Monaco v. Perkins et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION AT COLUMBUS
JASON D. MONACO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
EDWARD PERKINS, et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 2:25-cv-378
District Judge Douglas R. Cole
Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson
OPINION & ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Stay. (Doc. 32). For the following reasons, the
Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the Motion. Specifically, the dispositive motion
deadline is STAYED, and discovery is STAYED in part. 	The parties are ORDERED to file
discovery status reports on or before November 21, 2025; December 12, 2025; and January 9,
2026. Defendants are ORDERED to file a status report discussing the continued prudence of the
partial stay on or before January 16, 2026.
I. 	BACKGROUND
As the Court recently explained, Plaintiff Jason Monaco, who is incarcerated at Noble
Correctional Institution (“NCI”), joins the ranks of numerous plaintiffs in Ohio challenging the
Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections’ mail policies.1 (Doc. 5). Briefly, his pro se
Complaint alleges that in February 2022, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections
1 “The following is a list of known cases that include a claim, or claims, relating to the Legal Mail Policy: 3:21-cv-
0035, 2:22-cv-0021, 2:22-cv-2469, 2:22-cv-3236, 2:22-cv-3604, 1:22-cv-0170, 2:23-cv-2809, 2:23-cv-3147, 2:24-cv-
0393, 2:24-cv-0676, 2:24-cv-0764, 2:25-cv-0143, 2:25-cv[-]0378, 1:25-cv-0501. In addition, there are numerous other
cases pending wherein plaintiffs have filed a motion asking for a control number or an order directing ODRC not to
open legal mail. Finally, a class action complaint has been filed challenging another variance to the Legal Mail Policy.
See Ohio Justice and Policy Center v. Chambers-Smith et al, 1:25-cv-0291.” Williams v. Chambers-Smith, et al., No.
2:24-cv-393 (S.D. Ohio), Doc. 36.
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(“ODRC”) Director Chambers-Smith “signed and approved” a new legal mail policy, 75-MAL-
03. (Doc. 5 at 2, 7). As this Court previously summarized, “[t]he policy requires senders of ‘legal
mail,’ including courts, attorneys, and legal organizations, to obtain a ‘control number’ from the
prisoner’s correctional institution. If the sender does not, the prison may treat the mail as ‘regular
mail’ and copy and inspect it outside of the prisoner’s presence.” Warner v. Chambers-Smith, No.
2:24-CV-1565, 2025 WL 1904537, at *1 (S.D. Ohio July 10, 2025); see Ohio Admin. Code 5120-
9-17(B)(2).
Since 75-MAL-03’s implementation, alleges Plaintiff, his mail from courts has been
opened outside of his presence, read, and copied by NCI mailroom employees on numerous
occasions. (Doc. 5 at 1–8). Plaintiff also alleges that on at least one occasion, mail from a federal
court was withheld without his knowledge and then returned to sender. (Id. at 3). All this occurred
despite Plaintiff telling NCI mailroom supervisor Edward Perkins in both November 2022 and
February 2023 that he wanted “all legal mail from the courts to be opened in front of [him] and
signed for by [him].” (Id. at 1–2). Yet, Perkins allegedly “continue[d] to instruct . . . his mailroom
staff to open, read[,] inspect and copy [Plaintiff’s] legal mail from the Federal Courts outside [his]
presence.” (Id. at 6; see also id. at 3–5 (listing instances between December 2022 and February
2025 when Plaintiff’s mail from this Court and the Northern District was opened outside of his
presence)).
The Court previously construed Plaintiff’s Complaint as raising the following claims
against Defendants in their individual capacities: violation of his First Amendment right to receive
legal mail; violation of his First Amendment right to access the courts; violation of the stipulated
legal mail order in Allah v. Chambers-Smith, No. 2:22-cv-21-EAS-KAJ (S.D. Ohio) (Doc. 91);
and civil conspiracy under Section 1983. (Doc. 6; see generally Doc. 5).
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Over the last several months, the parties have exchanged discovery. (See, e.g., Doc. 38).
As the case schedule currently stands, discovery must be completed by January 14, 2026, and
dispositive motions are due February 16. 	(Doc. 15). 	Now, though, Defendants seek to stay all
proceedings pending resolution of Shine-Johnson, et al. v. Chambers-Smith, et al., No. 2:22-cv-
3236 (S.D. Ohio) (“Shine-Johnson”). 	(Doc. 32; see also Doc. 43). 	Plaintiff opposes the stay.
(Doc. 40). This matter is ready for consideration.
II. 	STANDARD
“[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to
control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for
counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). The proponent of a
stay must “show that there is pressing need for delay, and that neither the other party nor the public
will suffer harm from entry of the order.” Ohio Env’t Council v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 565 F.2d 393, 396
(6th Cir. 1977). And while the “most important factor is the balance of the hardships,” the Court
must “also consider whether granting the stay will further the interest in economical use of judicial
time and resources.” 	Poffenbarger v. Kendall, No. 3:22-CV-1, 2022 WL 7180295, at *2 (S.D.
Ohio Sept. 2, 2022) (quoting F.T.C. v. E.M.A. Nationwide, Inc., 767 F.3d 611, 627–28 (6th Cir.
2014)) (citation modified).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Defendants seek an order staying this case during the pendency of Shine-Johnson. (Doc.
32). 	They purport that the similarities between this case and Shine-Johnson implicate judicial
economy concerns. (Id. at 3). They also note the Court’s order appointing the plaintiffs in Shine-
Johnson counsel and the upcoming dispositive motion deadline in that case. (Id.); but see Shine-
Johnson, Doc. 101 (granted joint motion to stay the discovery and the dispositive motions
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deadlines pending a decision on plaintiffs’ upcoming motion to amend the complaint)).
Ultimately, the Court finds that only a partial stay is justified here.
Up front, this Court has stayed several other cases challenging aspects of ODRC’s mail
policies until a decision is rendered in Shine-Johnson. See, e.g., Williams v. Chambers-Smith, et
al., No. 2:24-cv-393; Holmes v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, et. al., No.
2:23-cv-3147; Swain v. Chambers-Smith, et al., No. 2:23-cv-2809. In each, the Court found that
judicial economy justified the stay. 	Id. 	That judicial economy concern extends here because
aspects of this case overlap with aspects of Shine-Johnson. 	Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that
Defendants violated his constitutional rights by treating mail from courts as regular mail rather
than as legal mail. (Doc. 5 at 4–6). He, in large part, ties the alleged constitutional violations to
Chambers-Smith’s enactment of 75-MAL-03. (Id. at 7 (citing Sallier v. Brooks, 343 F.3d 868 (6th
Cir. 2003)). These issues mirror issues raised in Shine-Johnson. See Shine-Johnson, Doc. 47 at
11–13 (alleging Chambers-Smith “made changes” to 75-MAL-03 that allow prisons to open legal
mail outside of the presence of inmates in violation of constitutional rights), 15 (alleging mailroom
defendants, acting under the policy, impermissibly opened legal mail from courts)).
Plaintiff acknowledges these “parallel issues” between his case and Shine-Johnson. (Doc.
40 at 2 (specifically identifying the “constitutionality of the legal mail policy 75-MAL-03 and its
associated 5120-9-l 7(B)(2) Administrative Rule”)). 	Nonetheless, he submits that his case is
different. (Id. (citing Smith v. S.E.C., 129 F.3d 356, 361 (6th Cir. 1997)). Plaintiff points to his
individual claims—including that Defendant Perkins impermissibly opened or held legal mail—
as being too different from anything alleged in Shine-Johnson to warrant slowing his case. (Id. at
2–3). 	He argues that a stay will only delay discovery he needs to litigate all his individualized
claims. (Id.).
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While Plaintiff attempts to minimize Shine-Johnson’s similarity to this matter, the
constitutionality of 75-MAL-03 and how ODRC defines legal mail are central to both cases.
Accordingly, judicial economy favors staying at least part of this matter while the Court considers
Shine-Johnson. See Poffenbarger, 2022 WL 7180295, at *2; Williams, No. 2:24-cv-393; Holmes,
No. 2:23-cv-3147; Swain, No. 2:23-cv-2809. 	Still, Plaintiff’s concerns about discovery are not
unfounded. 	As he states, there are parts of this case that are particular to him. 	It follows that
Plaintiff should still be allowed to probe those matters now. This outcome sufficiently balances
the burden of a stay on Plaintiff while also preserving judicial economy.
Accordingly, the Court PARTIALLY STAYS this case. Specifically, the Court STAYS
the dispositive motions deadline. 	The Court also STAYS discovery related to ODRC’s mail
policies at large and ODRC’s general treatment of legal mail. 	The parties may proceed on
discovery concerning Plaintiff’s individualized claims. 	Namely, Plaintiff may seek discovery
related to his allegations that his mail was impermissibly opened and copied outside of his
presence; and related to his allegations that his mail was impermissibly held or returned to sender.
To facilitate the continued exchange of this discovery, the parties are ORDERED to confer
on a discovery plan. The Court observes that the parties previously did some of this work. (Doc.
38 (joint status report describing some discovery Plaintiff intends to seek)). But they are required
to confer again and collaboratively decide (1) which of Plaintiff’s pending or upcoming discovery
requests fall within the scope of discovery allowed to proceed under this Order; and (2) what
individualized discovery Plaintiff still requires. 	The Court expects both sides to approach this
conference in good faith. 	The parties are ORDERED to file a joint status report on or before
November 21, 2025. The report should provide an update on the conference, detail what discovery
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has been completed thus far, and describe the parties’ plan to complete the remaining discovery
for Plaintiff’s individual claims.
In that same vein, the discovery deadline in this case is currently January 14, 2026. (Doc.
15). The Court will maintain this deadline for the discovery permitted to continue under this Order.
The parties are ORDERED to file two more joint status reports detailing their progress. The first
is due on or before December 12, 2025. And the second is due on or before January 9, 2026.
Lastly, Defendants are ORDERED to file another status report, updating the Court on the
continued advisability of the partial stay in light of developments in Shine-Johnson. This report
is due on or before January 16, 2026. 	The Court notes that should the disposition of Shine-
Johnson be continually postponed, the Court may entertain lifting the stay in this case.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’
Motion to Stay. (Doc. 32). The dispositive motion deadline is STAYED, and, as explained above,
discovery is STAYED in part. The parties are ORDERED to file discovery status reports on or
before November 21, 2025; December 12, 2025; and January 9, 2026. Defendants are ORDERED
to file a status report discussing the continued prudence of the partial stay on or before January 16,
2026.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: November 7, 2025 	s/ Kimberly A. Jolson
KIMBERLY A. JOLSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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