Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
OZGUR ALCAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
SECRETARY OF THE U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 1:25-cv-961
JUDGE DOUGLAS R. COLE
Magistrate Judge Vascura
OPINION AND ORDER
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is currently detaining
Petitioner Ozgur Alcan pending removal proceedings. Alcan filed a Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1), requesting this Court to order his release. ICE has since
responded. (Doc. 9). And one of the other Respondents, Warden of Butler County Jail,
also has filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 6), arguing it is not a proper Respondent. For
the reasons explained below, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Alcan’s Petition (Doc. 1) and DENIES AS MOOT Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. 6).
BACKGROUND
The background of this case is not the clearest. The Court does its best to piece
together the story between the Petition, the Return of Writ, and the government’s
exhibits. To start, Petitioner is a citizen of Turkey. (Doc. 1, #2; Not. to Appear, Doc.
9-1, #67; Form I-213, Doc. 9-2, #70, 72). He arrived in the United States on April 7,
2022, near San Luis, Arizona. (Doc. 1, #4; Doc. 9-1, #67; Doc. 9-2, #70). When Alcan
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first arrived, he was not “admitted or paroled after inspection by an Immigration
Officer.” (Doc. 9-1, #67). Four days after his arrival, immigration officials seemingly
stopped Alcan. The Court concludes that this must be the case because Alcan received
a Notice to Appear (NTA) dated April 11, 2022. (See Doc. 9-1, #67). Oddly, the
Department 	of 	Homeland 	Security’s 	(DHS) 	“Record 	of 	Deportable/Inadmissible
Alien,” known as Form I-213, stated his “Length of Time Illegally in U.S.” as “at
entry,” perhaps because it had only been a few days. (Doc. 9-2, #70). In any event, the
NTA further stated that he was charged with violating § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) because he is “an alien present in the United
States without being admitted or paroled.” (Doc. 9-1, #67). And it ordered him to
appear before an immigration judge on May 3, 2022. (Id.).
Alcan does not dispute, and has not disputed, that he entered the United States
without inspection. He first admitted it to the immigration officers that initially
stopped him. (Doc. 9-2, #72). And he again admitted as much in immigration court.
(Immigration Judge Decision, Doc. 9-3, #74 (admitting factual allegations in NTA)).
So on July 18, 2022, the immigration judge “sustained removability as charged and
directed Turkey as the country for removal, should removal become necessary.” (Id.
at #74).
Four days later, Alcan applied for asylum and withholding of removal. (Id.; see
Doc. 1, #4). In his initial conversations with immigration officers, he had claimed that
he was afraid to return to Turkey. (Doc. 9-2, #72). The immigration judge heard
testimony from Alcan, as well as several family members, as part of a consolidated
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asylum case. (Doc. 9-3, #74). But on April 1, 2024, the immigration judge denied
Alcan’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
Convention Against Torture. (Id. at #97). Accordingly, the immigration judge ordered
Alcan be removed to Turkey. (Id.; see Doc. 1, #2).
Several weeks later, on April 22, 2024, Alcan appealed this decision to the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). (Doc. 9-4, #100). There have been no hearings
or briefing schedule set since then. (Id. at #99–100).
For the next year and a half, it appears that Alcan was not detained, although
neither the Petition nor Return of Writ state whether Alcan was released on bond or
otherwise. Nevertheless, Alcan states that he “has been incarcerated since November
14, 2025.” (Doc. 1, #1). But he does not offer any further details about how or why his
detention came to pass.
The government’s Return of Writ, however, fills in at least some of the gaps.
On November 17, 2025, Alcan was arraigned in Dayton Municipal Court on charges
of felonious assault with a deadly weapon and criminal damage. (Case Summary,
Doc. 9-6, #104–06). Several days later, on November 21, the court dismissed those
charges 	because 	the 	“case 	[was] 	ignored 	by 	the 	grand 	jury.” 	(Id. 	at 	#107
(capitalization omitted)). From there, ICE detained Alcan on November 22. (Doc. 9,
#50; Not. to EOIR: Alien Address, Doc. 9-5, #103).
Alcan filed this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on December 23, 2025. (Doc.
1). There, he requests the Court declare his detention violates the due process clause
and the INA, and thus he seeks the Court to order Respondents to release him
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immediately. (Id. at #8). The federal Respondents 1 filed their Return of Writ. (Doc.
9). Butler County Jail separately moved for dismissal though and argues it is not a
proper Respondent. (Doc. 6). And Alcan replied. (Doc. 10).
With that, the petition is ripe for the Court’s review.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
There is some debate between the parties as to whether Alcan is in pre- or post-
removal detention. The answer determines which statutory scheme applies. So the
Court starts there. Ultimately, the Court concludes that Alcan is in pre-removal
detention pending the outcome of his asylum appeal. Based on that, then, the Court
finds he is properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
In the Petition, Alcan claims that his “detention became unconstitutional six
months after the removal order in his case became administratively final.” (Doc. 1,
#1). Based on that, Alcan argues that, under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), the government can
only detain him for 90 days. (Id. at #4–5). While the government may detain him
beyond that 90-day window, if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, “continued
detention is no longer authorized by statute.” (Id. at #5 (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis,
533 U.S. 678, 	699 	(2001))). 	But 	that 	framework 	only 	applies 	to 	post-removal
detention.
The government, by contrast, argues that Alcan does not in fact have a final
order of removal. (Doc. 9, #47). Instead, it maintains that ICE is detaining him under
1 These Respondents include Kristi Noem as the Secretary of DHS, DHS itself, Pam Bondi as
the Attorney General, and Kevin Raycraft as the ICE Director of the Detroit Field Office.
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8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) pending the outcome of his removal proceedings. (Id.). In other
words, he is in pre-removal detention. The government further argues that because
Alcan is an applicant for admission, he is subject to § 1225(b)(2), which mandates
detention, instead of § 1226(a), which permits release on bond. (Id. at #51–55).
Beyond that, the government also contests the Court’s jurisdiction, (id. at #56–61),
and that Alcan failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because he did not seek
a bond hearing in the first instance, (id. at #61–65).
Start with the threshold issue of whether Alcan is in pre- or post-removal
detention. Alcan does not address the government’s contention on this point in his
Reply. (Doc. 10 (only addressing jurisdiction and exhaustion)). Nevertheless, under 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A), after “an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall
remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days.” That removal
period 	starts, 	as 	relevant 	here, 	on 	the 	“date 	the 	order 	of 	removal 	becomes
administratively 	final.” 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 1231(a)(1)(B)(i). 	A 	removal 	order 	becomes
administratively final “upon the earlier of: (i) a determination by the Board of
Immigration Appeals affirming such order; or (ii) the expiration of the period in which
the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the Board of Immigration
Appeals.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B).
Here, the immigration judge entered an order of removal for Alcan on April 1,
2024. (Doc. 9-3, #97; see Doc. 9-4, #99). Alcan, however, appealed that decision to the
BIA. (Doc. 9-4, #100). Because that appeal is still pending, the removal order is not
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yet administratively final. Thus, Alcan is not in post-removal detention, and the 90-
day removal period has not started. So Alcan’s arguments are inapplicable.
As Alcan is in pre-removal detention, the next question is which statute
governs that detention—8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), which mandates detention for
“applicants for admission,” or § 1226(a), which permits release on bond. (Doc. 9, #51–
55). The Court has recently addressed this issue, several times over, and concluded
that the former, not the latter applies. See, e.g., Coronado v. Secretary, Department
of Homeland Security, No. 1:25-cv-831, 2025 WL 3628229 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 15, 2025);
Lucero v. Field Office Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations, No. 1:25-cv-
823, 2025 WL 3718730 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 23, 2025). 2 Like the petitioners in Coronado
and Lucero, Alcan acknowledges he is present in the country but was never admitted.
(Doc. 9-2, #72; Doc. 9-3, #74 (admitting factual allegations in Notice to Appear)).
Furthermore, Alcan has applied for asylum, so that further suggests he is “seeking
admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Thus, for the reasons more fully explained in the
Court’s previous decisions, the Court finds that Alcan is an “applicant for admission”
and falls under the purview of § 1225(b)(2), which in turn means he is subject to
2 The Fifth Circuit recently addressed this issue as well in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, __
F.4th __, 2026 WL 323330 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026). It also concluded that the government
properly detained the petitioners under § 1225(b)(2) and thus reversed the district courts’
orders to provide bond hearings under § 1226(a). Id at *1.
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mandatory 	detention. 3 	Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	DISMISSES 	WITHOUT
PREJUDICE Alcan’s Petition (Doc. 1). 4
In doing so, though, the Court once again takes a moment to observe that, in
denying this Petition, the Court it is not commenting on the wisdom of imposing
mandatory detention in this setting. The deluge of petitions that have inundated
federal courts on this topic in recent months highlight the very real personal costs
that mandatory detention imposes not only on the detainee, but also their family
members and loved ones. Then there are the accompanying societal costs, both in
terms of the direct costs of the detention itself, and the indirect costs arising from
sidelining those who might otherwise be productive members of society. At the same
time, the Court is also mindful that, once released, it is always possible that a person
not lawfully present in the country (especially if facing a substantial likelihood of
removal) may decline to appear for future removal proceedings. And if it is difficult
to predict who will appear and who will not, or to assess what dangers they may pose
in the interim, then perhaps there may be reasons to believe that mandatory
detention pending a removal determination is appropriate.
At the end of the day, though, Congress, not this Court, is the body responsible
for navigating the various competing concerns and articulating the appropriate path
3 Likewise, the Court more fully addressed its jurisdiction and the issue of exhaustion in
Coronado, 2025 WL 3628229, at *2–6, 13.
4 The Court dismisses without prejudice in the event that Petitioner wishes to pursue relief
as a potential class member in Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-cv-1873, 2025 WL 3713982
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025). Should he wish to do so, though, he should pursue any such remedy
in that court, not this one.
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forward. And, at least in this Court’s view, Congress has done so in the plain language
of § 1225(b)(2). That said, Congress’s chosen path must also comply with the
Constitution. And on that front, the Court notes that, if Congress mandates detention
pending a removal determination, then the Constitution arguably imposes some
obligation on the Executive to ensure that the removal determination occurs in a
reasonably prompt fashion. That is, if Alcan’s pre-removal detention goes on too long,
constitutional concerns may well arise. But given the limited duration of the
detention to date, that is a question for a later day. Having said that, in connection
with dismissing this action, the Court ORDERS the government to provide this
Court and Alcan’s counsel in writing, within fourteen days of the entry of this
judgment, its best current estimate as to when a determination on the question of
Alcan’s removal will be administratively final.
Separately, Respondent Warden of Butler County Jail filed a Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 6), arguing he is not a proper respondent for this habeas petition.
Because 	the 	Court 	dismisses 	the 	Petition, 	the 	Court 	DENIES 	AS 	MOOT
Respondent’s 	Motion 	(Doc. 	6). 	While 	the 	Court 	DISMISSES 	WITHOUT
PREJUDICE Alcan’s Petition (Doc. 1), the Court withholds an entry of judgment
until the government provides the request information.
SO ORDERED.
February 19, 2026
DATE 	DOUGLAS R. COLE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
mation.
UGLAS R.	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R COLE
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