Biton v. Jackson

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
ETTI BITON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-23-968-SLP
)
JEFFREY JACKSON, )
)
Defendant. )
O R D E R
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees [Doc. No. 140].
Defendant Jeffrey Jackson did not file a response. A hearing on this Motion was held on
December 12, 2025. In the exercise of discretion under LCvR 7.1(g), the Court deems the
Motion confessed. See also LCvR 54.2 (“Objections to the allowance of attorney’s fees
must be filed within 14 days from the date the motion for attorney’s fees is filed.”).1 For
the additional reasons set forth below, the Court finds that the amount of fees sought by
the Motion is a reasonable amount to be awarded pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(c).
The Court previously granted default judgment in favor of Plaintiff for unpaid
immigration financial support pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1183a. See Order [Doc. No. 24] and
Judgment [Doc. No. 25]. Plaintiff now seeks an award of $12,000 in attorneys’ fees
relating to collection and enforcement efforts against Defendant.
1 Defendant submitted a Response to the Court’s Show Cause Order [Doc. No. 147] regarding
Defendant’s failure to submit an expedited response to the Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees.
In the Response, Defendant stated “a response to the Motion was unnecessary.” [Doc. No. 147] at
2. At the Court’s December 12, 2025 hearing on the Motion, counsel for Defendant stated that
Defendant had no objection to the Motion.
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Plaintiff represents her attorneys’ fees are recoverable by function of 8 U.S.C. §
1183a(c). The statute provides, in relevant part: “[r]emedies available to enforce an
affidavit of support under this section include . . . an order for specific performance and
payment of legal fees and other costs of collection . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(c). “Attorneys’
fees are authorized under § 1183a(c) and are enforceable under federal law.” E.g., Shagoofa
v. Eshaqzi, No. 8:22-cv-1824-FWS-JDE, 2024 WL 1600657, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 26,
2024) (citations omitted); see also, e.g., Mao v. Bright, 645 F. Supp. 3d 805, 814-15 (S.D.
Ohio 2022) (finding the imposition of attorney fees warranted under § 1183a(c)). The
Court finds that awarding attorney fees relating to Plaintiff’s efforts in collection and
enforcement of the Judgment is proper. See Belevich v. Thomas, No. 2:17-CV-1193-AKK,
2022 WL 6502321, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 22, 2022) (“[B]ecause the statute contemplated
the shifting of collection costs . . . the court will include them in the award.”)
Plaintiff’s fee request is supported by the Affidavit of Ambrielle R. Glass [Doc. No.
140-1] and detailed billing records of Blackbox Legal Group [Doc. No. 140-2]. The Court
has reviewed the rates billed by Plaintiff’s counsel, the amount of hours expended on this
litigation by Plaintiff’s counsel, as well as the tasks performed by Plaintiff’s counsel.
The “determination of reasonableness and amount of the fee award is generally left
to the sound discretion of the district court.” Gamble, Simmons & Co. v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 175 F.3d 762, 773 (10th Cir. 1999). Upon review and for the reasons addressed in
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the Motion, the Court finds the hourly rates, time spent on particular tasks, and the amount
requested2 are reasonable.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff Etti Biton’s Motion for Award of
Attorneys’ Fees [Doc. No. 140] is GRANTED in part.3 Plaintiff is awarded attorneys’ fees
in the amount of $12,000.00. An amended judgment will be entered contemporaneously
with this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 17th day of December, 2025.
2 The Court notes Plaintiff seeks an attorneys’ fees award of $12,000, rather than the incurred
attorney expenses of $23,456.77. [Doc. No. 140].
3 Ambrielle Glass’s request for the award of attorney fees to be paid directly to BlackBox Legal
Group, instead of Plaintiff, is DENIED. Ms. Glass cites no authority for the request, and the
Court finds that the statute controls “‘what the losing defendant must pay, not what the
prevailing plaintiff must pay [her] lawyer,’ and [the statute] does not govern fee arrangements
between clients and their counsel.” E.g., Busby v. City of Tulsa, No. 11-CV-447-JED-JFJ, 2019
WL 13298882, at *1 (N. D. Okla. Apr. 5, 2019) (quoting Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 89-
90 (1990)).
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