SH, a minor et al v. O'Reilly Auto Enterprises, LLC

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION (DAYTON)
S.H., MINOR, BY AND THROUGH
HIS PARENTS AND LEGAL
GUARDIANS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
O’REILLY AUTO PARTS, et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 3:25-cv-00034
District Judge Michael J. Newman
Magistrate Judge Caroline H. Gentry
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The undersigned Magistrate Judge issues this Report and Recommendation after
reviewing the parties’ responses to the undersigned’s Show Cause Order (Doc. No. 8).
The undersigned concludes that Defendant has not shown, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. The undersigned therefore
RECOMMENDS that this matter be REMANDED to the Common Pleas Court of Clark
County, Ohio due to a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
I. 	BACKGROUND
This negligence action arose from an injury that Plaintiff S.H., a minor, allegedly
suffered while or after shopping at an O’Reilly Auto Parts store in Springfield, Ohio.
Plaintiff S.H. alleges that “[w]hile [he] was loading boxes into his vehicle, a rotor fell out
of the box and hit [him] on his foot.” (Complaint, Doc. No. 2-1, PageID 33.) Although
the caption of the Complaint also lists as Plaintiffs both Seth Harrison “as father and legal
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guardian” and Lisa Harrison “as mother and legal guardian,” these Plaintiffs do not assert
claims on their own behalf. (Id. at PageID 30-34.) Instead, the Complaint asserts a single
claim of negligence on behalf of Plaintiff S.H., who claims that he “suffer[ed] severe and
permanent injuries, suffered great pain of body and mind, a loss of enjoyment of life,
suffered mental anguish, required medical care and treatment in the past, and will
continue to suffer said losses in the future ….” (Id. at PageID 33-34.) Plaintiff demands
judgment in an amount exceeding twenty-five thousand dollars. (Id. at PageID 34.)
Defendant O’Reilly Auto Enterprises, LLC, dba O’Reilly Auto Parts timely
removed Plaintiff’s Complaint to this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.
(Redacted Notice of Removal, Doc. No. 1-5.) However, Defendant did not plausibly
allege that the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction had
been met. See Dart Cherokee Basin Oper. Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81 (2014)
(holding that when the plaintiff’s complaint does not state the amount in controversy, the
defendant’s notice of removal must plausibly allege the requisite amount). Instead,
Defendant asserted (without any explanation): “The matter in controversy exceeds
$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. The complaint states that the plaintiff is seeking
unspecified compensatory damages in excess of $25,000.00.” (Doc. No. 1-5, PageID 36.)
Upon review of the Complaint and Notice of Removal, the undersigned concluded
that Defendant did not plausibly assert that the amount-in-controversy requirement was
met. Therefore, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause why this matter should not be
remanded for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 8.)
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In response, Defendant cited the nature of the claimed damages (e.g., severe and
permanent injuries), Ohio’s $250,000 statutory damage cap for noneconomic damages,
“photographs of what appear to be an alleged severe injury to the big toe,” and plaintiff’s
interrogatory answer that he has “a permanent scar on the toe.” (Jurisdictional Brief, Doc.
No. 14, PageID 75-76.) Defendant argued that it “is not required to prove that the value
of the plaintiffs’ claims exceed $75,000.00,” but instead “need only demonstrate that the
plaintiffs are seeking damages in excess of that amount, in order for the amount in
controversy to exceed $75,000.00.” (Id. at PageID 76-77.) Defendant concluded:
Should the court require further proof of the amount in controversy, which
depends solely upon the damages claimed by the plaintiffs, the defendant
requests an in-person hearing on the record before the Court, at which the
Court and counsel can inquire further of the plaintiffs as to exactly what
damages they are claiming here.
(Id. at PageID 77.)
The undersigned Magistrate Judge set an evidentiary hearing for September 11,
2025. (Doc. No. 18.) Prior to the hearing, the parties filed a Joint Motion to Cancel
Evidentiary Hearing as Moot (Doc. No. 19), which the undersigned granted by notation
order. In the Joint Motion to Cancel, the parties stated:
The plaintiffs’ complaint on its face seeks unspecified damages in excess of
$25,000.00. (Doc # 1-1). The plaintiffs originally filed their complaint in
the Clark County Court of Common Pleas. In that court, there is a rule that
when a “party seeks more than twenty-five thousand dollars, the party shall
so state in the pleading but shall not specify in the demand for judgment the
amount of recovery sought[.]” Ohio Civ.R. 8(A).
The complaint contains claims by three separate plaintiffs, Mr. Seth
Harrison, Mrs. Lisa Harrison, and their minor child, S.H.
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The parties hereby stipulate that these three plaintiffs are each seeking
damages in excess of $25,000 for their separate damage claims. The parties
further stipulate that “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$75,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs,” as stated in 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
(Doc. No. 19, PageID 110-11.)
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
“[I]t is well established that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,
possessing only that power authorized by the Constitution and statute …, which is not to
be expanded by judicial decree[.]” Hudson v. Coleman, 347 F.3d 138, 141 (6th Cir. 2003)
(internal citations omitted). Therefore, this Court has a duty to review sua sponte whether
subject-matter jurisdiction exists in each case before it. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S.
77, 94 (2010) (“Courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-
matter jurisdiction exists, even when no party challenges it.”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the
court must dismiss the action.”).
If the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is uncertain, then this Court must strictly
construe the removal statutes and resolve all doubts in favor of remand. Brierly v.
Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc., 184 F.3d 527, 534 (6th Cir. 1999). This rule “makes
sense” because if the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction at any point of the proceedings
(including on appeal), then it must dismiss the case and nullify all proceedings up to that
point, “which serves no one’s interests.” Total Quality Logistics, LLC v. Franklin, No.
1:19-cv-266, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155757, *8 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 27, 2020) (Cole, D.J.).
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Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), federal district courts “have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and is between … citizens of different States.” Where, as
here, a case is removed from state court based upon diversity jurisdiction, the Sixth
Circuit “places a burden on [the removing] defendant … to show by a preponderance of
the evidence that the amount in controversy requirement has been met.” Hayes v.
Equitable Energy Res. Co., 266 F.3d 560, 572 (6th Cir. 2001).
If the plaintiff seeks a particular amount of damages in the complaint and has a
good-faith basis for doing so, then the defendant’s burden is relatively light, as the “sum
demanded … shall be deemed to be the amount in controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2).
Such reliance is not permitted, however, if it appears to a legal certainty that damages
cannot be recovered in that amount. Rosen v. Chrysler Corp., 205 F.3d 918, 921 (6th Cir.
2000) (citing St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1937)).
Alternatively, the defendant may state the amount in controversy in its notice of
removal if the plaintiff seeks nonmonetary relief or “State practice either does not permit
demand for a specific sum or permits recovery of damages in excess of the amount
demanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)(A). In either circumstance, the removing defendant
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount-in-controversy
requirement has been met. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)(B) (“[R]emoval of the action is proper
on the basis of an amount in controversy asserted under subparagraph (A) if the
district court finds, by the preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy
exceeds” $75,000) (emphasis added).
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The Court may rely on “reasonable inferences and deductions” when conducting
its analysis. Stern v. First Liberty Ins. Corp., 424 F. Supp. 3d 1264, 1269 (S.D. Fla. Jan.
24, 2020). But the Court is not bound by, and should not defer to, a plaintiff’s estimation
of his damages when determining whether the amount-in-controversy requirement is met.
E.g., Graves v. Standard Ins. Co., No. 18-5449, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 27526, *8-9 (6th
Cir. Sept. 11, 2019) (“Despite Graves’ statement under oath that the value of her claims
was ‘at least $883,000,’ we conclude that the district court clearly erred in finding that
the amount in controversy more likely than not was more than $75,000 at the time of
removal”); Stern, 424 F. Supp. 3d at 1269 (“[T]he district court is not bound by the
plaintiff’s representations regarding its claim and may review the record for evidence
relevant to the amount in controversy”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Similarly, parties cannot establish the existence of diversity jurisdiction merely by
stipulating that the amount-in-controversy requirement is met. “No action of the parties
can confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon a federal court.” Ahghazali v. Sec. of Health
& Human Servs., 867 F.2d 921, 927 (6th Cir. 1989) (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982)). If, however, parties
stipulate to facts that demonstrate the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court
may rely on such stipulations. Id. at 927 (“There is … a distinction between attempting to
confer jurisdiction and entering ‘a stipulation to a fact which serves to establish federal
jurisdiction.’”) (quoting U.S. v. Anderson, 503 F.2d 420, 422 (6th Cir. 1974)).
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III. 	ANALYSIS
The undersigned concludes that Defendant has not met its burden of proving that
the amount-in-controversy requirement has been met. Therefore, the undersigned
recommends that District Judge Newman remand this matter to state court for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction.
The Court will first address Defendant’s argument that the value of Plaintiffs’
claims is irrelevant, as it need only establish that Plaintiffs seek more than $75,000. In the
circumstances of this case, Defendant’s argument is incorrect. It is true that if a plaintiff
pleads an amount of damages in the complaint that exceeds $75,000 and has a good-faith
basis for doing so, then such an allegation will likely satisfy the amount-in-controversy
requirement. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2). In this case, however, Plaintiffs did not plead an
amount of damages that exceeds $75,000. Instead, because the practice in Ohio state
court limits plaintiffs to seeking damages in excess of $25,000, Defendant was permitted
to allege the amount in controversy in the notice of removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)(A)).
When this removal procedure is utilized, the Court must find by a preponderance of the
evidence that the amount-in-controversy requirement is met. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)(B).
Therefore, the Court turns to the evidence, which is sparse. Defendant represents
that Plaintiffs provided photographs of a seriously injured big toe, and that Plaintiff S.H.
stated in an interrogatory answer that he will have a permanent scar. These asserted facts
do not prove that it is likely, rather than merely possible, that the amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000. See Everett v. Verizon Wireless, Inc., 460 F.3d 818, 829 (6th Cir. 2006)
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(defendants “must do more than show a mere possibility that the jurisdictional amount is
satisfied”).
Defendant also relies on Plaintiff’s request to recover damages for a severe and
permanent injury to argue that the nature of the claimed damages shows that the amount-
in-controversy requirement is met. But vague and boilerplate allegations of injury are
insufficient. See Diaz v. Allstate Northbrook Indem. Co., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159626,
*15 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2022) (holding that plaintiff’s complaint was not removable where
noneconomic damages were only generally pled and omitted supporting details).
Next, Defendant argues that Ohio’s statutory cap for noneconomic damages shows
that the amount-in-controversy requirement is met. But Ohio’s statutory damage cap is
exactly that: a cap on damages. It sets a ceiling, not a floor. It limits Plaintiffs’ potential
recovery by limiting noneconomic damages to a maximum amount. It does not guarantee
a minimum amount or entitle Plaintiffs to recover the capped amount of noneconomic
damages. Unlike laws that establish statutory damages—which can entitle a plaintiff to a
minimum amount of damages—damage caps are of little relevance to the amount-in-
controversy requirement. See Steuerwald v. ExamWorks, LLC, No. 1:23-cv-215, 2023
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78640, *6 (W.D. Tex. May 4, 2023) (rejecting a similar argument and
noting that the cited Texas law “sets a cap, not a minimum, for punitive damages”).
Defendant also relies on the parties’ stipulation that Plaintiffs seek damages in
excess of $75,000. But it is well-established that parties cannot stipulate to the existence
of subject-matter jurisdiction. Ahghazali, 867 F.2d at 927 (internal quotations and citation
omitted). Although parties can stipulate to the existence of jurisdictional facts, they have
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not done so here. To the contrary, the parties “do not stipulate to any particular value of
the claims.” (Doc. No. 19, PageID 111.)
Finally, Defendant argues that each of the three Plaintiffs seeks damages in excess
of $25,000, and that the total amount sought therefore exceeds $75,000. A fair reading of
the Complaint does not support this assertion. Neither parent has asserted their own claim
for damages (such as for loss of consortium), pled a factual basis for asserting such a
claim, or sought damages on their own behalf. Instead, the parents appear to be named as
Plaintiffs solely in their capacities as a parent and legal guardian of Plaintiff S.H., who
asserts a single claim for negligence. There is no basis for concluding that either parent
has incurred (or seeks) damages in excess of $25,000.
For all these reasons, the undersigned concludes that Defendant has not proven, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
Moreover, if there is any doubt as to whether the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction—
and the undersigned finds that there is ample doubt in this case—then the proper course
of action is to remand the action to state court. Brierly, 184 F.3d at 534; Total Quality
Logistics, LLC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155757, *8.
Accordingly, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court REMAND this
matter to the Court of Common Pleas of Clark County, Ohio.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
/s/ Caroline H. Gentry
Caroline H. Gentry
United States Magistrate Judge
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Procedure On Objections
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written
objections to the proposed findings and recommendations within FOURTEEN days after
being served with this Report and Recommendations. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d),
this period is extended to SEVENTEEN days if this Report is being served by one of the
methods of service listed in Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C), (D), or (F). Such objections shall
specify the portions of the Report objected to and shall be accompanied by a
memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report and Recommendation is
based in whole or in part upon matters occurring of record at an oral hearing, the
objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such portions
of it as all parties may agree upon or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the
assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party’s
objections within FOURTEEN days after being served with a copy thereof.
Failure to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on
appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947,
949-50 (6th Cir. 1981).
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