Walker v. Bradley et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
MAURICE L. WALKER,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:25-cv-1474
Judge James L. Graham
v. 	Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Preston
Deavers
CHARLES E. BRADLEY, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Maurice L. Walker, proceeding pro se, initiated this action by filing an
application to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 1.) The Motion (ECF No. 1) is
GRANTED. All judicial officers who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs
had been prepaid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). It is ORDERED that Plaintiff be allowed to prosecute
his action without prepayment of fees or costs.
This matter is also before the Court for an initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint (Compl.,
ECF No. 1-1) under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A to identify cognizable claims and to
recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious,
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A. For the reasons below, the
Undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint.
I. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to
“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992).
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In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are
assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from
filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e)1 as part of the
statute, which provides in pertinent part:
(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the
court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that--
* 	* 	*
(B) the action or appeal--
(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or . . . .
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, Section 1915(e)
requires sua sponte dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is
frivolous or malicious, or upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.
“A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous when the plaintiff cannot make any claim
with a rational or arguable basis in fact or law.” Brown v. Kruse, No. 1:15-CV-526, 2015 WL
5907557, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 24, 2015) (citing Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328–29), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 1:15-CV-526, 2015 WL 5836009 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 7, 2015). “An
action has no arguable legal basis when the . . . plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest
which clearly does not exist. An action has no arguable factual basis when the allegations are
delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or wholly incredible.” Id. (citations and quotations
1 Formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).
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omitted). The Court does not need to accept as true factual allegations that are fantastical or
delusional. Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the
basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also
Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standards
to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint
must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual demands on the
authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502,
503 (6th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original).
Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . [a]
pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action,’” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
The Court holds pro se complaints “‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.’” Garrett v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., No. 08-3978, 2010 WL 1252923, at *2 (6th
Cir. April 1, 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient
treatment, however, has limits: “‘courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim
asserted.’” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v.
Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).
In addition, when it is evident from the face of the complaint that a court lacks federal
jurisdiction, the court may dismiss an action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under both 28
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U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3). Williams v. Cincy Urban
Apts., No. 1:10-CV-153, 2010 WL 883846, at *2 n.1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 9, 2010) (citing Carlock v.
Williams, 182 F.3d 916, 1999 WL 454880, at *2 (6th Cir. June 22, 1999) (table)).
II. 	ANALYSIS
The Undersigned concludes that Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff purports to sue Defendants2 pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Compl. at PageID 6.) Plaintiff identifies “Uniform Commercial Code 3-311,
3-603,” “Public Policy HJR 192, 73rd Congress, 1st Session,” and 18 U.S.C. Section 241 as his
federal constitutional or statutory rights(s) that unidentified state or local officials allegedly
violated. (Id.)
In support, Plaintiff asserts the following:
On or about May 9, 2023, I Maurice L. Walker caused to be sent via
certified 	mail 	to 	Charles 	E. 	Bradley 	Jr. 	CEO 	CONSUMER
PORTFOLIO SERVICES, INC. located at 19500 Jamboree RD.,
Ste 600 a “Bill Of Exchange” to satisfy debt per HJR 192.
On or about August 16, 2025 at 3:56pm, my personal private vehicle
was unlawfully confiscated and impounded by the City of Columbus
police Officer Vincent Farrand #3395 and the City of Columbus
Impound Lot.
On or about September 15, 2025 Charles E. Bradley Jr. refused to
satisfy debt per HJR 192 & UCC 3- 603 and release lien from my
private vehicle. CEO C. Bradley Jr. and the City of Columbus have
engaged in depriving me of my rights and private personal property
in which interest lies with me.
2 Plaintiff names Charles E. Bradley as Defendant in his caption but identifies both Charles E.
Bradley and “CONSUMER PORTFOLIO SERVCES, INC.” as Defendants in his Complaint.
(Compl. at PageID 1, 4, 5.) The Court will consider both Mr. Bradley and “CONSUMER
PORTFOLIO SERVCES, INC” as Defendants.
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(Id. at PageID 8.) Plaintiff contends that his “body, rights, and property” and/or “rights and
property” have been “wronged and or harmed” by Officer Farrand, Defendant Bradley, City of
Columbus, and “the Impound Lot.” (Id.)
42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows a plaintiff to seek redress from state actors for “the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.” Nelson v. Campbell, 541
U.S. 637, 643 (2004). To state a cause of action under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) a
deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States (2) caused by a
person acting under color of state law.” Hunt v. Sycamore Cmty. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 542
F.3d 529, 534 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff fails to identify a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States
that Defendants purportedly violated.3 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Bradley’s refusal to
“satisfy debt per HJR 192 & UCC 3- 603 and release lien from [his] private vehicle” deprived
him of his rights and private personal property. (Compl. at PageID 8.) Construing Plaintiff’s
Complaint liberally, it appears that “HJR 192” refers to House Joint Resolution 192, a “joint
resolution to establish a national policy relating to conversion to the metric system in the United
States.” H.R.J. Res. 192, 93rd Cong. (1973). “UCC 3-603” appears to refer to a section of a
generic version of the Uniform Commercial Code titled “Tender of Payment.” Neither “HJR
192” nor “UCC 3-603” are federal laws. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege the first
3 Plaintiff also lists Uniform Commercial Code 3-311 and 18 U.S.C. § 241 as rights that he
contends were violated. (Compl. at PageID 6.) Plaintiff, however, fails to allege that either
Defendant violated UCC 3-311 or 18 U.S.C. § 241. Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764
(6th Cir. 2002) (providing that “a complaint must allege that the defendants were personally
involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights” to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted under § 1983). In addition, Uniform Commercial Code 3-311 is not a federal law, and
42 U.S.C. § 241 does not provide for relief through a civil suit. “Absent a private right of action,
a plaintiff cannot recover civilly for violation of a criminal statute.” Milam v. Southaven Police
Dep’t, No. 15-CV-02029, 2015 WL 1637937, at *7 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 13, 2015).
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element of a § 1983 claim. The Undersigned need not address whether Plaintiff meets the
second element as both elements are required to plausibly state a claim. Williams v. US Corr.,
LLC, No. 3:19-CV-00463, 2019 WL 4644239, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 24, 2019) (“Thus, to state
a Section 1983 claim, Plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person
acting under color of state law.”) (emphasis added).
In sum, the Undersigned finds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted and RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS
the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted.
The Undersigned FURTHER RECOMMENDS that the Court certify pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that for the foregoing reasons an appeal of any Order adopting this Report
and Recommendation would not be taken in good faith and therefore deny Plaintiff leave to
appeal in forma pauperis. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).
PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS
If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, that
party may, within 14 DAYS, file and serve on all parties any objections to the Report and
Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part in
question, as well as the basis for objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
Responses to objections must be filed within 14 DAYS after being served with a copy. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b).
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The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object to the Report and
Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo review of by the District Judge
and waiver of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. Even when timely
objections are filed, appellate review of issues not raised in those objections is waived. Robert v.
Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate judge’s report,
which fails to specify the issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for appeal . .
. .” (citation omitted)).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: January 12, 2026 	/s/ Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers
ELIZABETH A. PRESTON DEAVERS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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