Neal v. Oklahoma County Criminal Justice Authority et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
LAURA NEAL, as Special )
Administratrix )
of the Estate of PARKER )
STEPHENS, deceased, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. CIV-23-114-PRW
)
OKLAHOMA COUNTY CRIMINAL )
JUSTICE AUTHORITY, )
et al., )
)
Defendants. )
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Laura Neal, represented by counsel, and on behalf of the Estate of Parker
Stephens, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging various civil rights violations.
(ECF No. 1). United States District Judge Patrick R. Wyrick has referred this matter to the
undersigned magistrate judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(B)-(C). Defendants Oklahoma County Criminal Justice Authority (OCCJA),
Board of County Commissioners for Oklahoma County (The Board), Matthew Francis, and
William Cunningham (collectively Defendants) have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
and Brief in Support, Plaintiff has responded, and Defendants have replied. (ECF Nos. 53,
66, & 69).1 For the reasons set forth herein, the Court should GRANT IN PART AND
DENY PART Defendants’ Motion, as discussed below.
1 On February 1, 2024, the Clerk of Court entered default against Defendant Hamilton.
See ECF
No. 25.
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I. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
Parker Stephens was booked into the Oklahoma County Jail in early 2020. (ECF
No. 1:4). Mr. Stephens’ medical chart stated that he suffered from serious mental health
conditions, including anxiety disorder, psychosis, affective disorder, and alcohol and drug
dependency. (ECF No. 1:4). For these issues, Mr. Stephens was prescribed anti-
depressant and anti-psychotic medication. (ECF No. 1:4). At various times during Mr.
Stephens’ stay at the Jail, he was placed on suicide watch and/or housed in the Jail’s
mental health unit. (ECF No. 1:4). During a January 11, 2021, interview with a state-
appointed psychologist, Mr. Stephens reported that he had previously attempted suicide
four times and had been hospitalized in 2019 after one attempt. (ECF No. 1:4). Mr.
Stephens also told the psychologist that the Jail had placed him on suicide watch once in
July 2020. (ECF No. 1:4).
On February 2, 2021, Mr. Stephens was housed on the second floor of the Jail, in
general population, in cell C36, with an inmate named Ismael Ruiz. (ECF No. 1:5). At
approximately 8:07 p.m. that evening, Inmate Ruiz observed Mr. Stephens in his bunk
having what he, Mr. Ruiz, believed to be a seizure, as Mr. Stephens was shaking
uncontrollably and had a white substance around or coming out of his mouth. (ECF No.
1:5). Ruiz used the emergency phone in the cell to call the Jail’s dispatcher in “Camera
Ops”/master control and the call was picked up by Defendant Cunningham. (ECF No.
1:5). Mr. Ruiz told Defendant Cunningham that he thought Mr. Stephens was having a
seizure and provided his cell number. (ECF No. 1:5). Defendant Cunningham radioed the
second-floor detention officer, Officer Hamilton, and notified him of the medical
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emergency in cell C36. (ECF No. 1:5). Despite the report, Officer Hamilton did not go to
check on Mr. Stephens. (ECF No. 1:5). After three (3) minutes passed without anyone
coming to check on Mr. Stephens, Inmate Ruiz called again and spoke to Defendant
Cunningham, who told Mr. Ruiz that he, Officer Cunningham, had reported the emergency
and that “they know.” (ECF No. 1:5). According to Ms. Neal, Defendant Cunningham took
no further action and Officer Hamilton never checked on Mr. Stephens. (ECF No. 1:6).
Around 5:00 a.m. the following morning, February 3, 2021, a jail trustee delivering
breakfast trays noticed that “Mr. Stephens’ leg was hanging off the bunk in an odd
position. Mr. Stephens was not moving or responding.” (ECF No. 1:6). The jail trustee
reported this to Officer Hamilton and asked him to check on Mr. Stephens. (ECF No. 1:6).
According to the Complaint, Officer Hamilton did not check on Mr. Stephens, but instead
stated “Oh, he’s alright.” (ECF No. 1:6). During “med pass” approximately 3 hours later,
Corporal Francis called for a nurse and gurney after finding Mr. Stephens not breathing
or moving. (ECF No. 1:6). LPN “Kali” responded to the call and, upon finding Mr. Stephens
without a pulse, told officers to secure the cell as a crime scene. (ECF No. 1:6). Following
a “limited” autopsy, the Medical Examiner ruled Mr. Stephens’ death a suicide with the
probable cause of death being “ligature asphyxiation.” (ECF No. 1:6).
Ms. Neal, on behalf of the Estate of Mr. Stephens, has alleged individual liability
against Officers Francis, Hamilton, and Cunningham, based on allegations that these
Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Mr. Stephens by failing to protect him from
serious bodily harm by failing to ensure that he received timely medical care when placed
on notice that he was in need of the same based on the calls from Mr. Ruiz. (ECF No.
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1:19-20). Plaintiff has also alleged municipal liability against Defendants OCCJA and the
Board, arguing liability based on the actions of the aforementioned individual officers, as
well as under a theory of systemic liability. (ECF No. 1:20-21).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW—MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue exists if “there is sufficient evidence favoring the
nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.”
See Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986) (citation omitted). Evidence that is “merely
colorable” or “not significantly probative” will not defeat a motion for summary judgment.
Id. at 249–50 (citation omitted). A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the
suit under the governing law.”
Id. at 248.
The moving party bears the initial burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Trainor v. Apollo Metal Specialties, Inc.,
318 F.3d 976, 979 (10th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Once the movant has met his initial
burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to “set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Courts may only consider
admissible evidence in reviewing summary judgment, but the evidence need not be
submitted “in a form that would be admissible at trial.”
Brown v. Perez, 835 F.3d 1223,
1232 (10th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Trevizo v. Adams, 455
F.3d 1155, 1160 (10th Cir. 2006)). Rather, the proponent must show that the evidence
is capable of presentation in an admissible form.
Id. (citations omitted). Courts must view
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all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
III. STANDING
In their first proposition, The Board has argued that Ms. Neal lacks Article III
standing to sue it for monetary damages because she cannot show that any custom or
policy of The Board constituted deliberate indifference to Mr. Stephens. (ECF No. 53:18-
21). The Board’s position is that the day-to-day operations of the jail have been delegated
to the Sherrif, and, in turn to the OCCJA. (ECF No. 53:18-21). According to the Board:
[It] has no statutory authority to act in jail operations, and without legal
authority act in jail operations, there is no way that the BOCC could have
engaged in unlawful conduct. Stated another way, without the authority to
act in jail operations, it is impossible for Neal to identify any illegal conduct
by the BOCC that caused Parker’s suicide. This is fatal to Article III standing
with respect to Neal’s claims against the BOCC.
(ECF No. 53:21).
The Court should find that The Board’s standing argument conflates the
justiciability of a plaintiff’s lawsuit with a plaintiff’s ultimate ability to prove a defendant’s
liability in that lawsuit, and this type of standing argument has been rejected by this
Court.
See Woodson v. Board of Cnty. Commissioners of Oklahoma Cnty., No. CIV-24-
681-JD, 2025 WL 2429686, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 14, 2025) (“While couched in terms
of subject matter jurisdiction, [the Oklahoma County Board of County Commissioners’]
argument [that the plaintiff lacks Article III standing to sue], in reality, is premised on
the notion that [the plaintiff] has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
because [the Oklahoma County Board of County Commissioners] has no authority to act
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in areas of detaining or releasing inmates.”) (citation omitted),	
adopted, 2025 WL
1834185;
Pendleton v. Board of Cnty. Commissioners for Oklahoma Cnty., No. CIV-18-
707-G, 2019 WL 4752269, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 30, 2019) (same);
Thurman v. Cty.
Comm'rs of Okla. Cty., No. CIV-17-950-M, 2018 WL 6237908, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 16,
2018) (same),
adopted, 2018 WL 6220213 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 28, 2018). The Court here
should adopt likewise reasoning and reject this argument.
IV. MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
It is well established “
Monell allows plaintiffs to sue local governing bodies (or their
functional equivalents) directly under § 1983 for constitutional violations pursuant to a
body’s policy, practice, or custom.”
Est. of Burgaz v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs for Jefferson
Cnty., 30 F.4th 1181, 1189 (10th Cir. 2022). To establish municipal liability, a plaintiff
must show: (1) the existence of a policy or custom, (2) a direct causal link between the
policy or custom and a constitutional injury, and (3) that the municipality acted with
deliberate indifference.
Prince v. Sheriff of Carter Cnty., 28 F.4th 1033, 1048-51 (10th
Cir. 2022). “A core principle of
Monell liability is that municipal entities are liable for only
their own actions and not vicariously liable for the actions of their employees.”
Crowson
v. Washington County, 983 F.3d 1166, 1191 (10th Cir. 2020). But “[b]ecause
municipalities act through officers, ordinarily there will be a municipal violation only where
an individual officer commits a constitutional violation.”
Id. So municipal liability arises
when an individual defendant violates an inmate’s rights while aligning with an official
municipal policy or custom.
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There is also a “limited exception to the requirement of individual unconstitutional
action.”
Buchanan v. Turn Key Health Clinics, LLC, 2023 WL 6997404, at *7 (10th Cir.
2023) (quotations omitted). “[W]hen a municipal-liability claim is premised on the
municipality’s ‘systemic failure[s],’ no single individual defendant need be found liable.
Rather, ‘the combined acts or omissions of several employees acting under a
governmental policy or custom may violate an individual’s constitutional rights.’ ”
Johnson
v. Davis County, 2022 WL 830202, at *3 (10th Cir. 2022) (quoting
Crowson, 983 F.3d at
1186).
As stated, Plaintiff has alleged municipal liability against The Board and the OCCJA
(Municipal Defendants), arguing liability based on the actions of the aforementioned
individual officers, as well as under a theory of systemic liability involving gross
deficiencies in staffing and jail procedures which resulted in Mr. Stephens’ death. (ECF
No. 1:20-21). The Municipal Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot establish the
“stringent requirements” required for municipal liability. (ECF No. 53:21-34). These
Defendants are wrong.
A. Policy
As discussed, “[a] municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a
respondeat
superior theory.”
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Instead, “the
government as an entity” may only be held liable “when execution of a government’s
policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may
fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.”
Id. at 694. A “municipal policy
or custom,” in turn, may take one of the following forms:
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(1) a formal regulation or policy statement; (2) an informal custom
amounting to a widespread practice that, although not authorized by
written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as
to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law; (3) the decisions of
employees with final policymaking authority; (4) the ratification by such
final policymakers of the decisions—and the basis for them—of subordinates
to whom authority was delegated subject to these policymakers’ review and
approval; or (5) the failure to adequately train or supervise employees, so
long as that failure results from deliberate indifference to the injuries that
may be caused.
Waller v. City and Cnty. of Denver, 932 F.3d 1277, 1283–84 (10th Cir. 2019) (citation
omitted). Both The Board and the OCCJA have argued a lack of policy but the Court
should find otherwise.
1. The Board
In arguing a lack of policy, The Board states: (1) Ms. Neal “lacks sufficient evidence
. . . that an employee of the County caused a violation of Parker’s right to adequate
medical care or to be protected from harm” and (2) any violation of Mr. Parker’s
constitutional rights was not attributable to an official policy/custom of the Board. (ECF
No. 53:29). According to The Board, “it is impossible for Neal to hold the BOCC liable
because the OCCJA is a legally separate entity over which the BOCC has no control over
its employees or policies.” (ECF No. 53:29). The Board supports this claim by citing Okla.
Stat. tit. 60 § 176.1 (stating that “the affairs of the public trust shall be separate and
independent from the affairs of the beneficiary in all matters or activities authorized by
the written instrument creating such public trust including, but not limited to, the public
trust’s budget, expenditures, revenues and general operation and management of its
facilities or functions….”); Okla. Stat. tit. 51, §152(11)(d) (defining a public trust as a
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separate political subdivision of the state); and Okla. Stat. tit. 19 § 513.2(B) (providing
that statutory obligations transfer to jail trust).
See ECF No. 53:29-30. But this Court has
rejected this argument previously, stating: (1) Section 176.1 does not prevent liability
against The Board because “Oklahoma law requires that the Board be named ‘[i]n all
suits or proceedings by or against a county[.]’ ” and (2) Section 513.2(B) “speaks to
duties, not liability, and does not negate the statutory provision regarding naming the
Board.”
Neal v. Oklahoma Cnty. Criminal Justice Authority, No. CIV-24-575-JD, 2025 WL
1104777, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 5, 2025),
adopted, 2025 WL 1104777, at *3 (W.D. Okla.
Mar. 27, 2025);
see also Bonilla v. Gerlach, No. CIV 23-1060-R, 2024 WL 457172, at *3
(W.D. Okla. Feb. 6, 2024) (denying motion to dismiss in part because “these statutes do
not necessarily relieve the sheriff of his own statutorily imposed duties and liabilities with
respect to the operation of a county jail”).
Essentially, The Board’s argument on “lack of policy” boils down to nothing more
than an attempt by the Board to escape liability based on the mere existence of the
OCCJA. But this argument amounts to nothing more than “finger-pointing,” and has been
rejected by this Court.
See Bond v. Okla. Cnty. Crim. Just. Auth., No. CIV-23-05-D, 2023
WL 2878772, at *2 n.1 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 10, 2023) (“This mutual finger-pointing further
suggests that it would be inappropriate at this stage to rule as a matter of law that the
OCCJA is not a proper defendant.”).
2. The OCCJA
The OCCJA argues that Ms. Neal’s reliance on “inadequate staffing and inadequate
supervision of inmates” (as it pertains to Plaintiff’s theory of systemic liability) is
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insufficient to establish policy in support of municipal liability on behalf of the Jail Trust.
(ECF No. 53:30-33). Citing a case from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the OCCJA
argues that “ ‘
continued adherence to an approach that they know or should know has
failed to prevent tortious conduct by employees may establish the conscious disregard
for the consequences of their action--the ‘deliberate indifference’--necessary to trigger
municipal liability.’ ” (ECF No. 53:30) (emphasis added). But here, the OCCJA goes on to
argue, the undisputed evidence proves that “the OCCJA and the jail administration
recognized the problem, repeatedly tried to hire and retain more detention staff, and
engaged in extensive and reasonable efforts to remedy the issue and to achieve higher
levels of staffing.” (ECF No. 53:31). In support, the OCCJA: (1) submits an affidavit from
Greg Williams, former Jail Administrator between July 2020 and January 2023, which
outlined his efforts to improve staffing during his tenure, and (2) asks the Court to take
judicial notice of nationwide reduced staffing issues in 2020-2021 in response to the
global pandemic. (ECF No. 53:31-32).
Two issues exist with the OCCJA’s argument. First, it has nothing to do with policy,
but instead directly implicates the third element of municipal liability—deliberate
indifference. As noted by this Court previously, “without making any substantive
argument regarding an official policy or custom of the OCCJA, Defendants appear to have
conceded the issue as to the OCCJA.”
Bond v. Oklahoma Cnty. Criminal Justice Authority,
2025 WL 781101, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 11, 2025).
Second, in support of its theory of systemic liability against the Municipal
Defendants, Plaintiff
has set forth evidence that severe understaffing at the Jail was a
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longstanding and pervasive problem, known to the OCCJA and Jail staff, including, but
not limited to:
• A 2008 report from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) on the conditions of
confinement at the Jail, which found high levels of inadequate supervision and
staffing at the Jail, overcrowding and a high rate of inmate assaults and deaths.
See ECF No. 66-16:4-6, 9, 11, 20-23.
• A 2010 Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) entered into between Oklahoma
County and the DOJ which instructed Oklahoma County to adequately fund and
staff the jail by 2014, or face court action from the federal government to force
compliance.
See ECF No. 66-17.
• Deposition testimony from former jail employees discussing the fact that staff
retention had been a continual problem at the Jail since at least 2004 and grew
worse after the Jail Trust took over.
See ECF No. 66-19:2-7.
• Deposition testimony from jail employees to the effect that beginning in
approximately April of 2020, “60 percent of the time” “one to two officers covered
a floor” despite the fact that the Jail’s staffing plan required five-six officers
assigned to each floor.
See ECF Nos. 16-5:2, 9-12; 16-21:2-3, 5.
• Information in a report from the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation (OSBI)
regarding an interview with Tiffany Carter, a former Captain at the Jail who stated
that in 2020, the Jail’s staffing level was “dangerous,” requiring her to take on
additional duties while ignoring others.
See ECF No. 63-23:3.
• Information in a report from the OSBI regarding an interview with Lieutenant
Yolanda Doroteo who stated that the Jail was “very short staffed” and “Jail staffing
was not adequate to operate properly.” (ECF No. 66-24:1).
• Information in a report from the OSBI regarding an interview with detention officer
Kaleb Landes that “[t]he jail staffing levels were so bad that detention officers
were missing basic things” and “Half the time, officers heard about altercations in
cells, but there were no officers available to respond.” (ECF No. 66-20:1). Mr.
Landes also stated that The Jail’s policy was for officers to respond to calls from
camera operations within two minutes of receiving the call, but in December 2020
and January 2021, the two-minute response policy was regularly not followed “due
to the Jail Trust’s administration of the Jail and the high turnover of jail staff.”
Id.
• A February 2021 report from the Oklahoma State Department of Health’s (OSDH)
Jail Inspection Division (JID) which outlined findings from its annual inspection and
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investigation of the Jail. This inspection included the review of records and
materials going back to June of 2020 and conclusions that the OCCJA repeatedly
failed to: (A) conduct and document visual sight checks as required by policy; (B)
provide a working intercommunication system, allowing for an emergency
response; and (C) “ensure sufficient staffing to perform all assigned functions
relating to security, custody and supervision of inmates.” (ECF No. 66-26:20-10).
• A report outlining a follow-up inspection in June of 2021, wherein the JID found
numerous repeat deficiencies, including inadequate staffing and supervision.
See
ECF No. 66-27.
• A Multicounty Grand Jury Report which found that, as of March 23, 2023, “37
inmates ha[d] died or became ill and died in the jail since July 1, 2020.” (ECF No.
66-18:8). The Grand Jury determined that one of the “major issues” leading to
inmate deaths at the Jail is “the failure of detention officers to conduct proper site
checks…” and “inadequate staffing, funding, surveillance, and training, coupled
with poor law enforcement protocols, led to the significant loss of life within the
jail.” (ECF No. 66-18:9).
Viewing the facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,
the Court should find that a reasonable jury could conclude that the OCCJA maintained
an official policy or custom of understaffing the Jail and failing to monitor inmates
sufficient for municipal liability.
B. Causation
Turning to the second element of municipal liability, The Board and the OCCJA
argue “Neal must produce evidence that the municipal action was the moving force
behind Parker’s death.” (ECF No. 53:33). The municipal Defendants then present a
somewhat cursory argument, stating: “Neal has failed to offer evidence that the OCCJA
displayed a consistent and systemic failure to maintain proper staffing and supervision
practices or that understaffing, supervision, training, or funding, was maintained with
deliberate indifference to known and obvious consequences. Therefore, the municipal
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Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.” (ECF No. 53:34). Plaintiff attributes the
death of Mr. Stephens, in part, under a theory of systemic liability which concerns jail
understaffing and a failure to properly monitor inmates.
See ECF No. 1:20-21. Based on
the plethora of evidence submitted by Plaintiff in support of this theory and previously
discussed, the Court should reject this argument and find that the Municipal Defendants
have presented sufficient evidence to establish causation under
Monell.
C. Deliberate Indifference
Deliberate indifference in the municipal liability context “may be satisfied when the
[defendant] has actual or constructive notice that its action or failure to act is substantially
certain to result in a constitutional violation, and it consciously or deliberately chooses to
disregard the risk of harm.”
Layton v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Okla. Cnty., 512 F. App’x
861, 871 (10th Cir. 2013);
Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1307 (10th Cir. 1998) (“In
the municipal liability context, deliberate indifference is an objective standard which is
satisfied if the risk is so obvious that the official should have known of it.”). While notice
is typically established “by proving the existence of a pattern of tortious conduct,”
deliberate indifference may also be found “absent a pattern of unconstitutional behavior
if a violation of federal rights is a highly predictable or plainly obvious consequence of a
municipality's action or inaction[.]”
Barney, 143 F.3d at 1307-08 (quotation marks and
citation omitted).
Here, the municipal Defendants argue a lack of deliberate indifference, arguing
that Plaintiff has failed to identify any jail staff who were aware that Mr. Parker suffered
from serious mental health conditions and was suicidal. (ECF No. 53:22-28). According
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to these Defendants, “Plaintiff has no evidence that prior to Parker’s suicide any jail
employee was subjectively aware that Parker faced an immediate suicide risk and ignored
that risk. Because ‘[n]o constitutional violation occurs unless medical care is intentionally
or recklessly denied,’ the Municipal Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.” (ECF
No. 53:28).
Mr. Stephens’ death was ruled a suicide with the probable cause of death being
“ligature asphyxiation.” (ECF No. 1:6). However, in the Complaint, Ms. Neal has alleged:
(1) individual liability against Officers Francis, Hamilton, and Cunningham, based on
allegations that these Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Mr. Stephens by failing
to protect him from serious bodily harm by failing to ensure that he received timely
medical care when placed on notice that he was in need of the same based on the calls
from Mr. Ruiz and (2) municipal liability against Defendants OCCJA and the Board, arguing
liability based on the actions of the aforementioned individual officers, as well as under a
theory of systemic liability. (ECF No. 1:19-21). In evaluating the issue of municipal liability
for The Board and the OCCJA based on the individual officers’ actions, the issue is not
whether the individual officers were aware of and disregarded a risk of suicide by Mr.
Parker, but instead, whether the individual officers were aware of and disregarded a need
for medical care. And under the systemic liability theory, the issue is whether the
“combined acts or omissions of several employees acting under a governmental policy or
custom may violate an individual’s constitutional rights.”
See supra,
Johnson v. Davis
County.
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Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to this effect which creates a dispute
of material facts on these issues, including, but not limited to:
• Deposition testimony from Defendant Hamilton, who stated he was assigned as a
“rover” who had to cover several floors, was the only officer assigned to the
Second Floor of the Jail on the night of February 2, 2021.
See ECF No. 66-5:2-3,
9.
• Deposition testimony from Plaintiff’s cellmate, Mr. Ruiz, who stated that on the
evening of February 2, 2021, he witnessed Mr. Stephens in his bunk having some
sort of medical emergency wherein he witnessed Mr. Stephens coughing and
vomiting with foam coming out of his mouth.
See ECF No. 66-3:3-4.
• A report from the OCCJA Special Investigations Unit (the SIU Report) which found
that Mr. Ruiz, concerned for Mr. Stephens’ life, used the emergency phone in the
cell to call the Jail’s dispatcher in “Camera Ops”.
See ECF Nos. 66-2:22, 66-3:4.
The report also showed that the dispatcher, Officer Cunningham, answered the
call and Ruiz stated: “I think my cellie’s been through a seizure right now.” (ECF
No. 66-2:22). Officer Cunningham then asked what cell, and Mr. Ruiz advised the
cell was 2 C36.
Id.
• Information in the SIU Report which found that after receiving the call from Inmate
Ruiz, Defendant Cunningham radioed the rover assigned to the Second Floor,
Officer Hamilton, and notified him of the medical emergency in cell C36.
See ECF
No. 66-2:2.
• Information in the SIU Report and testimony from Mr. Ruiz found that Officer
Hamilton never went to C-pod to check on Mr. Stephens.
See ECF No. 66-2:2; 66-
3:4.
• Information in the SIU Report, along with deposition testimony from Officer
Cunningham and Mr. Ruiz which establishes that three (3) minutes passed without
anyone coming to check on Mr. Stephens, prompting Mr. Ruiz called Camera Ops
a second time, advising dispatch: “My cellie man, he’s not okay.” 66-2:2, 22, 66-
8:2-5.
• Information in the SIU Report and deposition testimony from Defendant
Cunningham which reflects Defendant Cunningham’s receipt of the second call
from Inmate Ruiz without any further attempt to recontact Defendant Hamilton or
otherwise summon medical assistance.
See ECF No. 66-2:22; 66-8:4.
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• Deposition testimony from Mr. Ruiz and Information in the SIU Report which
confirmed that Officer Hamilton never went to check on Mr. Stephens the night of
February 2, 2021 and approximately 1-2 minutes after the second call, Mr.
Stephens stopped making noise.
See ECF No. 66-2:2,12; 66-3:4.
• The aforementioned evidence related to understaffing which led to lack of
supervision of inmates.
See supra.
Viewing the facts and the inferences in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the
Court should find that a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendants Cunningham and
Hamilton were aware of and disregarded specific knowledge that Mr. Stephens was in
dire need of medical care. Defendants argue that “according to the medical examiner,
[Mr. Stephens] would have been brain dead in approximately four minutes[;] therefore,
even if Defendant Hamilton had responded immediately to Parker’s cell, there is no
evidence that the outcome would have changed, and Neal has nothing, but speculation,
to refute this conclusion.” (ECF No. 53:27) (citation omitted). But Plaintiff has presented
evidence that Jail policy was for officers to respond to calls from camera operations within
two minutes of receiving the call, and in December 2020 and January 2021, the two-
minute response policy was regularly not followed.
See supra; ECF No. 66-20:1. Perhaps
if policy had been followed, a different outcome would have occurred. Even so,
Defendants’ position is purely speculative and evades the issue of deliberate indifference
which clearly existed in this case and can be, at this stage, at least disputed based on
evidence from Plaintiff that Defendant Hamilton essentially ignored the call to respond to
the medical emergency in Mr. Stephens’ cell and Defendant Cunningham essentially
ignored.
See supra.
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Furthermore, regarding Plaintiff’s theory of “systemic liability,” as directed at the
municipal Defendants, significant evidence exists from which a jury could conclude that
“a violation of [an inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights] is a plainly obvious consequence
of the purported customs of severely understaffing the Jail, failure to monitor inmates,
and failure to respond to inmate distress calls; and that the OCCJA was deliberately
indifferent to conditions at the Jail.”
Bond v. Oklahoma Cnty. Criminal Justice Authority,
at *7.
See supra, Section IV(A)(2).
D. Summary
In sum, the Court should find that based on the evidence of a municipal policy or
custom, a causal connection, and deliberate indifference, the Court should find that the
Municipal Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on either Plaintiff’s theory
of individual liability based on conduct committed by the individual officer defendants or
under a theory of systemic liability.
V. INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY OF OFFICERS CUNNINGHAM AND FRANCIS
Defendants Cunningham and Francis argue they are entitled to summary judgment
based on a lack of evidence which would establish that either of these Defendants
exhibited deliberate indifference to Mr. Parker in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (ECF
No. 53:34-36). The Court should agree, but only as to Defendant Francis.
A. Defendant Cunningham
Defendant Cunningham argues there is no evidence that he had any knowledge
that Mr. Stephens posed a risk of suicide, therefore preventing him from disregarding
said risk. (ECF No. 53:34-35). Defendant Cunningham admits that he “knew [Mr.
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Stephens’] cellmate thought [Mr. Stephens] was having a seizure” and in response, he
“radioed Defendant Hamilton, about a possible medical episode in [Mr. Stephens’ cell].”
(ECF No. 53:35). But according to Defendant Cunningham, “[t]here is no evidence that
[he] was aware that Cpl. Hamilton never checked on Parker.” (ECF No. 53:39).
The problem, however, is that Defendant Cunningham omits any mention of the
second call made by Mr. Stephens’ cellmate, Mr. Ruiz. When Mr. Ruiz called the first time,
Defendant Cunningham took the call and informed Defendant Hamilton of the medical
emergency in Mr. Stephens’ cell. (ECF Nos. 66-2:22; 66-8:2-3). But after three minutes
passed without anyone coming to check on Mr. Stephens, Mr. Ruiz called a second time,
and the call was again answered by Defendant Cunningham. (ECF No. 66-2:2, 22). In his
deposition, Defendant Cunningham admits to taking the second call and affirms that he
told Mr. Ruiz that he had “called” and “[t]hey know” and that he, Defendant Cunningham,
“already told the rover, [Defendant Hamilton].” (ECF No. 66-8:4). Again, Defendant
Cunningham argues a lack of deliberate indifference because “[t]here is no evidence that
[he] was aware that Cpl. Hamilton never checked on Parker.” (ECF No. 53:39). Defendant
Cunningham’s argument fails.
One type of deliberate indifference occurs when prison officials prevent an inmate
from receiving treatment or deny him access to medical personnel capable of evaluating
the need for treatment.
Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1211 (10th Cir. 2000).
Ordinarily, a medical professional will not be liable for this kind of deliberate indifference,
because he is the person who provides the treatment. If, however, an individual “knows
that his role in a particular medical emergency is solely to serve as a gatekeeper for other
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medical personnel capable of treating the condition, and if he delays or refuses to fulfill
that gatekeeper role due to deliberate indifference, it stands to reason that he also may
be liable for deliberate indifference from denying access to medical care.”
Id.
Here, Defendant Cunningham served in a “gatekeeper” role and, after taking the
second call, and hearing Mr. Ruiz say “My cellie man, needs you. He’s not okay,”
Defendant Cunningham told Mr. Ruiz that he had “called” and “[t]hey know” and that he,
Defendant Cunningham, “already told the rover, [Defendant Hamilton].” (ECF No. 66-
8:4). At this point Defendant Cunningham was aware that Defendant Hamilton had not
responded to the first call, but he took no action to call Defendant Hamilton a second
time or to seek additional assistance in responding to the medical emergency. In fact, an
investigator with the OCCJA assigned to the case found that following Mr. Ruiz’ second
call, “the operator [Defendant Cunningham] advises him [Mr. Ruiz] that the call had been
cleared.” (ECF No. 66-2:22). At this stage, a reasonable jury could find both that Mr.
Stephens suffered from a sufficiently serious medical need based on Mr. Ruiz’ call to
Defendant Cunningham, and that after the second call, Defendant Cunningham, acting
as a gatekeeper, consciously disregarded a substantial risk to Mr. Stephens’ health which
ultimately resulted in his death. As a result, the Court should find that Defendant
Cunningham is not entitled to Summary Judgment in his individual capacity.
B. Defendant Francis
In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Francis “was the supervisor
assigned to the Second Floor on the evening of February 2 and morning of February 3,
[and] failed to check on Mr. Stephens’ welfare and failed to assure that Hamilton was
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adequately monitoring the inmates, including [Mr.] Stephens.” (ECF No. 1:9). Plaintiff
further states that Defendant Francis “knew, or should have known, about the medical
emergency alerted by Inmate Ruiz on the night of February 2, but, with deliberate
indifference, disregarded the substantial risks to Mr. Stephens by failing to check on his
welfare, failing to assure tha[t] Hamilton checked on Stephens and failing to notify any
medical personnel.” (ECF No. 1:9).
Defendant Francis argues that he is entitled to summary judgment, stating that:
(1) he worked the day shift on February 2, 2021, (2) was not Defendant Hamilton’s
supervisor, and (3) was not working the night shift with Defendant Hamilton when the
calls came in from Inmate Ruiz. (ECF No. 53:35). Indeed, the SIU Report indicates that
Defendant Francis had worked the day shift on February 2 and February 3, 2021, and
this evidence supports Defendant Francis’ contention that he was not present when the
calls came in from Inmate Ruiz indicating there was a medical emergency in his cell
concerning Mr. Stephens.
See ECF No. 53-7:6-7. Evidence exists that Defendant Francis’
involvement in this matter did not occur until the following day, February 3, 2021, during
morning “med pass” when he discovered Mr. Stephens unresponsive and called for a
nurse and a gurney.
See ECF No. 53-7:6-7; 66-10. Plaintiff did not respond to this
argument and evidence from Defendant Francis.
See ECF No. 66.
Plaintiff has alleged individual liability against Defendant Francis based on
allegations that he was deliberately indifferent to Mr. Stephens by failing to protect him
from serious bodily harm by failing to ensure that he received timely medical care when
placed on notice that he was in need of the same based on the calls from Mr. Ruiz.
See
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ECF No. 1:19-20. But Defendant Francis has presented evidence, which Plaintiff did not
dispute, that he was not even present during the incident.
Based on this evidence, the Court should conclude that Defendant Francis has
demonstrated the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he
exhibited deliberate indifference to Mr. Stephens which contributed to his death and is
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
VI. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Defendant Cunningham argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity on the
individual liability claim against for deliberate indifference to Mr. Stephens’ serious
medical needs. (ECF No. 53:36-37).2 The Court should disagree.
“The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials . . . from liability
for damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”
Buck v. City of
Albuquerque, 549 F.3d 1269, 1277 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Boles v. Neet, 486 F.3d
1177, 1180 (10th Cir. 2007)). “A § 1983 defendant’s assertion of qualified immunity is
an ‘affirmative defense [that] creates a presumption that the defendant is immune from
suit.’ ”
Truman v. Orem City, 1 F.4th 1227, 1235 (10th Cir. 2021) (alteration in original)
(quoting
Est. of Smart by Smart v. City of Wichita, 951 F.3d 1161, 1168 (10th Cir.
2020)). “[A]t summary judgment, [a court] must grant qualified immunity unless the
2 Defendant Francis also argues he is entitled to qualified immunity, but the Court need not
consider this argument based on the recommendation that he is entitled to summary judgment
based on his lack of involvement in the incident involving Mr. Stephens’ death.
See supra.
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plaintiff can show (1) a reasonable jury could find facts supporting a violation of a
constitutional right, which (2) was clearly established at the time of the defendant's
conduct.”
Estate of Booker, 745 F.3d at 411;
see also Gross v. Pirtle, 245 F.3d 1151,
1156 (10th Cir. 2001) (“If the plaintiff fails to satisfy either part of the two-part inquiry,
the court must grant the defendant qualified immunity.”).
Under this framework, the Court must first ask whether Mr. Stephens’
constitutional rights were violated. Jail officials violate an inmate’s constitutional rights
through deliberate indifference whenever they knowingly ignore a “substantial risk of
serious harm” to an inmate.	
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828–29 (1994).
“Deliberate indifference has objective and subjective components.”
Callahan v. Poppell,
471 F.3d 1155, 1159 (10th Cir. 2006). To meet the objective component, the harm
suffered must be “sufficiently serious” to implicate the Eighth Amendment. Under the
subjective component, “the [inmate] must show that the defendants knew he faced a
substantial risk of harm and disregarded that risk, by failing to take reasonable measures
to abate it.”
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here, evidence exists that Mr. Stephens was suffering a medical emergency, which
Mr. Ruiz described as a seizure, which would be considered “sufficiently serious” to
satisfy the objective component under the Eighth Amendment.
See supra. Regarding
the subjective component, i.e., whether Defendant Cunningham exhibited deliberate
indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs, the record contains evidence that
Defendant Cunningham was aware of the medical emergency concerning Mr. Stephens
based on his receipt of Mr. Ruiz’ repeated calls and effectively ignored the second call
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from Mr. Ruiz by failing to take further action.
See supra.
In
Hardy v. Rabie, 147 F.4th 1156 (10th Cir. 2025) the Tenth Circuit held that jail
staff were not entitled to qualified immunity where a detainee repeatedly called for
assistance after falling from his wheelchair and officers allegedly ignored emergency
requests for help.
Id. at 1165-167. The court emphasized that deliberate indifference
may be inferred when an officer is aware of obvious signs of serious medical distress
and fails to act.
Id. Like the plaintiff in
Hardy, Plaintiff here has presented evidence that
Defendant Cunningham was confronted with clear indications of a serious medical need
and chose not to respond. Under
Hardy, such conduct—if proven—permits a finding of
deliberate indifference. At this stage, however, the Court should find that evidence exists
which would create a dispute of material fact as to whether Mr. Stephens’ constitutional
rights were violated.
Next, the Court must consider whether these rights were clearly established. To
overcome qualified immunity, a right must be clearly established such that “a reasonable
official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”
Truman v. Orem
City, 1 F.4th 1227, 1235 (10th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). “A right is clearly established
when a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision is on point, or if the clearly established
weight of authority from other courts shows that the right must be as the plaintiff
maintains.”
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, a court need
not find “precisely the same facts, and a prior case need not be exactly parallel to the
conduct here for the officials to have been on notice of clearly established law.”
Id.
(citation omitted). Instead, the Court must determine whether “courts have previously
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ruled that materially similar conduct was unconstitutional, or if ‘a general constitutional
rule already identified in the decisional law [applies] with obvious clarity to the specific
conduct’ at issue.”
Buck, 549 F.3d at 1290 (alteration in original) (quoting
United States
v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997)).
Here, the Court should find that Defendant Cunningham’s actions in failing to
respond to the second call from Inmate Ruiz to effectuate some sort of medical attention
to Mr. Stephens is “clearly established.”
See supra,
Hardy v. Rabie;
Lance v. Morris, 985
F.3d 787, 797-798 (10th Cir. 2021) (denying qualified immunity to defendant who
ignored inmate’s call to him at the “control tower” complaining of a persistent erection
accompanied by considerable pain and requesting medical help);
Quintana v. Santa Fe
Cnty. Bd. of Commissioners, 973 F.3d 1022, 1033 (10th Cir. 2020) (Even when inmates
do not request medical attention, it is “clearly established that when a detainee has
obvious and serious medical needs, ignoring those needs necessarily violates the
detainee’s constitutional rights.”);
Burke v. Regalado, 935 F.3d 960, 994 (10th Cir. 2019)
(denying qualified immunity for jail officials who left plaintiff immobile in his cell and
failed to render medical aid after plaintiff told them he was paralyzed).
Based on the foregoing, the Court should find that the right complained of was
“clearly established” and Defendant Cunningham is not entitled to qualified immunity.
VII. RECOMMENDATION AND NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
For the reasons discussed, the undersigned recommends the Court GRANT
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 53) but only as to Defendant
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Francis. The Court should DENY summary judgment to the remaining Defendants—The
Board, the OCCJA, and Defendant Cunningham.
The parties are advised of their right to file an objection to this Report and
Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by March 16, 2026, in accordance with
28 U.S.C. § 636 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. The parties are further advised
that failure to make timely objection to this Report and Recommendation waives the
right to appellate review of both factual and legal issues contained herein.
Casanova v.
Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 1123 (10th Cir. 2010).
VIII. STATUS OF REFERRAL
This Report and Recommendation terminates the referral by the District Judge in
this matter.
ENTERED on February 27, 2026.
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