USA v. Solomon et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 2:22-cr-222(3)
JUDGE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.
TEDDY ASEFA,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on: (1) Defendant Teddy Asefa’s Motion to Withdraw Plea
of Guilty (ECF No. 370); and (2) Mr. Asefa’s request to withdraw from his Plea Agreement (See
ECF No. 361 (Minute Entry)). The Government opposes both requests. (ECF Nos. 369, 372.) For
the reasons stated below, Mr. Asefa’s Motion to Withdraw Plea of Guilty (ECF No. 370) and Mr.
Asefa’s request to withdraw from the Plea Agreement (See ECF No. 361 (Minute Entry)) are both
DENIED, and the signed Plea Agreement (ECF No. 228) is ACCEPTED.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Asefa is charged with participating in two conspiracies in this case. (ECF No. 97.)
First, Mr. Asefa is accused of engaging in a conspiracy to illegally traffic controlled substances as
a member of a criminal organization known as the Third World Mob. (See id., Counts 1–5.)
Second, Mr. Asefa is accused of conspiring to defraud the Pandemic Unemployment Assistance
program by falsely applying for, and receiving, financial assistance during the COVID-19
pandemic. (See id., Count 9.) The Government argues that both conspiracies are part of the same
overarching conspiracy to illegally traffic narcotics. (See ECF No. 192.)
On December 6, 2023, a federal grand jury returned a Second Superseding Indictment
Case: 2:22-cr-00222-EAS Doc #: 394 Filed: 11/25/25 Page: 1 of 14 PAGEID #: <pageID>

2
against Mr. Asefa. (ECF No. 97.) Count One charges Mr. Asefa with conspiracy to distribute
controlled substances in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 846. (Id., PageID 404–11.) Count Two charges
Mr. Asefa with possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime (in Count One) in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). (Id., PageID 411.) Count Three charges Mr. Asefa with
possession with intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(vii). (Id.) Count Four charges Mr. Asefa with possessing a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime (in Count Three) in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i).
(Id., PageID 412.) Count Five charges Mr. Asefa as a felon in possession of a firearm in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). (Id.) Count Seven charges Mr. Asefa with obstruction of justice in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2). (Id., PageID 413.) Count Nine charges Mr. Asefa with wire
fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. (Id., PageID 418–19.)
On August 1, 2024, Mr. Asefa entered into a Plea Agreement with the Government under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) and agreed to plead guilty to Counts One and Nine
of the Second Superseding Indictment. (ECF No. 228, PageID 1408.) The Plea Agreement set
forth an agreed-upon sentencing range of between 144 and 240 months of incarceration. (Id.,
PageID 1410.) In exchange for his agreement to plead guilty, the Government “agree[d] to the
dismissal of any remaining counts of the Second Superseding Indictment against the Defendant at
the entry of final judgment.” (Id., PageID 1412–13.)
Pursuant to the Plea Agreement, Mr. Asefa was brought before this Court on August 2,
2024, to change his plea to Counts One and Nine from not guilty to guilty. (See Change of Plea
Hearing, ECF No. 231 (Minute Entry).) After proceeding through this Court’s rigorous Rule 11
colloquy with Mr. Asefa, the Court accepted Mr. Asefa’s guilty plea on Counts One and Nine.
(See id.) However, the Court deferred consideration of the Plea Agreement until sentencing. (See
Case: 2:22-cr-00222-EAS Doc #: 394 Filed: 11/25/25 Page: 2 of 14 PAGEID #: <pageID>

3
id.); United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 674 (1997) (holding that “[g]uilty pleas can be accepted
while plea agreements are deferred, and the acceptance of the two can be separated in time”).
On September 23, 2025, this matter was set for sentencing. (ECF No. 357.) Sentencing did
not occur, however, because Mr. Asefa expressed a desire to withdraw from the Plea Agreement
at the hearing. (See ECF No. 361 (Minute Entry).) Mr. Asefa also indicated that he may want to
withdraw his guilty plea altogether, but he did not affirmatively move to do so at that time. (See
id.) So, this Court continued the sentencing hearing and ordered the parties to “file simultaneous
memoranda . . . addressing whether Mr. Asefa can withdraw from the Plea Agreement under Rule
11(c)(1)(C), after the Court accepted his guilty plea.” (ECF No. 363, PageID 4453.)
Following the September 23, 2025 Hearing, Mr. Zachary Swisher—who represented Mr.
Asefa throughout the plea process—sought to withdraw as counsel because Mr. Asefa intended to
raise ineffective assistance of counsel as part of his argument in support of withdrawing from the
Plea Agreement and/or his guilty plea. (ECF No. 365.) This Court granted Mr. Swisher’s request
(ECF No. 368), and Mr. John Kevin West was appointed to represent Mr. Asefa. Mr. West has
represented Mr. Asefa throughout the course of arguing the issues currently before this Court. (See
ECF Nos. 370, 371.)
Pursuant to this Court’s September 24, 2025 Order (ECF No. 363), the Government filed
a memorandum arguing that Mr. Asefa cannot withdraw from the Plea Agreement. (ECF No. 369.)
Anticipating that Mr. Asefa may also move to withdraw his guilty plea altogether, the Government
further argued why this Court should not allow Mr. Asefa to do so. (Id.) Shortly after the
Government filed its opening brief, Mr. Asefa did in fact file a Motion to Withdraw Plea of Guilty.
(ECF No. 370.)
The Court will now address in turn: (1) Mr. Asefa’s Motion to Withdraw Plea of Guilty
Case: 2:22-cr-00222-EAS Doc #: 394 Filed: 11/25/25 Page: 3 of 14 PAGEID #: <pageID>

4
(ECF No. 370); and (2) Mr. Asefa’s request to withdraw from his Plea Agreement (See ECF No.
361 (Minute Entry)).
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I. 	Mr. Asefa’s Motion to Withdraw Plea of Guilty
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d) governs the standard for withdrawal of a guilty
plea. As applicable to this case, the Rule states that a defendant may withdraw his guilty plea “after
the court accepts the plea, but before it imposes sentence if . . . the defendant can show a fair and
just reason for requesting the withdrawal.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B).
Rule 11(d)(2)(B) is designed “to allow a hastily entered plea made with unsure heart and
confused mind to be undone, not to allow a defendant to make a tactical decision to enter a plea,
wait several weeks, and then obtain a withdrawal if he believes that he made a bad choice in
pleading guilty.” United States v. Alexander, 948 F.2d 1002, 1004 (6th Cir. 1991) (citation
modified). The defendant carries the burden of proving that withdrawal of his guilty plea is
justified, and the matter is left to the sound discretion of the Court. Id. at 1003–04.
Courts within the Sixth Circuit consider various factors to determine whether, under the
totality of circumstances, a defendant has shown a “fair and just reason” to withdraw his guilty
plea under Rule 11(d)(2)(B):
(1) the amount of time that elapsed between the plea and the motion to withdraw it;
(2) the presence (or absence) of a valid reason for the failure to move for withdrawal earlier
in the proceedings;
(3) whether the defendant has asserted or maintained his innocence;
(4) the circumstances underlying the entry of the guilty plea;
(5) the defendant’s nature and background;
Case: 2:22-cr-00222-EAS Doc #: 394 Filed: 11/25/25 Page: 4 of 14 PAGEID #: <pageID>

5
(6) the degree to which the defendant has had prior experience with the criminal justice
system; and
(7) potential prejudice to the government if the motion to withdraw is granted.
United States v. Bashara, 27 F.3d 1174, 1181 (6th Cir. 1994), superseded by guidelines
amendment on other grounds, USSG § 3B1.1.
These seven factors are “a general, non-exclusive list and no one factor is controlling.”
United States v. Bazzi, 94 F.3d 1025, 1027 (6th Cir. 1996). “The relevance of each factor will vary
according to the circumstances surrounding the original entrance of the plea as well as the motion
to withdraw.” United States v. Haygood, 549 F.3d 1049, 1052 (6th Cir. 2008). If a district court
determines from the first six factors that a defendant has not established a “fair and just reason”
for withdrawal of his plea, the court need not address any potential prejudice to the government.
Alexander, 948 F.2d at 1004.
As detailed below, an examination of the Bashara factors reveals that Mr. Asefa cannot
offer a fair and just reason for requesting withdrawal.
A. Time Elapsed Between the Plea and the Motion to Withdraw
Mr. Asefa entered his guilty plea on August 2, 2024. (Change of Plea Hearing, ECF No.
231 (Minute Entry).) It was not until the September 23, 2025 Hearing that Mr. Asefa first expressed
to this Court a desire to withdraw his guilty plea. (ECF No. 361 (Minute Entry).) Thus, 417 days
elapsed between his guilty plea and his first request to withdraw the plea.
Courts have properly denied withdrawal motions on far shorter delays. See, e.g., United
States v. Benton, 639 F.3d 723, 727 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation modified) (finding a 30-day delay to
be “at the boundary line between what is acceptable and what is not”); United States v. Valdez,
362 F.3d 903, 913 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that an “unjustified 75–day delay, alone, supported the
court’s denial”); United States v. Durham, 178 F.3d 796, 798–99 (6th Cir. 1999) (“The strongest
Case: 2:22-cr-00222-EAS Doc #: 394 Filed: 11/25/25 Page: 5 of 14 PAGEID #: <pageID>

6
factor supporting the district court’s denial of Durham’s motion is the length of time between
Durham’s plea and the filing of his motion to withdraw. Durham waited approximately seventy-
seven days to file his motion after entering his guilty plea.”)
Though Mr. Asefa offers arguments to justify the delay in connection with this factor (ECF
No. 370, PageID 4553; ECF No. 371, PageID 4557–58), those arguments are relevant to the second
factor—the presence or absence of a valid reason for failing to move earlier—rather than the mere
lapse of time. Thus, the first Bashara factor weighs against permitting Mr. Asefa to withdraw his
guilty plea.
B. Reason for Failing to Move to Withdraw Earlier
Mr. Asefa contends that three reasons justify the 417-day delay, all of which stem from his
receipt and review of his presentence investigation report: (1) he did not realize that enhancements
could be applied in calculating his sentencing guidelines until he received the report; (2) the report
contains references to methamphetamine and cocaine that he was not previously aware of; and (3)
he communicated his desire to withdraw his plea to his prior counsel shortly after receiving the
report,1 but his counsel dissuaded him from filing a motion, and Mr. Asefa did not know he could
communicate his desire to withdraw to the Court without counsel. (ECF No. 370, PageID 4553–
54; ECF No. 371, PageID 4558.) Additionally, Mr. Asefa attacks the validity of his plea in
connection with this factor by arguing that he did not have the ability to “understand the
1 In his reply to the Government, Mr. Asefa states for the first time that he expressed “his desire
to withdraw his plea to his prior counsel shortly after entering his plea.” (ECF No. 371, PageID
4558 (emphasis added).) However, Mr. Asefa otherwise indicates that he first expressed “his
desire to withdraw his plea to his prior counsel shortly after receiving his presentence
investigation report” (ECF No. 370, PageID 4553 (emphasis added)), and any alleged earlier
expression is unsupported by the record. Thus, the Court construes Mr. Asefa’s statement to
mean that he informed his prior counsel of his desire to withdraw only after receiving the
presentence investigation report, which was transmitted to Mr. Asefa on June 10, 2025—over ten
months after he entered his guilty plea. (See ECF No. 320.)
Case: 2:22-cr-00222-EAS Doc #: 394 Filed: 11/25/25 Page: 6 of 14 PAGEID #: <pageID>

7
consequences of his plea” because: (1) he was taking mental health medication and suffering from
mental health issues; and (2) he did not have access to legal research. (ECF No. 370, PageID 4554.)
The Government counters that Mr. Asefa’s delay is an “improper strategic” move that cannot
support withdrawal. (ECF No. 372, PageID 4563.) For the reasons that follow, the Court agrees
with the Government.
1. 	Mr. Asefa’s Reasoning for Delay
Before addressing Mr. Asefa’s proffered reasons for the delay, the Court recognizes that a
defendant’s reasoning “will be more closely scrutinized when he has delayed his motion for a
substantial length of time.” United States v. Ellis, 470 F.3d 275, 281 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation
modified). Because Mr. Asefa waited nearly 14 months after pleading guilty before moving to
withdraw that plea, this Court will closely scrutinize his alleged justifications for the delay.
All of the reasons that Mr. Asefa offers as justifications for the delay begin with Mr. Asefa
changing his mind about pleading guilty after seeing the presentence investigation report. (See
ECF No. 370, PageID 4553–54; ECF No. 371, PageID 4558.) The Sixth Circuit has explicitly
found that “[d]efendants are not permitted to plead guilty and then use their PSR to their advantage
in seeking to withdraw a guilty plea.” United States v. Dalalli, 651 F. App’x 389, 401 (6th Cir.
2016); see also United States v. Poole, 2 F. App’x 433, 438 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding that a
defendant’s “potential review of presentence reports” weighs against a motion to withdraw). By
Mr. Asefa’s own admission in connection with all of these alleged reasons, that is exactly what is
he attempting to do here. Such conduct “represents the kind of improper tactical decision that does
not permit a withdrawal.” See United States v. Crowe, No. 22-6046, 2023 WL 4586154, at *5 (6th
Cir. July 18, 2023) (citation modified). Consequently, the Court finds that Mr. Asefa has failed to
establish a valid reason for the delay.
Case: 2:22-cr-00222-EAS Doc #: 394 Filed: 11/25/25 Page: 7 of 14 PAGEID #: <pageID>

8
2. 	Validity of Mr. Asefa’s Guilty Plea
By asserting that he did not have the ability to “understand the consequences of his plea”
at the time he entered it (ECF No. 370, PageID 4554.), Mr. Asefa is also arguing that his plea is
invalid here. “A guilty plea is valid if it is entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently by the
defendant.” United States v. Catchings, 708 F.3d 710, 716 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v.
Dixon, 479 F.3d 431, 434 (6th Cir. 2007)); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.
The Court is satisfied that Mr. Asefa’s plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. In
accordance with Rule 11, the Court verified that Mr. Asefa’s plea was voluntary and that Mr. Asefa
understood his applicable constitutional rights, the nature of the crimes charged, the consequences
of his guilty plea, and the factual basis for concluding that he committed the crimes charged. (See
Change of Plea Hearing, ECF No. 231 (Minute Entry).) Additionally, the Court verified that Mr.
Asefa was not impaired by any medication or substances that would affect his ability to understand
the nature and consequences of his plea. (See id.) Mr. Asefa also independently confirmed the
foregoing in the Plea Agreement. (ECF No. 228, PageID 1413–14.) The Court therefore finds that
Mr. Asefa’s guilty plea is valid, and Mr. Asefa’s arguments to the contrary do not support his
Motion to Withdraw. See United States v. Watkins, 815 F. App’x 22, 25 (6th Cir. 2020) (citation
modified) (“Absent extraordinary circumstances, when the Rule 11 procedures are fully adequate,
we hold a defendant pleading guilty to the statements he makes at his plea hearing.”).
For the reasons set forth above, the second Bashara factor weighs against Mr. Asefa’s
Motion to Withdraw.
C. Assertion or Maintenance of Innocence
With respect to this factor, Mr. Asefa states that he is “prepared to represent to the Court
that he did not understand the nature of the charges to which he entered a plea and that he is not
Case: 2:22-cr-00222-EAS Doc #: 394 Filed: 11/25/25 Page: 8 of 14 PAGEID #: <pageID>

9
guilty of the offenses charged in the superseding indictment.” (ECF No. 370, PageID 4554.)
However, the Government correctly points out that Mr. Asefa has not proclaimed his innocence
until now. (See ECF No. 369, PageID 4547.) To the contrary, Mr. Asefa admitted before this Court
under oath that he was in fact guilty of the conduct as alleged in Counts One and Nine of the
Second Superseding Indictment. (See Change of Plea Hearing, ECF No. 231 (Minute Entry).)
The Sixth Circuit has noted that “the absence of a defendant’s vigorous and repeated
protestations of innocence supports the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.” United States
v. Goddard, 638 F.3d 490, 494 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation modified). Moreover, courts within the
Sixth Circuit should hold a defendant to the statements he makes at his plea hearing “[a]bsent
extraordinary circumstances.” Watkins, 815 F. App’x at 25.
Mr. Asefa made his first protestation of innocence in his Motion to Withdraw—over a year
after he pleaded guilty—and any extraordinary circumstances that would warrant setting aside Mr.
Asefa’s admission of guilt under oath are lacking in the record. Thus, this factor also weighs
against Mr. Asefa.
D. Circumstances Underlying the Plea
Mr. Asefa argues that he didn’t understand the nature and consequences of his plea because
he entered it shortly before trial. (ECF No. 370, PageID 4554; ECF No. 371, PageID 4558–59.)
However, this contention contradicts Mr. Asefa’s statements, offered to this Court under oath,
establishing that he pleaded guilty knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. (See Change of Plea
Hearing, ECF No. 231 (Minute Entry).)
The Sixth Circuit holds that a “defendant’s statements at a plea hearing should be regarded
as conclusive as to truth and accuracy in the absence of a believable, valid reason justifying a
departure from the apparent truth of those statements.” United States v. Owens, 215 F. App’x 498,
Case: 2:22-cr-00222-EAS Doc #: 394 Filed: 11/25/25 Page: 9 of 14 PAGEID #: <pageID>

10
502 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation modified).
Here, there is no question that the Court conducted a thorough Rule 11 colloquy, during
which Mr. Asefa repeatedly acknowledged that he was pleading guilty of his own free will with a
full understanding of his rights and the consequences of his plea. (See Change of Plea Hearing,
ECF No. 231 (Minute Entry).) The Court is not persuaded that the close proximity between his
plea and trial date is a “believable, valid reason” that justifies setting those acknowledgements
aside. See Owens, 215 F. App’x at 502. Defendants routinely enter into plea agreements with the
Government on the eve of trial, yet the Court—as it did here—can still verify that a defendant’s
plea is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent by scrupulously following the Rule 11 procedure. As a
result, the Court find that Mr. Asefa’s guilty plea is valid and that he did understand the nature and
consequences of his guilty plea when he entered it. Further support for the Court’s finding on this
factor is provided above in Section I(B)(2) concerning the validity of Mr. Asefa’s guilty plea.
Therefore, the fourth Bashara factor weighs against allowing withdrawal in this case.
E. Mr. Asefa’s Nature and Background
Mr. Asefa claims that his nature and background support his Motion to Withdraw because:
(1) he only has a middle school education; and (2) he could not understand the consequences of
his Plea Agreement. (ECF No. 370, PageID 4554–55; ECF No. 371, PageID 4559.) The Court has
already disposed of Mr. Asefa’s second claim (See Sections I(B)(2), I(D)), and his first claim is
not supported by the record because Mr. Asefa has obtained his General Equivalency Diploma
(GED). (ECF No. 320, PageID 3929.) Regardless of his level of education, Mr. Asefa has admitted
to significant involvement in a complex drug trafficking operation spanning several years (See
ECF No. 228, PageID 1415–17), evincing that he is sophisticated enough to evade law
enforcement while engaging in a criminal enterprise.
Case: 2:22-cr-00222-EAS Doc #: 394 Filed: 11/25/25 Page: 10 of 14 PAGEID #: <pageID>

11
A defendant’s nature and background weighs against his motion to withdraw where “the
record indicates that [the defendant] understood what he was doing when he entered the guilty
plea.” Ellis, 470 F.3d at 285.
In consideration of the relevant facts set forth above, the Court finds that the record reflects
that Mr. Asefa fully understood what he was doing when he entered his guilty plea. As a result,
this factor also supports denying Mr. Asefa’s Motion to Withdraw.
F. 	Mr. Asefa’s Prior Experience with the Criminal Justice System
The instant case is not Mr. Asefa’s first interaction with the criminal justice system, nor is
it his first conviction. (See ECF No. 320, PageID 3915–23.) In fact, Mr. Asefa has considerable
experience with the criminal justice system. (See id.) Yet, Mr. Asefa contends that this factor
weighs in his favor because all of his prior convictions were in state court. (ECF No. 370, PageID
4555.) The Sixth Circuit has previously rejected this argument. United States v. Blander, 713 F.
App’x 431, 438 (6th Cir. 2017) (finding that a district court properly concluded the sixth Bashara
factor weighed against granting a defendant’s motion to withdraw where he only had prior
experience with the state criminal justice system). This Court, too, is unpersuaded. This factor
weighs against Mr. Asefa.
G. Potential Prejudice to the Government
“The government is not required to establish prejudice that would result from a plea
withdrawal, unless and until the defendant advances and establishes a fair and just reason for
allowing the withdrawal.” Benton, 639 F.3d at 729 (citation modified). When “all preceding factors
weigh against [the defendant], the government is not required to show that it would be prejudiced
by withdrawal of the plea.” Id.
Because the Court has determined that each of the first six Bashara factors weighs against
Case: 2:22-cr-00222-EAS Doc #: 394 Filed: 11/25/25 Page: 11 of 14 PAGEID #: <pageID>

12
allowing withdrawal, the Court need not consider whether granting Mr. Asefa’s motion would
prejudice the Government. However, that is not to suggest that the Court has concluded that
granting Mr. Asefa’s motion would not prejudice the government—it certainly could. Rather, the
point is simply that, because the other Bashara factors weigh against Mr. Asefa, he failed to
establish a fair and just reason for allowing the withdrawal regardless of any potential prejudice to
the Government. Thus, the Court need not—and does not—analyze this factor.
Because Mr. Asefa has failed to provide a fair and just reason for requesting the
withdrawal, Mr. Asefa’s Motion to Withdraw Plea of Guilty (ECF No. 370) is DENIED.
II. Mr. Asefa’s Request to Withdraw from the Plea Agreement
When a district court is presented with a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, the court has
three options: it “may accept the agreement, reject it, or defer a decision until the court has
reviewed the presentence report.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(3)(A). In deciding whether to accept or
reject a plea agreement, “a district court must rationally construct a decision based on all relevant
factors.” United States v. Cota-Luna, 891 F.3d 639, 647 (6th Cir. 2018) (citation modified). If a
court rejects a plea agreement, the court must give the defendant an opportunity to withdraw their
guilty plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(A); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(5)(B). In seeking to
withdraw from his Plea Agreement (ECF No. 228), Mr. Asefa is asking this Court to reject the
Plea Agreement.
District courts have broad discretion in deciding whether to reject a plea agreement. United
States v. Moore, 916 F.2d 1131, 1135 (6th Cir. 1990). However, “that discretion has limits—if a
district court rejects a plea agreement, it must explain why.” United States v. Sabit, 797 F. App’x
218, 221 (6th Cir. 2019). And the district court’s explanation must be a “sound” one. Moore, 916
F.2d at 1135–36 (holding that a district court must “articulate a sound reason for rejecting” a plea
Case: 2:22-cr-00222-EAS Doc #: 394 Filed: 11/25/25 Page: 12 of 14 PAGEID #: <pageID>

13
agreement). In other words, a court “may not act arbitrarily, invidiously, or pursuant to a
categorical policy,” and the court’s reasoning for rejecting the plea agreement must be “case-
specific.” In Re United States, 32 F.4th 584, 594–95 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation modified).
Though this is a case-specific analysis, the Sixth Circuit has recognized the following as
“sound” reasons for rejecting a plea agreement: (1) the agreement does not adequately reflect the
seriousness of the offense; (2) the agreement unduly cabins the judge’s sentencing discretion; or
(3) the agreement is contrary to the sound administration of justice. Id. Generalized policy grounds
and findings that are “clearly not in accord with the facts of the case,” on the other hand, do not
justify rejection of a plea agreement. Id. at 595.
In this case, the record does not support any sound reason for rejecting the Agreement. The
Government correctly points out that rejecting the Plea Agreement would enable Mr. Asefa to
make “an end-run around the normal guilty-plea withdrawal analysis” under Bashara because a
defendant must be given an opportunity to withdraw his or her plea when a court rejects his or her
plea agreement. (ECF No. 369, PageID 4546); Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(5)(B). As this Court
explained in Section I, Mr. Asefa cannot meet his burden to show that withdrawal of his guilty
plea is warranted under Bashara. The same facts and circumstances relevant to Mr. Asefa’s Motion
to Withdraw are at issue here. Because Mr. Asefa failed to identify a “fair and just reason” to
withdraw his plea under those facts and circumstances, the Court must find that there is no “sound
reason” to reject the Plea Agreement. In fact, rejecting the Agreement here would be contrary to
the sound administration of justice because it would allow Mr. Asefa to bypass a burden of proof
he cannot meet, yet obtain the same relief that requires a defendant to satisfy that burden: an
opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea. This Court will not permit Mr. Asefa to prevail through
such improper procedural tactics.
Case: 2:22-cr-00222-EAS Doc #: 394 Filed: 11/25/25 Page: 13 of 14 PAGEID #: <pageID>

14
Moreover, the Court finds that the Plea Agreement was the result of an arms-length
negotiation between well-qualified attorneys and proposes a favorable outcome for both parties.
Mr. Asefa claims that the ineffective assistance of his prior counsel, Mr. Zachary Swisher, led him
to sign the Plea Agreement, which he now believes was not in his best interest. (See ECF No. 370.)
That claim, however, is entirely unsubstantiated. This Court’s perception is that Mr. Swisher
represented Mr. Asefa’s best interests competently and effectively throughout his involvement in
this case. Indeed, the Plea Agreement itself is evidence that Mr. Swisher had Mr. Asefa’s best
interests in mind. Under the Agreement, the highest possible sentence Mr. Asefa faces is 20 years.
(ECF No. 228, PageID 1410.) Without the Agreement, Mr. Asefa would be facing life in prison.
(ECF No. 320, PageID 3930.) Clearly, Mr. Swisher worked diligently to obtain an advantageous
outcome for Mr. Asefa in the form of the Plea Agreement. Overriding that outcome for no reason
other than because Mr. Asefa asked this Court to would be far from a sound exercise of judicial
discretion.
Thus, the Court DENIES Mr. Asefa’s request to withdraw from the Plea Agreement (See
ECF No. 361 (Minute Entry)) and, therefore, ACCEPTS the Plea Agreement (ECF No. 228).
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Asefa’s Motion to Withdraw Plea of Guilty (ECF No. 370) and
Mr. Asefa’s request to withdraw from the Plea Agreement (See ECF No. 361 (Minute Entry)) are
both DENIED, and the signed Plea Agreement (ECF No. 228) is ACCEPTED. Notice of the date
of Mr. Asefa’s sentencing hearing is forthcoming.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
11/25/2025 	s/Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.
DATE 	EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case: 2:22-cr-00222-EAS Doc #: 394 Filed: 11/25/25 Page: 14 of 14 PAGEID #: <pageID>