Hill v. Heath

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
DAVIS ANTHONY HILL,
Petitioner,
v.
TARYN L. HEATH,
Respondent.
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Case No. 5:25-CV-00646-BMB
JUDGE BRIDGET MEEHAN BRENNAN
MAGISTRATE JUDGE
JENNIFER DOWDELL
ARMSTRONG
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
I. 	INTRODUCTION
Petitioner, Davis Anthony Hill (“Mr. Hill”), seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1). Mr. Hill is serving a sentence of 16 to 21 and a half years in
prison after entering a plea of no contest to charges of drug trafficking, drug possession, and
having weapons while under disability.
Mr. 	Hill 	asserts 	three 	grounds 	for 	relief. 	Respondent 	(“Warden”) 	filed 	an
answer/return of writ on June 18, 2025. (ECF No. 7). Mr. Hill filed a traverse on August 16,
2025. (ECF No. 10). This matter was referred to me on April 3, 2025 under Local Rule 72.2
to prepare a report and recommendation on Mr. Hill’s petition. (See ECF non-document entry
dated April 3, 2025). For the reasons set forth below, I recommend that Mr. Hill’s petition be
DISMISSED and/or DENIED. I further recommend that the Court not grant Mr. Hill a
certificate of appealability. Finally, I recommend that the Court substitute Warden George A.
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Frederick for Judge Taryn L. Heath as the respondent in this proceeding.1
II. 	RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND
For purposes of habeas corpus review of state court decisions, a state court's findings
of fact are presumed correct and can be contravened only if the habeas petitioner shows, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the state court's factual findings are erroneous. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e)(1); Moore v. Mitchell, 708 F.3d 760, 775 (6th Cir. 2013); Mitzel v. Tate, 267 F.3d
524, 530 (6th Cir. 2001). This presumption of correctness applies to factual findings made by
a state court of appeals based on the state trial court record. Mitzel, 267 F.3d at 530. The Ohio
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Appellate District summarized the facts as follows:
{¶2} In 2019, a multi-agency investigation was launched following a tip from an FBI
wire stating Appellant had taken over for a drug trafficker who was in prison. Agent
Kelly Hmiel of the Stark County Sheriff's Department Metro Narcotics Unit Task
Force was involved in the investigation.
{¶3} Over a three-month period, Agent Hmiel utilized a confidential informant
(hereinafter “C.S.”) to make controlled drug buys from Appellant. The officer
monitored Appellant's routes taken and the houses he visited, and determined the
drug-related history of people who lived in the homes Appellant's visited. She
witnessed an unknown female enter and leave Appellant's residence, and subsequently
make a hand-to-hand transaction with another person.
{¶4} Officers watched Appellant's residence in Canton, Ohio, during the controlled
drug buys. After a call or text from C.S. was sent to Appellant, officers saw Appellant
leave the residence and drive to the site of the controlled buy. Appellant used the same
vehicle every time, and never left the vehicle. During the controlled buys, C.S. wore
a wire and used buy-money supplied by police to purchase contraband from
Appellant. The recovered contraband was sent to the Stark County Crime Lab, where
the drugs recovered were found to be either heroin, fentanyl, or carfentanil.
{¶5} On May 29, 2019, officers sought a search warrant to install a GPS tracking
device on Appellant's vehicle. The warrant (hereinafter “tracker warrant”) was issued,
and a tracking device was placed on the vehicle which alerted Agent Hmiel every time
1 Mr. Hill named Judge Taryn L. Heath as the respondent in his petition. (ECF No. 1). In the return of writ,
respondent states that Mr. Hill is currently incarcerated at Marion Correctional Institution, and that Warden
George A. Frederick is the warden of that institution, and thus the proper respondent in this proceeding. (ECF
No. 7, PageID # 31, n.1); see also https://appgateway.drc.ohio.gov/OffenderSearch/Search/Details/A773422
(last accessed Jan. 2, 2026). I therefore recommend that the Court substitute Warden George A. Frederick for
Judge Taryn L. Heath as the respondent in this proceeding.
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Appellant went mobile. Two or three more controlled buys occurred during the time
the tracker was on the vehicle. In late June, 2019, officers followed Appellant's vehicle
to a well-known drug house in Akron, and followed the vehicle back to Appellant's
residence. Agent Hmiel was able to identify Appellant as the person in the vehicle.
{¶6} Officers obtained a search warrant for Appellant's residence on July 1, 2019. The
next day, officers set up a vehicle perimeter around the residence. When Appellant
returned to the residence, officers told him they had a warrant to search the residence.
Appellant was searched. On Appellant's person, officers found multiple cell phones,
a small bag of marijuana, and over a thousand dollars in cash. Appellant was placed
in the back of a police cruiser while officers swept the house for safety reasons.
{¶7} Agent Hmiel then took Appellant inside the residence, provided him with the
search warrants, and had him sit at the kitchen table. Agent Jarrod Blanc was seated
at the table across from Appellant. The officer was going through paperwork, as he
was responsible to inventory the items found in the house. After two or three minutes,
Appellant asked the agents if they were looking for “dog food,” which is slang for
heroin, and told the officers the “dog food” was in the top of the closet. Appellant also
mentioned there was a rifle under the bed.
(ECF No. 7-1, Exhibit 36); State v. Hill, No. 2023CA00029, 2023 WL 8439317, 2023-
Ohio-4381 (5th Dist. Dec. 4, 2023).
III. 	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. State Court Guilty Plea
On August 26, 2019, Mr. Hill was indicted in the Stark County Court of Common
Pleas on: (1) one first-degree felony count of trafficking in heroin in violation of O.R.C. §
2925.03(A)(2)(C)(6)(g); (2) one first-degree felony count of heroin possession in violation of
O.R.C. § 2925.11(A)(C)(6)(f); (3) one first-degree felony count of trafficking in a fentanyl-
related compound in violation of O.R.C. § 2925.03(A)(2)(C)(9)(h); (4) one first-degree felony
count 	of 	possession 	of 	a 	fentanyl-related 	compound 	in 	violation 	of 	O.R.C. 	§
2925.11(A)(C)(11)(g); (5) two third-degree felony counts of heaving weapons while under
disability in violation of O.R.C. § 2923.13(A)(2); and (6) one fifth-degree felony count of
aggravated drug possession in violation of O.R.C. § 2925.11(A)(C)(1)(a). (ECF No. 7-1,
Exhibit 1). The trafficking, heroin possession, and fentanyl possession counts also carried
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major drug offender specifications. Id. On August 30, 2019, Mr. Hill pled not guilty to all
charges. (ECF No. 7-1, Exhibit 2).
On January 3, 2020, Mr. Hill filed a motion to suppress or exclude any evidence
obtained from the search of his residence. (ECF No. 7-1, Exhibit 3). After the trial court held
a suppression hearing, Mr. Hill filed a post-hearing brief, in which he also argued that the
court should exclude the statements he made to agents during the search because they were
obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. (ECF No. 7-1, Exhibit 4). On April 22,
2020, the court denied the motion to suppress. (ECF No. 7-1, Exhibit 5).
On July 21, 2020, Mr. Hill filed a second suppression motion, seeking to exclude any
information obtained as a result of the installation of the vehicle tracking device. (ECF No.
7-1, Exhibit 6). On July 27, 2020, Mr. Hill filed a supplemental motion to suppress, in which
he also asked the trial court to reconsider its prior order denying his motion to suppress
evidence obtained from the search of his residence. (ECF No. 7-1, Exhibit 8). On July 27,
2020, the trial court denied both motions in an oral ruling. (ECF No. 8-2, 46:12-22; 48:21-
25).
On August 5, 2020, Mr. Hill withdrew his plea of not guilty and pled guilty to all
charges. (ECF No. 7-1, Exhibit 9). On the same day, the trial court sentenced Mr. Hill to an
aggregate term of 16 to 21 and a half years in prison. Id.
B. Direct Appeal
On September 10, 2020, Mr. Hill, through counsel, timely filed a notice of appeal to
the Fifth Appellate District. (ECF No. 7-1, Exhibit 11). In his appellate brief, Mr. Hill raised
the following assignments of error:
1. 	The trial court abused its discretion when it did not allow appellant to enter a
plea of no contest.
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2. 	The trial court erred when it imposed a vindictive sentence upon appellant.
(ECF No. 7-1, Exhibit 12).
On June 9, 2021, the Fifth Appellate District affirmed. (ECF No. 7-1, Exhibit 14). Mr.
Hill, through counsel, timely appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. (ECF No. 7-1, Exhibit
16). In his memorandum in support of jurisdiction, Mr. Hill raised the following propositions
of law:
1. 	If the Trial Court abused its discretion in not allowing a Defendant to enter a
plea of no contest, then reversal is appropriate. Here, where the Trial Court
refused to allow Defendant to enter a plea of no contest, arbitrarily, reversal is
appropriate.
2. 	If the Trial Court imposes a vindictive sentences [sic] upon a Defendant for
exercising their constitutional rights, reversal and re-sentencing is appropriate.
Here, where the Court stated upon the record their inclination to impose a
sentence slightly less than what the State was recommending, then without
receiving any new facts, imposes a higher sentence than recommended on the
date trial was to go forward, reversal and re-sentencing is appropriate.
(ECF No. 7-1, Exhibit 17).
On September 23, 2021, the Ohio Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction over the appeal
with respect to Mr. Hill’s first proposition of law only. (ECF No. 7-1, Exhibit 19). On
December 20, 2022, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court abused its
discretion by refusing to permit Mr. Hill to enter a plea of no contest based on the trial court’s
own determination that there were no legitimate grounds for appeal. (ECF No. 7-1, Exhibit
25). The court remanded the case to the trial court to allow Mr. Hill to enter a new plea. Id.
C. Resentencing and Subsequent Appeal
On March 7, 2023, Mr. Hill entered a plea of no contest. (ECF No. 7-1. Exhibit 28).
The trial court again sentenced Mr. Hill to an aggregate term of 16 to 21 and a half years in
prison. Id.
On March 27, 2023, Mr. Hill, through counsel, timely filed an appeal to the Fifth
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Appellate District. (ECF No. 7-1, Exhibit 29). In his appellate brief, Mr. Hill raised the
following assignment of error:
1. 	The trial court erred in denying appellant’s motions to suppress.
First Issue: Under Crim.R. 41 and the Sixth Amendment’s notice clause, a
vehicle tracker warrant fails if (a) government fails timely to serve a defendant
with same and (b) if the confidential informant supporting the warrant is
unreliable. Here, the warrant suffers from both problems. Must this Court
reverse?
Second Issue: Under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, a home search
warrant is invalid for lack of probable cause, particularly on the word of an
unreliable informant. Here, the home search warrant suffers from, inter alia, the
word of an unreliable informant, with no good faith exception, yet the trial Court
denied Hill’s motion to suppress. Must this Court reverse?
Third Issue: Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, if a defendant makes
a statement in response to an interrogation while in custody without receiving
Miranda warnings, then a trial court should exclude same. Here, the police took
a statement from Hill while in custody but without Miranda warnings, and the
Court denied his motion to suppress. Must this Court reverse?
(ECF No. 7-1, Exhibit 32).
On December 4, 2023, the Fifth Appellate District affirmed. (ECF No. 7-1, Exhibit
36). On January 18, 2024, Mr. Hill, through counsel, filed a notice of appeal to the Ohio
Supreme Court. (ECF No. 7-1, Exhibit 38). In his memorandum in support of jurisdiction,
Mr. Hill raised the following propositions of law:
1. 	If a vehicle tracker warrant fails under Crim.R. 41 and the Sixth Amendment’s
notice clause when (a) the government does not serve the defendant in a timely
manner and (b) the confidential informant supporting the warrant is unreliable,
and if both conditions (a and b) are true for a given vehicle tracker warrant, then
this Court must reverse the decision based on that warrant.
2. 	If a home search warrant lacks probable cause due to reliance on an unreliable
informant, and there is no good faith exception, then it is invalid under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments. In Hill's case, the home search warrant was based
on the word of an unreliable informant without a good faith exception, and the
trial court denied Hill's motion to suppress. Therefore, this Court should reverse
the trial court's decision.
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3. 	If a home search warrant lacks probable cause due to reliance on an unreliable
informant, and there is no good faith exception, then it is invalid under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments. In Hill's case, the home search warrant was based
on the word of an unreliable informant without a good faith exception, and the
trial court denied Hill's motion to suppress. Therefore, this Court should reverse
the trial court's decision.2
(ECF No. 7-1, Exhibit 39). On April 2, 2024, the Ohio Supreme Court declined to
accept jurisdiction over the appeal. (ECF No. 7-1, Exhibit 41).
D. Federal Habeas Action
On April 2, 2025, Mr. Hill, through counsel, filed his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas
petition. (ECF No. 1). Mr. Hill’s habeas petition raises three grounds for relief:
1. 	Appellant asserts that the tracker warrant was not timely served as required by
Crim. R. 41(D)(2) and that the confidential informant supporting it was
unreliable, thereby undermining the warrant’s validity.
2. 	The search warrant for Hill’s residence lacked adequate probable cause because
it relied on evidence from controlled buys conducted away from his home and
on an uncorroborated confidential informant’s testimony that failed to establish
a sufficient nexus between his residence and the illicit activity.
3. 	Hill’s un-Mirandized statements, obtained while he was effectively in custody
without receiving the requisite Miranda warnings, should have been suppressed
as a violation of his Fifth Amendment rights.
Id. The Warden filed an answer/return of writ on June 18, 2025. (ECF No. 7). Mr. Hill
filed a traverse on August 16, 2025. (ECF No. 10).
IV. STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND GOVERNING LAW
A. Jurisdiction
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) authorizes this court to entertain an application for a writ of
habeas corpus on “behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court
2 Mr. Hill’s second and third propositions of law to the Ohio Supreme Court were identical. However, in the
body of his argument regarding his third proposition of law, Mr. Hill argued that the police obtained statements
he made during the search of his home in violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Warden
does not argue that Mr. Hill failed to adequately present his Miranda claim to the Ohio Supreme Court.
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only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” A state prisoner may file a § 2254 petition in the “district court for the
district wherein such person is in custody or in the district court for the district within which
the State court was held which convicted and sentenced him[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d). The
Stark County Court of Common Pleas sentenced Mr. Hill, and the Court takes judicial notice
that Stark County is within this Court’s geographic jurisdiction. Accordingly, this Court has
jurisdiction over Mr. Hill’s § 2254 petition.
B. Cognizable Federal Claim
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), a state prisoner may challenge his custody “only on the
ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” A petitioner's claim is not cognizable on habeas review if it “presents no federal issue
at all.” Glaze v. Morgan, No. 1:19-CV-02974, 2022 WL 467980, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 18,
2022) (quoting Bates v. McCaughtry, 934 F.2d 99, 101 (7th Cir. 1991)). Thus, “errors in
application of state law . . . are usually not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.” Bey v.
Bagley, 500 F.3d 514, 519 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Walker v. Engle, 703 F.2d 959, 962 (6th
Cir. 1983)); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (“[I]t is not the province
of a federal habeas court to reexamine state court determinations on state law questions.”).
A federal habeas court does not function as an additional state appellate court; it does
not review state courts’ decisions on state law or procedure. Allen v. Morris, 845 F.2d 610,
614 (6th Cir. 1988) (citing Oviedo v. Jago, 809 F.2d 326, 328 (6th Cir. 1987)). Instead,
“federal courts must defer to a state court's interpretation of its own rules of evidence and
procedure” in considering a habeas petition. Id. (quotation omitted).
C. AEDPA Standard of Review
28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act,
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Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (“AEDPA”), provides in relevant part as follows:
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant
to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was
adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim
–
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
(Id.)
To determine whether relief should be granted, the Court must use the “look-through”
methodology and look to the “last explained state-court judgment” on the petitioner's federal
claim. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991) (“The essence of unexplained orders is
that they say nothing. We think that a presumption which gives them no effect—which simply
‘looks through’ them to the last reasoned decision—most nearly reflects the role they are
ordinarily intended to play.”); Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1193 (2018) (“We conclude
that federal habeas law employs a ‘look through’ presumption.”).
“A decision is ‘contrary to’ clearly established federal law when ‘the state court
arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or
decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable
facts.’” Otte v. Houk, 654 F.3d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362, 412-13 (2000)). “Clearly established Federal law for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) includes
only the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions.” White v.
Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419 (2014) (quotations and citations omitted). “[U]nder the
unreasonable application clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court
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identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably
applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75
(2003). “The unreasonable application clause requires the state court decision to be more than
incorrect or erroneous”—it must be “objectively unreasonable.” Id.
Under § 2254(d)(2), “when a federal habeas petitioner challenges the factual basis for
a prior state court decision rejecting a claim, the federal court may overturn the state court's
decision only if it was ‘based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.’” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 18 (2013)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)). A state court decision is an “unreasonable determination
of the facts” under § 2254(d)(2) only if the trial court made a “clear factual error.” Wiggins
v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 528 (2003). A state court's factual determination is not unreasonable
merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first
instance. Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010). Even if “[r]easonable minds reviewing
the record might disagree” about the finding in question, “on habeas review that does not
suffice to supersede the trial court's . . . determination.” Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341-
42 (2006). The prisoner bears the burden of rebutting the state court's factual findings “by
clear and convincing evidence.” Burt, 571 U.S. at 18 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)).
For state prisoners, the § 2254(d) standard “is difficult to meet . . . because it is meant
to be.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). This is because, “[a]s amended by
AEDPA, § 2254(d) is meant only to stop short of imposing a complete bar on federal-court
relitigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings.” Id. at 103. “It preserves authority
to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility [that] fairminded jurists could disagree
that the state court’s decision conflicts with this Court's precedents” and “goes no further.”
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Id. Thus, in order to obtain federal habeas corpus relief, “a state prisoner must show that the
state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification
that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any
possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id.
V. ANALYSIS 3
A. Ground One: Invalid Tracker Warrant
In his first ground for relief, Mr. Hill argues that the warrant the State obtained to
place a tracking device on his vehicle was invalid because the police failed to timely serve
the warrant on him and because the confidential informant supporting the warrant was
unreliable. The Warden responds that Mr. Hill’s first ground for relief is not cognizable in
habeas. The Warden’s argument is well-taken.
Mr. Hill first argues that the tracking device warrant was invalid under Ohio Rule of
Criminal Procedure 41(D)(2), which provides that the officer executing the warrant must
serve a copy of the warrant on the person tracked within 10 days after use of the device has
ended. See Ohio R. Crim. P. 41(D)(2). As noted above, however, federal habeas corpus relief
is not available for errors of state law. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67. Rather, “it is only
noncompliance with federal law that renders a State’s criminal judgment susceptible to
collateral attack in the federal courts.” Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010). Thus, to the
extent Mr. Hill premises his claim on the State’s alleged violation of Rule 41(D)(2), his first
ground for relief is not cognizable.4
3 The Warden does not argue that Mr. Hill procedurally defaulted on his claims or that he failed to exhaust them.
Nor does the Warden argue that the petition is untimely.
4 The Fifth Appellate District held that the trial court did not err in determining that the warrant was served on
Mr. Hill within 10 days as Rule 41(D)(2) requires. (ECF No. 7-1, Exhibit 36, ¶ 16). Even if Mr. Hill’s Rule
41(D)(2) argument were cognizable, he has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that the Fifth Appellate
District made an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court
proceeding. See Burt, 571 U.S. at 18; Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 528.
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Mr. Hill also argues that his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights were violated because
he was not given a meaningful opportunity to challenge the tracking device warrant. In
particular, he argues that there were factual disputes regarding whether agents served the
warrant on him and that the absence of clear evidence prevented him from disproving the
State’s assertions. Mr. Hill also argues that the trial court determined probable cause based
on an unredacted affidavit that the court reviewed in camera and that Mr. Hill was not
permitted to see or contest.
In Stone v. Powell, the Supreme Court held that, given the “nature and purpose” of
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, habeas review is generally unavailable to
petitioners who asset that evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search and seizure
was introduced at trial. 428 U.S. 465, 481-82 (1976). Thus, a petitioner may not pursue a
Fourth Amendment claim “if he had a full and fair opportunity to raise the claim in state court
and presentation of the claim was not thwarted by any failure of the state’s corrective
processes.” Machacek v. Hofbauer, 213 F.3d 947, 952 (6th Cir. 2000).
To determine whether Powell bars a petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim, a court
conducts a two-step review process. First, the court “must determine whether the state
procedural mechanism, in the abstract, presents the opportunity to raise a fourth amendment
claim.” Riley v. Gray, 674 F.2d 522, 526 (6th Cir. 1982). Second, the court “must determine
whether presentation of the claim was in fact frustrated because of a failure of that
mechanism.” Id.
In Good v. Berghuis, the Sixth Circuit held that an “opportunity for full and fair
consideration” means “an available avenue for the prisoner to present his claim to the state
courts, not an inquiry into the adequacy of the procedure actually used to resolve that
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particular claim.” 729 F.3d 636, 639 (6th Cir. 2013). “In the absence of a sham proceeding,
there is no need to ask whether the state court conducted an evidentiary hearing or to inquire
otherwise into the rigor of the state judiciary’s procedures for resolving the claim.” Id. at 639.
Judged against that standard, Mr. Hill’s arguments are unavailing. He does not argue
that Ohio’s procedures, in the abstract, fail to provide criminal defendants with an opportunity
to raise a Fourth Amendment claim, and the Sixth Circuit has held that Ohio’s procedures are
“clearly adequate.” Riley, 674 F.2d at 526. Mr. Hill does argue that the trial court frustrated
his ability to raise the claim in his particular case. In particular, he argues that there was a live
dispute regarding whether agents actually served him with the warrant and that irregularities
in the warrant documentation “impaired the adversarial process and undermined meaningful
appellate review . . . .” (ECF No. 10, PageID # 646). However, Mr. Hill does not dispute that
both the trial court and the appellate court considered his arguments, and he has not shown
that either proceeding was a “sham” proceeding. Good, 729 F.3d at 639. There is thus “no
need” to inquire into the rigors of the procedure that the state courts employed. Id. at 639-40
(holding that Powell barred Fourth Amendment Claim where petitioner presented claim to
state trial and appellate courts); Machacek, 213 F.3d at 952 (holding that petitioner’s Fourth
Amendment claim was not reviewable where “the record reflects that petitioner was able to
present his Fourth Amendment claims to the Michigan courts and that these claims were
carefully considered and rejected at the trial level and on appeal”).
Mr. Hill also argues that the alleged procedural defects violated his due process rights
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. However, his argument asks the Court to inquire
into the rigors of the state court procedures for adjudicating the claim in contravention of
Powell and Good. See Maddox-El v. McKee, No. 1:07-cv-11349-BC, 2012 WL 1019166, at
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*21 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 26, 2012) (petitioner’s claim that he was denied due process because
prosecution concealed lack of probable cause supporting warrant was not cognizable under
Powell because petitioner had full and fair opportunity to litigate claim in state court). I
therefore recommend that the Court dismiss Mr. Hill’s first ground for relief as non-
cognizable.
B. Ground Two: Invalid Search Warrant for Residence
In his second ground for relief, Mr. Hill argues that the search warrant for his
residence lacked probable cause because it relied on evidence from controlled buys that did
not occur at his home and on the uncorroborated testimony of a confidential informant that
failed to establish a sufficient nexus between his home and the alleged illicit activity.
As with his first round for relief, Mr. Hill’s second ground for relief is not cognizable.
He again argues that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated as a result of an invalid
search. However, Mr. Hill has not shown that he was denied a full and fair opportunity to
present his claim to the state courts either in theory or in practice. I therefore recommend that
the Court dismiss Mr. Hill’s second ground for relief as not cognizable under Powell.
C. Ground Three: Fifth Amendment
In his third and final ground for relief, Mr. Hill asserts that his Fifth Amendment rights
were violated because agents subjected him to custodial interrogation without first warning
him of his rights under the Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1996).
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself . . . .” U.S. CONST . amend. V. To effectuate that right, the
Supreme Court held in Miranda that, as an “absolute prerequisite to interrogation,” an
individual must be clearly informed of his right to counsel and his right to remain silent. 384
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U.S. at 471. “Thus, Miranda ‘requires that a warning as to the availability of the privilege
against self-incrimination and to the assistance of counsel be issued prior to questioning
whenever a suspect is (1) interrogated (2) while in custody.” Mason v. Brunsman, 483 F.
App’x 122, 126 (6th Cir. 2012) (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d
1343, 1347 (8th Cir. 1990)). If a suspect is subject to custodial interrogation without receiving
a Miranda warning, any statements the suspect made are not subsequently admissible against
them. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476.
Custodial interrogation occurs when the suspect is subject to “questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way.” Moranda, 384 U.S. at 444. Custody is “a term
of art that specifies circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious danger of
coercion.” Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 508-09 (2012). To determine whether a defendant
was in custody, a court must “ascertain whether, in light of the ‘objective circumstances of
the interrogation,’ a ‘reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to
terminate the interrogation and leave.” Id. at 509 (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S.
318, 322-23 (1994) (per curiam); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995)). In making
that determination, relevant factors include: (1) the location of questioning; (2) the duration
of questioning; (3) statements made during the interview; (4) whether the suspect was
physically restrained; and (5) whether the suspect was released at the end of questioning. Id.
Mr. Hill argues that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated when officers obtained
several statements from him during the search of his home without first reading him a
Miranda warning. In those statements, Mr. Hill asked if officers were looking for “dog food,”
a slang term for heroin, and told them where they could find the “dog food.” (ECF No. 7-1,
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Exhibit 36, ¶ 7). Mr. Hill also informed officers that he had a rifle under the bed. Id.
In response, the Warden argues both that Mr. Hill was not in custody and that the
police did not interrogate him because he provided his statements voluntarily. The Warden
first argues that the Fifth Appellate District correctly held that Mr. Hill was not in custody.
However, that is not an accurate summary of the Fifth Appellate District’s decision. Rather
than holding that Mr. Hill was not in custody, the Fifth Appellate District assumed for the
sake of argument that he was. Id. at ¶ 30. The court also noted that, while “not determinative,”
one of the agents testified that she believed Mr. Hill was in custody because police had
handcuffed him, placed him in a cruiser, and moved him from one location to another before
Mr. Hill made the statements at issue. Id. at ¶ 30 n. 1.
Like the Fifth Appellate District, I need not determine whether Mr. Hill was in custody
at the time he made the statements because his claim can be disposed of on the issue of
whether he was subject to interrogation. The Fifth Appellate District addressed that question
on the merits, holding that Miranda did not apply because Mr. Hill made his statements
voluntarily and without any questioning from the police:
In the instant case, there is no evidence questioning was initiated by law enforcement.
Even assuming arguendo Appellant was “in custody” when seated at his kitchen table
across from Agent Blanc, we find his statements concerning the location of heroin and
a rifle in the house were not the product of interrogation. Agent Blanc testified he and
Agent Mike Volpe were seated at the kitchen table with Appellant. Agent Blanc
testified he was packaging inventory as it was brought to him. Maybe two to three
minutes after Appellant was brought to the table, Appellant made the statements. The
statements were not in response to any questions posed by officers in the room, but
were spontaneously offered by Appellant. No further questioning occurred as a follow
up to Appellant's statements. Agent Blanc informed Agent Hmiel what Appellant said,
and she removed Appellant from the room. Based on the testimony from the first
suppression hearing, we find the trial court did not err in failing to suppress the
statements made by Appellant on the basis he was not read his Miranda rights. We
find Miranda warnings were not required in the instant case, because Appellant was
not subject to interrogation by police officers.
(ECF No. 7-1, Exhibit 36, ¶ 30) (footnote omitted).
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The Fifth Appellate District’s holding that Mr. Hill was not subject to interrogation
was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established law. The Supreme
Court has held that “‘[i]nterrogation,’ as conceptualized in the Miranda opinion, must reflect
a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself.” Rhode Island v.
Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980). Thus, the Court held in Innis that Miranda applies “whenever
a person in custody is subject to either express questioning or its functional equivalent.” Id.
at 300-01. However, “since the police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable
results of their words or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or
actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response.” Id. at 301-02. Moreover, “[v]olunteered statements of any
kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by”
Miranda. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478.
It is true that “the term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express
questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those
normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. Here, however,
there is no indication that the police said anything or took any actions that they should have
known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Instead, the Fifth Appellate
District found that agents were simply sitting at a table with Mr. Hill packaging inventory
when he volunteered the statements. (ECF No. 7-1, Exhibit 36, ¶ 30).
Mr. Hill has not cited any clearly established law for the proposition that sitting with
a suspect and packaging inventory is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. To
the contrary, the Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit have held that a suspect was not subject
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to interrogation even where the police engaged in actions more likely to elicit a statement
from the suspect than anything the police did here. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 302-03 (holding that
officers did not interrogate suspect by engaging in brief conversation in front of him); Hart
v. Steward, 623 F. App’x 739, 745-46 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding that suspect was not subject
to interrogation where suspect made statement as “a voluntary response to an officer’s
accurate declaratory statement”); Hoffner v. Bradshaw, 622 F.3d 487, 512 (6th Cir. 2010)
(holding that police’s basic investigatory questions during execution of search warrant did
not constitute interrogation). And, because Mr. Hill made his statements to the police
voluntarily and without any prompting, Miranda does not apply.
Mr. Hill argues that the Fifth Appellate District’s finding that he volunteered the
statements at issue is “unreliable and incomplete” because there was no audio or body camera
recording of the statements and because the slang term “dog food” is unusual. (ECF No. 10,
PageID # 656), Mr. Hill also argues that the “safer and legally correct” reading of the facts is
that he made the statements following the functional equivalent of interrogation. Id. However,
Mr. Hill has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that the state courts made an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court
proceedings, and thus has not rebutted the Fifth Appellate District’s factual findings. See Burt,
571 U.S. at 18; Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 528. Accordingly, the Fifth Appellate District’s holding
that Mr. Hill was not subject to interrogation was not contrary to or an unreasonable
application of clearly established law, and I recommend that the Court deny Mr. Hill’s third
ground for relief on the merits.
VI. RECOMMENDATION REGARDING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
A. Legal Standard
As amended by AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) provides that a petitioner may not
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appeal a denial of an application for a writ of habeas corpus unless a judge issues a certificate
of appealability. The statute further provides that “[a] certificate of appealability may issue .
. . only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
Although the statute does not define what constitutes a “substantial showing” of a
denial of a constitutional right, the burden on the petitioner is obviously less than the burden
for establishing entitlement to the writ; otherwise, a certificate could never issue. Rather, the
courts that have considered the issue have concluded that “[a] ‘substantial showing’ requires
the applicant to ‘demonstrate that the issues are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court
could resolve the issues (in a different manner); or that the questions are adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.’” Hicks v. Johnson, 186 F.3d 634, 636 (5th Cir. 1999)
(quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 755 (5th Cir. 1996)). The statute requires that
certificates of appealability specify which issues are appealable. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3).
Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District
Courts, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, provides that “[t]he district court must issue or deny a
certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Rule 11(a),
28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. “If the court issues a certificate, the court must state the specific issue
or issues that satisfy the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).” Id.; see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(3) (“The certificate of appealability under [§ 2253(c)(1)] shall indicate which
specific issue or issues satisfy the showing required by [§ 2253(c)(2)].”). In light of the Rule
11 requirement that the court either grant or deny the certificate of appealability at the time
of its final adverse order, a recommendation regarding the certificate of appealability issue is
included here.
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B. Analysis
Mr. Hill has not made a substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right for
the reasons set forth above. Because jurists of reason would not find these conclusions
debatable, I recommend that no certificate of appealability issue in this case.
VII. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, I RECOMMEND that the Court DISMISS and/or DENY
Mr. Hill’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. I also recommend
that the Court not grant him a certificate of appealability. Finally, I recommend that the Court
substitute Warden George A. Frederick for Judge Taryn L. Heath as the respondent in this
proceeding.
Dated: January 5, 2026 	s/Jennifer Dowdell Armstrong
Jennifer Dowdell Armstrong
U.S. Magistrate Judge
NOTICE TO PARTIES REGARDING OBJECTIONS
Local Rule 72.3(b) of this Court provides:
Any party may object to a Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings,
recommendations or report made pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)
within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof, and
failure to file timely objections within the fourteen (14) day period
shall constitute a waiver of subsequent review, absent a showing of
good cause for such failure. Such party shall file with the Clerk of Court,
and serve on the Magistrate Judge and all parties, written objections which
shall 	specifically 	identify 	the 	portions 	of 	the 	proposed 	findings,
recommendations, or report to which objection is made and the basis for
such objections. Any party may respond to another party’s objections
within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. The
District Judge to whom the case was assigned shall make a de novo
determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings
or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the
Magistrate Judge. The District Judge need conduct a new hearing only in
such District Judge’s discretion or where required by law, and may
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consider the record developed before the Magistrate Judge, making a
determination on the basis of the record. The District Judge may also
receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the
Magistrate Judge with instructions.
Id. (emphasis added).
Failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the forfeiture or
waiver of the right to raise the issue on appeal either to the district judge or in a subsequent
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals, depending on how or whether the party responds
to the report and recommendation. Berkshire v. Dahl, 928 F.3d 520, 530 (6th Cir. 2019).
Objections must be specific and not merely indicate a general objection to the entirety of the
report and recommendation; a general objection has the same effect as would a failure to
object. Howard v. Sec’y of Health and Hum. Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991).
Stated differently, objections should focus on specific concerns and not merely restate
the arguments in briefs submitted to the magistrate judge. “A reexamination of the exact same
argument that was presented to the Magistrate Judge without specific objections ‘wastes
judicial resources rather than saving them, and runs contrary to the purpose of the Magistrates
Act.’” Overholt v. Green, No. 1:17-CV-00186, 2018 WL 3018175, *2 (W.D. Ky. June 15,
2018) (quoting Howard). The failure to assert specific objections may in rare cases be
excused in the interest of justice. See United States v. Wandahsega, 924 F.3d 868, 878-79
(6th Cir. 2019).
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