Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
JAMES C. 1 	Case No. 2:25-cv-231
Plaintiff, 	Graham, J.
v. 	Bowman, M.J.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff James C. filed this Social Security appeal in order to challenge the
Defendant’s finding that he is not disabled. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Proceeding through
counsel, Plaintiff presents one claim of error, which the Defendant disputes. As explained
below, 	the 	Administrative 	Law 	Judge 	(ALJ)’s 	finding 	of 	non-disability 	should 	be
AFFIRMED, because it is supported by substantial evidence in the administrative record.
I. 	Summary of Administrative Record
On August 3, 2018, Plaintiff protectively filed an application for child’s insurance
benefits based on disability. 	Plaintiff also filed an application for supplemental security
income on December 23, 2019. In both applications, Plaintiff alleged disability beginning
July 28, 2016. These claims were denied initially on October 30, 2020, and upon
reconsideration on April 27, 2021. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a timely written request for
hearing and an administrative hearing, by video, was held on January 10, 2022. 	At the
hearing, Plaintiff represented by counsel, appeared and testified. (Tr. 54). Millie Droste,
1 The Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the
United States has recommended that, due to significant privacy concerns in social security cases, federal
courts should refer to claimants only by their first names and last initials. See General Order 22-01.
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an impartial vocational expert, also testified at the hearing. Further, the claimant’s
stepfather, Nicholas Randolf testified as a witness. Thereafter on March 8, 2022, an ALJ
issued an unfavorable decision, concluding that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Tr. 22).
Plaintiff filed a timely request for review of the ALJ’s decision with the Appeals Council.
By order dated January 27, 2023, the Appeals Council refused to review the decision of
the ALJ and the ALJ’s decision therefore became the final decision of the Commissioner.
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a Complaint with this Court, however, before the Court
entered its opinion, Plaintiff filed a subsequent application for SSI benefits on June 15,
2023. (Tr. 1251). The Court issued an Order dated March 26, 2024, remanding Plaintiff’s
case to the Commissioner for a new administrative hearing. (Tr. 1377). A new hearing
was held with Administrative Law Judge Irma Flottman considering the entirety of
Plaintiff’s SSI claim. (Tr. 1258). The ALJ issued a new decision, again denying benefits
to Plaintiff dated December 12, 2024. (Tr. 1215).
Plaintiff was born on February 4, 1996, and was 20 years old on his alleged onset
date of disability. 2 He has a high school education and has no past relevant work.
Based upon the record and testimony presented at the hearing, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff had the following severe impairments:
“Title II Child Disability Benefit (CDB) claim as of 2/4/2018 (age 22): learning
disorder with specific impairment in mathematics and written expression; affective
disorders; generalized anxiety disorder; history of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
(ADHD); schizophrenia; and intermittent explosive disorder (IED). Title XVI Protective
2 To be entitled to CIB, a claimant who is 18 years or older must show that he is an insured person’s
child, is dependent on the insured, applied, is unmarried, and had a disability that began before 22 years
old. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.350
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Filing Date (PFD) (reopening 8/2/2018): learning disorder; Generalized anxiety disorder;
ADHD; personality disorder/IED; schizoaffective/schizophrenia disorder; and IED.” 	(Tr.
1221). 	The ALJ concluded that none of Plaintiff’s impairments alone or in combination
met or medically equaled a listed impairment in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subp. P, Appendix
1. 	Despite these impairments, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retains the RFC to
perform the full range of work at all exertional levels subject to the following limitations:
Mentally, 	he 	is 	capable 	of 	work 	in 	an 	environment 	with 	goal-based
production, where work is measured by the end result not pace work. He
could perform simple, routine, repetitive tasks; would be allowed off task 5
percent of the day; could perform a low stress job, defined as occasional
changes in work setting and occasional decision making required; could
work in a setting where others maybe around, but he is more off by himself;
could have no interaction with the public and only occasional interaction
with coworkers and supervisors; and would require supervision where the
supervisor checks work 1-2 times per day. (Title II CDB claim only).
Concerning the Title XVI claim, he has the residual functional capacity to
perform less than the full range of medium work except frequent balancing,
stooping, kneeling, crouching, and climbing ramps and stairs; occasional
crawling and climbing ladders, ropes and scaffolds. Mentally, he is capable
of simple, routine, and repetitive tasks. He is able to work in an environment
with goal-based production, where work is measured by the end result not
pace work. His work would be allowed off task 5 percent of the day. He
should have no interaction with the public and only occasional interaction
with coworkers and supervisors. He could work in a setting where others
may be around, but he is more off by himself. Further, he would require
supervision where the supervisor checks work 1 -2 times per day. He would
require a low stress job, defined as occasional changes in work setting and
occasional decision-making required.
(Tr. 1225). Based upon his RFC and testimony from the vocational expert, the ALJ
concluded that Plaintiff could not perform his prior work but could perform other jobs that
exist in significant numbers in the national economy, including janitor, hand packager,
and laundry worker. (Tr. 1241). Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff is not under
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disability, as defined in the Social Security Regulations, and is not entitled to CIB or SSI.
(Tr. 1241).
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. 	Therefore, the ALJ’s
decision stands as the Defendant’s final determination. On appeal to this Court, Plaintiff
argues that the ALJ erred by failing to properly evaluate the opinion of Dr. Rowland.
Plaintiff’s contention is not well taken.
I. 	Analysis
A. Judicial Standard of Review
To be eligible for benefits, a claimant must be under a “disability.” See 42 U.S.C.
§1382c(a). 	Narrowed to its statutory meaning, a “disability” includes only physical or
mental impairments that are both “medically determinable” and severe enough to prevent
the applicant from (1) performing his or her past job and (2) engaging in “substantial
gainful activity” that is available in the regional or national economies. See Bowen v. City
of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 469-70 (1986).
When a court is asked to review the Commissioner’s denial of benefits, the court’s
first inquiry is to determine whether the ALJ’s non-disability finding is supported by
substantial evidence. 	42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 	Substantial evidence is “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (additional citation and internal quotation
omitted). 	In conducting this review, the court should consider the record as a whole.
Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359, 362 (6th Cir. 1978). If substantial evidence supports
the ALJ’s denial of benefits, then that finding must be affirmed, even if substantial
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evidence also exists in the record to support a finding of disability. Felisky v. Bowen, 35
F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994). As the Sixth Circuit has explained:
The Secretary’s findings are not subject to reversal merely because
substantial evidence exists in the record to support a different conclusion....
The substantial evidence standard presupposes that there is a ‘zone of
choice’ within which the Secretary may proceed without interference from
the courts. If the Secretary’s decision is supported by substantial evidence,
a reviewing court must affirm.
Id. (citations omitted).
In considering an application for supplemental security income or for disability
benefits, the Social Security Agency is guided by the following sequential benefits
analysis: at Step 1, the Commissioner asks if the claimant is still performing substantial
gainful activity; at Step 2, the Commissioner determines if one or more of the claimant’s
impairments are “severe;” at Step 3, the Commissioner analyzes whether the claimant’s
impairments, 	singly 	or 	in 	combination, 	meet 	or 	equal 	a 	Listing 	in 	the 	Listing 	of
Impairments; at Step 4, the Commissioner determines whether or not the claimant can
still perform his or her past relevant work; and finally, at Step 5, if it is established that
claimant can no longer perform his or her past relevant work, the burden of proof shifts to
the agency to determine whether a significant number of other jobs which the claimant
can perform exist in the national economy. See Combs v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec.,
459 F.3d 640, 643 (6th Cir. 2006); see also Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d
525, 528-29 (6th Cir. 1997) (explaining sequential process); 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520,
416.920.
A plaintiff bears the ultimate burden to prove by sufficient evidence that she is
entitled to disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a). A claimant seeking benefits must
present sufficient evidence to show that, during the relevant time period, she suffered an
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impairment, or combination of impairments, expected to last at least twelve months, that
left her unable to perform any job. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
B. The ALJ’s Decision is supported by Substantial Evidence
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred when evaluating the findings of consultative
examiner, Susan Rowland, Ph.D. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to
properly consider the supportability and consistency factors. 	Plaintiff’s contentions are
not well-taken.
The new regulations for evaluating medical opinions are applicable to this case
because Plaintiff's claim was filed after March 27, 2017. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c (2017).
The new regulation at 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c differs from the previous regulation at 20
C.F.R. § 416.927 in several key areas. The agency no longer has a “treating source rule”
deferring to treating source opinions. 82 Fed. Reg. 5844, 5853 (Jan. 18, 2017) (technical
errors corrected by 82 Fed. Reg. 15,132 (Mar. 27, 2017)). Under the new regulations, the
agency “will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight,
to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), including those from
[the claimant's own] medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a). Further, while the ALJ
must articulate consideration of all medical opinions, the new regulations no longer
mandate the “controlling weight” analysis or the “good reasons” standard in weighing a
treating source opinion. Compare 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2) with 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a),
(b).
The ALJ is only required to explain how he or she considered the supportability
and consistency factors, which are the two most important factors in determining the
persuasiveness of a medical source's opinion or a prior administrative medical finding. 20
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C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2). The ALJ may, but is not required to, explain how he or she
considered 	the 	other 	remaining 	factors 	in 	paragraphs 	(c)(3) 	through 	(c)(5) 	when
articulating how he or she considered medical opinions. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920c(b)(2)-
(3).
In practice, this means that the “supportability” factor “concerns an opinion's
reference to diagnostic techniques, data collection procedures/analysis, and other
objective medical evidence.” Reusel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:20-CV-1291,
2021 WL 1697919, at *7 n.6 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 29, 2021) (citing SSR 96-2p, 1996
SSR LEXIS 9 (July 2, 1996) (explaining supportability and inconsistency); 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3), (4) (differentiating “supportability” and “consistency”); 20
C.F.R. 	§ 	404.1520c(c)(1), 	(2) 	(further 	clarifying 	the 	difference 	between
“supportability” 	and 	“consistency” 	for 	purposes 	of 	the 	post-March 	27, 	2017
regulations)).
As to supportability, “[t]he more relevant the objective medical evidence and
supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical
opinion(s) ... the more persuasive the medical opinions ... will be.” 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520c(c)(1). In other words, supportability addresses whether a medical professional
has sufficient justification for their own conclusions. See Crystal E.J. v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., No. 2:21-CV-04861, 2022 WL 2680069 (S.D. Ohio July 12, 2022) (Preston Deavers,
M.J.).
Additionally, as a rule, an ALJ must build an accurate and logical bridge between
the evidence and his conclusion. Fleischer v. Astrue, 774 F.Supp.2d 875, 877 (N.D. Ohio
2011); see also Wilson v. Com'r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544-546 (6th Cir. 2004)
(holding it was not harmless error for the ALJ to fail to make sufficiently clear why he
rejected the treating physician's opinion, even if substantial evidence not mentioned by
the ALJ existed to support the decision to reject the treating physician's opinion). Thus,
“an ALJ's decision must articulate with specificity reasons for the findings and conclusions
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that he or she makes.” Bailey v. Com'r of Soc. Sec., 173 F.3d 428, 1999 WL 96920 at *4
(6th Cir. Feb, 2, 1999).
Here, in formulating Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ considered the opinion of Dr. Rowland,
a psychiatrist and mental consultative examiner. 	Notably, Plaintiff was examined by Dr.
Rowland on October 20, 2020, as part of his disability claim. (Tr. 793). 	Dr. Rowland
opined that Petitioner could understand, carry out, and remember simple instructions. (Tr.
805). Dr. Rowland opined next that he could sustain concentration and persist in work-
related activities at a reasonable pace. Id. Dr. Rowland then opined that he may perform
better at a job requiring limited interactions with people and the general public. (Tr. 806).
Finally, Dr. Rowland opined that he may perform better where he has only limited contact
with other coworkers and the public under a consistent, trusted supervisor accomplishing
simple tasks with clear, simple instructions. Id. He would also benefit from learning coping
strategies or being permitted to take additional short breaks. Id.
The ALJ found Dr. Rowland’s opinions to be partially persuasive. 	Namely, with
respect to her opinion that Plaintiff required additional short breaks, the ALJ found that
opinion to be unpersuasive. (Tr. 1237). The ALJ noted the opinion was vague, contingent,
and speculative in nature. Id. The ALJ also found that the opinion was not supported by
the record evidence which was “substantially normal” or “relatively normal” with no
significant limitations noted in the record. In this regard, the ALJ indicated that treatment
notes showed that Plaintiff had logical cognition, had clear, coherent, and intact thought
processes, was alert and oriented, and exhibited appropriate and intact attention and
concentration. (Tr. 1230-1234, citing Tr. 503, 709, 802, 962-963, 965, 976, 1049, 1154).
The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff was able to pursue activities he enjoyed such as playing
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basketball, running, and playing video games, sometimes for up to 8 hours per day (Tr.
1235, citing Tr. 656, 923). As such, the ALJ found that this ability to perform activities for
up to 8 hours at a time was inconsistent with the need for additional breaks. (Tr. 1235).
Plaintiff claims the ALJ erroneously rejected Dr. Rowlands opinion regarding his
need to take short breaks and argues, inter alia, other than declaring that Dr. Rowland’s
opinions were not supported by the record; (Tr. 1237) the ALJ did not provide any citations
to the record to support that conclusion. The ALJ merely stated that the evidence was
substantially normal or relatively normal and that there were no significant limitations
noted in the treatment record. As such, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to engage in
any sort of analysis regarding the consistency between Dr. Rowland’s opinions and the
rest of the record.
The Commissioner, however, contends that the ALJ need not use the magic words
of “supportability” or “consistency,” or provide a certain level of detail in her analysis of
the opinion evidence, to show that she considered these factors. See Garland v. Ming
Dai, 593 U.S. 357, 369 (2021) (finding that an agency need not “follow a particular formula
or incant ‘magic words’” for its decision to be upheld by a reviewing court); Andrew E. v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2025 WL 724606, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 6, 2025) (holding that
neither a particular length of analysis nor specific “magic words” are required and the
appropriate level of articulation with respect to the analysis of an opinion depends on the
unique circumstances of each claim); Chad T. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 2022 WL
4355001, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 20, 2022) (“the regulations that require ALJs to explain
their 	analysis 	of 	the 	supportability 	and 	consistency 	factors 	do 	not 	require 	those
explanations to contain a specific level of detail.” Instead, “the appropriate level of
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articulation will necessarily depend on the unique circumstances of each claim.” ) (quoting
Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844, 5854, 2017 WL 168819 (Jan. 18,
2017) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c and 416.920c)).
Thus, as long as the ALJ’s decision, when read as a whole, shows that she
substantively considered the supportability and consistency factors, the ALJ’s decision
must be affirmed. See Dunlavy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 24-3333, 2024 WL 4558606,
at *3 (6th Cir. Oct. 23, 2024) (The ALJ evaluated the psychologists’ opinion in the same
section of her decision in which she discussed the inconsistencies in the record. That is
enough to ‘connect the dots.’) (citations omitted).
In this regard, with respect to supportability, the Commissioner contends that the
ALJ detailed Dr. Rowland’s concerns about malingering and feigning impairments and
examination deficits multiple times in her decision. (Tr. 1233, 1235, 1239). Specifically,
the ALJ considered Dr. Rowland’s notations that Plaintiff was aloof with a restricted range
and indifferent affect, but also had adequate personal hygiene and grooming, had
appropriate eye contact, was generally cooperative without disorientation, sat calmly,
showed no bizarre or abnormal behaviors (such as outward indications of restlessness,
psychomotor retardation, or psychomotor agitation), had clear speech, and had intact
thought processes that were clear, organized, and goal-directed. 	(See Tr. 1233, citing
Tr. 799-801). The ALJ also considered Dr. Rowland’s notation wherein Plaintiff reported
depressed mood, but also reported that there were periods of time when he was not
depressed and experienced variation in energy and sleep. (Tr. 1233, citing Tr. 800).
The ALJ noted that Plaintiff reported hallucinations, yet Dr. Rowland noted that
Plaintiff was unable to provide details of the hallucinations and thus, Dr. Rowland deemed
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the hallucinations non authentic, finding it was likely he was malingering his mental
illness. (Tr. 1233; citing Tr. 800). Furthermore, as noted by the Commissioner, the ALJ
also 	considered 	that 	Dr. 	Rowland 	reported 	that 	Plaintiff 	exhibited 	intact 	mental
functioning, yet he was observed to malinger deficits to his recent and immediate
memory, his attention and concentration were intact, and his remote and working
memories were intact. (Tr. 1233, citing Tr. 802). The ALJ finally considered Dr. Rowland’s
statement that Plaintiff feigned impairments and feigned deficits, her observation that
Plaintiff 	was 	fabricating 	symptomology 	for 	external 	gain, 	and 	her 	assessment 	of
malingering (Tr. 1233, citing Tr. 802- 803).
In light of the foregoing, the Commissioner contends that the ALJ’s consideration
of the mostly normal examination findings in Dr. Rowland’s report and her observations
of malingering and feigning impairments and symptoms goes directly to the supportability
of 	Dr. 	Rowlands’s 	opinions. 	See 	20 	C.F.R. 	§§ 	404.1520c(c)(2), 	416.920c(c)(2)
(discussing supportability). The undersigned agrees.
Plaintiff however, contends that while Dr. Rowland’s findings included references
to Plaintiff’s adequate personal hygiene, appropriate eye contact, his ability to be calm
and cooperative, his lack of restlessness or psychomotor retardation, clear speech, intact
attention and concentration, intact immediate memory, and intact thought processes; Dr
Rowland also described Plaintiff as aloof with a restricted range and indifferent affect, as
well as a depressed mood, decreased energy, and hallucinations. (Doc. 12 at 2-3). 	Dr.
Rowland’s report also documented issues with mood swings, anger, and difficulty dealing
with others. As such, Plaintiff argues that “the evidence clearly cuts both ways” as Dr.
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Rowland’s report contains normal and abnormal findings. Id. at 3. Plaintiff’s contentions
fail to show any error by the ALJ.
It is well established that it is the duty of the ALJ to resolve any conflict among the
evidence and weigh the medical source opinions. See Mullins v. Secy. of Health and
Human Servs., 836 F.2d 980, 984 (6th Cir.1987). Where, as here, there is a conflict in the
medical evidence as to plaintiff's functioning, it is the ALJ's function to resolve such
conflicts. Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1036 (6th Cir.1994); Hardaway v. Secretary of
H.H.S., 823 F.2d 922, 928 (6th Cir.1987); King v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 968, 974 (6th
Cir.1984). The ALJ's determination must stand if it is supported by substantial evidence
regardless of whether the reviewing court would resolve the conflicts in the evidence
differently. Kinsella v. Schweiker, 708 F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir.1983). See also Boyle v.
Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 347 (6th Cir.1993); Tyra v. Secretary of H.H.S., 896 F.2d 1024,
1028 (6th Cir.1990). Here, the ALJ was faced with conflicting evidence relating to
Plaintiff's ability to perform work related activities. As outlined above, the ALJ's resolution
of this conflict was done in accordance with agency regulations and controlling law and
is supported by substantial evidence.
With respect to consistency, the ALJ addressed this factor during his evaluation of
Dr. Rowland’s findings as well as throughout his decision. Namely, the ALJ determined
that Dr. Rowland’s opinion, relating to short breaks was not persuasive because it was
“vague, contingent, and speculative in nature” (Tr. 1237). The ALJ also explained that the
statement was “not supported by the overall record given the substantially normal or
relatively normal mental status findings in treatment notes and no significant limitations
noted in participating in mental health treatment.” (Tr. 1237).
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Plaintiff contends, however, that ALJ did not provide any citations to the record to
support his conclusion that the opinion was inconsistent with the substantially normal or
relatively normal mental status findings in the treatment notes. 	In response, the
Commissioner notes that Plaintiff cited no authority in support of the requirement of
specific record citations. 	Notably, here, the ALJ discussed the examination findings, in
extensive 	detail, 	with 	citations 	to 	the 	record. 	(Tr. 	1230-1234) 	and 	identified
inconsistencies in the record regarding mental health symptoms, just prior to addressing
the opinion (Tr. 1235-1237). More importantly, with respect to the limitation of short
breaks, the Commissioner noted that the ALJ identified multiple examinations with
citations to the record, that showed that Plaintiff had logical cognition, had clear, coherent,
and intact thought processes, was alert and oriented, and exhibited appropriate and intact
attention and concentration. (Tr. 1230-1234, citing Tr. 503, 709, 802, 962-963, 965, 976,
1049, 1154). Additionally, the ALJ limited Plaintiff to simple, routine, repetitive tasks; by
limiting him to work in an environment with goal-based production, where work was
measured by the end result not pace; and by allowing him to be off task 5 percent of the
workday (Tr. 1224-1225). 	In light of the foregoing, the undesigned finds that the ALJ’s
decision is substantially supported in this regard.
While Plaintiff may disagree with the ALJ's assessment of the medical opinion
evidence, he has failed to demonstrate any factual or legal error. Instead, he simply asks
this Court to reweigh the evidence in order to reach a different conclusion. But the only
issue for this Court is whether the Commissioner's decision is substantially supported.
See Walters v. Com'r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d at 528 (acknowledging that it is not a court's
role to resolve conflicts in the evidence). A court may not reverse even if there is
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substantial evidence to support an alternative conclusion, so long as the ALJ's analysis
falls within a “zone of choice.” That standard is met here. See generally, Biestek v.
Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148,1154 (2019) (holding that substantial evidence is evidence a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion and that the threshold
“is not high”).
This court may not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or decide
questions of credibility. Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). The court,
however, may examine all the evidence in the record, regardless of whether such
evidence was cited in the Commissioner's final decision. See Walker v. Sec'y of Health &
Human Servs., 884 F.2d 241, 245 (6th Cir. 1989); Heston v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 245
F.3d 528, 535 (6th Cir. 2001). Here, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's findings and
her conclusion that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security
Act.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the reasons explained herein, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT Defendant’s
decision be found to be SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, and AFFIRMED,
and that this case be CLOSED.
s/ Stephanie K. Bowman
Stephanie K. Bowman
United States Chief Magistrate Judge
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
JAMES C. 	Case No. 2:25-cv-231
Plaintiff, 	Graham, J.
v. 	Bowman, M.J.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendants.
NOTICE
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written
objections to this Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after
being served with a copy thereof. That period may be extended further by the Court on
timely motion by either side for an extension of time. 	All objections shall specify the
portion(s) of the R&R objected to, and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in
support of the objections. 	A party shall respond to an opponent’s objections within
FOURTEEN DAYS after being served with a copy of those objections. 	Failure to make
objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas
v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
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