Whitfield v. Evers et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
CALEB WHITFIELD, 	Case No. 3:24-cv-244
Plaintiff, 	Rose, J
Litkovitz, M.J.
vs.
SERGEANT EVERS, et al., 	REPORT AND
Defendants. 	RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Caleb Whitfield, an inmate at the Toledo Correctional Institution (ToCI) in
Toledo, Ohio, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his civil rights
while he was a pretrial detainee at the Montgomery County Jail (MCJ) in Dayton, Ohio. (Doc.
5). This matter is before the Court on defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 33),
plaintiff’s response in opposition (Doc. 39), and defendants’ reply memorandum (Doc. 40).
I. 	Background
The facts relevant to plaintiff’s claims against defendants are taken from plaintiff’s
amended complaint (Doc. 24), defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 36), both
parties’ responsive memorandum and exhibits, (Docs. 39, 40), and plaintiff’s affidavit (Doc. 39-
1, Ex. A). The undisputed evidence of record shows Mr. Whitfield was housed at the MCJ at the
time plaintiff claims his rights were violated. (Doc. 36 at PageID 163; Doc. 39 at PageID 194).
On November 28, 2021 at 14:57 hours, Correctional Officer J. Ratliff documented the following:
“Inmate[’s] door lock (cell 204) needs repair again, lock is loose. Inmate removed from cell and
relocated to cell 140 while repaired.” (Doc. 39-2 at PageID 213). Jail records indicate that on
November 28, 2021 at 15:00 hours, jail staff moved Mr. Whitfield from cell A204 in the
Administrative Segregation unit where he had been housed since November 3, 2021 to cell
MHD140. (Doc. 39-3 at PageID 214). Mr. Whitfield remained housed in cell MHD140 until
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November 29, 2021 at 08:03 hours when he was moved to transport cell TRN114. (Id.). Mr.
Whitfield remained housed in transport cell TRN114 until December 8, 2021 at 18:24 hours
when he was returned to cell A203 in the Administrative Segregation unit. (Id.).
Mr. Whitfield alleges that during the time he was housed in transport cell TRN114
defendants Evers and Eversole allegedly subjected plaintiff to an unsanitary cell—with the cell
walls, floor, food port, and toilet covered in feces, an “overwhelming smell of urination,” no
working water, and constant illumination that interfered with his sleep and his eyes. Mr.
Whitfield alleges these conditions caused him headaches, anxiety, and depression. He states he
was forced to sleep on a bare concrete slab without a mattress for two days and denied cleaning
supplies in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 (See Amended Complaint, Doc. 24; Ex. A,
Doc. 39-1, Whitfield Aff.).
The Court now considers defendants’ motion for summary judgment and the parties’
responsive memoranda.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
A motion for summary judgment should be granted if the evidence submitted to the Court
demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). A grant of
summary judgment is proper unless the nonmoving party “establish[es] genuinely disputed
material facts by ‘citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . . or . . . showing that the
1 Plaintiff argues additional claims in his responsive memorandum related to jail customs and practices, violations of
jail policies, and denial of recreation privileges, but on January 6, 2025 the Court entered a Report and
Recommendation dismissing these claims with prejudice. (Doc. 6 at 47, adopted see Doc. 13). The only remaining
claim in this action is plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claim against defendants Evers and Eversole. (Id. at 42-
43). Therefore, the Court will address only the conditions of confinement claims.
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materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute.’” United Specialty Ins. Co.
v. Cole’s Place, Inc., 936 F.3d 386, 403 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)). The
Court must evaluate the evidence, and all inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party. Satterfield v. Tennessee, 295 F.3d 611, 615 (6th Cir. 2002); Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Little Caesar Enterprises, Inc.
v. OPPCO, LLC, 219 F.3d 547, 551 (6th Cir. 2000).
The trial judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the
matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine factual issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at
249. The trial court need not search the entire record for material issues of fact, Street v. J.C.
Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479-80 (6th Cir. 1989), but must determine “whether the
evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so
one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52.
“Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-
moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. “When
opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so
that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for
purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380
(2007). However, “[f]acts that are not blatantly contradicted by [the evidence] remain entitled to
an interpretation most favorable to the non-moving party.” Coble v. City of White House, Tenn.,
634 F.3d 865, 870 (6th Cir. 2011). “In response to a properly supported summary judgment
motion, the non-moving party ‘is required to present some significant probative evidence which
makes it necessary to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the dispute at trial.” Maston v.
Montgomery Cnty. Jail Med. Staff Pers., 832 F. Supp. 2d 846, 849 (S.D. Ohio 2011) (quoting
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Sixty Ivy St. Corp. v. Alexander, 822 F.2d 1432, 1435 (6th Cir. 1987)).
A fact is “material” if its resolution will affect the outcome of the lawsuit. Beans v. City
of Massillon, No. 5:15-cv-1475, 2016 WL 7492503, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 30, 2016), aff’d, No.
17-3088, 2017 WL 3726755 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). The party who
seeks summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the
basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. To make its
determination, the court “need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other
materials in the record.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). The party opposing a properly supported
motion for summary judgment “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288 (1968).
Because plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his filings are liberally construed. Spotts v. United States, 429
F.3d 248, 250 (6th Cir. 2005); Boswell v. Mayer, 169 F.3d 384, 387 (6th Cir. 1999) (pro se plaintiffs
enjoy the benefit of a liberal construction of their pleadings and filings). However, a party’s status as a
pro se litigant does not alter the party’s duty on a summary judgment motion to support his factual
assertions with admissible evidence. Maston, 832 F. Supp. 2d at 851-52 (citing Viergutz v. Lucent
Techs., Inc., 375 F. App’x 482, 485 (6th Cir. 2010)).
III. Evidence Presented
In support of the motion for summary judgment, defendants rely on the affidavit of
defendant Eversole (Ex. C, Doc. 36-3, Eversole Aff.), plaintiff’s prisoner grievance form dated
December 7, 2021 (Ex. C, Doc. 36-3 a PageID 187-88), and defendants’ responses to plaintiff’s
discovery requests (Ex. A, Doc. 36-1; Ex. B, Doc. 36-2). Plaintiff relies on the allegations in his
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amended complaint (Doc. 24), his affidavit (Ex. A, Doc. 39-1), as well as a jail records obtained
during discovery (Ex. B-G, Docs. 39-2 to 39-7).
Affidavit of Caleb Whitfield2
Mr. Whitfield avers that on November 28, 2021, he was removed from his cell in
Administrative Segregation due to a report that the “cell door lock was loose” on cell A204 and
moved to cell MHD140. (Ex. A, Doc. 39-1, Whitfield Aff., at PageID 209: ¶¶ 1-2). He states
that approximately 8-10 hours later, defendant Evers escorted him to transport cell TRN114
where he assisted jail staff in removing plaintiff’s handcuffs. (Id. at ¶ 3). Mr. Whitfield states
that upon defendant Evers exiting and the door being secured, plaintiff “noticed the
overwhelming smell of human waste and feces scattered everywhere.” (Id. at ¶ 5). Mr.
Whitfield described the conditions of the cell as having “feces scattered on the walls, cell
window, food port, around the cell’s camera, around and on the toilet, as well as dried in every
corner of the cell [except] one. . . . [and] [c]aked up dry urine in front of the cell[s] door.” (Id. at
¶ 6). Mr. Whitfield states he “ran to the cell door and banged on the cell window and requested
cleaning supplies” from Sgt. Evers. (Id.). According to Mr. Whitfield, defendant Evers
responded, “You can’t get that down here.” (Id.).
Mr. Whitfield states that during the 11 days he was housed in transport cell TRN114, he
was “subjected to constant illumination from the cell[’]s highly bright light” which he claims
“are brighter than the observational cell[] lights.” (Ex. A, Doc. 39-1, Whitfield Aff., at PageID
210: ¶¶ 8-9). Mr. Whitfield states that he was deprived of a mattress, blanket, and shower during
his first 48 hours in the cell. (Id. at ¶ 11). Mr. Whitfield also states that the water was not
2 The Court notes that parts of plaintiff’s affidavit relate to claims previously dismissed by this Court. (see January
6, 2025 Report and Recommendation, Doc. 6, adopted see Doc. 13). Only those statements relevant to the
remaining claims have been included.
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running in the cell, except for the toilet. (Id. at ¶ 10, 12).
Mr. Whitfield claims that the constant illumination caused him to suffer sleep deprivation
and vision issues, while the pain from laying on concrete due to not having a mattress caused
lower back pain, cramping muscles, and swollen limbs. (Id. at ¶ 13-14). He also states that
exposure to human waste psychologically tortured him while the other conditions physically
tortured him, causing him to experience depression and anxiety. (Id. at ¶ 15). He further states
that not having access to drinking water caused him to feel dizzy and sick. (Id. at ¶ 20).
Mr. Whitfield states he filed a grievance regarding the conditions of his cell to which
defendant Eversole responded to, indicating that Mr. Whitfield’s grievance lacked merit. (Ex. A,
Doc. 39-1, Whitfield Aff., at PageID 211: ¶ 16). Mr. Whitfield avers that defendant Eversole
never physically came to the cell to investigate the merits of his complaint before submitting his
finding. (Id. at ¶ 16). Mr. Whitfield states that the custom and practice of the MCJ is to house
inmates in transport cells as a form of punishment due to the cell conditions and isolation. (Id. at
¶ 17).
Affidavit of John Eversole
Defendant Eversole states that as a Sergeant at MCJ, he is responsible for “investigating
inmate grievances, making factual findings on grievances, formulating any resolutions of
grievances, and updating inmates on the outcomes of their grievances.” (Ex. C, Doc. 36-3 at
PageID 186: ¶ 4). He states that transport cells are used as temporary housing for inmates when
housing is limited and are also used as observation rooms for high-risk inmates. (Id. at ¶ 5). He
states that the lights remain illuminated in the transport cells to better view the inmates and to
maintain the security and welfare of the inmate. (Id.). He states that the transport cells are
cleaned by 1st floor cleaning detail between inmates. (Id.).
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Defendant Eversole states that on December 8, 2021, he responded to Mr. Whitfield’s
grievance relating to “being denied privileges” and found that his “grievances were
unsubstantiated.” 	(Ex. C, Doc. 36-3 at PageID 186: ¶¶ 6-7). He states that Mr. Whitfield was
offered showers and cleaning supplies but declined to exercise those privileges on several
occasions. (Id. at ¶ 7).
Jail Incident Report
On or about December 1, 2021, defendant Eversole completed the following jail incident
report:
This is [Mr. Whitfield’s] 30 day review for housing within Administrative
Segregation. 	As of this reporting, [Mr. Whitfield] is temporarily housed within
TRS114 due to purposefully damaging the cell door lock to A204, where he used
to be housed. 	[Mr. Whitfield] is considered a serious security risk to the facility
and to staff members. Therefore, as of this reporting and although currently housed
within transport staging, Administrative Segregative housing remains appropriate
for this Inmate. Respectfully Submitted, Sergeant John W. Eversole/239.
(Doc. 39-4 at PageID 215).
Prisoner Grievance Form
On December 7, 2021, Mr. Whitfield submitted a prisoner grievance form stating the
following:
I am being housed in a holding cell. I have already wrote a paper grievance but still
received no response. 	I have [been] denied my right to shower on several
occasions. . . . My holding cell has no hot and cold water. My holding cell light
never turns off. My holding cell has [nowhere] to put my mat so it has to go on the
floor. My holding cell has no water sprinkler, which is a safety hazard. I have been
denied my request to physically clean my cell due to [feces] being all over the walls.
Upon entering this holding cell, [I] was also forced to go thirty to thirty-five hours
without a mat[], blanket, shower, and water. 	This is [] cruel and unusual
punishment and against policy as well as my constitutional rights. 	[There is] no
explanation for me being down here for as long as I have[.] [T]his is preventing
me from studying my case.
(Ex. C, Doc. 36-3 at PageID 187). On December 8, 2021, defendant Eversole responded with
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the following:
[T]here is no grievance. You were housed within transport staging due to trying
to force open a security door within A-Pod, specifically A204, which you nearly
was able to open with your repeated instances where you kicked the door. You
were issued sanctions to that effect but still continued to kick the door to the point
the cell door was compromised and the cell taken out of service. You are
currently being housed in a cell that the door secures properly. I know you have
been given showers with documented instances to that fact. I will have the first
floor officers provide you some cleaning supplies. I am currently in the process
to re-evaluate your current housing situation.
(Ex. C, Doc. 36-3 at PageID 188).
On December 8, 2021, Mr. Whitfield submitted a professional contact request using the
jail communication system stating the following:
Request: (For A Captain ONLY) How do I write a grievance then the same person
my grievance is against respond[s], like he’ll be able and willing to investigate and
possibly discipline himself? I have written copies of the grievances that [I] filled
out so I fail to understand how Sgt’[s] don’t have them. I have the exact time and
date 	I 	gave 	my 	grievances 	to 	the 	C.[O.] 	And 	[there’s] 	no 	evidence 	or
documentation of me damaging the door. 	How isn’t [this] a violation of my
constitutional rights, “Marked as [n]ot a grievance.”
(Ex. G, Doc. 39-7 at PageID 218). On December 9, 2021, Captain J. Stephens sent the following
response:
[G]rievances fit a specific criteria which is listed at the beginning of the process.
[I]f what you are reporting doesn’t meet that criteria then, even though we respond,
it is not considered a grievance. 	[T]he one you wrote today against CO Duncan
will be handled by a sergeant. We moved you upstairs like you wanted and now
you are having problems there including trying to damage my doors, which can be
clearly viewed on camera. I am asking you to please stop doing this. You have a
long time to remain here until the court will be finished with you. I’m sure you’d
like to remain somewhere pleasant and with amenities such as a TV, access to
kiosk, phones etc. 	If you continue the behaviors you’re exhibiting then you lose
privileges which will make this a long and difficult stay for you. 	If there is
something you’d like that would calm you and help you pass the time like a puzzle
book or something to read please put in a kiosk request to the Chaplain and we will
assist you.
(Id.).
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IV. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 36)
a. 	Legal Standard
Historically, the Sixth Circuit has analyzed pretrial detainees Fourteenth Amendment
claims for unconstitutional conditions of confinement under the same Eighth Amendment
framework applied to convicted prisoners. Westmoreland v. Butler Cnty., Kentucky, 29 F.4th
721, 727 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing Richmond v. Huq, 885 F.3d 928, 937 (6th Cir. 2018)). While
prison officials must “provide humane conditions of confinement” and “ensure that inmates
receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
832 (1994), “[t]he Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons,” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 349 (1981), and “[n]ot every unpleasant experience a prisoner might endure while
incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment.” Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987). Instead, “extreme deprivations
are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim . . . [b]ecause routine discomfort is
‘part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.’” Hudson v.
McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
This constitutional framework includes both objective and subjective components.
Westmoreland, 29 F.4th at 726 (citing Richmond, 885 F.3d at 937-38). In the context of a
Fourteenth Amendment condition of confinement claim, the plaintiff must first show “that [he or
she] is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Assi v.
Hanshaw, 625 F. Supp. 3d 722, 745 (S.D. Ohio 2022) (quoting Bensfield v. Murray, No. 4:21-
cv-P104, 2022 WL 508902, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 18, 2022)). Second, the plaintiff must show
“that [the defendant] acted ‘deliberately’ and ‘recklessly in the face of an unjustifiably high risk
of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known.’” Id. (quoting Brawner v.
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Scott Cnty., 14 F.4th 585, 596 (6th Cir. 2021)). See also Westmoreland v. Butler Cnty., 29 F.4th
at 728. Finally, conditions-of-confinement claims “are highly fact-specific” and “the length of
exposure to the conditions is often paramount.” Lamb v. Howe, 677 F. App’x 204 (6th Cir.
2017). Therefore, the Court should “consider the interrelationship between the severe conditions
and their duration” when evaluating the merits of a conditions-of-confinement claim. Francis v.
Altiere, 491 F. App’x 539, 543 (6th Cir. 2012).
b. 	Eligibility for compensatory damages
Initially, the Court finds that Mr. Whitfield cannot bring a claim against defendants for
compensatory damages for emotional distress based on the allegations of the complaint. The
Prison Litigation Reform Act states that “[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner
confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered
while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). Even
though the physical injury required by § 1997e(e) for a § 1983 claim need not be significant, it
must be more than de minimis for an Eighth Amendment claim to go forward. Flanory v. Bonn,
604 F.3d 249, 254 (6th Cir. 2010) (collecting cases). Here, plaintiff first alleges that he became
depressed and anxious as a result of defendants’ actions and the “psychological torture” of his
confinement conditions. He does not allege any physical injuries resulted from unsanitary
conditions. While Mr. Whitfield does allege some underlying physical injuries resulting from
defendants’ alleged failure to provide a mattress for 48 hours, such as lower back pain, cramping
muscles, and swollen limbs, he provides no medical documentation or other evidence to support
those claims and states that his pain only “lingered for 4-5 days.” (Doc. 39 at PageID 207).
Mr. Whitfield also alleges he experienced depression, anxiety, and vision problems
arising from 24/7 illumination in his cell but provides no medical documentation to support these
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claims. (Id. at 204, 207). While blurred vision constitutes a physical manifestation that could
potentially satisfy the PLRA’s physical injury requirement if properly documented, plaintiff’s
failure to provide any medical records, expert testimony, or clinical verification of the alleged
blurred vision renders his claim for compensatory damages for mental or emotional injuries
(anxiety and depression) legally insufficient under the PLRA. See Flanory, 604 F.3d at 254.
Plaintiff is therefore precluded by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) from seeking damages for the
depression and anxiety purportedly caused by the alleged conditions of his confinement. See
Richmond v. Settles, 450 F. App’x 448, 456 (6th Cir. 2011) (prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim
for mental anguish purportedly caused by the deprivation of six meals over a seven-day period
was barred by § 1997e(e) where the prisoner failed to show his physical health suffered as a
result of the deprivation).
c. 	Unsanitary conditions
Plaintiff’s claim that defendants housed him in a cell for 11 days that was covered in
human waste fails to satisfy the objective element of a Fourteenth Amendment condition of
confinement claim, i.e., that plaintiff was “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk
of serious harm.” Assi v. Hanshaw, 625 F. Supp. 3d 722 (S.D. Ohio 2022) (internal quotations
omitted) (quoting Bensfield, 2022 WL 508902, at *2). “It is well-established that the presence of
some unsanitary conditions in a cell (including fecal matter) does not establish an Eighth
Amendment claim, except in circumstances where the volume of matter and duration of exposure
are extreme.” Edge v. Mahlman, No. 1:20-cv-892, 2021 WL 3725988, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 23,
2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 20113138 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 18, 2022). As
such, requiring a prisoner to live in a cell with “massive amounts” of feces covering “nearly floor
to ceiling” and to sleep in raw sewage violates the Eighth Amendment. Taylor v. Riojas, 592
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U.S. 7, 7-8 (2020). On the other hand, temporary or minor inconveniences resulting from
unsanitary conditions are unlikely to meet this standard. Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d
508, 511 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Brown v. Mahlman, No. 1:22-cv-239, 2022 WL 17817615, at
*3 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 19, 2022) (“Courts have typically found that temporary exposure to feces
does not meet the objective component of the Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement
test.”); Figueroa v. Cty. of Rockland, No. 16-cv-6519, 2018 WL 3315735, *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 5,
2018) (allegations of feces and bodily fluids on the walls are insufficient to create a
constitutional concern).
The cell conditions that Mr. Whitfield alleges are unpleasant; however, he offers no
evidence indicating that he suffered physical injury resulting from exposure to unsanitary
conditions. Further, under the above standards and in view of the relatively short length of time
that Mr. Whitfield was subjected to them (11 days in the cell), these conditions do not rise to the
level of unconstitutional conditions of confinement claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Still v. Davis, No. 1:16-cv-640, 2018 WL 1202827 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 8, 2018), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 1:16-cv-640, 2018 WL 2943227 (S.D. Ohio June 12, 2018)
(noting “courts have held that even fairly long exposure [to sewage] will not satisfy the objective
component . . . in the absence of any physical harm.”) (collecting cases).
d. 	Denial of Mattress
Mr. Whitfield’s further alleges that defendants denied him a mattress for 48 hours and
that he had to sleep on his mattress on the cell floor for the remainder of the 11 days he spent in
transport cell TRN114. (Doc. 39 at PageID 196). Defendants do not deny that Mr. Whitfield
was without a mattress for 48 hours but state that the transport cell TRN114 that he was moved
to was “to accommodate only as temporary housing, therefore sleeping accommodations were
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provided once it was deemed that repairs [to A204] would take longer than intended.” (Doc. 36
at PageID 167-68). Defendants additionally state that plaintiff’s transfer to the transport cell
resulted from his previous cell A204 being “removed from service due to the damage caused by
[p]laintiff.” (Id. at PageID 167).
Mr. Whitfield has failed to raise a genuine issue of fact as to the denial of a mattress
because deprivation of a mattress for 48 hours does not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation. See Jones v. Toombs, No. 95-1395, 1996 WL 67750, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb.15, 1996)
(“The defendants did not violate [the plaintiff’s] Eighth Amendment rights by depriving him of a
mattress for a two week period.”) (citing Schroeder v. Kaplan, No. 93-17123, 1995 WL 398878,
at *2 (9th Cir. July 7, 1995) (denial of mattress for four weeks did not violate the Constitution)).
“[C]ourts in the Sixth Circuit have routinely rejected Eighth Amendment claims for mattress
restrictions,” i.e., the denial of a mattress. Cook v. Leitheim, No. 1:22-cv-630, 2022 WL
3040342, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 2, 2022). See also Cooper v. Montgomery Cnty., Ohio, No.
3:13-cv-272, 2017 WL 2841678, at *10 (S.D. Ohio June 30, 2017), aff’d sub nom. Cooper v.
Montgomery Cnty., Ohio Sheriff’s Dep’t, 768 F. App’x 385 (6th Cir. 2019) (noting, in a case
brought by a pretrial detainee, that “[a]s a general rule, courts have held that short-term
deprivations of a mattress pass constitutional muster.”). Therefore, Mr. Whitfield’s allegation
that he slept without a mat or mattress for 48 hours fails to allege a sufficiently serious
deprivation in this respect. Richmond, 450 F. App’x at 455 (deprivation of a mattress and
bedding for a fixed period of time does not violate the Eighth Amendment”).
e. 	Lack of Running Water
Similarly, to the extent Mr. Whitfield seeks to assert a Fourteenth Amendment claim
against defendants for housing him in a cell without running water (Doc. 39 at PageID 194, 199,
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207), his claims do not rise to the level of an actionable unconstitutional conditions of
confinement claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Taper v. Branch, No. 1:23-cv-806,
2024 WL 2862527, at *4, *10 (S.D. Ohio June 6, 2024), report and recommendation adopted,
No. 1:23-cv-806, 2024 WL 3163916 (S.D. Ohio June 24, 2024) (finding that an inmate awaiting
transport who was “housed in a condemned cell . . . that had black mold, roaches, rats, and no
running water” for 15 days “fail[ed] to allege facts showing the type of extreme deprivations
necessary to sustain a plausible Eighth Amendment claim.”) (collecting cases). Defendant
Eversole states in his affidavit that Mr. Whitfield was offered showers and “declined . . . on
several occasions” (Doc. 36-3 at PageID 186, ¶ 7), which Mr. Whitfield does not refute except to
state that “showers are monitored therefore uncomfortable.” (Doc. 39 at PageID 205). See
Johnson v. Cool, No. 1:22-cv-00031, 2024 WL 3992412, at *11 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 29, 2024),
report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 360607 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 31, 2025) (finding that a
“14-day period without a shower would rise to the level of an extreme deprivation when a 6-day
period does not do so”) (citing Richmond, 450 F. App’x at 455). See also Richmond, 450 F.
App’x at 455 (denying an inmate access to running water, or the ability to shower for six days
not actionable); Wiley v. Kentucky Dep’t of Corr., No. 11-cv-97, 2012 WL 5878678, at *2 (E.D.
Ky. Nov. 21, 2012) (finding that being “confined for two weeks in a ‘dry cell’ with no running
water” did not give rise to a constitutional claim).
Further, Mr. Whitfield has failed to raise a genuine issue of fact as to the subjective
element of a Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claim because he has not shown
that defendants demonstrated deliberate indifference to an excessive risk to his health and safety.
Mr. Whitfield alleges he felt “dizzy” and “physically drained . . . presumably from a lack of
fluids” but he offers no medical evidence to support this conclusory claim. (Doc. 39 at PageID
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207). See also Benson v. Carlton, 229 F.3d 1150 (6th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff's “allegation that he
suffered a whirling sensation in his head after his fear of [defendant correctional officer] caused
him to skip supper constitutes a de minimus injury and does not support a claim for mental or
emotional suffering under the Eighth Amendment and § 1997e(e).”) (citing Siglar v. Hightower,
112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997)). Nor does he allege that defendants denied him fluids
altogether; rather, he alleges only that there was no running water in his cell.
f. 	24/7 Lighting
Finally, as to Mr. Whitfield’s allegations that he was subjected to continuous 24-hour
illumination, he failed to produce sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue that this condition
“posed a serious risk to his health or safety.” McKerchie v. Wrigglesworth, No. 1:23-cv-1319,
2024 WL 1210774, at *9 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 2024) (finding “24/7 daytime illuminating light”
in inmate’s cell for over 3 months failed to state a Fourteenth Amendment conditions of
confinement claim when inmate failed to demonstrate it created a serious risk of harm). While
Mr. Whitfield states he suffered headaches, and blurred and double vision, he offers only his
affidavit, which is unsupported by medical records, as evidence that the challenged conditions
posed a substantial risk of serious harm or caused him any injury. See Edge, 2021 WL 3725988.
Further, his claim regarding constant illumination fails the subjective element of a
Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claim by failing to present evidence that
defendants “acted ‘deliberately’ and ‘recklessly “in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm
that is either known or so obvious that it should be known.” O'Neill v. Adams Cnty. Jail, No.
1:23-CV-200, 2024 WL 3754879, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 12, 2024) (quoting Brawner, 14 F.4th at
596). Plaintiff argues that defendants were “well aware of the lights” and therefore
“intentionally and/or recklessly disregarded the known risk of constant illumination. . . .” (Doc.
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39 at PageID 204). Although Mr. Whitfield’s submitted grievance states that his “holding cell
light never turns off” he does not report any related medical complaints or describe any
deprivations he suffered as a result. (Doc. 36-3 at PageID 187). While it is clear defendants
were aware that the lights in the transport cells never shut off, Mr. Whitfield presents no
evidence from which the Court can infer that defendants were aware of his alleged sleep
deprivation and visions issues and “deliberately ignored them.” Pouncy v. Bush, No. 1:23-cv-
280, 2023 WL 3243476, at *10 (W.D. Mich. May 4, 2023) (citing Chavarria v. Stacks, 102 F.
App’x 433, 434-35 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that constant illumination of a prison administrative
unit at night in order to prevent guards from being assaulted was a reasonable security measure
and thus did not violate the Eighth Amendment, even when inmate reported “the lighting was
causing him to lose sleep.”)).
Further, defendants state that they “did not control or alter the lighting” in plaintiff’s cell
and that “[t]he lighting conditions were no different than [they were for] any other inmates
placed in it.” (Doc. 36 at PageID 171). Pouncy, 2023 WL 3243476, at *10 (citing Chavarria,
102 F. App’x at 436 (finding that even if plaintiff had alleged his sleep deprivation resulting
from the 24/7 lighting was “sufficiently serious to be cognizable under the Eighth Amendment,
[he] cannot establish an Eighth Amendment violation because he cannot show that his
deprivation is unnecessary and wanton.”) and Zatko v. Rowland, 835 F. Supp. 1174, 1181 (N.D.
Cal. 1993) (dismissing plaintiff’s claim that constant illumination in his cell deprived him of
sleep when plaintiff admitted that guards did not “unnecessarily use the light to keep [plaintiff]
awake.”)).
Lastly, the defendants allege the lighting in the transport cells serves a legitimate
penological purpose. Defendant Eversole states in his affidavit that “[t]ransport Cells are also
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used as observation rooms for high risk inmates. Lights remain illuminated in order to view
these inmates in order to maintain security and the welfare of the inmate.” (Ex., C, Doc. 36-3 at
PageID 187, ¶ 5, Eversole Aff.). See Reynolds v. Herrington, No. 4:13cv-P132-M, 2014 WL
1330190, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 1, 2014) (finding that courts have failed to find that constant
illumination is a constitutional violation when done for legitimate penological reasons) (citing
Williams v. Ward, 567 F. Supp. 10, 15 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that keeping hallway lights on
all night for security reasons was not a constitutional violation even where plaintiff claimed he
was unable to sleep)). Plaintiff has failed to present evidence creating an issue of fact on the
subjective element of this claim.
In construing the facts alleged by plaintiff in the light most favorable to him, the Court
finds that none of the conditions of confinement he identifies are severe enough to constitute
objectively serious harm, and Mr. Whitfield has failed to create a genuine issue of fact as to
whether defendants were deliberately indifferent to an excessive risk to his health and safety.
Accordingly, the Court recommends that defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Mr.
Whitfield’s conditions of confinement claim against defendant Eversole and Evers be
GRANTED.
g. 	Qualified Immunity
Defendants Eversole and Evers are also entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified
immunity “shields ‘government officials performing discretionary functions . . . from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Barker v. Goodrich,
649 F.3d 428, 433 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 475 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
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Once a defendant raises a qualified immunity defense to a claimed constitutional violation, the
plaintiff must satisfy a two-pronged analysis: (1) Taken in the light most favorable to the party
asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show that the official’s conduct violated a constitutional
right, and (2) if a violation could be made out on a favorable view of plaintiff’s submissions, was
the right clearly established at the time of the injury. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001),
overruled in part by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). As the Court determines that
plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of fact as to his Fourteenth Amendment conditions of
confinement claim, defendants’ request for qualified immunity should likewise be GRANTED.
See Courtright v. City of Battle Creek, 839 F.3d 513, 518 (6th Cir. 2016) (finding that if one
prong of the qualified immunity analysis “is not satisfied, then qualified immunity shields the
government officer from civil damages.”).
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 62) be GRANTED on all claims.
Date: 	_________________________
Karen L. Litkovitz
United States Magistrate Judge
2/20/2026
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
CALEB WHITFIELD, 	Case No. 3:24-cv-244
Plaintiff, 	Rose, J
Litkovitz, M.J.
vs.
SERGEANT EVERS, et al.,
Defendants.
NOTICE
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written
objections to this Report & Recommendation within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being
served with a copy thereof. This period may be extended further by the Court on timely motion
by either side for an extension of time. Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report
objected to and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If
the Report and Recommendation is based in whole or in part upon matters occurring on the
record at an oral hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the
record, or such portions of it as all parties may agree upon, or the Magistrate Judge deems
sufficient, unless the assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another
party’s objections WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make
objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn,
474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
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