Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
JOSHUA G.1 	Case No. 2:25-cv-199
Plaintiff, 	Cole, J.
v. 	Bowman, M.J.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Joshua G. filed this Social Security appeal in order to challenge the
Defendant’s finding that he is not disabled. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Proceeding through
counsel, Plaintiff presents one claim of error, which the Defendant disputes. As explained
below, 	the 	Administrative 	Law 	Judge 	(ALJ)’s 	finding 	of 	non-disability 	should 	be
AFFIRMED, because it is supported by substantial evidence in the administrative record.
I. 	Summary of Administrative Record
Plaintiff applied for supplemental security income (SSI) in April 2018, claiming
disability beginning as of February 18, 2019. (Tr. 126, 365-70). His applications were
denied initially and upon reconsideration. (Tr. 126, 150-56, 160-64). After a hearing, the
ALJ issued an unfavorable decision in June 2021, finding that Plaintiff was not under a
disability as defined in the Social Security Act (Act) (Tr. 126-38). 	However, in August
2022, the Appeals Council remanded the case for further consideration of Plaintiff’s
mental impairments. (Tr. 144-47). On December 13, 2023, a new ALJ issued an
1 The Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the
United States has recommended that, due to significant privacy concerns in social security cases, federal
courts should refer to claimants only by their first names and last initials. See General Order 22-01.
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unfavorable decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined in the Act. (Tr. 17-
31).
Plaintiff was born in 1985 and was 33 years old on date his application was filed.
He has a limited education. Plaintiff has a history of mental health issues and substance
abuse. He has no past relevant work.
Based upon the record and testimony presented at the hearing, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: “major depressive disorder; generalized
anxiety disorder; panic disorder; post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD); attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD); paranoid personality disorder; cannabis use disorder; and
opioid use disorder.” 	(Tr. 20). The ALJ concluded that none of Plaintiff’s impairments
alone or in combination met or medically equaled a listed impairment in 20 C.F.R. Part
404, Subp. P, Appendix 1. Despite these impairments, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff
retains the RFC to perform a full range of work subject to the following limitations:
He can understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions and tasks
in a routine work environment that involves no more than occasional
changes, no production based quotas such as found in assembly line work,
occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors, and no interaction
with the public.
(Tr. 23). Based upon his RFC and testimony from the vocational expert, the ALJ
concluded that Plaintiff could perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy, including such jobs as floor cleaner, wall cleaner, hospital cleaner. (Tr. 1017).
Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff is not under disability, as defined in the
Social Security Regulations, and is not entitled to SSI. (Tr. 30, 31).
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. 	Therefore, the ALJ’s
decision stands as the Defendant’s final determination. On appeal to this Court, Plaintiff
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argues that the ALJ’s RFC finding is not substantially supported. Plaintiff’s contention is
not well taken.
I. 	Analysis
A. Judicial Standard of Review
To be eligible for benefits, a claimant must be under a “disability.” See 42 U.S.C.
§1382c(a). 	Narrowed to its statutory meaning, a “disability” includes only physical or
mental impairments that are both “medically determinable” and severe enough to prevent
the applicant from (1) performing his or her past job and (2) engaging in “substantial
gainful activity” that is available in the regional or national economies. See Bowen v. City
of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 469-70 (1986).
When a court is asked to review the Commissioner’s denial of benefits, the court’s
first inquiry is to determine whether the ALJ’s non-disability finding is supported by
substantial evidence. 	42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 	Substantial evidence is “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (additional citation and internal quotation
omitted). 	In conducting this review, the court should consider the record as a whole.
Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359, 362 (6th Cir. 1978). If substantial evidence supports
the ALJ’s denial of benefits, then that finding must be affirmed, even if substantial
evidence also exists in the record to support a finding of disability. Felisky v. Bowen, 35
F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994). As the Sixth Circuit has explained:
The Secretary’s findings are not subject to reversal merely because
substantial evidence exists in the record to support a different conclusion....
The substantial evidence standard presupposes that there is a ‘zone of
choice’ within which the Secretary may proceed without interference from
the courts. If the Secretary’s decision is supported by substantial evidence,
a reviewing court must affirm.
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Id. (citations omitted).
In considering an application for supplemental security income or for disability
benefits, the Social Security Agency is guided by the following sequential benefits
analysis: at Step 1, the Commissioner asks if the claimant is still performing substantial
gainful activity; at Step 2, the Commissioner determines if one or more of the claimant’s
impairments are “severe;” at Step 3, the Commissioner analyzes whether the claimant’s
impairments, 	singly 	or 	in 	combination, 	meet 	or 	equal 	a 	Listing 	in 	the 	Listing 	of
Impairments; at Step 4, the Commissioner determines whether or not the claimant can
still perform his or her past relevant work; and finally, at Step 5, if it is established that
claimant can no longer perform his or her past relevant work, the burden of proof shifts to
the agency to determine whether a significant number of other jobs which the claimant
can perform exist in the national economy. See Combs v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec.,
459 F.3d 640, 643 (6th Cir. 2006); see also Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d
525, 528-29 (6th Cir. 1997) (explaining sequential process); 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520,
416.920.
A plaintiff bears the ultimate burden to prove by sufficient evidence that she is
entitled to disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a). A claimant seeking benefits must
present sufficient evidence to show that, during the relevant time period, she suffered an
impairment, or combination of impairments, expected to last at least twelve months, that
left her unable to perform any job. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
B. The ALJ’s Decision is supported by Substantial Evidence
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC finding is not supported by substantial evidence
because he erred in improperly weighing the opinion evidence. 	Specifically, Plaintiff
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argues that the ALJ erred in finding the opinions of Dr. Rowland, Dr. Matyi, and Dr. Rivera
were not persuasive.
The new regulations for evaluating medical opinions are applicable to this case
because Plaintiff's claim was filed after March 27, 2017. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c (2017).
The new regulation at 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c differs from the previous regulation at 20
C.F.R. § 416.927 in several key areas. The agency no longer has a “treating source rule”
deferring to treating source opinions. 82 Fed. Reg. 5844, 5853 (Jan. 18, 2017) (technical
errors corrected by 82 Fed. Reg. 15,132 (Mar. 27, 2017)). Under the new regulations, the
agency “will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight,
to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), including those from
[the claimant's own] medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a). Further, while the ALJ
must articulate consideration of all medical opinions, the new regulations no longer
mandate the “controlling weight” analysis or the “good reasons” standard in weighing a
treating source opinion. Compare 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2) with 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a),
(b).
The ALJ is only required to explain how he or she considered the supportability
and consistency factors, which are the two most important factors in determining the
persuasiveness of a medical source's opinion or a prior administrative medical finding. 20
C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2). The ALJ may, but is not required to, explain how he or she
considered 	the 	other 	remaining 	factors 	in 	paragraphs 	(c)(3) 	through 	(c)(5) 	when
articulating how he or she considered medical opinions. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920c(b)(2)-
(3).
In practice, this means that the “supportability” factor “concerns an opinion's
reference to diagnostic techniques, data collection procedures/analysis, and other
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objective medical evidence.” Reusel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:20-CV-1291,
2021 WL 1697919, at *7 n.6 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 29, 2021) (citing SSR 96-2p, 1996
SSR LEXIS 9 (July 2, 1996) (explaining supportability and inconsistency); 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3), (4) (differentiating “supportability” and “consistency”); 20
C.F.R. 	§ 	404.1520c(c)(1), 	(2) 	(further 	clarifying 	the 	difference 	between
“supportability” 	and 	“consistency” 	for 	purposes 	of 	the 	post-March 	27, 	2017
regulations)).
As to supportability, “[t]he more relevant the objective medical evidence and
supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical
opinion(s) ... the more persuasive the medical opinions ... will be.” 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520c(c)(1). In other words, supportability addresses whether a medical professional
has sufficient justification for their own conclusions. See Crystal E.J. v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., No. 2:21-CV-04861, 2022 WL 2680069 (S.D. Ohio July 12, 2022) (Preston Deavers,
M.J.).
Here, 	on 	September 	25, 	2018, 	Susan 	Rowland, 	Ph.D, 	RN, 	provided 	a
psychological evaluation, finding that Plaintiff would have “moderate limitations in
understanding, carrying out, and remembering both one-step and complex instructions.”
(Tr 537). Dr. Rowland also opined that Plaintiff would have “moderate limitations in
sustaining concentration and persisting in work-related activity at a reasonable pace,” and
moderate 	limitations 	in 	maintaining 	effective 	social 	interactions 	with 	coworkers,
supervisors, and the public. Id.
At the initial level, Plaintiff’s medical records were reviewed by State agency
medical consultant Cindy Matyi, PhD on September 25, 2018. Tr 97, 107. Dr. Matyi opined
that Plaintiff has moderate limitations in understanding, remembering, and carrying out
one-step and complex instructions. (Tr 98). She further opined that Plaintiff has moderate
limitations 	in 	maintaining 	effective 	social 	interactions 	on 	a 	consistent 	basis 	with
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supervisors, co-workers, and the public, as well as moderate limitations dealing with
normal work pressures. Id. In light of such limitations, Dr. Matyi opined that Plaintiff may
benefit from a relatively isolated workstation. (Tr 102). 	On reconsideration, Dr. Rivera
affirmed these findings.
In formulating Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ found Dr. Rowlands findings of moderate
limitations are generally persuasive, however, the finding of moderate limitations in
understanding, carrying out, and remembering one-step instructions is not persuasive.
(Tr. 27). The ALJ found that Dr. Rowland’s indication of a poor prognosis and an inability
to trust others are not persuasive. In so concluding, the ALJ noted that Dr. Rowland did
provide support for her opinion; however, the examination findings did not support the
moderate limitation in one-step instructions, as the examination showed Plaintiff’s
intelligence was estimated to be in the low average range, his thought processes were
clear, linear, organized, and goal directed, his memory was intact, he appeared attentive,
and his insight and judgment were intact. The ALJ further noted that while Dr. Rowland
noted an inability to trust people, she also found only moderate limitations in effective
social interactions, and she observed Plaintiff to be cooperative. Id. She noted that rapport
was easily established and maintained, and he appeared reasonably candid. Id. (internal
citations omitted). As such, the ALJ determined that the opinion of moderate limitation in
the ability to understand, carry out, and remember one step instruction and would have a
poor prognosis are also inconsistent with the sporadic treatment history and the objective
findings of record. Id.
With respect to Dr. Matyi and Dr. Rivera, the ALJ concluded that their findings were
not persuasive. Notably, the ALJ determined that while the finding of moderate limitations
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is consistent with the overall record, and the record does show Plaintiff is limited to a
routine work environment, occasional changes, no production based quotas, occasional
interaction with coworkers and supervisors, and no interaction with the public, the record
does not support a finding that Plaintiff is able to complete occasional complex tasks. (Tr.
28-29). Further, the ALJ found that the record does not support the findings that the
claimant 	needs 	a 	relatively 	isolated 	workstation, 	superficial 	interaction 	or 	minimal
interaction with others or need continued supervisory support with no over the shoulder
supervisory scrutiny beyond interaction limitations stated in the above residual functional
capacity. (Tr. 29).
The ALJ further noted that while the record shows Plaintiff is limited to occasional
interaction with coworkers and supervisors, and no interaction with the public, it also
shows the claimant was consistently noted to be cooperative and pleasant with good eye
contact. (Tr. 28). As noted above, treatment notes indicated that rapport was easily
established and maintained. Additionally, the ALJ noted that while the record does show
the Plaintiff to be limited to routine work, no more than occasional changes, and no
production-based quotas, it does not support further limitations such as the need for
additional supervisory support or the need to have changes be well explained and
introduced slowly. Despite the Plaintiff’s impairments, the ALJ noted Plaintiff was
observed to have from fair to good insight and judgment. He was well groomed, awake,
alert, oriented, cooperative, and pleasant with normal thought processes and speech. (Tr.
29).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s evaluation of these opinions failed to comply with
Agency regulations because the ALJ did not properly evaluate the supportability and
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consistency of their opinions. 	In this regard, Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ cherry
picked the evidence to contradict these opinions. Plaintiff’s contentions lack merit.
Here, the ALJ properly evaluated these opinions in accordance with Agency
regulations and controlling law. 	As noted by the Commissioner, the ALJ found that Dr.
Rowland and Dr. Rivera provided some support for their findings, noting Plaintiff’s
reported symptoms, however, they also noted that Plaintiff had no difficulty understanding
and was attentive, his concentration was intact, and he sat calmly throughout the
interview. (Tr. 28, 102-04, 115, 117). 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1) (supportability). The ALJ
also noted that while the findings of moderate limitations were consistent with the overall
record, the record showed that Plaintiff was limited to a routine work environment with
occasional changes but without production-based quotas. (Tr. 28-29). 20 C.F.R. §
416.920c(c)(2) (consistency). Moreover, as noted by the ALJ, the record demonstrated
that Plaintiff could occasionally interact with co-workers and supervisors, but not interact
with the public.
In making these determinations, the ALJ also properly considered the clinical
findings. 	The ALJ found that Plaintiff could occasionally interact with co-workers and
supervisors with no interaction with the public as the record showed that Plaintiff
consistently appeared cooperative and pleasant with good eye contact. (Tr. 29, see also
Tr. 534, 542, 546, 551, 556, 561, 618, 622, 626, 630, 812). Plaintiff easily established
and maintained rapport with a stranger. (Tr. 29, 534). Additionally, while the record
showed Plaintiff was limited to routine work with occasional changes and no production-
based quotas, it did not support the further limitations for additional supervisory support
or the need to have the changes well explained and introduced slowly. (Tr. 29). Plaintiff
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appeared alert, oriented, awake, cooperative, pleasant, and well-groomed with normal
thought process, normal speech, and fair to good insight and judgment. (Tr. 29, 618, 630).
He had normal memory, attention, concentration, insight, and judgment (Tr.21-22, 25, 27,
536, 542, 546, 551, 556, 618, 626, 630, 733- 34, 737, 750, 761, 776, 812).
Plaintiff argues, inter alia, that although he was found to be cooperative and
pleasant on evaluation, treatment notes consistently note his mental health issues, such
as being on the brink of relapse, having maximum anxiety and depression levels, hearing
voices in his head, frequent fighting with his wife, and feeling that someone was out to
get him. (Tr 546, 705). Plaintiff further asserts that in September 2018, treatment notes
again 	documented 	good 	physical 	appearance 	and 	grooming, 	but 	also 	noted 	he
complained that ‘everything is bad” and his anxiety being at a “10/10 level.” (Tr. 604).
Despite presenting well in one-on-one sessions, Plaintiff contends that the record
continually documents that he feels his psychological symptoms are the worst when he
is around others in social situations. (Tr 593). Plaintiff has described that his heart races
and his chest tightens when socializing. Id. Doctors have consistently diagnosed him with
anxiety, and he has unsuccessfully tried various medications to combat his symptoms.
(Tr 733, 736, 761, 775).
Additionally, in arguing that the ALJ’s RFC is not supported by substantial
evidence, Plaintiff also points to his testimony at the administrative hearing, wherein he
alleges that his responses were disorganized, marked by repeated false starts, confusion
and an inability to articulate coherent thoughts.
However, as noted by the Comissioner, Plaintiff’s arguments amount to an attempt
to have this Court reweigh the record and come to a contrary decision. That is not the
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role of the Court. See Shepard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 705 F. App’x 435, 443 (6th Cir.
2017). The ALJ was confronted with the not uncommon scenario of conflicting opinion
evidence. Id. at 442 (“Shepard contends that there is conflicting evidence in the record
that demonstrates she was incapable of light work during the relevant period. That may
be so, but when the ALJ is ‘presented with the not uncommon situation of conflicting
medical evidence[,] [t]he trier of fact has the duty to resolve that conflict.’) (citing
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 399, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971)). Our
job is only to ensure that the Commissioner’s determination is supported by substantial
evidence.”).
As detailed above, the ALJ properly evaluated the opinion evidence. 	As long as
the ALJ’s decision, when read as a whole, shows that she substantively considered the
supportability and consistency factors, the ALJ’s decision must be affirmed. See Hill v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 560 F. App’x 547, 551 (6th Cir. 2014) (recognizing that the ALJ’s
decision should be read as a whole when determining whether his consideration of the
opinion evidence was consistent with the regulations). Such is the case here.
Accordingly, 	the 	undersigned 	finds 	that 	the 	ALJ’s 	decision 	is 	substantially
supported. It is well established that it is Plaintiff's burden to show that the ALJ's findings
are unsupported by substantial evidence. Here, Plaintiff argues only that evidence exists
from which the ALJ could have drawn a different conclusion. That is not enough. See
Jones v. Com'r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 477 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he Commissioner's
decision cannot be overturned if substantial evidence, or even a preponderance of the
evidence, supports the claimant's position, so long as substantial evidence also supports
the conclusion reached by the ALJ.”). The evidence summarized above easily constitutes
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“substantial evidence” to support the ALJ's evaluation of the opinion evidence. While
Plaintiff may disagree with that assessment, he has failed to demonstrate any factual or
legal error. A court may not reverse so long as the ALJ's analysis falls within a “zone of
choice,” a standard that is met here.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the reasons explained herein, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT Defendant’s
decision be found to be SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, and AFFIRMED,
and that this case be CLOSED.
/s Stephanie K. Bowman
Stephanie K. Bowman
United States Magistrate Judge
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
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JOSHUA G. 	Case No. 2:25-cv-199
Plaintiff, 	Cole, J.
v. 	Bowman, M.J.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendants.
NOTICE
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written
objections to this Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after
being served with a copy thereof. That period may be extended further by the Court on
timely motion by either side for an extension of time. 	All objections shall specify the
portion(s) of the R&R objected to, and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in
support of the objections. 	A party shall respond to an opponent’s objections within
FOURTEEN DAYS after being served with a copy of those objections. 	Failure to make
objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas
v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
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