Hunter v. Kettering Medical Center et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON
LISA HUNTER,
Plaintiff, 	Case No. 3:23-cv-267
vs.
KETTERING MEDICAL CENTER, et al., 	District Judge Michael J. Newman
Magistrate Judge Peter B. Silvain, Jr.
Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER: (1) DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc.
No. 18) AS TO COUNTS 1 AND 2; (2) GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. No. 18) AS TO COUNT 3; AND (3) DENYING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. No. 20)
______________________________________________________________________________
This civil case is before the Court on the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment.
Doc. Nos. 18, 20. Plaintiff Lisa Hunter alleges, through counsel and in her three-count complaint,
claims 	against 	Defendants 	Kettering 	Medical 	Center 	and 	Kettering 	Adventist 	Healthcare
(“Defendants”)1, for failure to accommodate, disability discrimination and retaliation in violation
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and the Ohio Civil
Rights Act, Ohio Rev. Code 4112.01, et seq. Doc. No. 1.
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. 	Doc. No. 18. 	Plaintiff opposed the
motion (Doc. No. 48), and Defendants filed a reply (Doc. No. 51). Plaintiff then filed a “response,”
which the Court interpreted as a sur-reply. Doc. No. 54. Plaintiff also filed a motion for partial
1 It is undisputed that Plaintiff was employed by Defendant Kettering Medical Center. Doc. No. 17-2 at
PageID 196-97. Defendants argue Kettering Adventist Healthcare, though, is an improper party and all
claims against it should be dismissed; they do not, however, cite any evidence to support their position. See
Doc. No. 18 at PageID 739. Because Kettering Adventist Healthcare and/or its agents were involved in the
facts of this case, including the interactive process, Defendant Kettering Adventist Healthcare is a proper
party. See, e.g., Doc. No. 17-1 at PageID 92-94; 97.
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summary judgment. Doc. No. 20. Defendants responded (Doc. No. 47), and Plaintiff replied (Doc.
No. 52). Thus, the cross-motions for summary judgment are now ripe for review.
The Court finds there are genuine disputes of material fact regarding Plaintiff’s claims as
to complaint counts 1 and 2 (i.e., failure to accommodate and disability discrimination). As such,
the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to those counts. 	Because
Plaintiff does not intend to pursue complaint count 3 (i.e., retaliation) and withdraws that claim in
her summary judgment opposition memorandum (Doc. No. 48 at PageID 860), the Court
GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to that count only. 	Finally, the Court
DENIES Plaintiff’s partial motion for summary judgment as to complaint counts 1 and 2 (i.e.,
failure to accommodate and disability discrimination).
I. Summary Judgment Standard
A motion for summary judgment should be granted if the evidence submitted to the Court
demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled
to summary judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
“Summary judgment is only appropriate ‘if . . . depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’”
Keweenaw Bay Indian Comm. v. Rising, 477 F.3d 881, 886 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c)). 	“Weighing of the evidence or making credibility determinations are prohibited at
summary judgment – rather, all facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party.” Id. Once “a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, an
opposing party may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading[.]” Viergutz v.
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Lucent Techs., Inc., 375 F. App’x 482, 485 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Instead, the party
opposing summary judgment has a shifting burden and “must – by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule – set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” 	Id. (citation
omitted).
II. Undisputed Facts
Plaintiff was hired in September 2021 to work in the Medical-Surgery 5 Unit at Soin
Medical Center in Beavercreek, Ohio. 	Doc. No. 17-2 at PageID 196-97. 	When she was hired,
Plaintiff had around fifty percent (50%) hearing loss in both ears, and she used hearing aids to
partially mitigate her hearing impairment. Doc. No. 17-4 at PageID 399. Upon starting her job,
Plaintiff informed her supervisor of her hearing impairment. Id. at PageID 386; Doc. No. 17-2 at
PageID 199. 	On November 27, 2021, Plaintiff had a sudden, full loss of hearing in her left ear
while at work. 	Doc. No. 17-4 at PageID 398-99. 	Plaintiff then left work. 	Id. at PageID 400.
Despite communication between Plaintiff and Defendants, Plaintiff did not return to work in her
nursing position. Doc. No. 17-2 at PageID 273-74; 280; Doc. No. 17-4 at PageID 615.
Defendants told Plaintiff she was free to apply to other positions in Defendants’ network.
Doc. No. 17-4 at PageID 508-12. 	She was not hired into any of the positions to which she
submitted applications. Id. Plaintiff was notified of her termination by letter on March 30, 2022.
Id. at PageID 513, 618.
III. Analysis
The Court, having reviewed the record carefully—including the parties’ briefs, the
opposition memoranda in the case, and the summary judgment evidence—finds there are several
genuine disputes of material fact which preclude summary judgment for either party. 	See, e.g.,
White v. Wyndham Vacation Ownership, Inc., 617 F.3d 472, 475–76 (6th Cir. 2010). The facts are
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such that a jury could reasonably find for either party. 	See, e.g., Marshall v. The Rawlings Co.
LLC, 854 F.3d 368, 381 (6th Cir. 2017). Among other disputed issues of fact, the parties genuinely
dispute the accommodation(s) offered to Plaintiff; when and how those accommodations were
communicated to Plaintiff; and whether, under the unique facts of this case, those accommodations
were timely offered and were reasonable within the meaning of the ADA and state law. Compare
Doc. No. 17-2 at PageID 262, and Doc. No. 17-5 at PageID 654, with Doc. No. 17-4 at PageID
396-97.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED as to counts 1 and 2
(i.e., failure to accommodate and disability discrimination), but GRANTED as to count 3 (i.e.,
retaliation). Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment is DENIED. This case was recently
referred to Magistrate Judge Peter B. Silvain, Jr. as mediation coordinator. Should the parties not
settle during mediation, this matter will promptly be scheduled for trial.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
March 18, 2026 	s/Michael J. Newman
Hon. Michael J. Newman
United States District Judge
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