Docket Searcher LLC v. Gentry et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
DOCKET SEARCHER, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case Number 2:25-cv-485
Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.
Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura
BOYD WILLIAM GENTRY, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on two Motions to Dismiss: Defendant Midland Credit
Management Inc.’s (“Midland Credit”) Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 21) and Defendant Boyd
Gentry’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 25). For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS both
Motions.
BACKGROUND
This case stems from a series of subpoenas that were issued by Attorney Boyd Gentry in
three cases in Ohio state courts. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 19, ¶¶ 78–79.) Plaintiff Docket Searcher,
LLC (“DocketSearcher”), the recipient of the subpoenas, alleges that the subpoenas were
frivolous and intended to harass DocketSearcher. (Id. ¶ 135.)
DocketSearcher is a company that searches publicly available information and provides
the search results in various forms to its customers who requested the information. (Id. ¶ 40.) It
states that it has no control over what the customer does with the information after
DocketSearcher has provided it to the customer and that it has no “relevant evidence about any
civil matter pending in any court, other than what is publicly available over the Internet.” (Id.
¶¶ 46, 48.)
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DocketSearcher asserts that Mr. Gentry is an attorney who represents debt collection
companies that “regularly submit what appears to be manufactured evidence.” (Id. ¶ 64.)
According to DocketSearcher, Mr. Gentry regularly represents Midland Credit and Defendant
LVNV Funding LLC (“LVNV”). (Id. ¶¶ 66–67.) DocketSearcher alleges that Mr. Gentry
“continues to file questionable documents in numerous cases (including cases for Midland)”
despite “evidence of spoliation and evidence tampering.” (Id. ¶ 68.)
On March 31, 2025, DocketSearcher received via certified mail two subpoenas related to
two cases brought by Midland Credit, one in the Butler County Court of Common Pleas and the
other in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. (Id. ¶ 78.) About two weeks later,
DocketSearcher learned of a third subpoena related to a lawsuit brought by LVNV in the
Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas. (Id. ¶ 79.) The subpoenas commanded
DocketSearcher to attend depositions and produce documents at those depositions. (Id. ¶ 83.)
DocketSearcher asserts that the subpoenas were defective on their face because they “never
described with reasonable particularity the matters for examination.” (Id. ¶¶ 85–87.)
DocketSearcher contends that it has never had any involvement in the state-court cases,
and the defendants in those cases have never been clients of DocketSearcher nor had any
relationship with DocketSearcher. (Id. ¶¶ 88–102.) It argues that Defendants had no basis for
believing that DocketSearcher had any information about the underlying cases. (Id. ¶ 103.)
DocketSearcher informed Defendants that the subpoenas sought irrelevant information
and were unduly burdensome. (Id. ¶ 105.) In response, Mr. Gentry and Midland Credit amended
one of the subpoenas to command DocketSearcher to appear for a deposition at an earlier date,
making the subpoena “less reasonable and more burdensome.” (Id. ¶¶ 106–08.) DocketSearcher
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argues this shows that Defendants were using the subpoenas for “no substantial purpose other
than to embarrass, harass, or burden DocketSearcher.” (Id. ¶ 110.)
Midland Credit filed a memorandum in the Butler County case addressing the subpoena.
(Id. ¶ 113.) In the memorandum, it asserted that DocketSearcher “was involved in soliciting” the
defendant in that case to bring a counterclaim against Midland Credit, and that the defendant’s
proferred expert, Sam Han, had a financial interest in the counterclaim. (Id. ¶ 119–20.) For
context, according to Mr. Gentry, Sam Han is the organizing member of DocketSearcher and
was disclosed as a potential expert witness for the defendants in the underlying cases. (ECF No.
25, PageID 270.) DocketSearcher asserts that Midland Credit’s assertions in the memorandum
are false. (Am. Compl., ¶¶ 119–20.) The judge in that case quashed the subpoena and
commanded Mr. Gentry and Midland Credit to depose Sam Han, rather than DocketSearcher.
(Id. ¶¶ 127–28.) Midland Credit then issued a document subpoena to Sam Han “commanding
production of DocketSearcher’s financial documents, electronic documents, trade secrets, and
privileged documents.” (Id. ¶ 129.)
According to DocketSearcher, Midland Credit, and LVNV have not deposed Sam Han to
this day. (Id. ¶ 135.) DocketSearcher asserts this demonstrates that Defendants had no intention
of legitimately questioning Sam Han and instead issued the subpoenas to harass, oppress, or
abuse DocketSearcher. (Id.)
DocketSearcher filed this lawsuit to recoup damages that it alleges have resulted from
Defendants’ abuse of the litigation process and false representations in connection with the
“frivolous” subpoenas. (Id. ¶ 136.) DocketSearcher brings three counts against Defendants:
(1) violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq.,
(2) negligence, and (3) punitive damages. (Id. ¶¶ 137–217.)
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Mr. Gentry and Midland Credit each filed a Motion to Dismiss DocketSearcher’s
Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF Nos. 21, 25.)
DocketSearcher responded (ECF Nos. 26, 28), and Mr. Gentry and Midland Credit replied. (ECF
Nos. 27, 29.) Both Motions are now ripe for consideration.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 12(b)(6), Plaintiffs must satisfy the pleading requirements set forth in Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which requires a pleading to contain a “short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Accordingly,
“[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–
78 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678 (clarifying the
plausibility standard from Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Furthermore, “[a]lthough for the purposes
of a motion to dismiss [a court] must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true,
‘[the court is] not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (internal quotations omitted).
ANALYSIS
The Court first notes a preliminary matter regarding the subpoenas. Midland Credit
attached the subpoenas at issue as exhibits to its Motion. (See ECF Nos. 21-1, 21-2, 21-3.)
DocketSearcher does not dispute the inclusion of the subpoenas for the Court’s consideration.
(See ECF No. 26, PageID 309–10.) Because the subpoenas are extensively referred to in the
Amended Complaint and are central to DocketSearcher’s claims, the Court will take them into
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consideration when deciding the Motions. See Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate Ath. Ass’n, 528 F.3d
426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008) (On a motion to dismiss, the court “may consider the Complaint and any
exhibits attached thereto, public records, items appearing in the record of the case and exhibits
attached to defendant’s motion to dismiss so long as they are referred to in the Complaint and are
central to the claims contained therein.”).
Turning to the merits, Mr. Gentry and Midland Credit argue that all three of
DocketSearcher’s claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Court first
addresses Mr. Gentry’s and Midland Credit’s Motions to dismiss the FDCPA claim before
turning to the state-law claims.
I. 	Violations of the FDCPA
DocketSearcher alleges that Defendants violated the following FDCPA provisions:
• 	15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b): “ . . . [A] debt collector may not communicate, in connection
with the collection of any debt, with any person other than the consumer, his attorney,
a consumer reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney
of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector.” (Am. Compl., ¶ 143.)
• 	15 U.S.C. § 1692d: “A debt collector may not engage in any conduct the natural
consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with
the collection of a debt.” (Id. ¶ 153.)
• 	15 U.S.C. § 1692e: “A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading
representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” (Id. ¶ 161.)
• 	15 U.S.C. § 1692f: “A debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to
collect or attempt to collect any debt.” (Id. ¶ 168.)
Mr. Gentry first argues that DocketSearcher has failed to state a claim against him
because he is not a debt collector under the FDCPA. (ECF No. 25, PageID 273.) Additionally, he
and Midland Credit both argue that DocketSearcher’s FDCPA claim fails because the subpoenas
were not “communications in connection with the collection of a debt” under the FDCPA. (Id.
PageID 273–75; ECF No. 21, PageID 217–19.)
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The Court is not convinced that Mr. Gentry is not a debt collector under the FDCPA. See
Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 299 (1995) (“[T]he [FDCPA] applies to attorneys who
‘regularly’ engage in consumer-debt-collection activity, even when that activity consists of
litigation.”). Nevertheless, the Court need not analyze whether Mr. Gentry is a debt collector
under the statute because the subpoenas were not “communications in connection with the
payment of a debt,” as is required for recovery under the FDCPA.
According to the Sixth Circuit, “for a communication to be in connection with the
collection of a debt, an animating purpose of the communication must be to induce payment by
the debtor.” Grden v. Leikin Ingber & Winters PC, 643 F.3d 169, 173 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing
Gburek v. Litton Loan Serv. LP, 614 F.3d 380, 385 (7th Cir. 2010)). Although the “animating
purpose” of a communication is typically a question of fact for the jury to decide, on a motion to
dismiss, the court need only assess whether it is plausible that the purpose in sending the letter
was to induce payment, based on the facts alleged in the complaint. Estep v. Manley Deas
Kochalski, LLC, 552 F. App’x 502, 505 (6th Cir. 2014). When determining whether an animating
purpose of a communication is to induce payment by a debtor, factors to consider are:
(1) the nature of the relationship of the parties; (2) whether the communication
expressly demanded payment or stated a balance due; (3) whether it was sent in
response to an inquiry or request by the debtor; (4) whether the statements were
part of a strategy to make payment more likely; (5) whether the communication was
from a debt collector; (6) whether it stated that it was an attempt to collect a debt;
and (7) whether it threatened consequences should the debtor fail to pay.
Goodson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 600 F. App’x 422, 431 (6th Cir. 2015).
In light of the above factors, the Court concludes that inducing payment of a debt was not
an animating purpose of the subpoenas. DocketSearcher is not a debtor and has no relationship
with Midland Credit or Mr. Gentry. The subpoenas do not demand payment or state a balance
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due, nor do they express any intent to collect payment or threaten consequences for non-
payment.
DocketSearcher argues that the subpoenas “made the attempt to collect debt more likely
to succeed.” (ECF No. 26, PageID 318.) Although the litigation in the state-court cases could
conceivably proceed in a manner that ultimately results in payment of the alleged debts, the
connection between the subpoenas and any such payment is too attenuated. The subpoenas were
issued to a non-party as part of discovery in response to counterclaims brought against Midland
Credit and LVNV. DocketSearcher cites two non-binding cases for the proposition that an
improper subpoena can form the basis of an FDCPA claim. (Id. PageID 313–15, 317.) But those
cases are not on point. There, the “subpoenas” were issued to debtors as part of efforts to collect
their debts. See Simon v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 732 F.3d 259, 262–63 (3d Cir. 2013) (letter and
“notice of examination” sent to bankruptcy petitioners regarding possible discharge of their debt
if they agreed to pay a reduced amount); Kranz v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., No. SA-18-CV-
169-XR, 2020 WL 3899223, at *1 (W.D. Tex. July 10, 2020) (letter titled “subpoena” sent to
debtor post-judgment “as an aid of enforcement of execution”). Here, by contrast, the subpoenas
were issued to a third party for the purpose of questioning defendants’ proferred expert witness
about his financial interest in the state-court cases. As such, the subpoenas cannot be
characterized as communications in connection with the collection of a debt.
To be clear, the Court expresses no view as to whether the subpoenas were proper or
directed to the correct non-party. Rather, the Court concludes only that the animating purpose of
the subpoenas was not to induce payment of a debt, and therefore they were not
“communications in connection with the collection of a debt.” Thus, DocketSearcher’s FDCPA
claim cannot go forward.
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Mr. Gentry and Midland Credit have established that DocketSearcher has failed to state a
claim under the FDCPA. Accordingly, Mr. Gentry’s and Midland Credit’s Motions to Dismiss
the FDCPA claim are GRANTED. DocketSearcher’s FDCPA claim against Mr. Gentry and
Midland Credit is DISMISSED with prejudice.
II. 	DocketSearcher’s Remaining Claims
DocketSearcher also brings state-law claims for negligence and punitive damages. (Am.
Compl., ¶¶ 192–217.) A federal court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law
claims that constitute part of the same case or controversy as the claim over which the court has
original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. But a district court may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction when it has dismissed all claims over which it had original federal jurisdiction.
Id. § 1367(c)(3); see also Williams v. Addison Cmty. Schs., No. 25-1205, 2026 WL 575854, at *3
(6th Cir. Mar. 2, 2026).
“In determining whether to retain jurisdiction over state-law claims, a district court
should consider and weigh several factors, including the ‘values of judicial economy,
convenience, fairness, and comity.’” Gamel v. City of Cincinnati, 625 F.3d 949, 951 (6th Cir.
2010) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)). But “[i]f the federal
claims are dismissed before trial, the state claims generally should be dismissed as well.” Brooks
v. Rothe, 577 F.3d 701, 709 (6th Cir. 2009); see also Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply, 465 F.3d
719, 728 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[A] federal court that has dismissed a plaintiff's federal-law claims
should not ordinarily reach the plaintiff's state-law claims.”).
DocketSearcher’s federal claim is dismissed, and the remaining state-law claims do not
implicate significant federal interests to warrant the exercise of federal jurisdiction. The Court
therefore declines to “needlessly decid[e] state law issues.” Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp.,
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Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1993); see also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of
comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading
of applicable law.”). An Ohio state court is better equipped to interpret DocketSearcher’s
remaining claims. Accordingly, DocketSearcher’s negligence and punitive damages claims
are DISMISSED without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, (ECF No. 21) Defendant Midland Credit Management
Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and (ECF No. 25) Defendant Boyd Gentry’s Motion to
Dismiss is GRANTED. DocketSearcher’s FDCPA claim against Mr. Gentry and Midland Credit
is DISMISSED with prejudice. DocketSearcher’s remaining claims against Mr. Gentry and
Midland Credit are DISMISSED without prejudice. DocketSearcher’s claims against
Defendant LVNV Funding LLC remain.
This case remains open.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
3/17/2026 	s/Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.
DATE 	EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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