EHO360 LLC v. Opalich

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
EHO360 LLC,
Plaintiff,
vs.
NICHOLAS OPALICH,
Defendant,
WESBANCO, formerly known as
Premier Bank,
Garnishee.
CASE NO. 1:23-mc-56
DISTRICT JUDGE
DAVID A. RUIZ
MAGISTRATE JUDGE
JAMES E. GRIMES JR.
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
This miscellaneous case was referred to me for handling the Writ of
Execution filed by Plaintiff EHO360 LLC against Defendant Nicholas Opalich,
including processing the Writ of Garnishment to Garnishee WesBanco. Doc.
19. Now before the Court is EHO360’s Motion for attorneys’ fees, Doc. 36,
following 	Garnishee 	WesBanco’s 	failure 	to 	timely 	answer 	the 	Court’s
garnishment order and failure to appear or respond to the Court’s Show Cause
Order. For the reasons explained below, I recommend that the Court find
WesBanco in contempt and award EHO360 $1,113.50 in attorney fees.
Background
On October 1, 2025, the Court sent to WesBanco by certified mail an
Order of Garnishment, a blank form of Answer of Garnishee, and a $1.00 check.
See Order, 10/1/2025; Doc. 25. WesBanco was required to complete the Answer
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form and return it to the Court within five business days of receiving it or
before the Court’s hearing, which was set for October 10, 2025. See Doc. 25;
Ohio Rev. Code § 2716.21(B); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(1) (providing that
money judgments are enforced under the law of the state where the court is
located). WesBanco failed to timely submit its Answer.
On November 9, about a month later and still with no Answer from
WesBanco, EHO360 filed a Motion asking the Court to require WesBanco to
show cause why it should not be held in contempt for its failure to answer. Doc.
32; see Ohio Rev. Code § 2716.21(E) (“If a garnishee fails to answer as required
by this section, … the court may proceed against the garnishee for contempt.”).
The Court granted EHO360’s Motion and ordered WesBanco to appear on
November 25, to show cause why it should not be held in contempt for its
failure to submit an Answer. Doc. 33. The Court held the hearing as scheduled.
Doc. 34. EHO360’s counsel appeared; WesBanco did not appear. Doc. 34. Nor
did WesBanco submit an Answer, any other filing, or contact the Court.
On 	December 	2, 	EHO360 	filed 	a 	Motion 	for 	attorneys’ 	fees 	from
WesBanco, requesting $1,113.50. Doc. 36. This amount accounts for the time
counsel spent drafting the show cause motion and attending the show cause
hearing. Id. On December 5, WesBanco filed an Answer to the garnishment
order, Doc. 38, and on December 8, it filed a response to the Court’s Show Cause
Order explaining why it did not timely answer or appear at the hearing, Doc.
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39. It did not respond to EHO360’s Motion for fees and the time to do so has
passed.
Discussion
The Supreme Court has long held that federal courts have certain
“inherent powers” including “the ability to fashion an appropriate sanction for
conduct which abuses the judicial process.” Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Haeger, 581 U.S. 101, 107 (2017) (citations omitted). One such sanction may
be an award of attorneys’ fees, meaning an order to a “party that has acted in
bad faith to reimburse legal fees and costs incurred by the other side.” Id.
This Court has made clear that such a sanction,
when imposed pursuant to civil procedures, must be
compensatory rather than punitive in nature. See
Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 826–830,
114 	S.Ct. 	2552, 	129 	L.Ed.2d 	642 	(1994)
(distinguishing 	compensatory 	from 	punitive
sanctions and specifying the procedures needed to
impose each kind). In other words, the fee award
may go no further than to redress the wronged party
“for 	losses 	sustained”; 	it 	may 	not 	impose 	an
additional amount as punishment for the sanctioned
party’s misbehavior. Id., at 829, 114 S.Ct. 2552
(quoting United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U.S.
258, 304, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884 (1947)).
Id. at 108 (footnote omitted).
The Sixth Circuit has articulated a two-step inquiry to apply when
considering whether certain conduct is subject to a court’s inherent authority
to issue sanctions. See Williamson v. Recovery Ltd. P’ship, 826 F.3d 297, 302
(6th Cir. 2016). First, the court should consider whether the party engaged in
conduct “that hampered the enforcement of a court order.” Id. Second, if the
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conduct did hamper the enforcement of a court order, whether the party acted
in bad faith. Id. For conduct to support a finding of bad faith, conduct “must
display either an intent to thwart judicial proceedings or a reckless disregard
for the effect of his conduct on those proceedings.” Wu v. T.W. Wang, Inc., 420
F.3d 641, 643 (6th Cir. 2005).
First, WesBanco’s failure to answer and appear at the show cause
hearing “hampered the enforcement of a court order.” Williamson, 826 F.3d at
302. The Court could not process its garnishment order without WesBanco’s
Answer, which WesBanco was also statutorily required to provide. See Ohio
Rev. Code § 2716.21(B). And the Court could not resolve this issue—by, for
instance, letting WesBanco explain why it failed to file its Answer—because
WesBanco failed to respond to the Court’s Show Cause Order or appear at the
hearing.
Second, WesBanco’s conduct amounted to bad faith. In its late response
to the Court’s Show Cause Order, WesBanco explains that the Court’s orders
“were never forwarded to” any of the three bank employees “dedicated to
processing legal papers.” Doc. 39, at 1. WesBanco states that it has “policies
and procedures” and “branch employee training programs in place to prevent
such occurrences,” but “[u]nfortunately, the policies, procedures and/or the
training did not work in this instance.” Id. at 2. While WesBanco says that it
“has launched an investigation into this matter, and will respond internally to
help ensure that the situation does not occur in the future,” id. at 1, the fact
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remains that it twice failed to ensure that mail from the Court reached the
proper 	person. 	This 	amounts 	“a 	reckless 	disregard 	for 	the 	effect 	of
[WesBanco’s] conduct on th[e]se proceedings.” See Wu, 420 F.3d at 643. Finally,
EHO360’s fee request is limited to the “reimburse[ment] [of] legal fees and
costs incurred by” WesBanco’s misconduct. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
581 U.S. at 107. Sanctions are therefore warranted.
To determine whether the requested amount, $1,113.50, is reasonable,
I use the “lodestar method” of calculation; that is, “the number of hours
reasonably expended … multiplied by a reasonably hourly rate.” Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). EHO360 seeks fees for drafting its Motion
to show cause (.2 hours), which is reasonable. And it seeks fees for the time
counsel spent traveling to and attending the show cause hearing (1.5 hours).
Generally, travel time as a fee award is compensable time. See, e.g., In re AME
Church Emp. Ret. Fund Litig., No. 1:22–MD–3035, 2025 WL 3070043, at *5
(W.D. Tenn. Nov. 3, 2025) (citing Wayne v. Vill. of Sebring, 36 F.3d 517, 532
(6th Cir. 1994) (“[Plaintiffs] correctly point out that ... the time spent traveling
is fully compensable”) and Smith v. Service Master Corp., 592 F. App’x 363, 372
(6th 	Cir. 	2014) 	(“The 	Sixth 	Circuit 	has 	often 	found 	travel 	time 	to 	be
compensable if determined by the district courts to be the local practice
regarding payment for travel time.”)). Courts in this district have found travel
time to be compensable in prevailing-party, fee-shifting cases. See Pirolozzi v.
Stanbro, No. 5:07-cv-798, 2009 WL 3624919, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 29, 2009);
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Disabled Patriots of Am., Inc. v. Rsrv. Hotel, Ltd., 659 F. Supp. 2d 877, 889
(N.D. Ohio 2009); but see Woods v. Willis, 981 F. Supp. 2d 700, 703 (N.D. Ohio
2013) (finding that travel time is not compensable). I find that in this case,
travel time is compensable. The total number of hours EHO360 seeks therefore
is reasonable.
As for a reasonable rate, a court “has broad discretion in determining a
reasonable hourly rate for an attorney,” and “use[s] as a guideline the
prevailing 	market 	rate, 	which 	is 	defined 	as 	‘the 	rate 	that 	lawyers 	of
comparable skill and experience can reasonably expect to command within the
venue of the court of record.’” The Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted,
831 F.3d 686, 715 (6th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). Courts in this district
regularly consult the Ohio State Bar Association’s Report, The Economics of
Law Practice in Ohio. See, e.g., Ramsey v. FirstEnergy Corp., No. 5:23-cv-86,
2023 WL 6794478, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 13, 2023). I do the same here.
EHO360’s attorney, Ronald M. McMillan is a senior-counsel litigator
with a large firm with over 20 years of experience. Doc. 36-1, at 1, 3. He states
that his hourly rate for 2025 is $655. Id. at 1. This amount is within the high
range of the rates published in The Economics of Law Practice in Ohio. The
following snapshot of the report shows the hourly billing rate for counsel, from
the mean at the low end to the 95th percentile at the high end:
in McMillan’s main general field, Doc. 36-1, at 3:
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with McMillan’s years of experience:
in the Cleveland region:
at a large firm like McMillan’s:
See The Economics of Law Practice in Ohio, at 39–43 (OSBA 2024) (available
at https://www.ohiobar.org/member-tools-benefits/practice-management-tools-
and-services/economics-of-law-practice-study/). Moreover, the economic data
from the 2024 report was gathered in 2023, and McMillan performed the work
in late 2025. Taking into account a small amount of inflation, I find that
McMillan’s 	requested 	hourly 	rate 	is 	reasonable. 	See 	Ramsey, 	2023 	WL
6794478, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 13, 2023) (accounting for inflation between the
time the data was collected and the time the work for the fees was rendered).
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Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, I recommend that the Court grant
EHO360’s Motion for attorney fees, Doc. 36, and award it fees from WesBanco
in the amount of $1,113.50.
Dated: December 29, 2025
/s/ James E. Grimes Jr.
James E. Grimes Jr.
U.S. Magistrate Judge
OBJECTIONS
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with
the Clerk of Court within 14 days after the party objecting has been served
with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Failure
to file objections within the specified time may forfeit the right to appeal the
District Court’s order. See Berkshire v. Beauvais, 928 F.3d 520, 530–31 (6th
Cir. 2019).
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