USA v. Jose Daniel Zazueta-Hernandez, et al.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION - CINCINNATI
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	Case No. 1:19-cr-130
Plaintiff,
V.
JOSE DANIEL ZAZUETA-
HERNANDEZ, et al.,
Judge Matthew W. McFarland
Defendants.
ORDER AND OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Third-Party Movant David Maddox's First
Motion for 	Return of Property (Doc. 1253). The Government filed 	a Response in
Opposition (Doc. 1256), to which Mr. Maddox filed a Reply in Support (Doc. 1257.) Thus,
this matter is ripe for the Court's review. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES
Third-Party Movant David Maddox's Motion for Return of Property.
BACKGROUND
In April 2018, Third-Party Movant David Maddox delivered several pieces of
jewelry to Defendant Tri-State Jewelers, Inc., for cleaning and repair. (Motion, Doc. 1253,
Pg. ID 8753.) These items included: (1) a Rolex watch; (2) a ring; (3) a chain; and (4) a dog
tag necklace. (Id. at Pg. ID 8754.) On November 13, 2019, the United States executed a
search warrant at Tri-State Jewelers; 	during 	the 	execution of this 	warrant, 	Drug
Enforcement Administration ("DEA") agents seized assorted jewelry from the premises.
(Response, Doc. 1256, Pg. ID 9056-57.) Then, on December 9, 2020, the DEA returned
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several bags of jewelry labeled as "repairs" or "layaway" to counsel for Defendant
Vyacheslav Minyalo. (Id. at Pg. ID 9057.)
Tri-State Jewelers also entered into a plea agreement with the Government in
which it agreed to the immediate forfeiture of jewelry deemed property involved in the
offense charged or property traceable to such property. (Response, Doc. 1256, Pg. ID
9057.) This Court entered a Preliminary Order of Forfeiture (Doc. 1047), finding that all
right, title, and interest in the assorted jewelry had been forfeited to the United States.
(Id.) The Government then published notice of the forfeiture action and of its intent to
dispose of the jewelry in accordance with the law. (Id.) The Government sent written
notice of the Preliminary Order of Forfeiture to all persons who "reasonably appeared to
be a potential claimant with standing to contest the forfeiture" of the jewelry. (Id. at Pg.
ID 9058.) The deadline to respond to this notice was May 8, 2023. (Id. at Pg. ID 9059.)
Three petitioners established a legal interest in some of this jewelry, and the United States
entered into settlement agreements to return their jewelry to them. (Id. at Pg. ID 9058; see
also Docs. 1185, 1186, 1189.) As no other person or entity filed a petition with the--Court
asserting any interest, and the deadline had passed, this Court entered a First Final Order
of Forfeiture against the remaining jewelry on April 16, 2024. (Id.; see also Doc. 1215.)
Pursuant to this Order, the U.S. Marshals Service sold the remaining jewelry. (Id.) Over a
year later, on September 29, 2025, Maddox filed a third-party petition to assert his interest
in, and request the return of, the four pieces of jewelry mentioned above. (Motion, Doc.
1253.)
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LAW AND ANALYSIS
Under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(2), a party wanting to assert a legal interest in property
ordered forfeited to the United States has thirty days from the final publication of notice
to petition the Court for a hearing on the validity of the alleged interest. As the
Government pointed out, any interested party had until May 8, 2023, to file a petition
asserting a legal interest in the forfeited jewelry. (See Response, Doc. 1256, Pg. ID 9059.)
But, Maddox did not file his petition until September 29, 2025, over two years after the
deadline. (Id.) Furthermore, the Government notes that, setting aside the two-year delay,
Maddox still failed to comply with the statutory requirements in his petition to set forth
the nature and extent of his right, title, or interest in the jewelry, or the time and
circumstances of his acquisition of his right, title, or interest in the jewelry. (Id.)
Nevertheless, in his Reply, Maddox contends that the Government should return
his jewelry because "keeping it violates the very purpose of forfeiture," as it was not
property 	illegally 	obtained. 	(Reply, 	Doc. 	1257, 	Pg. 	ID 	9065.) 	To 	allow 	"technical
procedural issues to block the return of property creates an unjust taking of property."
(Id.) And, Maddox argues that the Government "did not make the effort to obtain
customer lists from Tri-State Jewelers to notify owners" of the seized property, even
though it is "common knowledge" that jewelers often have jewelry in their possession
for repair. (Id.) Finally, Maddox states that "[e]thics require" that the Government return
his property, property which "[t]he government has sold." (Id.) Instead, Maddox states
that the Government should provide him a list of the sold property so he can identify his
pieces and receive compensation for them. (Id. at Pg. ID 9065-66.) In response, though,
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the Government points out that the DEA had returned property labeled "repairs" or
"layaway," and such jewelry was not included in the forfeiture. (Response, Doc. 1256, Pg.
ID 9060.) So, it is likely that Maddox's jewelry was not forfeited but had instead been
returned to Defendant Minyalo' s counsel. (Id.)
Furthermore, assuming that the Government had, in fact, sold Maddox's property,
the only recourse here would be for the Court to amend the Final Order of Forfeiture.
However, once a court has entered a final order of forfeiture, it can amend that order "in
only two circumstances." United States v. Monea Family Trust I, 626 F.3d 271,277 (6th Cir.
2010). First, an amendment is appropriate if the petitioner can prove under 21 U.S.C. §
859(n)(6)(A) that he "has a legal right, title, or interest in that property," that was vested
or superior to any right, title, or interest of the defendant at the time of the commission
of the acts which gave rise to the forfeiture of the property." Id. Or, an amendment can
be appropriate if the petitioner can prove under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(B) that he or she is
"a bona fide purchaser for value of the right, title, or interest in the property and was at
the time of purchase reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to
forfeiture." Id. But, as the Government points out, Maddox failed to put forth evidence of
either circumstance that was specific to the property named in the Preliminary Order of
Forfeiture; thus, he has failed to state a claim for relief under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6).
For all the foregoing reasons, Third-Party Movant David Maddox's Motion for
Return of Property (Doc. 1253) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
By: --------~	- 	-1/J	_	,'4	__..,	! 	>----
JUDGE MATTHEW W. Mc ARLAND
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