Grant v. Heo et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION (DAYTON)
PATRICIA A. GRANT, PH.D.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
RICHARD W. HEO, PRESIDENT/CEO,
GULF ISLAND FABRICATION, INC.,
et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 3:25-cv-00392
District Judge Michael J. Newman
Magistrate Judge Caroline H. Gentry
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
TO DENY IN FORMA PAUPERIS STATUS
Plaintiff Patricia Grant recently submitted two pro se civil complaints to the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. The complaints instituted
two actions:
1. 	Grant v. Grant Seabron, S.D. Ohio Case No. 3:25-cv-391, and
2. 	Grant v. Heo, Case No. S.D. Ohio Case No. 3:25-cv-392.
The cases appear to concern two parcels of real property located in Texas, and both name
Texas citizens as defendants. Both cases are pending on the docket of District Judge
Michael J. Newman. Certain matters have been referred to the undersigned Magistrate
Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and the Court’s Amended General Order No. DAY
21-01.
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Currently pending before the Court in this case, Case No. 3:25-cv-392, is
Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) and without prepaying the
fees to file the case. (Doc. No. 1.) For the reasons explained below, the undersigned
Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the Court DENY the Application.
Plaintiff states in her Application that she is not employed. (Doc. No. 1 at PageID
2.) She reports receiving “Veteran Administration Disability” and “Social Security
Disability” funds over the past year of $61,971.60, or $5,164.30 per month. (Id.; see also
PageID 7-8 [identifying monthly benefit amounts].) She does not have any dependents.
(Id. at PageID 2.)
Plaintiff reports several monthly expenses, which together do not exceed her
monthly income. (Id. at PageID 3.) Specifically, Plaintiff’s reported monthly expenses
total $4,759.77. (Id.) Her reported monthly income totals $5,164.30 (Id. at PageID 2),
leaving $404.53 available per month. While Plaintiff asserts that her monthly expenses
entirely consume her monthly income (Id. at PageID 4), her Application does not
substantiate that statement.
In addition, Plaintiff appears to have assets, including a home and a vehicle. (Id. at
PageID 3.) She reports that she pays a mortgage and vehicle loan payment, but she does
not disclose her home or vehicle as assets. (Id. at PageID 2.) Plaintiff does report that she
owns “Inherited Land” with an estimated market value of $70,000; this refers to one of
two parcels of real estate in Texas, which was “awarded to [her] by a Texas court.” (Id. at
PageID 3, 4.) The value of the second Texas parcel is “[u]nknown.” (Id. at PageID 4.)
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Plaintiff asserts that these two parcels are “not liquid.” (Id.) The value of, and Plaintiff’s
equity in, her home and vehicle are also unknown.1
“Anyone who files a lawsuit in federal court presumptively must pay a filing fee.”
Crump v. Blue, 121 F.4th 1108, 1110 (6th Cir. 2024) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)). The
total fee amount is $405, which consists of a $350 filing fee and a $55 administrative fee.
However, a plaintiff “who cannot pay the fee may ask to proceed ‘in forma pauperis,’ a
status that allows the litigant to pay the fee over time or sometimes not at all.” Id. (citing
§ 1915(a)-(b)).
“Proceeding in forma pauperis is a privilege and not a right.” Ohio v. Ealy, No.
1:09-cv-245, 2009 WL 1118704, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 24, 2009) (citing Wilson v.
Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 603 (6th Cir. 1998)). A litigant need not be absolutely destitute to
be allowed to proceed in forma pauperis. See Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,
335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948). But an applicant must show that “because of his [or her]
poverty,” they cannot pay the fee and continue to afford the necessities of life. Id.
Additionally, “[a] plaintiff seeking in forma pauperis standing must respond fully to the
questions on the Court’s in forma pauperis form.” West v. AFSCME Bldg. Corp., No.
2:22-cv-2235, 2022 WL 18142399, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 14, 2022).
Whether to grant IFP status is within the Court’s discretion, and the burden of
convincing the Court is on the applicant. Dotson v. Colvin, No. 7:16-cv-198, 2016 U.S.
1 Public records reflect that Plaintiff purchased her home in Kettering in 2022 for $232,310. See
Montgomery County Auditor, https://www.mcrealestate.org/search/commonsearch.aspx?mode=address
(last visited January 15, 2026).
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Dist. LEXIS 205449, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 7, 2016). Courts “generally consider an
applicant’s employment, annual income and expenses, and any other property or assets
the individual possesses” when considering an IFP application. Crochran Through
Shields v. Columbus City Sch., No. 2:15-cv-632, 2017 WL 11634750, at *1 (S.D. Ohio
Nov. 20, 2017). However:
Courts have routinely denied in forma pauperis status to litigants who have
significant income and assets such as a home and vehicles, even if it would
require some financial sacrifice in order for the applicant to pay the filing
fee. . . . In forma pauperis status is usually reserved either for indigent
prisoners or for persons who subsist on small fixed-income payments such
as social security, unemployment compensation, or public assistance and
who would truly be required to forego food, shelter, clothing, or some other
necessity were they to devote any of their scant resources to paying a
judicial filing fee.
Bush v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Correction, No. 2:05-cv-667, 2007 WL 4365381, at *1
(S.D. Ohio Dec. 10, 2007).
Here, Plaintiff has assets, including a home, two other parcels of real estate, and a
vehicle. (Doc. No. 1 at PageID 3-4.) She has only provided an estimate of the value of
one asset and has not adequately explained why the assets she did disclose are not liquid.
Further, although she has a “fixed income” from two sources, it is not insignificant.2
(Doc. No. 1 at PageID 2-3.) Cf. Thompson v. Fuyao Glass Am., No. 3:25-cv-259, 2025
2 Plaintiff’s annual income of $61,971.60 exceeds the 2025 federal poverty guideline for a one-person
household of $15,650. See https://aspe.hhs.gov/topics/poverty-economic-mobility/poverty-guidelines (last
visited January 13, 2026). “Although not the applicable standard for determining entitlement to IFP
status, [the federal poverty] guidelines are used to determine financial eligibility for certain federal
programs. As such, they provide a useful reference point in determining whether an individual is in
poverty and, thus, likely unable to pay the required filing fee.” Muehlfeld v. Comm’r of SSA, No. 3:23-cv-
225, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69271, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 14, 2023) (citing Levet v. Comm’r of SSA, No.
1:14-cv-1378, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96078, 2014 WL 3508893, at *2 n.1 (N.D. Ohio July 15, 2014)).
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U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164421, at *2-3 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025), report and
recommendation adopted, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180855, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Sep. 15,
2025) (Rice, J.) (denying IFP status where the plaintiff earned $3,000 per month,
supported four dependents, and had no assets).
Plaintiff emphasizes that her expenses include a sizeable consolidated debt, but her
monthly payments—the ones disclosed—do not exceed her income as a mathematical
matter, even without consideration of her assets. See Muehlfeld v. Comm’r of SSA, No.
3:23-cv-225, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69271, at *5-6 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 14, 2023)
(collecting cases) (“Financial ability has been found, and thus IFP denied, where income
and assets exceed monthly expenses.”).
The undersigned concludes that Plaintiff has not satisfied her burden to show that,
because of her poverty, she cannot afford to pay the modest one-time cost of filing this
case while still providing for the necessities of life. See Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339; see also
Dotson v. Colvin, No. 7:16-cv-198, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205449, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Nov.
7, 2016) (noting that a person “who owns a home, has real and personal property that
could be liquidated, and receives steady income . . . would almost certainly not be
granted IFP status, and accordingly, would have to make a financial calculation if [they]
wanted to pursue a lawsuit.”).
The undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS to District Judge Newman that the
Court DENY Plaintiff’s IFP Application (Doc. No. 1) and ORDER her to pay $405 (the
$350 filing fee plus a $55 administrative fee) in full by a set deadline if she wants to
proceed with this case.
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Plaintiff may object to this recommendation as detailed in the section below. In the
alternative, Plaintiff may pay $405 to the Clerk of Court. She is ADVISED that she must
notify the Court if her mailing address changes while this case is pending. She may also
wish to review the resources for pro se parties on the Court’s website. See
https://www.ohsd.uscourts.gov/pro-se.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
/s/ Caroline H. Gentry
Caroline H. Gentry
United States Magistrate Judge
Notice Regarding Objections to this Report and Recommendation
If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation (“R&R”), the party may
serve and file specific, written objections to it within fourteen (14) days after being
served with a copy thereof. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). All objections shall specify the
portion(s) of the R&R objected to and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in
support of the objections. The Court may extend the fourteen-day objections period if a
timely motion for an extension of time is filed.
A District Judge of this Court will make a de novo determination of those portions
of the R&R to which objection is made. Upon proper objection, a District Judge of this
Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations
made herein, may receive further evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate
Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the R&R will result in
a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the R&R de novo, and will also
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operate as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of the District Court adopting the
R&R. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947
(6th Cir. 1981).
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