Coleman v. Maderitz Concrete Company et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
DARRELL LAMAR COLEMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
MADERITZ CONCRETE
CONSTRUCTION, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 4:24-cv-1544
Judge J. Philip Calabrese
Magistrate Judge
Jonathan D. Greenberg
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Lamar Coleman, an inmate representing himself, filed suit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a concrete company, the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation
and Correction, and two correctional officers based on injuries sustained during
another’s inmate’s attack on him using construction materials left unattended. In an
opinion and order dated October 11, 2025, the Court granted the motion for judgment
on the pleadings of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction and the
correctional officers. (ECF No. 52.) Also, the Court declined to exercise jurisdiction
over Plaintiff’s State-law claims against the concrete company and dismissed those
claims without prejudice.
In granting Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court noted
the closeness of the question on the record presented, even under the high standard
for deliberate indifference and failure to protect. (Id., PageID #399.) Based on that
observation, Plaintiff timely moves for reconsideration under Rule 59 of the Federal
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Rules of Civil Procedure. 	(ECF No. 54, PageID #412.) 	Further, he argues that the
allegations 	in 	the 	amended 	complaint 	meet 	both 	the 	subjective 	and 	objective
components of the standard under Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). 	(Id.,
PageID #411.) 	Also, Mr. Coleman maintains that the Court did not construe the
amended complaint in his favor. (Id., PageID #407–08.)
ANALYSIS
Under Rule 59, a court may alter or amend the judgment where there is a clear
error of law, newly discovered evidence, or an intervening change in controlling law
or to prevent manifest injustice. 	GenCorp, Inc. v. American Int’l Underwriters, 178
F.3d 804, 	834 	(6th Cir. 	1999) 	(citations omitted). 	Such 	relief 	constitutes 	an
extraordinary remedy reserved for exceptional cases. Hines v. Commissioner of Soc.
Sec., 414 F. Supp. 3d 1080, 1081 (S.D. Ohio 2019) (citations omitted). 	It is not an
opportunity to re-argue matters or “to raise arguments which could, and should, have
been made before judgment issued.” 	Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v.
Engler, 146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. World
Univ. Inc., 978 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1992)). 	Justifying reconsideration requires a
moving party to: 	(1) demonstrate an intervening change in the controlling law; (2)
establish that new evidence is available; or (3) prove that a clear error occurred or
reconsideration is necessary to prevent manifest injustice. 	See Louisville/Jefferson
Cnty. Metro. Gov’t v. Hotels.com, L.P., 590 F.3d 381, 389 (6th Cir. 2009). 	A district
court retains the discretion to entertain such a motion. 	Rodriguez v. Tennessee
Laborers Health & Welfare Fund, 89 F. App’x 949, 959 n.7 (6th Cir. 2004).
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The Court reads Mr. Coleman’s motion as invoking the third ground for relief
under Rule 59. Because of the closeness of the question, the Court has reviewed the
record and the parties’ briefs again, with the benefit of Mr. Coleman’s motion for
reconsideration. Based on that (second) careful review, the Court remains of the view
that the moving Defendants are entitled to judgment on the pleadings. Contrary to
Mr. Coleman’s claim, the Court respectfully disagrees that it did not construe the
amended complaint in his favor at every opportunity. 	Where the Court and
Mr. Coleman do not see eye to eye is how the pleadings, construed in his favor, fall
against the high standard for the claims Mr. Coleman brings against the Ohio
Department of Rehabilitation and Correction and the correctional officers. 	In that
regard, the Court sees the amended complaint as pleading negligence, perhaps even
recklessness. Such a state of mind would generally satisfy the element of intent for
an ordinary tort claim.
But Mr. Coleman does not bring an ordinary tort claim. 	He proceeds under
Section 1983. 	Although lawyers and judges colloquially refer to this statute as
providing a right of action for constitutional torts, such language is neither precise
nor technically accurate. Claims under Section 1983 require more than the general
tort standard for intent. As relevant here, Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to plead
a defendant’s subjective state of mind to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
Even assuming that Defendants intended (in a tortious sense) to injure Mr. Coleman,
that intent differs from the constitutional standard for deliberate indifference.
Nothing in the amended complaint pleads or gives rise to an inference that any
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Defendant intended to deprive Mr. Coleman of a constitutionally protected right.
Again, the Court remains of the view that the record presents a close question on this
issue. 	Reasonable 	people—even 	reasonable 	jurists—can 	disagree 	about 	this
conclusion.
As for Maderitz Concrete Construction, Plaintiff now recasts his claims as
arising under Section 1983. 	(ECF No. 54, PageID #409–10.) 	But in his amended
complaint, 	Plaintiff 	alleges 	only 	that 	Maderitz 	Concrete 	Construction 	acted
negligently. (ECF No. 36, PageID #205.) Each time the amended complaint identifies
Maderitz Concrete Construction, it claims the company acted negligently or pursuant
to some tort duty. 	(Id. (“The Defendant Maderitz Construction Company was
negligent by not removing the larger pieces of asphalt from the yard as soon as
possible.”).) And the amended complaint pleads that Maderitz could be liable for any
injuries to inmates due to its negligence. (Id., PageID #206 (“Maderitz assumed the
risk that actions or inactions taken by the company could make them liable for
injuries received to inmates due to negligence.”).) 	Now, Plaintiff argues that his
allegations 	against 	“Defendants” 	collectively 	include 	Maderitz 	Concrete
Construction, such that he brings a claim under federal law against it. Setting aside
the notice deficiencies under Rule 8 with such a practice, no allegation in the amended
complaint—even construed liberally in Plaintiff’s favor—suggests that he proceeds
under federal law against Maderitz Concrete Construction. 	Dismissal of the State-
law claims against Maderitz Concrete Construction leaves Mr. Coleman free to
pursue those claims in State court if he so chooses.
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CONCLUSION
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	the 	Court 	DENIES 	Plaintiff’s 	motion 	under
Rule 59.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 20, 2025
J. Philip Calabrese
United States District Judge
Northern District of Ohio
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