that the wrecker driver was in the cab of the wrecker for much of the time the inventory
search was being conducted. The Court disagrees that the omissions and deviations alleged
by Defendant would make the inventory search conducted here improper and illegal. For
example, Officer Estrem testified that he understood § 5-405.4’s requirement that the
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search be conducted “in the presence of the wrecker driver” to mean that the officer must
wait for the wrecker driver to arrive before beginning the search, which Officer Estrem did,
and that the wrecker driver merely needs to be “on the scene” in order to fulfill § 5-405.4’s
requirement that he be “present.” 	Even if Defendant has reasonable grounds to criticize
this interpretation or the manner in which Officer Estrem completed the Impound Report,
it is indisputable that (a) §§ 5-405.2(J) and 5-405.4 plainly authorized OCPD officers in
these circumstances to inventory and impound the Suburban and (b) Officer Estrem
carefully and thoroughly examined the contents of the Suburban in a manner consistent
with the administrative purpose of recording valuable property and identifying dangers.
Based on the evidence presented, the Court finds that OCPD conducted a proper inventory
search pursuant to a proper purpose. 	The alleged missteps in OCPD’s execution of § 5-
405.4, or other relevant OCPD procedures, are not sufficient to establish that this was “[a]n
inventory search undertaken in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation.” Cecala,
2000 WL 18948, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 6
Based on the same view of the evidence, the Court rejects the suggestion that the
inventory search of the Suburban was merely “a ruse for a general rummaging in order to
discover incriminating evidence,” in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Florida v. Wells,
495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990). Although, again, the evidence shows that some OCPD officers on
6 The Court agrees with the Government that suppression of evidence based upon minor
deviations from a law enforcement agency’s policies for inventorying and impounding a
vehicle would be inconsistent with the purpose of the exclusionary rule, which is to exclude
evidence 	only 	when 	police 	conduct 	is 	“sufficiently 	deliberate 	that 	exclusion 	can
meaningfully deter it” and “sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price
paid by the justice system.” Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009).
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the scene were aware that the DEA suspected that controlled substances were present in
the Suburban, “an inventory search may be justified by a legitimate inventory purpose
despite an officer’s subjective desire to uncover criminal evidence.” 	Cecala, 2000 WL
18948, at *2. That justification was present here. 7
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Suppress (Doc. No. 21) is
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 6th day of February, 2026.
7 Based upon this determination, the Court need not address the parties’ alternative
arguments as to whether the officers had probable cause to conduct the search based upon
a belief that the vehicle contained contraband or evidence of a crime.
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