Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
DAVITI PHURTSKHVANIDZE,
Petitioner,
v.
FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR OF
ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL
OPERATIONS, DETROIT FIELD
OFFICE, IMMIGRATION AND
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No. 1:25-cv-827
JUDGE DOUGLAS R. COLE
Magistrate Judge Bowman
OPINION AND ORDER
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is currently detaining
Petitioner Daviti Phurtskhvanidze pending removal proceedings. Phurtskhvanidze
filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1), requesting this Court to order his
release or, in the alternative, to order Respondents to provide him a bond hearing.
Separately, Phurtskhvanidze has moved for declaratory judgment on the same
grounds. (Doc. 6). According to Phurtskhvanidze, ICE is incorrectly claiming that 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), which mandates detention, applies to him. (Doc. 1, #9–10).
Instead, he says, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which provides for discretionary detention,
governs. (Id.). This Court recently addressed that precise question of statutory
interpretation in Coronado v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-831, 2025
WL 3628229 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 15, 2025), and further explained its reasoning in Lucero
v. Field Off. Dir. of Enf’t and Removal Operations, No. 1:25-cv-823, 2025 WL 3718730
(S.D. Ohio Dec. 23, 2025). Like the petitioners there, Phurtskhvanidze was charged
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with having entered the United States without admission or inspection. (Doc. 1, #2).
Thus, for the reasons more fully explained in Coronado and Lucero, the Court finds
that 	Phurtskhvanidze 	falls 	within 	the 	express 	definition 	of 	an 	“applicant 	for
admission,” who, as such, is “seeking admission,” and thus subject to § 1225(b)(2).
Still, Phurtskhvanidze, in his reply, raises a few points distinct from those the
petitioners raised in Coronado and Lucero, which merit some additional attention.
First, in arguing that § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to aliens in his situation, he offers
other “real-life scenarios” that fall under § 1225(b)(2); he does so to show that his
interpretation would not render that provision superfluous. (Doc. 8, #123–24). These
scenarios include “[i]ndividuals seeking parole into the United States pursuant to
§ 1182(d)(5)”; “[n]oncitizens with approved visas … who are being inspected by an
immigration officer”; and “[a]liens who do not possess any form of admission
document and are not seeking parole, but who are attempting to enter the United
States and are being inspected by an immigration officer.” (Id. at #124). While the
Court agrees these proffered scenarios show that § 1225(b)(2) would not be pure
“surplusage” under Petitioner’s interpretation, that does not outweigh the textual
arguments as to the provision’s meaning—in particular those regarding the phrase
“applicant for admission”—that the Court found persuasive in Coronado.
Second, Phurtskhvanidze raises a Fifth Amendment Due Process challenge
distinct from those raised in Coronado and Lucero. (Id. at #124–26). Separate from
the 	arguments 	over 	which 	statutory 	provision 	should 	apply, 	he 	argues 	that
Respondents cannot detain him under § 1225(b)(2) because they already previously
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detained and released him on his own recognizance under § 1226(a) back in 2022. (Id.
at #124). Basically, he argues that the government cannot change horses midstream
to deprive him of rights—in this case, a bond hearing—that attached when the
government previously granted him bond. (Id. at #124–26). Phurtskhvanidze appears
to rest this argument on two grounds: (1) Supreme Court precedent requiring “that
changes in position by administrative authorities require the issuance of a new
decision,” (id. at #126 (citing Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
591 U.S. 1, 22–23 (2020))), and (2) that his “release under § 1226(a) ‘created a reliance
interest in [his] continued freedom, so long as [he] abided by the terms of [his]
release,’” (id. (quoting Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-6924, 2025 WL 2637503, at
*8 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 12, 2025))).
As to the first, this Court addressed a similar point in Lucero, explaining that
while it is “not entirely clear to the Court what Regents requires in terms of
implementing a policy change, nor how that stacks up to the procedures Respondents
followed in adopting and implementing their change,” it ultimately did not matter as
the petitioner had not raised an Administrative Procedures Act challenge. Lucero,
2025 WL 3718730, at *5. The same is true here. And inasmuch as Phurtskhvanidze
is arguing that the government citing § 1225(b)(2) as the source of authority for his
detainment is a “belated justification,” Regents, 591 U.S. at 23, the Court is
unconvinced. Petitioner was arrested and detained after ICE changed its policy and
the BIA adopted the same position. (Doc. 1, #6–7, 10).
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Turning to the second point, Phurtskhvanidze is correct that some district
courts have (at least at the preliminary injunction stage) found that aliens released
on bond under § 1226(a) have a liberty interest that “cannot be unilaterally abrogated
without 	process 	by 	the 	Government 	simply 	‘switching 	tracks’” 	to 	§ 1225(b)(2)
detainment. Salcedo Aceros, 2025 WL 2637503, at *8. But a couple of things bear
mention. First, the Court notes that Salcedo Aceros’s holding rested on that court’s
decision that § 1225(b)(2) did not apply to the petitioner, id. at *12; but this Court
has, of course, gone the other way on that question. Further, the reasoning in Salcedo
Aceros relies on the assumption that detaining an individual under § 1225(b)(2) when
they have previously been released on bond under § 1226(a) denies them the “process”
or “procedural protections” they are due. Id. at *8. The Court disagrees. True,
Phurtskhvanidze and other like-petitioners have a liberty interest in remaining free
from detention, and courts have long held that, at least in the criminal context, that
liberty extends to a bond—meaning a bond cannot be revoked arbitrarily or for no
reason at all. See, e.g., Atkins v. Michigan, 644 F.2d 543, 550 (6th Cir. 1981).
Moreover, it is also true that here the Petitioner was granted bond under § 1226(a)
and then later detained without being afforded the bond hearing that provision
requires. But his current detention did not result from the government seeking to
revoke his bond under § 1226(a); rather it is the result of a change in government
policy (and interpretation) through which the government determined that aliens in
Petitioner’s 	position 	are 	subject 	to 	§ 1225(b)(2) 	and 	its 	mandatory 	detention
provision. That Phurtskhvanidze was granted rights under one statutory provision
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does not mean that other provisions of the code cannot be enforced against him, so
long as those provisions lawfully apply. So, for Phurtskhvanidze to prevail, he would
need 	to 	allege 	that 	§ 1225(b)(2)’s 	procedures 	were 	not 	followed 	or 	that 	those
procedures violate his due process rights in some way. Absent that, the government
detaining him under that provision does not violate his Fifth Amendment due process
rights. And if he is instead arguing that the government’s policy shift, in and of itself,
violates his rights, the better vehicle for such an argument, as discussed above and
in Lucero, is a challenge under the APA.
Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	DISMISSES 	WITHOUT 	PREJUDICE
Phurtskhvanidze’s Petition (Doc. 1)1 and DENIES his Motion for Declaratory
Judgment (Doc. 6). The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to enter judgment and to
TERMINATE this case on its docket.
SO ORDERED.
January 21, 2026
DATE 	DOUGLAS R. COLE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
1 The Court dismisses without prejudice in the event that Petitioner wishes to pursue relief
as a potential class member in Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-cv-1873, 2025 WL 3288403
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025).
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