USA v. Miller, et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	) 	CASE NO. 1:22-CR-498-2
)
Plaintiff, 	) 	JUDGE BRIDGET MEEHAN BRENNAN
)
v. 	)
)
MARIO HOYLE, 	) 	OPINION AND ORDER
)
Defendant. 	)
On April 25, 2024, Defendant Mario Hoyle (“Hoyle”) was sentenced to a within-
Guidelines range sentence of 46 months of incarceration following his guilty pleas to two
controlled substance violations: participating in a conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent
to distribute controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C), and
distribution of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). (Doc. 333,
Judgment.)
On April 14, 2025, Hoyle moved pro se for compassionate release and a sentence
reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3585(c)(2) and Amendment 821 to the United States
Sentencing Guidelines. (Doc. 431, Motion for Compassionate Release; Doc. 432, Motion to
Reduce Sentence.) On April 16, 2025, the Court appointed the Federal Public Defender’s Office
pursuant to the Court’s Amended General Order 2020-7-3 and General Order 2023-20.
(4/16/2025 Non-Document Order.) Hoyle’s motion for a sentence reduction was denied. (Doc.
444, Opinion and Order.) The Federal Public Defender’s Office supplemented Hoyle’s motion
for compassionate release. (Doc. 451, Supplement to Motion for Compassionate Release; Doc
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451-1 through 451-4, Exhibits.) The government opposed. (Doc. 453.) For the reasons stated
herein, Hoyle’s Motion for Compassionate Release is DENIED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On August 25, 2022, a federal grand jury returned a 38-count indictment charging Hoyle
and others with various controlled substance offenses. (Doc. 1, Indictment.) Hoyle was charged
with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute controlled substances in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) (Count 1) and distribution of cocaine
base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) (Count 23). Id. On January 17, 2024,
Hoyle pleaded guilty to both counts pursuant to a plea agreement. (Doc. 274, Plea Agreement.)
The agreement limited the parties’ sentencing arguments to a within-Guidelines range sentence
and foreclosed any arguments for a departure or variance. (Id. at 1262.)1 The government
agreed it would not bring any other criminal charges against Hoyle “for violations known to the
USAO on the date of the execution of this agreement.” (Id. at 1261.) Relevant here, Hoyle
acknowledged the factual basis set forth in the plea agreement, including two specific sales:
approximately 3.9 grams of cocaine base on April 26, 2022, and approximately 2.2 grams of
cocaine base on May 18, 2022. (Id. at 1267.)
Hoyle filed a sentencing memorandum. (Doc. 308.) In it, he stated he was close with his
family, even speaking with his 11 siblings on a daily basis.2 (Id. at 1787; see also Doc. 299,
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all internal citations are to the PageID # generated by the CM/ECF
system.
2 Two of Hoyle’s siblings were co-defendants in this case and incarcerated at the time of
sentencing. (Doc. 299 at 1644.) One of them, Montez Miller, was granted clemency and is now
serving a four-year term of supervised release. (See Docket in Case No. 1:22-cr-498-1, notation
of Executive Grant of Clemency issued on 1/17/25.)
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PSR, ¶ 72.) Prior to his arrest in this case, Hoyle lived with his grandmother. (PSR, ¶ 73.) He
did not have a plan for where he would live upon his release. (Id.)
At sentencing, the Court determined Hoyle’s total offense level was 19. (Doc. 334,
Statement of Reasons.) His 11 criminal prior convictions, which began at the age of 18 and
continued each year until he was 24, resulted in six criminal history points and a Criminal
History Category of III. (Id.; PSR, ¶¶ 49-62.) His prior offenses included assault and two
separate drug trafficking offenses. (PSR, ¶¶ 49, 58-59.) Hoyle received a 36-month term of
incarceration in the first drug trafficking case and a 60-month term of incarceration in the
second. (Id., ¶¶ 58-59.) The 60-month term was imposed consecutively to the 36-month term,
resulting in a combined term of incarceration of 96 months. (Id. ¶ 59.)
On December 3, 2021, Hoyle was placed on post release control. (Id.) He was 31 years
old. Hoyle was on post release control at the time of these offenses. (Id., ¶ 61.) With a total
offense level 19 and a Criminal History Category III, the advisory range was 37-46 months.
After considering all of the information before it, the Court analyzed the Section 3553 factors
and determined a high-end sentence of 46 months was sufficient but no greater than necessary.3
II. 	LAW AND ANALYSIS
“‘Generally speaking, once a court has imposed a sentence, it does not have the authority
to change or modify that sentence unless such authority is expressly granted by statute.’” United
States v. Alexander, 951 F.3d 706, 707 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Curry, 606 F.3d
323, 326 (6th Cir. 2010)). Compassionate release is one statutorily authorized exception. 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Under § 3582(c)(1)(A), a district court may reduce a sentence only if
3 Defendant sought a low-end sentence of 37 months.
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“the defendant satisfies three requirements: (1) ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant
such a reduction’; (2) the ‘reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the
Sentencing Commission’; and (3) the relevant § 3553(a) factors support the reduction.” United
States v. Hunter, 12 F.4th 555, 561 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)). It is the
defendant’s burden to demonstrate a reduction is warranted. See United States v. Gordon, No.
23-3188, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 5227, at *6-7, 2024 WL 1005772 (6th Cir. Mar. 4, 2024).
Failure to meet any one of these criteria is a basis on which to deny relief. United States v.
Tomes, 990 F.3d 500, 502 (6th Cir. 2021).
To be extraordinary and compelling, the presented circumstances must be “most unusual,
far from common, and having little or no precedent.” United States v. McCall, 56 F.4th 1048,
1055 (6th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (quotations and citation omitted). The Sentencing Commission’s
amended policy statement for compassionate release motions, effective November 1, 2023,
identifies “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances, namely (1) a defendant’s particular
medical circumstances, (2) a defendant’s advanced age, (3) certain family circumstances, (4)
within-custody physical or sexual abuse, and (5) “any other circumstance or combination of
circumstances that, when considered by themselves or together with any of the reasons described
in paragraphs (1) through (4), are similar in gravity to those described in paragraphs (1) through
(4).”4 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)-(5). Rehabilitation alone is not an “extraordinary or compelling”
reason for compassionate release but may be considered in the Court’s Section 3553(a) analysis.
4 Section 1B1.13(b) includes paragraph 6, recognizing a policy statement that unusually long
sentences where a change in controlling law results in a “gross disparity” may present an
“extraordinary and compelling” circumstance. Paragraph 6 has been declared invalid. United
States v. Bricker, 135 F.4th 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2025).
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See United States v. Parks, No. 24-5566, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 8525, at *4, 2025 WL 1069308
(6th Cir. Apr. 9, 2025).
With the November 1, 2023 amendments, § 1B1.13 applies to inmate-filed
compassionate release motions. United States v. Harris, No. 23-5187, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS
32005, at *4, 2023 WL 10294625 (6th Cir. Dec. 4, 2023).
A. Extraordinary and Compelling Reason/Family Circumstances
Hoyle’s pro se motion asserts the very argument Bricker forecloses, that being that a
purported retroactive change resulting in a sentencing disparity is an extraordinary and
compelling reason. (Doc. 431; see also Bricker, 135 F.th 427.) His supplement, however,
presents his grandmother’s current medical condition as the extraordinary and compelling reason
upon which relief should be granted. (Doc. 451 at 2991-92.)
Early release may be appropriate if a defendant’s immediate family member is (1)
“incapacitat[ed]” and (2) the defendant is the only available or suitable caregiver. U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13(b)(3). Grandparents are included in the definition of immediate family member.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(3)(D).
Demonstrating a qualifying family member’s incapacitation requires sufficient
information or documentation to establish the family member “is completely disabled, meaning
that the [individual] . . . cannot carry on any self-care and is totally confined to a bed or chair.”
United States v. Cansler, No. 4:22-cr-19, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218870, at *10, 2025 WL
3110562 (WD. Ky. Nov. 5, 2025) (citing Bureau of Prisons Program Statement No. 5050.50,
Compassionate Release/Reduction in Sentence: Procedures for Implementation of 18 U.S.C. §§
3582 and 4502(g) (2019), at 10.) This Program Statement also recognizes severe cognitive
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deficits, like dementia, as qualifying diagnoses for incapacitation.5 Bureau of Prisons Program
Statement No. 5050.50 at 10. If a defendant establishes the incapacitation of a qualifying family
member, he must still “clear a high bar to show [he is] the only available caregiver; other
potential caregivers can be significantly burdened and still be available. Cansler, 2025 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 218870, at *9-10 (collecting cases).
Hoyle has not presented documentation of his grandmother’s condition. Nor has he
demonstrated that other sources of assistance (assisted living, Medicaid, etc.) are unavailable.
Notwithstanding, the Court credits Hoyle’s representation that his grandmother has unfortunately
been diagnosed with dementia and now requires full-time care. (Doc. 451 at 2992.)
The remaining question is whether Hoyle has established he is the sole available
caregiver. The record does not support such a finding. Hoyle mentions a cousin, a brother, and
his father as potential but unavailable caregivers. (Id.) There is no evidence to support this
contention, but an out-sized burden on other potential caregivers does not, without more,
establish that Hoyle is the only available caregiver. Cansler, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218870, at
*11. Moreover, Hoyle maintains a close relationship with 10 other siblings who live in or near
his grandmother’s home in Cleveland, Ohio. (Doc. 308 at 1787; PSR, ¶¶ 72-73.) “If a family
member is named on the record, and there is no evidence that he or she is unavailable, courts
may find that family member [or members] to be [] available caregiver[s].” Cansler, 2025 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 218870, at *11-12 (colleting cases). Because Hoyle has not demonstrated he is his
5 The Program Statement does not mention grandparents, but § 1B1.13(b)(3)(D) expressly
includes grandparents as qualifying family members. The Program Statement defines
“incapacitation” of certain others in the section titled “Requests Based on Non-Medical
Circumstances – Incapacitation of Spouse or Registered Partner.” Bureau of Prisons Program
Statement No. 5050.50 at 6. The Court applies this definition of incapacitation to grandparents
to reconcile § 1B1.13(b)(3)(D)’s inclusion of grandparents as qualifying family members.
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grandmother’s sole available caregiver, Hoyle has not met his burden of establishing
extraordinary and compelling family circumstances.
B. Section 3553(a) Factors
Even if Hoyle could establish an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate
release, the Section 3553(a) factors do not support a sentence reduction. Hoyle asks the Court to
consider his young age at the time of his prior offenses, rehabilitation, harsh prison conditions,
and time already served. (Doc. 451 at 2993.) Taking all of these as true, a sentence reduction is
not consistent with the sentencing factors established by Congress. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A).6
Drug trafficking offenses are “serious offense[s] that, in [themselves], pose[] a danger to
the community.” United States v. Stone, 608 F.3d 939, 947 n.6 (6th Cir. 2010). Hoyle sold
drugs to a confidential source. (PSR, ¶ 9.) He was seen on multiple occasions at the
organization’s stash house. (Id., ¶¶ 30-32.) Conduct that presents a clear danger to others
weighs against a sentence reduction.
Hoyle is a repeat offender. On February 26, 2015, he was sentenced on two separate
drug trafficking cases, both of which stemmed from sales of cocaine base to undercover agents
with the Drug Enforcement Administration. (Id., ¶¶ 58-59.) He was sentenced to a combined
term of 96 months (36 months on first case and 60 months on second). (Id.) While incarcerated
he committed 46 rule infractions. (Id., ¶ 58.) Hoyle initially completed a halfway house
program but absconded in September 2022. (Id., ¶ 59.) Hoyle’s involvement in this drug
trafficking organization began within weeks of being placed on post release control. Hoyle’s 11
prior convictions occurred between the ages of 18 and 24, but he was incarcerated at 24 and
6 The Court incorporates its assessment of the Section 3553(a) factors stated at sentencing.
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remained so until he was 31. He then immediately returned to drug trafficking. Hoyle’s
commitment to inmate programming is commendable, and the circumstances of confinement are
undoubtedly challenging. But Hoyle’s prompt return to drug trafficking and his demonstrated
inability to comply with the terms of release conditions weigh against a sentencing reduction.
The Court carefully considered the Section 3553(a) factors at sentencing. The PSR
recognized a basis to depart and vary upward, but the Court declined to do so. (Id., ¶¶ 111, 113
(noting Hoyle’s criminal history was underrepresented because of the “intervening arrest”
provisions in U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2)).) Instead, for the reasons stated, the Court imposed a high-
end sentence of 46 months. The information provided in Hoyle’s Motion does not alter the
Court’s overall assessment of the sentencing factors or its conclusion that a sentence of 46-month
term of incarceration is sufficient but no greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of
sentencing.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Defendant Mario Hoyle’s Motion for Compassionate
Release is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: 	December 10, 2025 	_________________________________
BRIDGET MEEHAN BRENNAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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