Smigelski v. Amazon.com Inc et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
ANDREW SMIGELSKI,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:25-cv-1342
v. 	Judge Edmund A. Sargus
Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson
AMAZON.COM INC, et al.,
Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The matter before the Court is an initial screen of Plaintiff Andrew Smigelski’s pro se
Complaint 	under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1915(e)(2). 	For 	the 	following 	reasons, 	the 	Undersigned
RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 8) be DISMISSED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s Complaint paints a picture of a grand conspiracy, with him at the center. He sues
Amazon.com, Inc. (“Amazon”), Amazon’s Chief Executive Officer Andy Jassy, and unidentified
John Doe “FBI agents or federal contractors.” (Doc. 8 at 2).
According to the Complaint, in September 2024, Plaintiff filed a Freedom of Information
Act (“FOIA”) request with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”). 	(Id.). 	He alleges that
“within days” Amazon and its agents began “tampering” with his packages. (Id. at 2–3 (alleging his
packages came in “counterfeit boxes” that used “non-standard materials” and showed “visible
evidence of tampering”)). Though he contacted various customer service teams and Defendant Jassy
to complain, Plaintiff says “Amazon never investigated” and once told him that one of his packages
was flagged for examining and resealing. (Id. at 3–5 (describing “seven-level[s]” of “obstruction”)).
In essence, Plaintiff believes that because of his FOIA request, federal agents and Amazon
are working in tandem to monitor him and open his packages. (See id. at 3–7). More specifically,
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he alleges that FBI agents “infiltrated Amazon’s supply chain and [are] using counterfeit Amazon
materials to conduct surveillance on customers.” (Id. at 6). Plaintiff believes that Amazon and its
CEO are either turning a blind eye to the “infiltration” or are “ratif[ying” the conduct. (Id. at 7).
Plaintiff brings federal claims for violation of his First and Fourth Amendment rights,
violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 and 1125 for “trademark counterfeiting,” and violation of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act under 18 U.S.C. § 2712. (Id. at 8–10). He also asserts state
law claims for negligence, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Id.).
Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at
11–12).
The Court previously observed that Plaintiff’s allegations are “fanciful to say the least.”
(Doc. 7 at 1). 	The Court allowed Plaintiff the chance to explain why his claims should not be
dismissed as frivolous. 	(Id. (also ordering Plaintiff to show cause why his Section 1983 claims
should not be dismissed as to Amazon and Jassy)). 	Plaintiff filed his response. 	(Doc. 10).
Consequently, the Undersigned can now conduct an initial screen of the Complaint.
II. 	STANDARD
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must dismiss the Complaint,
or any portion of it, that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2). Complaints by pro se litigants are to be construed liberally and held to less stringent
standards than those prepared by attorneys. Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004).
But this leniency is not boundless, and “it is not within the purview of the district court to conjure
up claims never presented.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 977 (6th Cir. 2012). At
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bottom, “basic pleading essentials” are still required, regardless of whether an individual proceeds
pro se. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).
These essentials are not onerous or overly burdensome. A complaint must contain “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” see Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2), and provide the defendant with “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation omitted).
In reviewing Plaintiff’s Complaint at this stage, the Court must construe it in his favor, accept all
well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and evaluate whether it contains “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 	Although this standard does not require “detailed factual
allegations, . . . [a] pleading that offers labels and conclusions” is insufficient. Id. at 678 (internal
quotation and quotation marks removed). In the end, the Court must dismiss the Complaint “if it
tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” 	Id. (internal quotation and
quotation marks omitted).
Courts also “understand § 1915(e)(2) to include screening for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.” Howard v. Good Samaritan Hosp., No. 1:21-cv-160, 2022 WL 92462, at *2 (S.D.
Ohio Jan. 10, 2022). 	Indeed, courts are obligated to consider whether they have subject matter
jurisdiction and may raise jurisdictional issues sua sponte. Klepsky v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,
489 F.3d 264, 268 (6th Cir. 2007). 	Additionally, the Sixth Circuit is clear that courts are
empowered to “sua sponte dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when the allegations of a complaint are
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totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of merit, or no longer open to
discussion.” Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). If a court finds
that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Quite simply, Plaintiff’s claims as pled are frivolous. 	Plaintiff premises his claims on
several allegations he says are connected: a FOIA request, the appearance or timing of his Amazon
packages, and customer service interactions (or lack thereof). (See generally Doc. 8; see also Doc.
10). But the connection between these events is too attenuated to state a claim. Despite assuring
the Court that they are linked (see Doc. 10), Plaintiff provides very factual little support beyond
his own conclusory allegations. For example, he has alleged no facts which allow the Undersigned
to reasonably infer that the FBI has “infiltrated” the Amazon supply chain. He has alleged no facts
which allow the Undersigned to reasonably infer that Amazon or its CEO surveilled him. 	And
even allowing that his Amazon packages looked anomalous or were opened pursuant to a policy,
he has alleged no facts which allow the Undersigned to reasonably infer that the appearance or
treatment of his packages was unlawfully nefarious. Without a reasonable basis for any of this,
Plaintiff’s claims fall apart. 	The Undersigned cannot rely only on Plaintiff’s conspiracy-tinged
suspicions.
In short, this is the type of case which this Court is empowered to dismiss as “totally
implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of merit, or no longer open to discussion.”
Apple, 183 F.3d at 479. And even if, as Plaintiff argues (Doc. 10), Apple does not apply here, the
Court may still dismiss frivolous claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 	Accordingly, the
Undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Complaint be DISMISSED.
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc.
8) be DISMISSED.
Date: January 15, 2026 /s/ Kimberly A. Jolson
KIMBERLY A. JOLSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS
If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, that
party may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve on all parties objections to the Report and
Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part in
question, as well as the basis for objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Response
to objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b).
The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object to the Report and
Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo review by the District Judge and
waiver of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. See, e.g., Pfahler v. Nat’l Latex
Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 816, 829 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that “failure to object to the magistrate
judge’s recommendations constituted a waiver of [the defendant’s] ability to appeal the district
court’s ruling”); United States v. Sullivan, 431 F.3d 976, 984 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that
defendant waived appeal of district court’s denial of pretrial motion by failing to timely object to
the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation). 	Even when timely objections are filed,
appellate review of issues not raised in those objections is waived. 	Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d
981, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate judge’s report, which fails to
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specify the issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for appeal . . . .”) (citation
omitted).
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