Staton et al v. Hogeback

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
In Re 	)
) Case No. 25-10744
DERRICK G. HOGEBACK 	) Chapter 7
PAMELA R. HOGEBACK 	) Judge Buchanan
)
Debtors 	)
______________________________________)
)
ROGER D. STATON, et al. 	) Adv. Pro. 25-1024
)
Plaintiffs 	)
v. 	)
)
DERRICK G. HOGEBACK 	)
)
Defendant 	____ __)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs Aaron J. Jackson’s and Roger D. Staton’s
Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket Number 15]; the Response of Derrick G. Hogeback to
Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket Number 20]; Plaintiffs Aaron J. Jackson’s and Roger D.
This document has been electronically entered in the records of the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 28, 2026
Case 1:25-ap-01024 Doc 26 Filed 05/28/26 Entered 05/28/26 14:15:22 Desc Main
Document Page 1 of 12

Staton’s Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket Number 21]; the Sur-Reply
Brief of Derrick G. Hogeback in Response to Issues Raised by Plaintiff[s] in Their Response
[Docket Number 24]; and Plaintiffs Aaron J. Jackson’s and Roger D. Staton’s Sur-Sur-Reply to
Defendant Hogeback’s Sur-Reply [Docket Number 25].
Prior to the bankruptcy filing, Plaintiff Aaron Jackson obtained a state court civil judgment
against the Defendant-Debtor and was awarded $231,200.00 in compensatory and punitive
damages plus an award of $118,218.75 in attorney fees to his attorney, Plaintiff Roger Staton. The
Plaintiffs together filed a complaint in this adversary proceeding to except the debt from the
Defendant-Debtor’s discharge as a willful and malicious injury under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). They
subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that the state court judgment was
entitled to issue preclusive effect on the elements of a willful and malicious injury, or,
alternatively, that the elements were met with Plaintiff Aaron Jackson’s affidavit.
Upon review of the parties’ summary judgment filings, the Court concludes that the state
court judgment lacks specific findings of fact or conclusions of law on which to give issue
preclusive effect. However, Plaintiff Aaron Jackson’s affidavit sets forth undisputed facts which
meet the elements of a willful and malicious injury. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted
to the Plaintiffs.
I. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On November 29, 2010, Defendant-Debtor Derrick G. Hogeback (“Mr. Hogeback”) struck
and physically beat Plaintiff Aaron Jackson (“Mr. Jackson”) with his fists [Docket Number 15,
Attached Affidavit of Mr. Jackson (“Jackson Aff.”), § 2].1 The encounter was an “unprovoked
1 The facts set forth in this section are found in the affidavit of Plaintiff Aaron Jackson and exhibits submitted in
support of Plaintiffs Roger Staton’s and Aaron Jackson’s motion for summary judgment. They have not been disputed
by the Defendant-Debtor Derrick G. Hogeback by contrary evidence except where stated.
Case 1:25-ap-01024 Doc 26 Filed 05/28/26 Entered 05/28/26 14:15:22 Desc Main
Document Page 2 of 12

physical attack” that broke Mr. Jackson’s jaw and bent his hand and fingers so forcefully that he
has permanent and disabling injuries requiring painful treatment [Id.]. Mr. Jackson now has
permanent and partial disability as a result of the physical beating [Id.].
In his affidavit submitted on summary judgment, Mr. Jackson states that Mr. Hogeback
was convicted in a criminal court in Oxford, Ohio of assault and battery as a result of the attack
[Id., § 3]. Mr. Hogeback disputes this description of his conviction and submits a record from a
Butler County court to support that Mr. Hogeback entered a plea, and was found, guilty of, assault
and not battery [Docket Number 24, Ex. 1].
Mr. Jackson filed a civil complaint and jury demand against Mr. Hogeback in the Bulter
County, Ohio Court of Common Pleas based on the November 29, 2010 attack [Docket Number
15, Jackson Aff., § 4 and Ex. 1]. The case proceeded to a jury trial on September 30 through
October 2, 2013 [Id., Jackson Aff., § 4 and Ex. 2]. The jury returned a verdict against Mr.
Hogeback and in favor of Mr. Jackson [Id.]. The state court entered a Judgment Entry Ordering
Judgment in Favor of Plaintiff and Against Defendant Derrick Gene Hogeback which, in
accordance with the verdict, awarded Mr. Jackson the sum of $230,200.00 in compensatory
damages, $1,000.00 in punitive damages, and attorney fees to be determined by the court plus
interest at the statutory rate in Ohio from the date of the October 15, 2013 judgment [Id.]. On
January 29, 2014, the Bulter County, Ohio Court of Common Pleas entered an Order Granting
Application for Award of Attorney Fees awarding Mr. Jackson’s attorney, Roger Staton (“Mr.
Staton”), attorney fees in the amount of $118,218.75 [Id., Jackson Aff., § 5 and Ex. 3]. 2
2 On March 16, 2023, the Butler County, Ohio Court of Common Pleas entered a Revivor of Judgment for the sum of
$231,200.00 plus $118,218.75 attorney fees and costs and interest at the rate of 4% per annum [Id., Jackson Aff., § 7
and Ex. 5]. On October 22, 2013, the Clerk of the Butler County, Ohio Court of Common Pleas entered a Certificate
Case 1:25-ap-01024 Doc 26 Filed 05/28/26 Entered 05/28/26 14:15:22 Desc Main
Document Page 3 of 12

Following the filing of Mr. Hogeback’s bankruptcy case, Mr. Jackson and Mr. Staton
(collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint initiating this adversary proceeding to hold the
judgment debt, including attorney fees, excepted from discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).
Subsequently, they filed their motion for summary judgment asserting that no genuine issues of
material fact exist and they are entitled to judgment on their complaint as a matter of law.
II. 	SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
The Court addresses Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment under the standard set forth
in Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the “Rules”) made applicable to this
proceeding by Rule 7056 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Rule 56(a) provides that
summary judgment is to be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “As
to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts
that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry
of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A “genuine”
dispute exists only where “evidence is such that a reasonable [finder of fact] could return a
[judgment] for the nonmoving party.” Id.
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of
material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once established, an
opposing party cannot rely upon mere allegation but must instead set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Merely alleging that a factual
dispute exists cannot defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Id.
of Judgment Lien of record in the sum of $231,200.00 at the interest rate of 4% from October 15, 2013 plus court
costs [Id., Jackson Aff., § 6 and Ex. 4].
Case 1:25-ap-01024 Doc 26 Filed 05/28/26 Entered 05/28/26 14:15:22 Desc Main
Document Page 4 of 12

On summary judgment, a court is not “obligated to wade through and search the entire
record for some specific facts that might support the nonmoving party’s claims.” InterRoyal Corp.
v. Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir. 1989). Instead, the nonmoving party must go beyond
the pleadings and, by affidavits or other evidentiary materials of record, designate specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 110-11 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) and Celotex
Corp., 477 U.S. at 324).
All inferences drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in a light most favorable
to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus., Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986); Anthony v. BTR Auto. Sealing Sys., Inc., 339 F.3d 506, 511 (6th Cir.
2003). Nonetheless, mere conclusory allegations or unsupported opinions of the nonmovant are
insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-88; See also
Blaney v. Cengage Learning, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43780, at *19-20, 2011 WL 1532032,
at *7 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 22, 2011) (“Although the summary judgment standard requires that evidence
of record be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, it does not require that all
bald assertions and subjective unsupported opinions asserted by the nonmoving party be adopted
by a court.”).
III. 	LEGAL ANALYSIS
On summary judgment, Plaintiffs seek a determination that the state court civil judgment
awarding $230,200.00 in compensatory damages, $1,000.00 in punitive damages, and attorney
fees in the amount of $118,218.75 (the “State Court Judgment”) be excepted from Mr. Hogeback’s
discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). As the creditors, the Plaintiffs bear the burden of
proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the debt should be excepted from discharge.
Case 1:25-ap-01024 Doc 26 Filed 05/28/26 Entered 05/28/26 14:15:22 Desc Main
Document Page 5 of 12

Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991); Yeager v. Wilmers, 553 B.R. 102, 107 (S.D. Ohio
2015).
Bankruptcy Code Section 523(a)(6) provides that an individual debtor is not discharged
from any debt “for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property
of another entity.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). For an injury caused by the debtor to be “willful,” the
debtor must have “‘desire[d] to cause the consequences of his actions or believe[d] that the
consequences are substantially certain to result from his actions.’” Dardinger v. Dardinger (In re
Dardinger), 566 B.R. 481, 493 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2017) (quoting Schafer v. Rapp (In re Rapp),
375 B.R. 421, 436 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2007) and Markowitz v. Campbell (In re Markowitz), 190
F.3d 455, 464 (6th Cir. 1999)). For an injury to be “malicious,” the debtor must have acted “in
conscious disregard of [his] duties or without just cause or excuse.” Id. (quoting Wheeler v.
Laudani, 783 F.2d 610, 615 (6th Cir. 1986)). Maliciousness does not require that the person act
with ill will, spite or animosity toward the injured party. Id. at 499.
In their Motion, the Plaintiffs argue two alternative pathways to proving the elements
necessary to except the judgment debt against Mr. Hogeback from his discharge. First, they argue
that the State Court Judgment is entitled to issue preclusive effect with respect to the required
elements. Alternatively, they argue that the elements are met by the undisputed facts in Mr.
Jackson’s affidavit.
A. 	The State Court Judgment Is Not Entitled to Issue Preclusive Effect on the Elements
to Establish a Willful and Malicious Injury Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)
Issue preclusion may be applied in dischargeability proceedings when specific facts or
legal issues determined in prior litigation are relevant to the elements to except a debt from
discharge pursuant to one of the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 523. Grogan, 498 U.S. at 284 n.11;
Case 1:25-ap-01024 Doc 26 Filed 05/28/26 Entered 05/28/26 14:15:22 Desc Main
Document Page 6 of 12

Clark v. Springhart (In re Springhart), 450 B.R. 725, 730 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2011). Furthermore,
under 28 U.S.C. § 1738, federal courts are directed to give the same “full faith and credit” to a
state court judgment as would be given that judgment under the law of the state in which it is
rendered, absent some express or implied Congressional exception which ought to apply. Bay Area
Factors v. Calvert (In re Calvert), 105 F.3d 315, 317 (6th Cir. 1997); Sill v. Sweeney (In re
Sweeney), 276 B.R. 186, 189 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2002).
Consequently, in order for a judgment rendered in an Ohio state court to have issue
preclusive effect in a bankruptcy adversary proceeding, it must be entitled to such effect under
Ohio’s preclusionary principles. See Markowitz v. Campbell (In re Markowitz), 190 F.3d 455, 461
(6th Cir. 1999) (looking to the law in the state in which the issue was litigated to determine if re-
litigation of such issue is precluded). Under Ohio law, the doctrine of issue preclusion has four
elements:
(1) A final judgment on the merits in the previous case after a full and
fair opportunity to litigate the issue; (2) The issue must have been
actually and directly litigated in the prior suit and must have been
necessary to the final judgment; (3) The issue in the present suit must
have been identical to the issue in the prior suit; (4) The party against
whom estoppel is sought was a party or in privity with the party to the
prior action.
Sweeney, 276 B.R. at 189 (citations omitted); Dardinger, 566 B.R. at 494. “The party seeking to invoke
the doctrine of issue preclusion has the burden of establishing its applicability.” Dardinger, 566 B.R.
at 494.
In their Motion, Plaintiffs argue that the State Court Judgment is entitled to issue preclusive
effect with respect to the elements to except the debt from discharge as a willful and malicious
injury under § 523(a)(6). Mr. Hogeback disputes this contention arguing that there is nothing in
Case 1:25-ap-01024 Doc 26 Filed 05/28/26 Entered 05/28/26 14:15:22 Desc Main
Document Page 7 of 12

the judgment demonstrating that the required elements to prove a willful and malicious injury were
actually and directly litigated in the state court. The Court agrees.
As already noted, to prove a willful and malicious injury, the Plaintiffs must establish that
the debtor caused an injury to another entity, that the debtor desired to cause the consequences of
his actions or was substantially certain such harm would result, and that the debtor acted in
conscious disregard of his duties or without just cause or excuse. Dardinger, 566 B.R. at 493. The
State Court Judgment submitted by the Plaintiffs does not include any factual findings or legal
conclusions indicating that these elements were litigated and determined in state court [see Docket
Number 15, Ex. 2]. Perhaps understanding the limits of the two paragraph State Court Judgment,
the Plaintiffs also submit a copy of the state court complaint with their Motion [Docket Number
15, Ex. 1]. However, it is not clear from the State Court Judgment which counts and facts in the
state court complaint were proven at trial and formed the basis for the judgment against Mr.
Hogeback.
Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the State Court Judgment is
entitled to issue preclusive effect with respect to the elements to except the debt from discharge
under § 523(a)(6).
B. 	The Facts Set Forth in Mr. Jackson’s Affidavit Establish the § 523(a)(6) Elements
Alternatively, the Plaintiffs argue that the elements of a willful and malicious injury are
met through Mr. Jackson’s affidavit submitted with their Motion.
In the affidavit, Mr. Jackson states that on November 29, 2010, Mr. Hogeback struck and
physically beat him with his fists in an unprovoked physical attack that broke Mr. Jackson’s jaw
and bent his hand and fingers so forcefully that he has permanent and disabling injuries requiring
painful treatment [Docket Number 15, Jackson Aff., § 2]. Both parties agree that Mr. Hogeback
Case 1:25-ap-01024 Doc 26 Filed 05/28/26 Entered 05/28/26 14:15:22 Desc Main
Document Page 8 of 12

was convicted of assault, at the very least, related to the attack [Id., § 3 and Docket Number 24 Ex.
1]. Furthermore, Mr. Jackson brought a civil lawsuit against Mr. Hogeback ending in a jury verdict
in Mr. Jackson’s favor and a State Court Judgment awarding Mr. Jackson the sum of $230,200.00
in compensatory damages, $1,000.00 in punitive damages and attorney fees awarded to Mr. Staton
totaling an additional $118,218.75 [Docket Number 15, Jackson Aff., §§ 4-5 and Exs. 2 and 3].
These facts are not disputed by Mr. Hogeback.
1. 	The Injury Is Willful
Turning to the elements of § 523(a)(6), the Court begins with an analysis of whether these
undisputed facts support that the injury was “willful”, i.e., that Mr. Hogeback knew or was
substantially certain that injury would result to Mr. Jackson from the physical attack. While matters
of the mind are usually reserved for trial, this is not a per se rule. Continental Ins. Co. v. Adams,
438 F.3d 538, 540 (6th Cir. 2006). “A court may infer intent on summary judgment ‘where the
[assailant’s] conduct is both intentional and of such a nature and character that harm inheres in it,
that conduct affords a sufficiently clear demonstration of intent to harm subsuming any need for a
separate inquiry into capacity.’” Id. (further citation omitted). Many courts have concluded that
deliberately punching someone with one’s fists is the type of conduct from which a willful injury
can be inferred. See Berry v. Vollbracht (In re Vollbracht), 276 F. App’x 360, 362 (5th Cir. Oct.
24, 2007) (“[Debtor]’s haymakers, like most garden-variety punches to the face, are objectively
very likely to cause harm.”); Juett v. Casciano (In re Casciano), 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 82, at *15-
16, 2016 WL 105926, at *5-6 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. Jan. 11, 2016) (debtor’s intentionally thrown punch
to slow the plaintiff down is evidence of debtor’s intent to harm and is willful under § 523(a)(6));
Albert v. Nason (In re Nason), 654 B.R. 644, 649 (Bankr. D. Maine 2023) (concluding that the
deliberate act of swiftly swinging a closed first in an upward and forceful manner within striking
Case 1:25-ap-01024 Doc 26 Filed 05/28/26 Entered 05/28/26 14:15:22 Desc Main
Document Page 9 of 12

distance of the plaintiff’s face was “at least substantially certain to cause the consequence of bodily
harm”); Davis v. Music (In re Music), 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 1067, at *15, 2014 WL 1089849, at *5
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio Mar. 19, 2014) (“This court concludes, as have other courts, that injuries arising
from a deliberate punch are intended.”); Kleman v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 322 B.R. 306, 309
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2004) (holding that the defendant-debtor’s actions “were, in fact, ‘willful’
based upon the common sense notion that when one physically hits another with enough force to
break another’s jaw, an alternative, but plausible explanation is all but impossible to discern”).
According to Mr. Jackson’s affidavit, Mr. Hogeback struck and physically beat Mr.
Jackson with his fists causing injuries that included breaking Mr. Jackson’s jaw and injuring his
hand and fingers. Mr. Hogeback does not dispute these facts. Based on the record on summary
judgment, the Court concludes that the Plaintiffs have established that the injury is willful under
§ 523(a)(6).
2. 	The Injury Is Malicious
Next, the Plaintiffs must demonstrate that Mr. Hogeback physically striking and beating
Mr. Jackson was “malicious” or “in conscious disregard of [his] duties or without just cause or
excuse.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6); Dardinger, 566 B.R. at 493, 502 (noting that this standard does
not require ill-will or specific intent to do harm). An individual owes a duty not to assault another
person, but a claim of self-defense, mutual combat, or provocation may provide a just cause or
excuse. See Casciano, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 82, at *17, 2016 WL 105926, at *6; Yeager, 553 B.R.
at 108. Like a finding of willfulness, malice can also be inferred from the circumstances
surrounding the injury. Casciano, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 82, at *17, 2016 WL 105926, at *6.
In his affidavit, Mr. Jackson states that he was struck and beaten by Mr. Hogeback in an
“unprovoked physical attack” that caused his injuries. Mr. Hogeback submits no evidence to
Case 1:25-ap-01024 Doc 26 Filed 05/28/26 Entered 05/28/26 14:15:22 Desc Main
Document Page 10 of 12

dispute these facts. However, Mr. Hogeback’s attorney asserts in a brief that Mr. Jackson’s
affidavit omits that the source of Mr. Hogeback’s aggression was a third party and that Mr. Jackson
stepped into the middle of the dispute [Docket Number 24, p. 2].
Assertions like the one made by Mr. Hogeback’s attorney must be properly supported by
citation to factual materials of record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) (specifying that such
supportive materials of record may include affidavits, stipulations, depositions, documents,
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other such materials). The assertion made by Mr.
Hogeback’s attorney lacks any such citation or support. Accordingly, the assertion is properly
disregarded. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).3 Even if considered, Mr. Hogeback’s attorney failed to
explain how this alleged scenario would constitute self-defense, mutual combat, provocation, or
other “just cause” to negate the malice component of § 523(a)(6). See Casciano, 2016 Bankr.
LEXIS 82, at *18, 2016 WL 105926, at *6 (while, in appropriate circumstances, self-defense may
constitute a justifiable excuse that negates malice, it is the debtor-defendant who has the burden of
proving the elements of self-defense); Taylor, 322 B.R. at 309-10 (with guidance from Ohio law,
the elements to prove self-defense for purposes of negating “malice” include: (1) a lack of fault in
creating the situation giving rise to the affray; (2) a bona fide belief of imminent danger of death
or bodily harm; (3) a belief that the only means of escape from danger is through the use of force;
and (4) there is no duty to retreat); Roesing v. Moccio (In re Moccio), 41 B.R. 268, 273-75 (Bankr.
D. N.J. 1984) (determining that the mutual combat defense requires proof that a creditor-plaintiff
consented to and became a willing participant in the fight at which point it would follow that a
3 This Court may disregard unsupported assertions of fact set forth in briefing on summary judgment or give the party
opportunity to properly support or address the fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). This Court already provided Mr.
Hogeback a second opportunity to address the facts in Mr. Jackson’s affidavit through the order granting him time to
file a sur-reply [see Docket Number 22] so no further opportunity will be afforded.
Case 1:25-ap-01024 Doc 26 Filed 05/28/26 Entered 05/28/26 14:15:22 Desc Main
Document Page 11 of 12

defendant-debtor did not act willfully or maliciously unless the defendant-debtor exceeded the
plaintiff’s consent by use of disproportionate violence).
The undisputed facts support that Mr. Hogeback wrongfully struck and beat Mr. Jackson
with his fists causing his injuries and these actions were done without just cause or excuse, thus,
meeting the “malicious” element of § 523(a)(6).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
The Plaintiffs have established that the injury inflicted on Mr. Jackson by Mr. Hogeback
was willful and malicious pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). Accordingly, summary judgment is
granted in favor of the Plaintiffs and the State Court Judgment debt, including the award of
compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees, is excepted from discharge. See
HER, Inc. v. Barlow (In re Barlow), 478 B.R. 320, 333-34 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2012) (holding that
once a willful and malicious injury is established, all liability traceable to the injury, including an
award of punitive damages and attorney fees, is nondischargeable), aff’d, 501 B.R. 685 (B.A.P.
6th Cir. 2013).
In accordance with this memorandum opinion, the Court will enter a separate judgment
entry in favor of the Plaintiffs providing that the debt is excepted from discharge pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).
SO ORDERED.
Distribution List:
Roger Staton, Esq.
Eric Goering, Esq.
Case 1:25-ap-01024 Doc 26 Filed 05/28/26 Entered 05/28/26 14:15:22 Desc Main
Document Page 12 of 12