City of Springfield, Ohio et al v. The Blood Tribe et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON
CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, OHIO, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
THE BLOOD TRIBE, et al.,
Defendants.
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
Case No. 3:25-cv-33
Judge Thomas M. Rose
Magistrate Judge Caroline H. Gentry
______________________________________________________________________________
ENTRY AND ORDER DENYING DISMISSAL, AS REQUESTED IN
DEFENDANT DRAKE BERENTZ INITIAL BRIEF (DOC. NO. 35)
______________________________________________________________________________
Presently before the Court is Defendant Drake Berentz Initial Brief (the “Brief”) (Doc. No.
35). The Complaint (Doc. No. 1) in this matter has been brought by Plaintiffs City of Springfield,
Ohio (“Springfield” or the “City”), Rob Rue, Dr. David Estrop, Krystal Brown, Tracey Tackett,
Taylor Flora, Casey Rollins, Jessica Shafer, and Randall Comer (collectively, “Plaintiffs”).
Plaintiffs primarily allege that Defendants The Blood Tribe (“Blood Tribe”), Christopher Pohlhaus
(“Pohlhaus”), Drake Berentz (“Berentz”), and seven unnamed co-conspirators (collectively,
“Defendants”) acted in concert to violate the individual Plaintiffs’ civil rights, as proscribed by 42
U.S.C. §§ 1985(3) at 1986. (Doc. No. 1 at PageID 39-41.) Plaintiffs also claim eight additional
causes of action against Defendants for conduct related to this alleged conspiracy to violate civil
rights. (Id. at PageID 41-53.) Although his Brief is not properly styled as a motion, Berentz urges
the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ civil rights claims against him for lack of jurisdiction and for failure
to state a claim. (Doc. No. 35 at PageID 314-15.)
For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES the relief sought in Berentz’s Brief.
Case: 3:25-cv-00033-TMR-CHG Doc #: 47 Filed: 11/13/25 Page: 1 of 8 PAGEID #: <pageID>

2
I. 	BACKGROUND
The Court will not reiterate the alleged background in this case, as the Court previously
detailed those allegations when denying Pohlhaus’ Motion to Dismiss [for] Failure to State a Claim
(Doc. No. 20).1 For the sake of this Order, the Court only recounts that Blood Tribe is an alleged
neo-nazi organization, Berentz allegedly serves as Blood Tribe’s second-in-command, and, in mid-
to-late 2024, Berentz allegedly led groups affiliated with Blood Tribe in a coordinated campaign
against Plaintiffs’ due to their positive sentiments toward Haitian immigrants in Springfield. (See
Doc. No. 1 at PageID 2-4, 9, 17-20, 25-26.)
Berentz submitted his Brief on September 22, 2025, arguing for dismissal of this action.
(Doc. No. 35 at PageID 314-15.) Although Berentz’s Brief was not styled as a motion, Plaintiffs
responded to Berentz’s Brief on October 14, 2025. (Doc. No. 43.) Berentz did not file a reply.
Therefore, to the extent Berentz intended his Brief to request dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims against
him, that request is ripe for review and decision.
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. 	Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Rule 12(b)(1) motions to dismiss based upon subject matter jurisdiction generally fall into
one of two categories: facial attacks or factual attacks. Ohio Nat’l. Life Ins. Co. v. United States,
922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990). A facial attack questions the sufficiency of the pleading. Id.
In reviewing a facial attack, a trial court takes the allegations in the complaint as true. Id. If those
allegations adequately establish jurisdiction, then the court will find that jurisdiction exists. Gentek
Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 491 F.3d 320, 330 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal citations
omitted). In reviewing a factual attack, no presumptive truthfulness applies. Id.
1 For a comprehensive account of Plaintiffs’ allegations by the Court, see Doc. No. 34 at PageID 294-97.
Case: 3:25-cv-00033-TMR-CHG Doc #: 47 Filed: 11/13/25 Page: 2 of 8 PAGEID #: <pageID>

3
A factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction has been commonly termed a “speaking
motion.” Id. (citing Ohio Nat’l. Life Ins. Co., 922 F.2d at 325). When the facts regarding subject
matter jurisdiction create a factual controversy, the court must weigh the conflicting evidence to
determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists. Id. “In its review, the district court has wide
discretion to allow affidavits, documents, and even a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve
jurisdictional facts.” 	Id. 	Because the issue in a factual attack is the court’s jurisdiction, the
reviewing court may go beyond the pleadings and “weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the
existence of its power to hear the case.” United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1994);
see also Anestis v. United States, 749 F.3d 520, 524 (6th Cir. 2014).
However, a court will engage in this factual inquiry “only when the facts necessary to
sustain jurisdiction do not implicate the merits of the plaintiff’s claim.” Gentek, 491 F.3d at 330
(citing Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell & Assocs., 104 F.3d 1256, 1261 (11th Cir. 1997)). If a factual
attack on subject matter jurisdiction implicates the merits of the plaintiff’s claim, “the district court
should ‘find that jurisdiction exists and deal with the objection as a direct attack on the merits of
the plaintiff’s claim.’” 	Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 	This subjects the
party posing a factual attack on a court’s subject matter jurisdiction to the standards of Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6) and/or Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Id.
The party asserting jurisdiction has the burden of proof. Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442,
446 (1942); Glob. Tech., Inc. v. Yubei (XinXiang) Power Steering Sys. Co., 807 F.3d 806, 810 (6th
Cir. 2015). This burden must be satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence. Wright v. United
States, 82 F.3d 419 (6th Cir. 1996).
2. 	Motion To Dismiss for Failure To State A Claim
“The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is to allow a defendant to test whether,
as a matter of law, the plaintiff is entitled to legal relief even if everything alleged in the complaint
Case: 3:25-cv-00033-TMR-CHG Doc #: 47 Filed: 11/13/25 Page: 3 of 8 PAGEID #: <pageID>

4
is true.” Bihn v. Fifth Third Mortg. Co., 980 F. Supp. 2d 892, 897 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (citing Mayer
v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir. 1993)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is facially plausible when it includes
“factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. This standard is not the same as a probability standard, but “asks
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. “Where a complaint
pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between
possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus,
if a plaintiff has “not nudged [its] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, [the]
complaint must be dismissed.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the factual allegations of the
complaint as true and construe them in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 554-
55. 	However, the Court is not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation. Id. at 555-56. “In evaluating a motion to dismiss [a court] may consider the complaint
and any exhibits attached thereto, public records, items appearing in the record of the case and
exhibits attached to the defendant’s motion to dismiss so long as they are referred to in the
complaint and are central to the claims contained therein.” Luis v. Zang, 833 F.3d 619, 626 (6th
Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).
III. 	ANALYSIS
In his Brief, Berentz appears to argue that the Court lacks federal question jurisdiction over
Plaintiffs’ claims and that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against him. The Court considers
these two contentions accordingly.
1. 	Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Case: 3:25-cv-00033-TMR-CHG Doc #: 47 Filed: 11/13/25 Page: 4 of 8 PAGEID #: <pageID>

5
Not unlike the rest of his Brief in general, Berentz’s claim that the Court lacks jurisdiction
is difficult to parse. Construing his Brief liberally, the Court reads Berentz’s writings to raise a
facial challenge to Plaintiffs jurisdictional allegations. Specifically, Berentz asserts that Plaintiffs
have not brought this case pursuant to federal law. (Doc. No. 35 at PageID 307.) By this theory,
because Plaintiffs have not invoked the Court’s federal question jurisdiction, the Court has no
additional bases to consider Plaintiffs’ state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
Limited though jurisdiction may be, there is no question that “district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. When a plaintiff’s federal claim is accompanied by state law claims
that “form part of the same case or controversy,” district courts may exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the state law claims as well. 28 U.S.C § 1367(a).
In this case, the Court finds it nonsensical to suggest that Plaintiffs have failed to invoke a
federal question. 	Plaintiffs’ paramount causes of action–conspiracy to violate civil rights and
failure to prevent a conspiracy to violate civil rights–arise under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986.
These are federal statutes authorizing private causes of action. Further, the Court finds that it has
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ remaining claims. 	In essence, Plaintiffs’ seven other
claims either allege the same conspiracy under state law or allege causes of action which, if proven,
may constitute overt acts in furtherance of a civil rights conspiracy. This is all to say that Plaintiffs’
state law claims are inextricably linked to their federal claims involving an alleged conspiracy to
violate civil rights. 	Accordingly, the relief requested in Berentz’s Brief is DENIED insofar as
Berentz claims that the Court lacks jurisdiction here.
2. 	Plausibility of Plaintiffs’ Claims
Berentz’s argument concerning whether Plaintiffs have stated a plausible claim is again
somewhat convoluted. Most substantively, Berentz simply recites 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and states,
Case: 3:25-cv-00033-TMR-CHG Doc #: 47 Filed: 11/13/25 Page: 5 of 8 PAGEID #: <pageID>

6
“[n]one of the elements of either codified statute are applicable in the instant case.” (Doc. No. 35
at PageID 312-13.)
In pertinent part, 42 U.S.C. § 1985 provides:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the
highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly
or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or
of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing
or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or
securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the
laws … [and] if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any
act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in
his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege
of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action
for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any
one or more of the conspirators.
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Thus, to state a civil rights conspiracy claim under Section 1985(3), plaintiffs
must allege: “(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any
person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities
under the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either
injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United
States.” Cmty. Church of Chesterland Ohio v. Penny, 759 F. Supp. 3d 805, 809 (N.D. Ohio 2024)
(quoting United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Loc. 610, AFL-CIO v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825,
828-29 (1983)).
A plaintiff alleging a civil rights conspiracy under Section 1985 may also have a cause of
action under 42 U.S.C § 1986 against anyone who had knowledge of the conspiracy and the power
to prevent it, if such conspiracy be carried out. 42 U.S.C. § 1986. “Dismissal of a § 1986 claim
is proper if a plaintiff fails to state a cause of action under § 1985.” Thurmond v. Cnty. of Wayne,
447 F. App’x. 643, 650 (6th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
As discussed in the Court’s prior order (Doc. No. 34 at PageID 300-01), Plaintiffs have
Case: 3:25-cv-00033-TMR-CHG Doc #: 47 Filed: 11/13/25 Page: 6 of 8 PAGEID #: <pageID>

7
sufficiently pled a civil rights conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. 	The Complaint in this case
alleges a racialized campaign of terror launched on Springfield and its citizens in 2024. Based on
the events Plaintiffs allegedly endured, such as late-night visits from strangers and intimidating
demonstrations, it is further plausible that Plaintiffs might have suffered private injury. 	The
Complaint asserts that the overt acts of terror done unto Plaintiffs were the products of a
coordinated effort by Defendants. Most naturally, this supposed coordination leads the Court to
infer an internal agreement among Defendants. For good measure, Berentz’s alleged involvement
in a conspiracy to violate Plaintiffs’ civil rights is incredibly stark from the face of the Complaint.
To be sure, Plaintiffs basically allege that Berentz unabashedly led Blood Tribe members in
marches and public demonstrations that had the intended effect of intimidating Springfield
residents.
So too have Plaintiffs plausibly alleged a claim against Berentz for failure to prevent a
conspiracy to violate civil rights. 	Having alleged a conspiracy, Plaintiffs need only allege that
Berentz knew about the conspiracy and had the power to stop it. Given his allegedly public-facing
role, the Court finds it plausible that Berentz knew about the underlying conspiracy at issue.
Moreover, because he allegedly led many Blood Tribe efforts, the Court finds it reasonable to infer
that Berentz was in such a position of authority within Blood Tribe to prevent any conspiracy
against Plaintiffs’ civil rights.
Hence, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged causes of action against
Berentz and DENIES Berentz’s Brief to the extent he argues that Plaintiffs have failed to state a
claim.
Case: 3:25-cv-00033-TMR-CHG Doc #: 47 Filed: 11/13/25 Page: 7 of 8 PAGEID #: <pageID>

8
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES Defendant Drake Berentz Initial Brief
(Doc. No. 35) insofar as Berentz intended his Brief to constitute a motion. 	Regardless, it is
ORDERED that within fourteen (14) days of this Order, Berentz shall file a proper responsive
pleading to Plaintiffs’ Complaint. Therein, Berentz shall either admit or deny the allegations of
the Complaint, as contemplated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 	Berentz is placed on
NOTICE that a failure to timely respond to Plaintiffs’ Complaint may result in sanctions.
DONE and ORDERED in Dayton, Ohio, this Thursday, November 13, 2025.
s/Thomas M. Rose
________________________________
THOMAS M. ROSE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case: 3:25-cv-00033-TMR-CHG Doc #: 47 Filed: 11/13/25 Page: 8 of 8 PAGEID #: <pageID>