USA v. Ojeda-Elenes, et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	) 	CASE NO. 1:23-cr-95
)
)
PLAINTIFF, 	) 	CHIEF JUDGE SARA LIOI
)
vs. 	)
)
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
CAMERON HARRIS, 	)
)
)
DEFENDANT. 	)
Before the Court is the pro se motion of defendant Cameron Harris to vacate, set aside, or
correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc. No. 139.) Plaintiff United States of
America (the “government”) opposes the motion. (Doc. No. 146.) Harris did not file a reply. For
the reasons set forth herein, the motion to vacate is DENIED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On March 23, 2023, an indictment issued charging Harris with possession with intent to
distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) and conspiracy to distribute in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 846. (Doc. No. 26 (Superseding Indictment), at 1–2.)1 The indictment alleged
Harris’s involvement in a conspiracy to traffic fentanyl and other controlled substances. (Id.)
Harris was accused of possessing and conspiring to possess, “with intent to distribute[,] 400 grams
or more of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of fentanyl[.]” (Id.)
Harris executed a written plea agreement. (Doc. No. 70 (Plea Agreement).) As relevant
1 All page number references to the record herein are to the consecutive page numbers applied to each individual
document by the Court’s electronic filing system.
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here, Harris agreed that, before being apprehended, he attempted to elude law enforcement while
driving on Interstate 71 (“I-71”). (Id. at 11.) Harris agreed that law enforcement pursued him for
15 miles, and that he “reached speeds over 120 [miles per hour] and drove in an extremely reckless
manner.” (Id.) He further agreed that, when he exited I-71, he “drove through a shopping plaza
and struck a curb, causing the vehicle’s tires to flatten[.]” (Id.) Harris stipulated that the
computation of his sentencing range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Sentencing
Guidelines” or “U.S.S.G.”) would include a two-level increase to his offense level for “Reckless
Endangerment During Flight” under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2. (Id. at 6.)
At Harris’s change of plea hearing, the Court confirmed Harris’s intent to plead guilty.
(Doc. No. 143 (Change of Plea Trans.), at 2–3.) The Court confirmed that Harris was not under
any mental condition or the influence of any substance that would interfere with his ability to
understand the proceedings. (Id. at 6.) The Court confirmed that Harris reviewed the plea
agreement with his attorney, and that he initialed each page of the plea agreement and signed its
last page to indicate that he understood and agreed to the terms therein. (Id. at 6–8.) Harris stated
he understood the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty. (Id. at 8–11.)
The Court next reviewed the plea agreement’s sentencing provisions with Harris. Harris
confirmed his understanding that he “agree[d] to recommend that the Court impose a guideline
sentence 	in 	accordance 	with 	the 	computations 	and 	stipulations 	contained 	in 	this 	[plea]
agreement[.]” (Id. at 15.) Counsel for the government next stated that the plea agreement
“include[d] an additional enhancement for reckless endangerment during flight of plus two
pursuant to U.S.S.G. [§] 3C1.2[.]” (Id. at 17.) The Court asked Harris if he understood this, and he
responded, “[y]es, Your Honor.” (Id.)
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The first disclosure of the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) was filed on February
22, 2024 (Doc. No. 78 (First Disclosure PSR)), and the final revised PSR was filed on August 8,
2024. (Doc. No. 113 (Final Revised PSR).) The PSR consistently incorporated the stipulated
offense level increase for reckless endangerment during flight under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2. (Doc. No.
78, at 4, 7; Doc. No. 113, at 4, 7.) Ultimately, before any reductions, the Final Revised PSR
assigned Harris an offense level of 40 (which included a base offense level of 38 based upon the
quantity of drugs involved and the two-level increase for reckless endangerment during flight) and
a criminal history category of II. (Doc. No. 113, at 8, 12, 19.) After applying all reductions,
including a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G. §§ 3E1.1(a)
and (b), the Court determined that Harris’ advisory guideline calculation was 151 – 188 months of
imprisonment. (Doc. No. 155 (Sentencing Trans.), at 46–47.) Harris’s attorney objected to portions
of the PSR but did not object to the stipulated offense level increase under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2. (See
generally Doc. No. 103 (Objections).) The Court sentenced Harris to 151 months of imprisonment.
(Doc. No. 144, at 61.)
On July 8, 2025, Harris filed the present motion. He asserts two grounds for relief: (1) that
his offense level increase under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 was in error and (2) that Harris’s counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to said offense level increase. (Doc. No. 139-1 (Memorandum in
Support of Motion).)
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II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
A federal prisoner may attack the validity of his sentence by filing a motion to vacate, set
aside, or correct the sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the district court where he was sentenced.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Section 2255 sets forth four grounds upon which a federal prisoner may
state a claim for relief: “[1] the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of
the United States, or [2] that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or [3] that
the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or [4] [the sentence] is otherwise
subject to collateral attack[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
To prevail under § 2255, “a petitioner must demonstrate the existence of an error of
constitutional magnitude which had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the guilty
plea or the jury’s verdict.” Griffin v. United States, 330 F.3d 733, 736 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Brecht
v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 123 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1993)). “Relief is warranted
only where a petitioner has shown ‘a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete
miscarriage of justice.’” Id. (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346, 94 S. Ct. 2298, 41
L. Ed. 2d 109 (1974)).
The movant bears the burden of articulating sufficient facts to state a viable claim for relief
under § 2255. See McQueen v. United States, 58 F. App’x 73, 76 (6th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
Vague and conclusory claims that are not substantiated by allegations of specific facts with some
probability of verity are not enough to warrant relief. O’Malley v. United States, 285 F.2d 733,
735 (6th Cir. 1961) (citations omitted). A § 2255 motion may be dismissed if it only makes
conclusory statements without substantiating allegations of specific facts and fails to state a claim
cognizable under § 2255. See id. (“bare statement of conclusion” insufficient to entitle movant to
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be heard); see Green v. Wingo, 454 F.2d 52, 53 (6th Cir. 1972) (“conclusional averments” with
“no factual material upon which to test the validity of [such] conclusions” insufficient).
When a factual dispute arises in a § 2255 proceeding, an evidentiary hearing is required
“‘to determine the truth of the petitioner’s claims.’” Valentine v. United States, 488 F.3d 325, 333
(6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Turner v. United States, 183 F.3d 474, 477 (6th Cir. 1999)). The burden
borne by a § 2255 petitioner to obtain a hearing is not onerous. See Smith v. United States, 348
F.3d 545, 551 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Turner, 183 F.3d at 477). But a petitioner is not entitled to
an evidentiary hearing if he has not alleged any facts that, if true, would entitle him to federal
habeas relief. See McSwain v. Davis, 287 F. App’x 450, 458 (6th Cir. 2008) (denying hearing
where petitioner did not allege facts that, if true, would entitle petitioner to relief); Amr v. United
States, 280 F. App’x 480, 485 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding evidentiary hearing “unnecessary” where
there was “nothing in the record to indicate that [the petitioner] would be able to prove his
allegations” at hearing); see also Napier v. United States, No. 93-5412, 1993 WL 406795, at *2
(6th Cir. Oct. 8, 1993) (“To be entitled to a hearing, the prisoner must set forth detailed factual
allegations which, if true, would entitle him to relief under § 2255.” (citing Machibroda v. United
States, 368 U.S. 487, 496, 82 S. Ct. 510, 7 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1962))); cf Valentine, 488 F.3d at 334
(finding burden satisfied where petitioner “offers more than a mere assertion of his innocence; he
presents a factual narrative of the events that is neither contradicted by the record nor ‘inherently
incredible’”).
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III. 	LAW AND DISCUSSION
A. Application of U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2
Harris argues (Doc. No. 139-1, at 2) that, because his flight from authorities did not, in
fact, result in death or injury, the enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 for “creating a substantial
risk of dea[th] or serious bodily injury” (Doc. No. 113, at 6) was in error. An error in the application
of the Sentencing Guidelines is not cognizable under § 2255 absent a “complete miscarriage of
justice.” See Johnson v. United States, No. 2:10-cr-185, 2016 WL 5242960, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Sept.
22, 2016) (quoting Jones v. United States, 178 F.3d 790, 796 (6th Cir. 1999)), report and
recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 6084018 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 17, 2016).
Here, the Court sees no miscarriage of justice. Section 3C1.2 applies when “the defendant
recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person in the course
of fleeing from a law enforcement officer[.]” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2. Notably, § 3C1.2 only requires
substantial risk—not actual death or injury. See United States v. Dial, 524 F.3d 783, 788 (6th Cir.
2008). Sixth Circuit law “generally provides that high speed driving [] typically supports an
endangerment finding [under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2].” United States v. Brooks, No. 22-6066, 2024 WL
113790, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 10, 2024) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also United
States v. Rapp, 39 F. App'x 198, 201 (6th Cir. 2002) (“In this case defendant engaged in a high
speed chase which itself created a substantial risk to other motorists.”). Harris admitted in his plea
agreement that he attempted to elude law enforcement, driving “extremely reckless[ly]” at speeds
exceeding 120 miles per hour. (Doc. No. 70, at 11.) These admitted facts indicate a high speed
chase posing a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury, warranting application of U.S.S.G.
§ 3C1.2. Harris thus fails to establish any error, let alone a complete miscarriage of justice, in the
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application of § 3C1.2.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Harris next asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to object to the
PSR’s inclusion of a two-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2. (Doc. No. 139-1, at 1–2.)2 “To
prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, [a petitioner] must satisfy the two-pronged
test announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674
(1984).” Wingate v. United States, 969 F.3d 251, 255 (6th Cir. 2020). Specifically, the petitioner
must 	demonstrate: 	(1) 	that 	counsel’s 	performance 	fell 	below 	an 	objective 	standard 	of
reasonableness, and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant, resulting in
an unreliable or fundamentally unfair outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88; Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 390–91, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000). Counsel cannot be deemed
“ineffective [for] failing to raise a futile objection.” Biggs v. United States, 3 F. App'x 445, 449
(6th Cir. 2001); see also Harris v. United States, 204 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2000) (“because an
objection . . . would have been futile, [movant] cannot show that his attorney was constitutionally
‘ineffective’ in failing to make such an objection.” (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–96)).
Here, any objection to the application of § 3C1.2 would have been futile. In his plea
agreement, Harris admitted to leading law enforcement on a 15-mile, high speed chase that took
him on and off a major highway and through a shopping plaza. (Doc. No. 70, at 11.) Moreover, he
explicitly agreed to a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 for “Reckless Endangerment
2 Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are properly raised for the first time in a § 2255 motion. Spearman v.
United States, 43 F. App’x 906, 908 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[T]his court has consistently held that the proper vehicle for
raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is . . . a motion to vacate under § 2255.” (citation omitted)); see also
Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504, 123 S. Ct. 1690, 1694, 155 L. Ed. 2d 714 (2003) (“a motion brought
under § 2255 is preferable to direct appeal for deciding claims of ineffective assistance.”).
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During Flight[.]” (Id. at 6.) An objection would have been both non-sensical and futile. See Fairley
v. United States, 298 F. Supp. 2d 679, 685 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (“Petitioner stipulated to this
enhancement, which was a part of his plea bargain. . . . Therefore, any objection by counsel to the
enhancement would have been futile [.]” (citation omitted)). Harris’s counsel was not ineffective
for failing to lodge a futile objection. See Taylor v. United States, No. 3:12-cr-65, 2016 WL
3162060, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. June 3, 2016) (“To what could counsel have objected, since petitioner
explicitly agreed that his offense level would be increased by four levels because of his managerial
role in the conspiracy and his possession of a weapon? . . . Counsel was not ineffective for failing
to object to the non-objectionable.” (citation omitted)).
C. Hearing
Finally, the Court finds an evidentiary hearing unnecessary. To obtain a hearing, Harris
must allege facts that, if true, would entitle him to habeas relief. See McSwain, 287 F. App'x at
458. The factual crux of Harris’s argument is that his flight from authorities involved no actual
death or injury, thus rendering the two-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 inappropriate. (Doc.
No. 139-1, at 2.) As discussed above, actual death and/or injury is not required under § 3C1.2. See
Dial, 524 F.3d at 788. Thus, Harris’s factual allegations, if true, would not entitle him to habeas
relief and do not warrant a hearing.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Harris’s motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence (Doc.
No. 139) is DENIED. Further, for the same reasons, the Court concludes that “jurists of reason”
would not find it “debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a
constitutional right” or that the Court’s findings are “correct[.]” See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.
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473, 484, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 146 L. Ed. 2d 542 (2000). Additionally, the Court has detailed above
why Harris’s grounds for relief are otherwise belied by the record such that “reasonable jurists”
would not debate the Court’s denial of his motion to vacate. See id. Accordingly, the Court certifies
that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith, and that there is no basis upon
which to issue a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 29, 2025
HONORABLE SARA LIOI
CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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