Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
TIFFANY J.,1
Plaintiff,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
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Case No. 2:24-cv-04106
District Judge Edmund A. Sargus
Magistrate Judge Caroline H. Gentry
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION2
Plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits in April 2021.
Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration. After a hearing at
Plaintiff’s request, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that Plaintiff was not
eligible for benefits because she was not under a “disability” as defined in the Social
Security Act. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. Plaintiff
subsequently filed this action.
Plaintiff seeks an order remanding this matter to the Commissioner for the award
of benefits or, in the alternative, for further proceedings. The Commissioner asks the
Court to affirm the non-disability decision. For the reasons set forth below, the
1 See S.D. Ohio General Order 22-01 (“The Committee on Court Administration and Case Management
of the Judicial Conference of the United States has recommended that due to significant privacy concerns
in social security cases federal courts should refer to claimants only by their first names and last
initials.”).
2 See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The notice at the end of this opinion informs the parties of their ability to file
objections to this Report and Recommendation within the specified time period.
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undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends that the Commissioner’s decision be
AFFIRMED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff asserts that she has been under a disability since January 1, 2017. At that
time, she was thirty-nine years old. She was forty-five years old on the date last insured
of June 30, 2023. Accordingly, Plaintiff was considered a “younger person” under the
Social Security regulations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(c). Plaintiff has a “high school
education and above.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1564(b)(4).
The evidence in the Administrative Record (“AR,” Doc. No. 7) is summarized in
the ALJ’s decision (“Decision,” Doc. No. 7-2 at PageID 166-96), Plaintiff’s Statement of
Errors (“SE,” Doc. No. 10), the Commissioner’s Memorandum in Opposition (“Mem. In
Opp.,” Doc. No. 12), and Plaintiff’s Reply Memorandum (“Reply,” Doc. No. 13). Rather
than repeat these summaries, the Court will discuss the pertinent evidence in its analysis
below.
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Social Security Administration provides Disability Insurance Benefits to
individuals who are under a “disability,” among other eligibility requirements. Bowen v.
City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 470 (1986); see 42 U.S.C. §§ 402, 423(a)(1), 1382(a).
The term “disability” means “the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which . . . has lasted or can
be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1505(a).
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This Court’s review of an ALJ’s unfavorable decision is limited to two inquiries:
“whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and whether the findings of the ALJ
are supported by substantial evidence.” Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399,
406 (6th Cir. 2009); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of Social
Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.”).
“Unless the ALJ has failed to apply the correct legal standards or has made findings of
fact unsupported by substantial evidence,” this Court must affirm the ALJ’s decision.
Emard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 953 F.3d 844, 849 (6th Cir. 2020). Thus, the Court “may
not try the case de novo, nor resolve conflicts in evidence, nor decide questions of
credibility.” Id.
“Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court looks to an existing
administrative record and asks whether it contains ‘sufficien[t] evidence’ to support the
agency’s factual determinations.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019)
(citation omitted). This limited standard of review does not permit the Court to weigh the
evidence and decide whether the preponderance of the evidence supports a different
conclusion. Instead, the Court is confined to determining whether the ALJ’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence, which “means—and means only—‘such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id.
(citation omitted). This standard “presupposes that there is a zone of choice within which
the decisionmakers can go either way, without interference by the courts.” Mullen v.
Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986). Thus, the Court may be required to affirm the
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ALJ’s decision even if substantial evidence in the record supports the opposite
conclusion. Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir.1997).
The other line of judicial inquiry—reviewing the correctness of the ALJ’s legal
criteria—may result in reversal even when the record contains substantial evidence
supporting the ALJ’s factual findings. Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651
(6th Cir. 2009). “[E]ven if supported by substantial evidence, ‘a decision of the
Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own regulations and
where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a
substantial right.’” Id. (citations omitted). Such an error of law will require reversal even
if “the outcome on remand is unlikely to be different.” Cardew v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
896 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2018) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
III. 	FACTS
A. 	The ALJ’s Factual Findings
The ALJ was tasked with evaluating the evidence related to Plaintiff’s application
for benefits. In doing so, the ALJ considered each of the five sequential steps set forth in
the Social Security regulations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The ALJ made the following
findings of fact:
Step 1: 	Plaintiff engaged in substantial gainful activity from the alleged
onset date of January 1, 2017 through December 31, 2017. Plaintiff
did not engage in substantial gainful activity from June 1, 2018
through the date last insured of June 30, 2023.
Step 2: 	Through the date last insured, she had the severe impairments of
osteoarthritis of the left knee, lumbar degenerative disc disease with
disc herniation and radiculopathy, fibromyalgia, and adjustment
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disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood and obsessive-
compulsive disorder.
Step 3: 	She did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
met or equaled the severity of one in the Commissioner’s Listing of
Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
Step 4: 	Her residual functional capacity (RFC), or the most she could do
despite her impairments, see Howard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 276
F.3d 235, 239 (6th Cir. 2002), consisted of sedentary work as
defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a), subject to the following
limitations: could never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds but could
occasionally climb ramps and stairs, and could occasionally balance,
stoop, crouch, kneel, and crawl; could never be exposed to
unprotected heights, hazardous machinery, or commercial driving;
could perform only simple, routine tasks involving simple work-
related decisions; could have no more than occasional interactions
with supervisors, coworkers, and the general public; and could
tolerate few changes in a routine work setting.
She was unable to perform any of her past relevant work.
Step 5: 	Through the date last insured, considering Plaintiff’s age, education,
work experience, and RFC, there were jobs that existed in significant
numbers in the national economy that she could have performed.
(Decision, Doc. No. 7-2 at PageID 172-91.) These findings led the ALJ to conclude that
Plaintiff did not meet the definition of disability and so was not entitled to benefits. (Id. at
PageID 191-92.)
B. 	State Agency Psychological Consultants
State agency psychological consultant Jennifer Swain completed a Disability
Determination Explanation form in July 2021.3 (AR, Doc. No. 7-3 at PageID 233-38.) Dr.
3 There are no credentials after Jennifer Swain’s name, but she listed a Medical Specialty Code of 38,
which indicates a specialty in psychology. (AR, Doc. No. 8-3 at PageID 91, 95; see also DI 28084.050
Signatures, Dates, Specialty Name and Specialty (Items 25 to 28 and Items 30 to 33), SSA POMS DI
28084.050 (effective Oct. 27, 2015) (last updated Dec. 7, 2018).)
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Swain found moderate impairment in the “B Criteria” areas of interacting with others,
concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, and adapting or managing oneself. (Id. at
PageID 234.) She found no impairment in the area of understanding, remembering, or
applying information. (Id.) In the area of sustained concentration and persistence, Dr.
Swain indicated moderate limitation in the ability to carry out detailed instructions, to
maintain attention and concentration for extended periods, and to “complete a normal
workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically[-]based symptoms
and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest
periods.” (Id. at PageID 237.) She opined that Plaintiff was “able to concentrate and
persist to do simple, short-cycle tasks consisting of [one to three] steps in a setting
without demand for fast pace or high production.” (Id.)
As to social functioning, Dr. Swain found moderate limitation in Plaintiff’s ability
to interact appropriately with the general public and to get along with coworkers or peers
without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes. (AR, Doc. No. 7-3 at PageID
237.) Dr. Swain opined that Plaintiff was “able to interact with others on a superficial
basis.” (Id.) In the final area of adaptation, Dr. Wain found moderate limitation in the
ability to respond appropriately to changes in the work setting. (Id. at PageID 237-38.)
She opined that Plaintiff could “adapt to occasional changes in a routine setting” and that
“[m]ajor changes should be implemented gradually.” (Id. at PageID 238.)
Karla Delcour, Ph.D. reviewed the updated record at the reconsideration level in
January 2022 and affirmed Dr. Swain’s assessment. (AR, Doc. No. 7-3 at PageID 244-
49.)
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The ALJ concluded that the state agency psychological consultants’ findings were
“mostly persuasive.” (Decision, Doc. No. 7-2 at PageID 188.) But the ALJ did not adopt
verbatim the consultants’ functional discussion, explaining as follows:
[T]hey gave no specific definition to “superficial” interactions with others
(which the undersigned commutes to a reduced occasional frequency of
interacting during a workday), the step-based and non-fast pace of work
tasks that exceeds support from the available medical evidence and remains
inconsistent with the expanded record at the hearing level, and similarly the
opined need for even “major” workplace changes to be explained or
gradually introduced that is not congruent with their finding of no
limitation in understanding or memory abilities or by the conservative and
beneficial treatment prescribed via antidepressant and antianxiety
medications and a nightly sleep aid.
(Id.) The ALJ further explained why he did not adopt the consultants’ limitation for
superficial interactions with others:
Importantly, the State agency [psychological consultants] did not find
[Plaintiff] limited to both superficial types of interactions and reduced
frequency of interactions in a workday, but instead only offered the former
term as the extent of mental functional limitation in the area of engaging in
work-related social interactions. While the undersigned is aware that, per
the representative’s providing a redacted copy of a remand order from the
Appeals Council pertaining to another disability claimant, that at least one
Administrative Appeals Judge views the term superficial as readily
definable by its common dictionary meaning or as “shallow or cursory”
(see Ex. 15E/4-5), in practice and application to an individual’s maximum
mental functional abilities to interact with others in a work setting and over
the course of a workday, such term warrants a more precise meaning,
dimension, and scope. In cases, as here, where no definition is provided for
the term superficial but also frequency of interaction with others is not
found to be limited by the State agency [psychological consultants], the
undersigned has looked to the underlying medical and other evidence to
determine whether to accept such term conveying a qualitative reduction in
types of social interactions with others, or whether a reduced frequency of
interactions in a workday is better supported by such evidence and, in turn,
remains consistent with the additional evidence received at the hearing
stage of the claim(s).
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(Id. at PageID 188-89.)
The ALJ reasoned that evidence of Plaintiff’s “family living situation, indicated
activities outside the home[,] and her unremarkable behavior during encounters with her
mental health professionals in year 2021 and with her primary care doctor throughout”
warranted a limitation to occasional social interactions. (Decision, Doc. No. 7-2 at
PageID 189.) The ALJ explained that such a limitation was “both better supported by the
medical and other evidence available to and considered by the State agency
[psychological consultants], and more consistent with the additional evidence received
after the time of their reviews” than the consultants’ proposed limitation to superficial
social interactions. (Id.)
Finally, the ALJ explained why the other limitations that the consultants suggested
were more persuasive:
In remainder, the moderate limitations in broad and specific mental
functioning and Dr. Swain’s other assessed mental residual functional
abilities—i.e., simple, routine (“short- cycle”) tasks and few (occasional)
changes in a routine work setting—are more persuasive because they are
well supported by the summaries and analyses of the 2020- 2021 medical
evidence, including clinical observations of depressed and/or anxious mood
contrasting with full affect, average demeanor and cooperative behavior,
and (at times) intact attention (see Ex. 1A/2-3,5; 4A/4); and because they
remain, at the very least, consistent with the additional medical evidence
received at the hearing stage that shows null (0) scores on PHQ-2 for any
present reports of depression, no mentioned anxiety or panic attacks or
chronic and significant difficulty sleeping, or any medication pursued from
her primary care physician over 2022-2023 beyond the nightly Seroquel
medication (see generally Ex. 6F).
(Decision, Doc. No. 7-2 at PageID 189.)
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IV. 	LAW AND ANALYSIS
Plaintiff asserts just one error: “The ALJ failed to account for the state agency
psychologists’ opinion limiting [Plaintiff] to superficial interaction.” (SE, Doc. No. 10 at
PageID 803.) For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s assertion is not well-taken and
the undersigned recommends that the ALJ’s decision be affirmed.
A. 	Applicable Law
It is well-established that determination of the residual functional capacity (RFC)
is a task reserved for the ALJ. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c); see also Webb v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 368 F.3d 629, 633 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he ALJ is charged with the responsibility of
evaluating the medical evidence and the claimant’s testimony to form an ‘assessment of
[her] residual functional capacity’”). A claimant’s RFC describes the most she can do in a
work setting despite her physical and mental limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1).
When formulating the RFC, the ALJ must consider the claimant’s “ability to meet the
physical, mental, sensory, and other requirements of work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(4).
The ALJ must base the RFC on all relevant evidence in the record, including the
claimant’s descriptions of her limitations and symptoms, objective medical evidence,
medical opinions, other medical evidence, evidence from non-medical sources, and prior
administrative medical findings. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1)-(5).
Because Plaintiff filed her claim after March 27, 2017, the new regulations for
evaluating medical opinion evidence applied. Under these regulations, the ALJ “will not
defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any
medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) . . . .” 20 C.F.R.
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§ 404.1520c(a). Instead, the ALJ must evaluate the persuasiveness of each medical
opinion and prior administrative medical finding by considering the following factors: (1)
supportability; (2) consistency; (3) relationship with the plaintiff; (4) specialization; and
(5) any other factor “that tend[s] to support or contradict a medical opinion or prior
administrative medical finding.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c).
The first two factors—supportability and consistency—are the “most important.”
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2) (emphasis added). The supportability factor recognizes that
“[t]he more relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations
presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) . . . the more
persuasive the medical opinions . . . will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1). Therefore, an
ALJ’s supportability analysis addresses whether a medical professional has sufficient
justification for their own conclusions. See Crystal E.J. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:21-
CV-04861, 2022 WL 2680069 (S.D. Ohio July 12, 2022) (Preston Deavers, M.J.); accord
Burke v. O’Malley, No. 8:23-cv-415, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48944, *8 (M.D. Fla. Mar.
20, 2024) (“Supportability addresses the extent to which a medical source or consultant
has articulated record evidence bolstering her own opinion or finding.”).
The consistency factor, by contrast, recognizes that “[t]he more consistent a
medical opinion(s) . . . is with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical
sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) . . . will be.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c(c)(2). The ALJ’s consistency analysis therefore must compare the medical
opinion at issue to evidence from “other medical and nonmedical sources.” Ford v.
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Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:22-CV-00524, 2023 WL 2088157, at *17 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 31,
2023).
The distinction between the supportability and consistency factors is relatively
clear when the opinion is from a treating provider. Providers commonly rely on the
records in their possession—including progress notes, test results, statements from the
claimant, and opinions from other medical providers—to support their medical opinions.
An ALJ can readily identify a provider’s records that purportedly support their opinion
and use them to analyze supportability. Then, when analyzing consistency, the ALJ can
readily compare the provider’s opinion to opinions and evidence from other providers.
Because each factor (supportability and consistency) considers different evidence, the
reviewing court can easily determine whether the ALJ has addressed each factor.
It can be more challenging to distinguish between supportability and consistency
when the opinion is from a state agency consultant. Because they do not have their own
treatment records, consultants must review and rely upon documents in the administrative
record to support their opinions. The ALJ will, however, consider documents from the
same administrative record when analyzing both supportability and consistency. If the
consultant’s report clearly identifies the documents relied upon to support their opinions,
then the ALJ can conduct a supportability analysis that is based on those documents. But
if the consultant’s report does not clearly identify the documents that support their
opinions, then the ALJ’s ability to conduct separate supportability and consistency
analyses will be limited. See Kenneth B. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:22-CV-00672-
CHL, 2024 WL 1199025, at *6-7 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 19, 2024) (citing Tyrone H. v. Comm’r
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of Soc. Sec., No. 2:22-cv-3652, 2023 WL 2623571, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 24, 2023)
(Jolson, M.J.)).
Because they are the most important factors, the ALJ is required not only to
consider the supportability and consistency of all medical opinions in the record, but also
to “explain how he or she considered them.”4 Dayna S. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 3:21-CV-
00326, 2023 WL 2009135, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 15, 2023) (Gentry, M.J.) (citing to 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2) (internal punctuation omitted and emphasis added)). No
“specific level of detail” is required, as “the appropriate level of articulation will
necessarily depend on the unique circumstances of each claim.” Timothy B. v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., No. 2:22-CV-03834, 2023 WL 3764304, at *7 (S.D. Ohio June 1, 2023)
(Bowman, M.J.) (internal citations omitted). Thus, ALJs need not use “magic words or
any specific phrasing” to comply with the applicable regulations. Id.
Nevertheless, an ALJ is required “to show his or her work.” Scott K. v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., No. 3:21-CV-00129, 2022 WL 4484603, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 27, 2022)
(Silvain, M.J.) (internal citation omitted). Thus, “[t]his Court cannot uphold an ALJ’s
decision, even if there if there is enough evidence in the record to support the decision,
where the reasons given by the trier of fact do not build an accurate and logical bridge
between the evidence and the result.” Fleischer v. Astrue, 774 F. Supp. 2d 875, 877 (N.D.
Ohio 2011) (cleaned up) (internal quotations and citation omitted). See also Danyel P. v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:21-CV-02405, 2022 WL 1514170, at *6 (S.D. Ohio May 13,
4 By contrast, the ALJ “may, but [is] not required to,” explain the consideration given to the remaining
factors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2).
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2022) (Preston Deavers, M.J.) (ALJ’s “inexplicable and illogical consistency” warranted
remand); Kimberly S. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:21-CV-00310, 2022 WL 17820565,
at *3 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 20, 2022) (Silvain, M.J.) (ALJs must “provide a coherent
explanation of [their] reasoning . . . in order to provide sufficient rationale for a reviewing
adjudicator or court”); Hardiman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:12-CV-00508, 2013 WL
3762266, at *5 (S.D. Ohio July 16, 2013) (Preston Deavers, M.J.) (remanding case on the
ground that “the ALJ’s decision is internally inconsistent and incomplete”).
B. 	The ALJ’s Conclusions Regarding The State Agency Psychological
Consultants’ Findings Are Supported By Substantial Evidence, And
The ALJ Did Not Err By Failing To Include Additional Mental
Limitations In The RFC.
Plaintiff does not allege that the ALJ failed to follow the requirements of 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520c when he evaluated the state agency psychological consultants’ prior
administrative medical findings. Instead, Plaintiff’s sole assertion of error is that the ALJ
erred by failing to account for the consultants’ limitation to superficial interaction. (SE,
Doc. No. 10 at PageID 803.) Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred because although he
found the state agency psychological consultants’ opinions “mostly persuasive” except
for the limitation to superficial social interactions, “the ALJ’s decision to substitute
‘occasional’ for ‘superficial’ was legally incorrect, and the ALJ’s reasoning for
supporting his decision was not supported by substantial evidence.” (SE, Doc. No. 10 at
PageID 803.). For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s alleged error is without merit.
As noted, the consultants opined that Plaintiff was limited to interacting with
others “on a superficial basis.” (AR, Doc. No. 7-3 at PageID 237, 248.) The ALJ did not
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agree with this limitation, reasoning that the consultants “gave no specific definition to
‘superficial’ interactions with others” and concluding that the limitation was unsupported
by the record. (Decision, Doc. No. 7-2 at PageID 188-89.) The ALJ instead limited
Plaintiff to “occasional interactions with supervisors, coworkers, and the general public.”
(Id. at PageID 177.) The undersigned concludes that the ALJ adequately explained why
he did not adopt the superficial interaction limitation in the RFC, and his conclusions are
supported by substantial evidence.
As an initial matter, it is important to emphasize that the ALJ was not required to
adopt the consultants’ opinion wholesale. The RFC is not required to “recite medical
opinions verbatim[;] rather the ALJ is responsible for translating and incorporating
medical findings into a succinct RFC.” McIntosh v. Colvin, No. 16-cv-0963-JAH-BGS,
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30778, at *15 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2018) (citation omitted); c.f.
Poe v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Although the ALJ
may not substitute his opinions for that of a physician, he is not required to recite the
medical opinion of a physician verbatim in his residual functional capacity finding.”).
The ALJ also correctly stated that the term “superficial” was undefined. The
psychological consultants did not define the term “superficial” in their assessments. (AR,
Doc. No. 7-3 at PageID 234-38; 244-49.) The Social Security Administration’s policies
and regulations also do not define the term “superficial.” Social Security Ruling (SSR)
83-10 provides definitions of terms and concepts that are frequently used in evaluating
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disability.5 SSR 83-10, 1983 WL 31251 (S.S.A. January 1, 1983). “Frequent” is defined
as “occurring from one-third to two-thirds of the time.” Id. at *6. “Occasional” is defined
as occurring “from very little up to one-third of the time.” Id. at *5 (emphasis added).
The SSR does not define “superficial.” The term is also not defined in the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles (DOT), Social Security regulations, other SSRs, or HALLEX.
It is true, as Plaintiff notes, that this Court has held that the term “occasional
contact” refers to the quantity of time spent with individuals, and the term “superficial
contact” refers to the quality of the interactions. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
No. 2:18-CV-18, 2018 WL 6257432, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 30, 2018) (Vascura, M.J.);
see also Mabry-Schlicher v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 24-3811, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS
14028, at *11-14 (6th Cir. June 6, 2025) (upholding a remand order that required the ALJ
to adopt an RFC limitation for superficial interaction).
However, the Court need not decide whether the ALJ erred by declining to
consider these cases. The ALJ is not required to adopt verbatim the opinions and findings
of medical providers and experts when formulating the RFC. See, e.g., Reeves v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 618 F. App’x 267, 275 (6th Cir. 2015) (“[T]here is no requirement that an
ALJ adopt a state agency psychologist’s opinion verbatim; nor is the ALJ required to
adopt the state agency psychologist’s limitations wholesale.”). Furthermore, the ALJ
adequately explained the basis for his RFC finding. See Anissa H. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
5 Although SSRs do not have the same force and effect as statutes or regulations, they “are ‘binding on all
components of the Social Security Administration’ and represent ‘precedent final opinions and orders and
statements of policy and interpretations’ adopted by the Commissioner.” Ferguson v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 628 F.3d 269, 272 n.1 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 402.35(b)(1)).
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No. 2:21-cv-5315, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23150, at *24 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 9, 2023)
(Litkovitz, M.J.) (“The issue is whether the ALJ explained the basis for the RFC
determination.”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:21-cv-5315, 2023 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 54657 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2023) (Graham, D.J.) (citation omitted).
Specifically, the ALJ explained that he did not adopt the superficial limitation
because the consultants did not define the term, which was an accurate description of the
record. (Decision, Doc. No. 7-2 at PageID 188; AR, Doc. No. 7-3 at PageID 318, 248.)
The ALJ considered but did not follow an Appeals Council remand order that defined the
term “superficial interaction”,6 reasoning that “in practice and application to an
individual’s maximum mental functional abilities to interact with others in a work setting
and over the course of a workday, such term warrants a more precise meaning,
dimension, and scope.” (Decision, Doc. No. 7-2 at PageID 188.) The ALJ further
explained that the consultants “did not find the claimant limited to both superficial types
of interactions and reduced frequency of interactions in a workday, but instead only
offered the former term as the extent of mental functional limitation in the area of
engaging in work-related social interactions.” (Id. (emphasis in original).)
Despite the lack of clarity regarding the term “superficial interaction,” the ALJ
nevertheless considered whether evidence in the record warranted a limitation regarding
either the quantity of time spent with individuals or the quality of those interactions.
6 The remand order stated: “‘[S]uperficial interaction’ is a term that is readily defined, understood and
applicable to a work setting, as it speaks to the depth, kind and quality of social interactions, and indicates
that the claimant could not have sustained more than shallow or cursory interactions with others, i.e.,
coworkers, the general public, and/or supervisors.” (Doc. No. 7-6 at PageID 458-59.)
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(Decision, Doc. No. 7-2 at PageID 188-89.) The ALJ concluded that “[b]ased on
[Plaintiff’s] family living situation, indicated activities outside the home[,] and her
unremarkable behavior during encounters with her mental health professionals in year
2021 and with her primary care doctor throughout,” the RFC only needed to limit
Plaintiff to occasional interactions. (Decision, Doc. No. 7-2 at PageID 189.) The ALJ’s
conclusions about Plaintiff’s social functioning are supported by substantial evidence and
should therefore be affirmed.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to provide a logical bridge to explain the
reasoning behind his conclusions, and that “[t]he ALJ’s reasoning for substituting
‘occasional’ for ‘superficial’ interaction is insufficient.” (SE, Doc. No. 10 at PageID 807-
09; see also Reply, Doc. No. 13 at PageID 826-27.) According to Plaintiff:
The ALJ did not explain how [Plaintiff’s] living situation aligned more
closely with a limitation to occasional interaction. The ALJ did not explain
how [Plaintiff’s] activities of daily living aligned more closely with a
limitation to occasional interaction. The ALJ did not explain how the
treatment record aligned more closely with a limitation to occasional
interaction.
(SE, Doc. No. 10 at PageID 807.) The undersigned disagrees. As noted, the ALJ was not
required to adopt the consultants’ recommended limitations verbatim. The ALJ provided
an explanation—which is supported by substantial evidence—for why he rejected the
proposed limitation for superficial interactions. In addition, the ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s
social functioning elsewhere in the decision and explained why he only limited Plaintiff
to occasional interactions with individuals.
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For example, the ALJ found at Step Three that Plaintiff had moderate limitation in
the “B Criteria” area of interacting with others. (Decision, Doc. No. 7-2 at PageID 175-
76.) The ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff’s testimony at the June 2023 hearing that she had
difficulty getting along well with others at times, due to a combination of pain and
depression which caused irritability, as well as difficulty being around groups of people.
(Id. at PageID 175 (citing AR, Doc. No. 7-2 at PageID 218).) But the ALJ also pointed
out that Plaintiff did not allege any difficulty with getting along with others in the July
2021 Function Report. (Id. (citing AR, Doc. No. 7-6 at PageID 406).) The ALJ also noted
that Plaintiff regularly interacted with her family in person and by telephone. (Id. at
PageID 175-76 (citing AR, Doc. No. 7-6 at PageID 407).) Although the ALJ cited to
counseling records that showed abnormalities such as an anxious and depressed mood
and affect, the ALJ cited normal mental status findings in the psychiatric progress notes
that included an average demeanor, no remarkable clinical features of anxiety,
cooperative behavior, and a full affect. (Id. at PageID 176 (citing AR, Doc. No. 7-7 at
PageID 506, 513, 518, 525, 594, 604, 608).)
The ALJ also cited to Plaintiff’s reported daily activities and medical records in
his analyses of the other “B Criteria” areas of functioning. (Decision, Doc. No. 7-2 at
PageID 175-77.) The ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff’s subjective complaints about
difficulty being around others, difficulty handling changes, and a “primarily pain-related
need for assistance” with personal hygiene tasks such as bathing and dressing. (Id.) The
ALJ cited to medical records that showed abnormalities such as anxious and/or depressed
moods. (Id.) The ALJ balanced this evidence with records that documented Plaintiff’s
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abilities in these areas, such as caring for her children, being able to work with treatment
providers, taking prescribed medication, and being able to perform some activities of
daily living, such as preparing simple meals and household cleaning. (Id.) The ALJ also
cited normal mental status findings that included a normal mood, a full affect, an average
demeanor, adequate dress and hygiene, and no thoughts of harming herself. (Id.)
Additionally, the ALJ provided a detailed summary of Plaintiff’s medical records
and mental health treatment history in the RFC analysis. (Decision, Doc. No. 7-2 at
PageID 178-79, 183-86.) Here, the ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of
depression, crying spells, anxiety, panic attacks, obsessional thoughts, difficulty getting
along with others, social isolation, irritability, variable concentration and focus, difficulty
sleeping, and decreased energy. (Id.) He also discussed Plaintiff’s daily activities,
including Plaintiff’s reports of difficulties with several activities and her tendency to
isolate from others, as well as Plaintiff’s references to spending time with family and
doing some household chores. (Id.) The ALJ acknowledged several abnormal objective
examination findings including an anxious and/or depressed mood, mild irritability,
obsessional thought content, racing thoughts, and difficulty staying focused on a few
occasions. (Id. at PageID 183-86.) The ALJ compared these findings to other
examinations that showed a normal and/or appropriate mood and affect, normal speech,
average eye contact, average demeanor, appropriate dress and hygiene, cooperative
behavior, goal-directed thought processes, intact recall, an intact attention span, and no
noted observations of distractible attention or focus. (Id.) The ALJ found that on balance,
the evidence did not support Plaintiff’s allegations of symptom severity. (Decision, Doc.
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No. 7-2 at PageID 179-86.) He concluded that the RFC would account for Plaintiff’s
mental impairments by limiting Plaintiff to simple, routine tasks involving simple
decision-making, few changes, and occasional social interactions. (Id. at PageID 185.)
In sum, the ALJ’s decision to reject the superficial interaction limitation suggested
by the consultants—and to include an occasional interaction limitation in the RFC to
account for Plaintiff’s social impairment—is not an error. “The responsibility for
determining a claimant's [RFC] rests with the ALJ, not a physician.” Poe, 342 F. App’x
at 157 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c)). The ALJ’s explanation shows that he considered
whether Plaintiff required a limitation to superficial social interaction and explained his
reasons for rejecting such a limitation, and his conclusions are supported by substantial
evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c. Because the ALJ’s decision to include a different
limitation to account for Plaintiff’s moderate impairment in social functioning is within
the permissible “zone of choice,” Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545, the undersigned recommends
that the ALJ’s decision be affirmed.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. 	Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (Doc. No. 10) be OVERRULED;
2. 	The Court AFFIRM the Commissioner’s non-disability determination; and
3. 	The case be terminated on the Court’s docket.
s/ Caroline H. Gentry
Caroline H. Gentry
United States Magistrate Judge
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NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written
objections to the proposed findings and recommendations within FOURTEEN days after
being served with this Report and Recommendations. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d),
this period is extended to SEVENTEEN days if this Report is being served by one of the
methods of service listed in Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C), (D), or (F). Such objections shall
specify the portions of the Report objected to and shall be accompanied by a
memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report and Recommendation is
based in whole or in part upon matters occurring of record at an oral hearing, the
objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such portions
of it as all parties may agree upon or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the
assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party’s
objections within FOURTEEN days after being served with a copy thereof.
Failure to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on
appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947,
949-50 (6th Cir. 1981).
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