USA v. Brown

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
RAYSEAN J. BROWN,
Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
25-CR-6046-EAW-MJP
APPEARANCES
For the United States: 	Everardo A. Rodriguez
U.S. Attorney’s Office - Rochester
100 State Street
Suite 500
Rochester, NY 14614
For the Defendant: 	Bryan Scott Oathout
Law Office of Bryan Oathout
45 Exchange Blvd. Suite 260
Rochester, NY 14614
INTRODUCTION
Pedersen, M.J. Defendant Raysean J. Brown (“Defendant”) is charged by way
of an indictment returned on March 18, 2025, with two counts as follows: (1) Narcotics
Conspiracy; (2) Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of a Drug Trafficking Offense.
(Indictment, ECF No. 24.) The indictment also includes two forfeiture allegations.
(Id.)
Defendant filed his omnibus motion on September 23, 2025 (ECF No. 42). The
government filed its opposition on October 9, 2025 (ECF No. 43). The undersigned
held oral argument on December 1, 2025, and issued an omnibus order addressing all
issues raised in Defendant’s omnibus motion, except reserving on that part of
Case 6:25-cr-06046-EAW-MJP Document 54 Filed 12/22/25 Page 1 of 34

2
Defendant’s motion seeking to suppress tangible evidence seized by law enforcement
(Omnibus Order, December 1, 2025, ECF No. 48.)
As part of his motion papers, Defendant provided an affidavit, sworn to
September 19, 2025, in which he asserts his privacy and Fourth Amendment right in
the residence located at 29 Castlewood Drive, states that 29 Castlewood Drive was
his residence at the time of his arrest, and declares his privacy interest in his cellular
phone and related phone number 626-267-1100. (Def.’s Aff. at ¶¶ 4–6, ECF No. 42-4.)
The government has not contested Defendant’s standing to challenge the search
warrants executed with respect to 29 Castlewood Drive, Defendant’s cellular phone
with assigned number (626) 267-1100, or Defendant’s Apple account associated with
his cellular phone number (626) 267-1100.
After 	reviewing 	the 	motion 	papers 	and 	considering 	oral 	argument 	the
undersigned recommends that the District Judge DENY that part of Defendant’s
motion seeking suppression of tangible evidence. (ECF No. 42.)
JURISDICTION
On March 18, 2025, the Honorable Elizabeth A. Wolford referred this matter
to the undersigned to address all pre-trial matters
including all pre-trial matters that a Magistrate Judge may hear and
determine pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(A), and those which
a 	Magistrate 	Judge 	may 	hear 	and 	thereafter 	file 	a 	report 	and
recommendation for disposition pursuant to Section 636(b)(1)(B). All
procedural aspects of matters properly before the Magistrate Judge
under this Order, including scheduling and the filing of briefs or other
supporting material, shall be determined by the Magistrate Judge. All
motions 	or 	applications 	shall 	be 	filed 	with 	the 	Clerk 	and 	made
returnable before the Magistrate Judge.
(Text Order of Referral, ECF No. 26.)
Case 6:25-cr-06046-EAW-MJP Document 54 Filed 12/22/25 Page 2 of 34

3
DISCUSSION
Findings of Fact Regarding Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence Seized
During Execution of the Search Warrants.
Defendant’s cellular phone with assigned number (626) 267-1100
On March 4, 2024, the Honorable Michael Dollinger, Monroe County Court
Judge, issued a search warrant for the cellular phone assigned telephone number
(626) 267-1100. (Oathout Aff. at Ex. A, ECF No. 42-1.) Judge Dollinger made a finding
of probable cause based upon the application of Sabatino Smith, Special Agent for the
Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”), sworn to on March 4, 2024. (“3/4/24
Smith Aff.”).
Defendant asserts that the application is solely based on information received
from two confidential informants with their own personal motives for providing that
information. (Oathout Aff. ¶ 35(a).) More specifically, Defendant contends that
confidential source one (“CS-1”) is cooperating with the government in accordance
with his plea agreement in exchange for a more lenient sentence. (Id.) Defendant
asserts that Agent Smith’s application does not contain any information from CS-1
regarding Defendant’s use of his cellular phone with assigned number (626) 267-1100,
and particularly not in connection with narcotics sales. (Id. ¶ 35(b).)
Defendant argues that confidential source two (“CS-2”) is being monetarily
compensated for his cooperation and that he had only been cooperating with law
enforcement for two months when he began his cooperation related to Defendant. (Id.
¶ 35(c).) Defendant contends that there is no information that CS-2 was reliable
generally, other than conclusory language, and no indication that he was reliable
Case 6:25-cr-06046-EAW-MJP Document 54 Filed 12/22/25 Page 3 of 34

4
with respect to the information he provided as to Defendant. (Id.) Defendant further
contends that there is no information regarding how many purchases CS-2 made
directly with Defendant, where any such purchases were made, or how much fentanyl
was purchased prior to February 2024. (Id.) Defendant also asserts that the alleged
controlled purchase by CS-2 of fentanyl in February 2024 was made with an
“associate” of Defendant, not directly with the Defendant. (Id.)
Finally, 	Defendant 	contends 	that, 	while 	the 	search 	warrant 	application
indicates that Defendant utilized multiple cell phones to conduct the illegal narcotics
transactions, 	the 	application 	does 	not 	include 	any 	other 	phone 	numbers 	or
information related to what types of phones were used and the basis of this
knowledge. (Id. ¶ 35(d).)
In opposition, the government asserts that Special Agent Smith’s affidavit
provided ample probable cause to support the warrant, which sought cell site, cell site
sector, and other data showing the specific latitude and longitude or other precise
location information related to Defendant’s cellular phone. (Gov’ts Mem. of Law at 8,
ECF No. 43.) More specifically, the government contends that Special Agent Smith’s
affidavit described the ongoing investigation into Defendant, including reliable
information 	received 	from 	a 	confidential 	informant 	about 	Defendant’s 	drug
trafficking activities, as well as undercover purchases of fentanyl from Defendant.
(Id.) Special Agent Smith also included observations of Defendant utilizing his
cellular phone during the investigation to further his drug trafficking activities. (Id.)
In particular, CS-2 indicated that he/she would contact Defendant on his cellular
Case 6:25-cr-06046-EAW-MJP Document 54 Filed 12/22/25 Page 4 of 34

5
phone with assigned number (626) 267-1100 to arrange to purchase drugs from him
and this was corroborated when CS-2 arranged a controlled purchase of drugs from
Defendant 	by 	calling 	that 	phone 	number. 	(Id. 	at 	8.) 	CS-1 	also 	corroborated
Defendant’s use of his cellular phone in connection with Defendant’s drug trafficking
activities by advising law enforcement that Defendant would use a “drug phone”
when various customers called to purchase fentanyl from him.1 (Id.) The government
indicated that the GPS and cell site location information would lead to evidence
regarding Defendant’s drug trafficking, particularly because it would permit law
enforcement to track Defendant’s movements and aid in locating his stash houses.
(Id. at 9.) The government argues that Special Agent Smith established that
Defendant utilized his cellular phone with assigned number (626) 267-1100 such that
probable cause existed to support the warrant. Lastly, the government asserts that
even if probable cause was lacking, “Defendant has not shown and cannot show that
the searching officers did not rely in good faith on” the search warrant related to
Defendant’s cellular phone with assigned number (626) 267-1100. (Id. at 11–12.)
The facts as taken from Special Agent Smith’s affidavit are more fully
discussed in the analysis section, below.
Defendant’s Apple account associated with Defendant’s cellular phone
number (626) 267-1100
On May 21, 2024, the Honorable Julie Hahn, Monroe County Court Judge,
issued a search warrant for Defendant’s Apple account associated with his cellular
1 In its papers the government indicates that Defendant correctly noted in his papers that
Special Agent Smith’s affidavit does not provide any information from CS-1 that Defendant
utilizes phone number (626) 267-1100 to conduct narcotics sales. (Gov’ts Mem. of Law at 9 n.2.)
Case 6:25-cr-06046-EAW-MJP Document 54 Filed 12/22/25 Page 5 of 34

6
phone number (626) 267-1100. (Oathout Aff. at Ex. B, ECF No. 42-2.) Judge Hahn
made a finding of probable cause based upon the application of Matthew Walker,
Special Agent for the DEA, sworn to on May 21, 2024 (“Walker Aff.”).
Defendant contends that probable cause was lacking for this warrant. More
specifically, he asserts that the there is “no new information nor non-hearsay
information” related to CS-2 (referred to as “CS” in Walker’s affidavit) in Special
Agent Walker’s application related to Defendant’s Apple account. (Oathout Aff. ¶
35(g).) Defendant contends that the information contained in Special Agent Walker’s
application 	was 	derived 	from 	Special 	Agent 	Smith’s 	original 	application. 	(Id.)
Defendant further contends that Special Agent Walker’s application contains no new
or non-hearsay information that would lead to permitting retrieval of information
related to Defendant’s Apple account nor why the application is necessary for any
investigation into Defendant and any illegal narcotics trafficking. (Id.) Defendant
also asserts that the scope of the information sought, and granted, was overbroad as
the application sought all records related to the Apple account from September 1,
2023, to May 20, 2024, but that there was no information in the application regarding
any criminal activity as to Defendant after February 2024. (Id. ¶ 35(h).)
The government asserts that this warrant was supported by ample probable
cause as Special Agent Walker’s affidavit reliably recounted Defendant’s drug
trafficking history and the recent controlled purchase by a confidential informant who
called Defendant’s cellular phone to arrange the buy. (Gov’ts Mem. of Law at 9.) The
government further asserts that Defendant utilized his cellular telephone number to
Case 6:25-cr-06046-EAW-MJP Document 54 Filed 12/22/25 Page 6 of 34

7
set up utilities at 29 Castlewood Drive. (Id.) Agent Walker also explained, based on
his “experience, knowledge, and training” that drug dealers like Defendant often used
their cellular phones with internet capabilities to utilize social media accounts to
communicate with others. (Id. at 10.) Further, the government contends that the
warrant for Defendant’s Apple account was not overbroad because Special Agent
Walker’s application and affidavit seeking a warrant for that account is dated May
21, 2024, which was only three months after a controlled purchase was made from
Defendant in February 2024, and was timely given the ongoing investigation into
Defendant’s drug trafficking activities. (Id. at 10–11.) Finally, the government argues
that the good faith exception applies should probable cause be lacking to support the
warrant. (Id. at 11–12.) The facts as taken from Special Agent Walker’s affidavit are
more fully discussed in the analysis section, below.
29 Castlewood Drive, Rochester, New York
On January 28, 2025, the undersigned issued a search warrant for 29
Castlewood Drive, Rochester, New York. (Oathout Aff. at Ex. C, ECF No. 42-3.) The
undersigned made a finding of probable cause based upon the affidavit of Sabatino
Smith, Special Agent for the DEA, sworn to on January 28, 2025. (“1/28/25 Smith
Aff.”). (Id.)
Defendant contends that Special Agent Smith’s application for a search
warrant lacked sufficient allegations that Defendant conducted narcotic sales from
his residence at 29 Castlewood Drive or that he kept narcotics, paraphernalia, or
narcotic proceeds at that residence. (Oathout Aff. ¶ 35(m).) Defendant asserts that
Case 6:25-cr-06046-EAW-MJP Document 54 Filed 12/22/25 Page 7 of 34

8
Agent Smith’s allegations as contained in the warrant application “are based solely
on his opinions from surveillance of the residence, and other hearsay information
provided by confidential informants.” (Id.) Defendant contends that while there are
allegations that numerous individuals visited and entered his residence, leaving
shortly after, there is no evidence that law enforcement stopped any of those
individuals or found them with narcotics after leaving Defendant’s residence. (Id.) He
further argues that the government lacks any direct evidence “that places narcotics
nor the proceeds of narcotics dealing in [Defendant’s] hands” or in the hands of
anyone visiting his residence. (Id.) Finally, Defendant asserts that “any information
in [Agent Smith’s] application [came] from the illegal warrants previously granted
for [Defendant’s] phone.” (Id. ¶ 35(n).)
In opposition to Defendant’s motion the government contends that Special
Agent Smith’s affidavit established sufficient probable cause to believe that 29
Castlewood Drive contained evidence of criminal activity, including drug dealing.
(Gov’ts Mem. of Law at 7.) The government asserts that because Defendant was a
drug dealer of large quantities of drugs and 29 Castlewood Drive was his residence
that this provided probable cause to search that residence. (Id.) More specifically, the
government asserts that Special Agent Smith included evidence provided by three
reliable confidential informants and that the confidential informants’ information
was corroborated by four separate purchases of fentanyl directly from Defendant
conducted by an undercover officer and a controlled purchase made by a confidential
informant. (Id.) The government asserts that while Defendant changed his residence
Case 6:25-cr-06046-EAW-MJP Document 54 Filed 12/22/25 Page 8 of 34

9
to 29 Castlewood Drive during the investigation, he continued to conduct his drug
trafficking activities from that residence. (Id.) The government states that Special
Agent Smith’s affidavit provides details regarding activities by Defendant and others
at 29 Castlewood Drive that are consistent with Defendant selling drugs from that
residence. (Id.) Finally, even if the search warrant was not supported by probable
cause, the government asserts that the tangible evidence seized still should not be
suppressed because law enforcement relied on the warrant in good faith. (Id. at 11–
12.) The facts as taken from Special Agent Smith’s affidavit are more fully discussed
in the analysis section, below.
Conclusions of Law Regarding Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence
Seized During Execution of the Search Warrants.
As there is no dispute regarding standing, the undersigned will analyze
Defendant’s assertions that the search warrant applications of DEA Special Agents
Smith and Walker failed to provide sufficient facts upon which a finding of probable
cause could have been made by Judge Dollinger, Judge Hahn, and the undersigned.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, 	houses, 	papers, 	and effects, 	against 	unreasonable 	searches 	and
seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “To establish probable cause to search a residence,
two factual showings are necessary—first, that a crime was committed, and second,
that there is probable cause to believe that evidence of such crime is located at the
residence.” United States v. Travisano, 724 F.2d 341, 345 (2d Cir. 1983). Here, the
dispute centers not on whether a crime was committed, but rather whether there was
Case 6:25-cr-06046-EAW-MJP Document 54 Filed 12/22/25 Page 9 of 34

10
probable cause to believe that evidence of the crime would be located on Defendant’s
cellular phone and Apple account and at his residence.
“[P]robable cause to search a place exists if the issuing judge finds a ‘fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place’
and a federal court must apply a ‘totality-of-the-circumstances analysis’ in pursuing
this inquiry.” United States v. Ponce, 947 F.2d 646, 650 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). When reviewing the validity of a search warrant:
the duty of [the] court . . . is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a
substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing] that probable cause existed. A
search warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate is entitled
to substantial deference, and doubts should be resolved in favor of
upholding the warrant.
United States v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315, 326 (2d Cir. 1993) (quotations and citations
omitted); Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 157 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[A] reviewing court must
accord considerable deference to the probable cause determination of the issuing
magistrate . . ..”). “[A]fter-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit
[applying for a warrant] should not take the form of de novo review.” United States v.
Smith, 9 F.3d 1007, 1012 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 236) (alteration
in original). “[R]esolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely
determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants.” Id. (quoting United States
v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965)); see United States v. Clark, 638 F.3d 89, 93 (2d
Cir. 2011) (“Such deference derives not only from the law’s recognition that probable
cause is ‘a fluid concept’ that can vary with the facts of each case, but also from its
‘strong preference’ for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant, and its related
Case 6:25-cr-06046-EAW-MJP Document 54 Filed 12/22/25 Page 10 of 34

11
concern that ‘[a] grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants
will tend to discourage police officers from submitting their evidence to a judicial
officer before acting.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
Moreover, when analyzing whether the totality of the circumstances supports
a finding of probable cause “. . . the court may consider . . . an informant’s veracity,
reliability and basis of knowledge, and the extent to which an informant’s statements
. . . are independently corroborated.” McColley v. Cnty. of Rensselaer, 740 F.3d 817,
823 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Defendant’s cellular phone with assigned number (626) 267-1100
The search warrant was supported by ample probable cause
The undersigned reviewed Special Agent Smith’s application in support of the
search warrant. With respect to probable cause, the undersigned believes that the
totality of the circumstances, including the detailed information provided in Special
Agent Smith’s affidavit, afforded Judge Dollinger a substantial basis for concluding
that probable cause existed to issue the warrant for Defendant’s cellular phone with
assigned number (626) 267-1100.
Special Agent Smith asserts in his affidavit that he has been employed by the
DEA since September 2009, and that, at least as of the date of his application and
affidavit of March 4, 2024, he was assigned to the DEA Rochester Resident Office. He
states that he has completed training at the DEA Office of Training in Quantico,
Virigina, prior to beginning his employment in the Rochester Resident Office. His
training 	included 	“classroom 	preparation 	in 	drug 	trafficking 	networks, 	drug
Case 6:25-cr-06046-EAW-MJP Document 54 Filed 12/22/25 Page 11 of 34

12
identification, as well as practical application of surveillance, drug investigation, and
arrest procedures.” (3/4/24 Smith Aff.) As for experience, Special Agent Smith
indicated that
During my tenure with the DEA, I have participated in numerous
investigations relating to armed individuals that were involved in the
distribution 	of 	controlled 	substances, 	including 	fentanyl, 	heroin,
cocaine, 	methamphetamine, 	and 	other 	substances. 	I 	have 	also
participated in numerous interviews and debriefings of individuals
involved in armed drug trafficking. I am familiar with the habits,
methods, routines, practices and procedures commonly employed by
persons engaged in the armed trafficking of illegal drugs. Additionally,
I am familiar with the methods of use, effects, distribution, appearance,
as well as the methods of manufacture of controlled substances. I have
been the affiant on multiple federal and state search warrants, arrest
warrants and other applications. During my time at the Rochester
Resident Office, I have participated in numerous long-term narcotics
investigations that utilized the court-authorized interception of wire
communications that have resulted in the arrest of drug distributors,
and the seizures of quantities of controlled substances and firearms.
(Id. at 1–2, ECF No. 42-1.2)
In 	his 	affidavit, 	Special 	Agent 	Smith 	indicated 	he 	began 	investigating
Defendant’s drug trafficking activities in September 2023. (Id. ¶ 1.) Special Agent
Smith stated that in or around March 2022 and continuing into 2023, CS-1 told the
DEA that Defendant was a violent drug dealer who robbed other drug dealers and
who used his own supply of fentanyl for distribution. (Id. ¶ 2.) CS-1 stated Defendant
used a “drug phone” to sell fentanyl to various customers. CS-1 indicated that he
personally observed Defendant in possession of over 500 grams of fentanyl and had
been present when Defendant was processing and packaging fentanyl for sale. (Id.)
2 The page numbers referenced are to the initial page numbers on the bottom right-
hand corner of the affidavit before the government Bates-stamped the document and before
it was filed on CM/ECF.
Case 6:25-cr-06046-EAW-MJP Document 54 Filed 12/22/25 Page 12 of 34

13
Special Agent Smith indicated that CS-1 is personally known to the DEA, having
cooperated with law enforcement for over fifteen months (as of the date of Special
Agent Smith’s affidavit). (Id. ¶ 4.) CS-1’s cooperation began pursuant to a plea
agreement in exchange for a potential impact on his own sentencing. (Id.)
With 	respect 	to 	CS-2, 	Special 	Agent 	Smith’s 	affidavit 	indicates 	that 	in
February 2024 CS-2 told the Rochester Police Department that Defendant is a
fentanyl trafficker. (Id. at 3.) CS-2 told law enforcement that Defendant conducts his
fentanyl trafficking utilizing cell phones and that he/she had purchased drugs from
Defendant on multiple occasions, with the purchases usually set up by phone
conversations. (Id.) CS-2 stated that he/she communicated with Defendant over the
cellular phone with assigned number (626) 267-1100. (Id.) Specifically, in February
2024, CS-2 contacted Defendant on his cellular phone to arrange a controlled
purchase of fentanyl. (Id. ¶ 10.) Defendant provided CS-2 with a location for the
purchase and investigators observed CS-2 meet with an unknown black male believed
to be Defendant’s associate and purchase fentanyl from him. (Id. ¶ 11.) Special Agent
Smith indicated that CS-2 is personally known to him, that he/she had been
cooperating 	with 	law 	enforcement 	for 	two 	months, 	and 	that 	he/she 	is 	being
monetarily compensated for his/her cooperation. (Id. ¶ 8.)
With respect to the reliability of the confidential sources for purposes of
establishing probable cause, the Second Circuit considers an informant to be reliable
if such information “is based on reliable means, such as first-hand observations or
second-hand information from reliable sources, rather than unreliable means such as
Case 6:25-cr-06046-EAW-MJP Document 54 Filed 12/22/25 Page 13 of 34

14
rumor or innuendo,” and such confidential source information will be found to be
“sufficiently reliable . . . if the person providing the information has a track record of
providing reliable information, or if it is corroborated in material respects by
independent evidence” United States v. Wagner, 989 F.2d 69, 72–73 (2d Cir. 1993).
With respect to having a track record of reliability, Special Agent Smith indicated
that CS-1 had been cooperating with law enforcement for over fifteen months as of
the date of his affidavit. Certainly law enforcement would not continue to work with
a confidential informant for that period of time if he/she did not provide reliable
information.
Moreover, 	Special 	Agent 	Smith 	provided 	corroborating 	evidence 	for 	the
information provided by both CS-1 and CS-2. For both CS-1 and CS-2, Special Agent
Smith indicated their information “has been corroborated through independent
investigation, physical and electronic surveillance” and by information received from
other law enforcement agencies. (Id. ¶¶ 4 & 7.) In addition, Special Agent Smith
averred that both CS-1 and CS-2 indicated that the information he/she provided is
based on personal observations or conversations either with individuals directly
involved in the drug trafficking activity or individuals closely associated with those
directly involved in that activity. (Id. ¶¶ 4 & 8.). The undersigned finds this sufficiently
establishes CS-1 and CS-2’s reliability for purposes of establishing probable cause.
Moreover, as Defendant asserts, and the government does not contest, while
CS-1 stated that Defendant utilized a “drug phone” to conduct his drug trafficking
and that he/she personally saw Defendant with large quantities of fentanyl, CS-1 did
Case 6:25-cr-06046-EAW-MJP Document 54 Filed 12/22/25 Page 14 of 34

15
not indicate that Defendant utilized the specific cellular phone with assigned number
(626) 267-1100 to conduct narcotic sales. Regardless, this information provides
support 	that 	Defendant 	conducted 	narcotics 	sales 	utilizing 	cellular 	phones.
Importantly, 	Special 	Agent 	Smith 	also 	provided 	that 	CS-2 	directly 	contacted
Defendant on his cellular phone, number (626) 267-1100 and set up a successful
controlled purchase in February 2024 at the location at which Defendant told CS-2
the drug transaction would take place.
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the confidential sources’
reliability was sufficiently established to support a finding of probable cause, in
conjunction with the other information contained in Special Agent Smith’s affidavit,
for Judge Dollinger to issue the warrant. Further, the undersigned finds that the
totality of the circumstances provided a fair probability that contraband or evidence
of a crime would be found on Defendant’s cellular phone with assigned number (626)
267-1100. 	Accordingly, 	the 	undersigned 	believes 	it 	was 	reasonable 	for 	Judge
Dollinger, viewing the evidence amassed by Special Agent Smith, to determine he
had a substantial basis to conclude that the search warrant was supported by
probable cause.
Defendant’s Apple account associated with Defendant’s cellular phone
number (626) 267-1100
The search warrant was supported by ample probable cause
The undersigned reviewed Special Agent Walker’s application in support of the
search warrant for Defendant’s Apple account. With respect to probable cause, the
undersigned believes that the totality of the circumstances, including the detailed
Case 6:25-cr-06046-EAW-MJP Document 54 Filed 12/22/25 Page 15 of 34

16
information provided in Special Agent Walker’s affidavit, afforded Judge Hahn a
substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed to issue the warrant for
Defendant’s Apple account.
Special Agent Walker indicated in his affidavit in support of his application for
the search warrant that he has been a special agent with the DEA since October 2019.
(Walker Aff. ¶ 1, ECF No. 42-2.) Special Agent Walker states that “[s]ince becoming
a DEA agent, I have participated in numerous drug investigations. I have received
training at the DEA Training Academy, on the subjects of narcotics trafficking,
interdiction, and money laundering and asset forfeiture investigations.” (Id.) Special
Agent Walker described his experience as follows:
I have experience in the investigation of violations of federal and state
narcotics laws. I have conducted and participated in numerous narcotics
investigations resulting in the arrest and conviction of drug distributors,
and the seizure of quantities of controlled substances. During these
investigations my participation has included, but has not been limited
to, undercover operations; direction of confidential sources; debriefing of
defendants and others involved in the distribution and consumption of
illegal drugs; execution of search warrants; execution of arrest warrants;
I have been the affiant on search warrants and criminal complaints; I
have been involved in numerous surveillance operations. During my law
enforcement 	career, 	I 	have 	participated 	in 	cases 	involving 	the
distribution of cocaine, fentanyl, and methamphetamine. I am familiar
with the habits, methods, routines, practices and procedures commonly
employed by persons engaged in drug trafficking. I have had the
opportunity to speak with and observe other federal and state drug law
enforcement officers with regard to the manner in which controlled
substances are obtained, diluted, packaged, distributed, sold and used
within the framework of drug trafficking in the Western District of New
York and elsewhere. I am also familiar with, methods employed by drug
traffickers to cany out the delivery and receipt of illicit drugs and related
cash proceeds.
(Id.)
Case 6:25-cr-06046-EAW-MJP Document 54 Filed 12/22/25 Page 16 of 34

17
In his affidavit, Special Agent Walker indicated that he sought information
from Defendant’s Apple account for the period September 1, 2023, to May 20, 2024.
(Id. ¶ 2.) He further indicated that the source of the information contained in his
affidavit in support of the warrant application resulted from the DEA’s investigation
in which he was involved and in which task force officers from many other law
enforcement agencies were involved. (Id. ¶ 2.)
Special Agent Walker indicated that in early 2021 agents learned that
Defendant was working for a drug trafficking organization that was selling fentanyl
in Rochester, New York and agents conducted controlled buys from Defendant
utilizing confidential sources. (Id. ¶ 3.) Special Agent Walker also states that in
September 2023, agents utilized an undercover New York State Police investigator to
conduct four controlled purchases of fentanyl from Defendant. (Id.) After executing
multiple search warrants on some of Defendant’s associates in January 2024,
Defendant discontinued communications with the undercover agent. (Id.)
In 	February 	2024, 	a 	confidential 	source 	informed 	the 	Rochester 	Police
Department that Defendant was a fentanyl trafficker. (Id.) The confidential source
also told police officers that Defendant used cellular phones to communicate with his
customers, including instructing them where to meet him for the fentanyl sales. (Id.)
The confidential source also indicated that he/she personally purchased fentanyl from
Defendant on multiple occasions and that the sales were usually arranged through
phone conversations. (Id.) The confidential source specifically indicated that he/she
Case 6:25-cr-06046-EAW-MJP Document 54 Filed 12/22/25 Page 17 of 34

18
communicated with Defendant on Defendant’s cellular phone with associated phone
number (626) 267-1100. (Id.)
Also in February 2024, Rochester Police Department investigators arranged a
controlled purchase of fentanyl between the confidential source and Defendant. (Id.)
The confidential source contacted Defendant on his cellular phone with assigned
number (626) 267-1100 and Defendant told the confidential source where to meet him
to conduct the sale. (Id.) The investigators drove the confidential source to the agreed
upon location and the confidential source purchased fentanyl from an individual
believed to be an unknown associate of Defendant. (Id.) Using his training and
experience, Special Agent Walker deduced that Defendant utilized his cellular phone
with assigned number (626) 267-1100 to orchestrate the transaction described above.
(Id.)
Special Agent Walker provided that the confidential source’s information was
corroborated 	“through 	independent 	investigation, 	physical 	and 	electronic
surveillance, and by information received independently and separately from other
law enforcement agencies.” (Id.) In addition, Special Agent Walker indicated that the
confidential source “has provided agents reliable information in the past, relative to
narcotics 	trafficking, 	which 	has 	been 	independently 	corroborated.” 	(Id.) 	The
confidential source was personally known to the Rochester Police Department and
had been cooperating with law enforcement for over four months in return for
monetary compensation. (Id.)
Case 6:25-cr-06046-EAW-MJP Document 54 Filed 12/22/25 Page 18 of 34

19
Importantly, based upon his experience, knowledge, and training Special
Agent Walker detailed the use of cellular phones by narcotics traffickers in his
affidavit as follows:
a. Individuals engaged in illegal narcotics distribution often utilize cellular
telephones to facilitate illegal narcotics transactions.
b. Individuals engaged in illegal narcotics distribution often store telephone
numbers, names and other information relevant to their criminal activity in
their cellular telephones.
c. Individuals engaged in illegal narcotics distribution routinely utilize cellular
phones 	with 	internet 	capability 	to 	access 	social 	media 	outlets 	to
communicate with others.
d. Individuals engaged in illegal narcotics distribution often register the
cellular telephone numbers they utilize under false names, aliases, or no
name at all in an effort to deter law enforcement from detecting their illegal
activities.
e. Individuals engaged in illegal narcotics distribution often utilize multiple
cellular telephones and/or multiple telephone numbers, which are often
changed periodically, in an effort to deter law enforcement detection.
(Id. ¶ 1 on p. 7.3)
Defendant’s argument that “[t]here is no new information, nor non-hearsay
information, in the application of Special Agent Walker authoring [sic] the need for
any information related to request to retrieve information from the Apple Account” is
unavailing. (Oathout Aff. ¶ 35(g).) Defendant does not cite to any case law indicating
that it is impermissible for agents involved in the same investigation to rely on
information from the same confidential informant when seeking search warrants.
Nor does Defendant indicate that “new” information must be presented to meet the
3 This reference is to a second paragraph labeled “1” as contained in Special Agent
Walker’s affidavit and, therefore, the undersigned has also provided a page number on which
this information can be found in the affidavit itself. The page number is in the upper right-
hand corner and is the one automatically assigned when the document was filed on CM/ECF.
Case 6:25-cr-06046-EAW-MJP Document 54 Filed 12/22/25 Page 19 of 34

20
probable cause threshold when seeking a search warrant for a different aspect of the
investigation (i.e., for the Apple account).
The undersigned does not find that the warrant application seeking access to
information related to Defendant’s Apple account for the period September 1, 2023,
to May 20, 2024, was overbroad even though the last controlled buy from Defendant
occurred in February 2024. The undersigned finds Defendant’s argument analogous
to one of staleness. To that end, the Second Circuit has provided as follows:
when the supporting facts “present a picture of continuing conduct or an
ongoing activity, ... the passage of time between the last described act
and 	the 	presentation 	of 	the 	application 	becomes 	less 	significant.”
Martino, 664 F.2d at 867. Thus, we have held that in investigations of
ongoing narcotics operations, “intervals of weeks or months between the
last described act and the application for a warrant did not necessarily
make the information stale.” Rivera v. United States, 928 F.2d 592, 602
(2d Cir.1991). Indeed, “narcotics conspiracies are the very paradigm of
the 	continuing 	enterprises 	for 	which 	the 	courts 	have 	relaxed 	the
temporal requirements of non-staleness.” United States v. Rowell, 903
F.2d 899, 903 (2d Cir.1990) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
United States v. Ortiz, 143 F.3d 728, 732–33 (2d Cir. 1998). Indeed, narcotics
conspiracies, in particular, represent “the very paradigm of continuing enterprises
for which courts have relaxed the temporal requirements of non-staleness.” United
States v. Rowell, 903 F.2d 899, 903 (2d Cir. 1990) (internal quotations marks and
citations omitted). Consequently, courts in the Second Circuit have found probable
cause to remain current in narcotics cases, like this one, even when the gap between
the most recent information and the search was substantial.
For example, in Rivera v. United States, the Second Circuit noted that its
precedents have upheld relying on information “22 days to 18 months old” in search
Case 6:25-cr-06046-EAW-MJP Document 54 Filed 12/22/25 Page 20 of 34

21
warrant applications related to ongoing narcotics investigations. 928 F.2d 592, 602
(2d Cir. 1991) (in the context of narcotics conspiracies, “intervals of weeks or months
between the last described act and the application for a warrant [does] not necessarily
make the information stale). The same rationale is to be applied here, where
Defendant’s alleged criminal conduct was not a singular and isolated incident but
instead part of a conspiracy to distribute narcotics over a sustained period of time.
See e.g., United States v. Singh, 390 F.3d 168, 181–82 (2d Cir. 2004) (no staleness
from lapse of twenty months between information in affidavit and the search warrant
application where alleged criminal activity was of an ongoing and long-term nature);
United States v. Rowell, 903 F.2d 899, 903 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding that an eighteen-
month delay from the informant’s statement to the wiretap application was not stale
in a narcotics conspiracy).
The type of the evidence at issue here also supports a finding that the
information in the warrant application was not stale. “Staleness is highly relevant to
the legality of a search for a perishable or consumable object, like cocaine, but is
rarely relevant when it is a computer file. Computer and computer equipment are
‘not the type of evidence that rapidly dissipates or degrades.’” United States v. Seiver,
692 F.3d 774, 777 (7th Cir. 2012) quoting United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512,
529 (3d Cir. 2010). Like a computer, Defendant’s Apple account had the ability to
retain large amounts of personal data, photographs, communications, and other
records for long periods of time. Moreover, an Apple account is not the type of evidence
that rapidly dissipates or degrades. Thus, even though the date of the alleged
Case 6:25-cr-06046-EAW-MJP Document 54 Filed 12/22/25 Page 21 of 34

22
criminal activity ended, at most three months before the date of the warrant
application, there remained a substantial basis to believe that evidence of criminality
would be found in Defendant’s Apple account. Given the nature of the conduct alleged
and the evidence sought to be recovered, and bearing in mind the substantial
deference owed to a judge’s finding of probable cause, it cannot be said that a gap of
approximately 3 months here rendered the information stale.
Based 	on 	the 	foregoing, 	the 	undersigned 	finds 	that 	the 	totality 	of 	the
circumstances as contained in Special Agent Walker’s affidavit provided a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in Defendant’s
Apple account. Accordingly, the undersigned believes it was reasonable, viewing the
evidence amassed by Special Agent Walker, for Judge Hahn to determine that there
was a substantial basis to conclude that the search warrant was supported by
probable cause.
29 Castlewood Drive, Rochester, New York
The search warrant was supported by ample probable cause
Defendant disputes that Special Agent Smith provided a reasonable nexus
between his alleged drug activities and 29 Castlewood Drive sufficient to support a
finding of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant but the undersigned disagrees.
The undersigned reviewed Special Agent Smith’s application in support of the search
warrant. With respect to probable cause, the undersigned believes that the totality of
the circumstances, including the detailed information provided in Special Agent
Smith’s affidavit, afforded the undersigned a substantial basis for concluding that
Case 6:25-cr-06046-EAW-MJP Document 54 Filed 12/22/25 Page 22 of 34

23
probable 	cause 	existed 	to 	issue 	the 	warrant 	for 	Defendant’s 	residence 	at 	29
Castlewood Drive.
Special Agent Smith’s affidavit in support of his application for a search
warrant for 29 Castlewood Drive contains a description of his training and experience
that is almost identical to that contained in his affidavit in support of the search
warrant for Defendant’s cellular phone and will not be repeated here. Special Agent
Smith states that he has been one of the lead agents in Defendant’s investigation
since its inception and, as such, he is familiar with all aspects of the investigation.
(1/28/25 Smith Aff. ¶ 6, ECF No. 42-3.)
In 	his 	affidavit, 	Special 	Agent 	Smith 	indicated 	that 	CS-1 	(whom 	the
undersigned believes is the same “CS-1” from Special Agent Smith’s affidavit in
support of his application for a search warrant for Defendant’s cellular phone based
on the type of information received from the source) told DEA agents that Defendant
is a violent drug dealer and that he distributes his own supply of fentanyl. CS-1
personally observed Defendant with over a half a kilogram of fentanyl and was with
Defendant when the latter processed and packaged fentanyl for sale. (Id. ¶ 11.)
Special Agent Smith further indicated that CS-2 (also believed to be the same “CS-2”
related to the search warrant for Defendant’s cellular phone based on the type of
information received from the source) told the Rochester Police Department that
he/she had purchased fentanyl from Defendant on several occasions and that
Defendant supplies multiple customers who live outside of Monroe County who travel
to Monroe County to conduct drug transactions. (Id. ¶ 13.) Special Agent Smith also
Case 6:25-cr-06046-EAW-MJP Document 54 Filed 12/22/25 Page 23 of 34

24
provided that a third confidential source (“CS-3”) told agents that Defendant has an
alias of “Threatanyl,” that he sells cocaine and fentanyl, and that he is a rapper who
sings about the money he makes from selling drugs. (Id. ¶ 16.) CS-3 showed agents a
video of Defendant, which depicts him with larges amounts of U.S. currency. (Id.) CS-
3 further told agents that Defendant sells drugs with an individual named Brandon
Owens and showed them a picture of Owens. (Id.)
Special Agent Smith’s affidavit contains information regarding four instances
of purchases of fentanyl from Defendant to an undercover New York State Police
investigator taking place in September and October 2023 and twice in December
2023. 	(Id 	¶¶ 	22–31.) 	In 	each 	instance 	the 	undercover 	investigator 	contacted
Defendant by phone and Defendant provided a location for the purchase, where law
enforcement set up surveillance. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 24, 26–28, 30.) During the third controlled
buy it appeared that Defendant became suspicious of the undercover investigator and
called him to change the meeting location. (Id. ¶ 27.)
In April 2024 agents discovered that Defendant had moved to a new residence.
(Id. ¶ 36.) Information from Defendant’s utilities provider indicated that he was
residing at 29 Castlewood Drive. (Id. ¶ 36.) Based on this information, agents began
conducting surveillance on 29 Castlewood Drive, during which they saw Defendant
entering and exiting the location on a routine basis and spending the nights there.
(Id.) In his affidavit, Special Agent Smith included certain observations made during
surveillance of that premises from August 2024 to the date of his affidavit (January
28, 2025). (Id. ¶ 37.) More specifically, Special Agent Smith included eight instances
Case 6:25-cr-06046-EAW-MJP Document 54 Filed 12/22/25 Page 24 of 34

25
where a vehicle visited 29 Castlewood Drive during which someone from the vehicle
got out, entered the side door of the residence, and left very shortly thereafter as
follows:
1. 	August 8, 2024 –
a. 	Agents saw Defendant’s rental vehicle in the driveway, observed a
grey Nissan Rogue pull into the driveway at 11:26 a.m., a white
female enter the side door of the residence, and the same white
female exiting the residence and getting back into the Nissan
approximately one minute later. (Id. ¶ 39.) A check of the license
plate revealed that the vehicle was registered to a male from Hamlin,
New York. (Id.) Approximately half an hour later at 12:04 p.m. an
agent saw Defendant exit the residence, reposition his rental car in
the driveway, and reenter the residence. (Id. ¶ 40.)
b. 	At approximately 12:57 p.m. agent observed a black Lincoln SUV
park in the driveway, a while male exiting the vehicle, entering the
residence through the side door, and exiting at 1:03 p.m. (Id. ¶ 41.) A
check of the license plate revealed that the vehicle belonged to a
woman from Canandaigua, New York.
2. 	August 9, 2024: At 11:16 a.m. Special Agent Smith observed a grey sedan
park in the driveway of 29 Castlewood Drive, where Defendant’s rental
vehicle was also parked. (Id. ¶¶ 43–44.) A white male exited the sedan,
entered the side door of the residence, and left at approximately 11:22 a.m.
Case 6:25-cr-06046-EAW-MJP Document 54 Filed 12/22/25 Page 25 of 34

26
(Id. ¶ 44.) A check of the license plate revealed that the vehicle was a
Mitsubishi Mirage registered to an individual in Bath, New York. (Id.)
3. 	August 13, 2024: At 10:25 a.m. an agent observed a black Lincoln park in
the driveway of 29 Castlewood Drive, where Defendant’s rental vehicle was
also parked. (Id. ¶ 46.) This is the same vehicle that was observed at the
residence on August 8th. (Id.) An agent observed a white male exit the
vehicle, enter the side door of the residence, and leave at approximately
10:29 a.m. (Id.) The agent also saw Defendant exit the residence at 11:10
a.m. and then go back inside. (Id. ¶ 27.)
4. 	September 13, 2024: At 12:13 p.m. an agent observed a grey sedan park in
the residence’s driveway where Defendant’s rental vehicle was parked. (Id.
¶¶ 48–49.) The agent saw a white male exit the vehicle, enter the side door
of the residence, and exit the residence at approximately 12:16 p.m. (Id.
¶ 49.) A check of the license plate revealed that the vehicle was registered
to a woman from Rochester, New York, whose son matched the physical
description of the individual observed by the agent. (Id. ¶¶ 49–50.)
5. 	October 4, 2024: On this date Special Agent Smith observed, via electronic
surveillance, Defendant exit his residence and sit in his rented vehicle in
his driveway at 1:50 p.m. (Id. ¶ 52.) At 2:26 p.m. a light-colored sedan
parked in the driveway of the residence and a white male walked towards
Defendant’s rental car. (Id. ¶ 53.) Due to a camera glitch the next thing
Case 6:25-cr-06046-EAW-MJP Document 54 Filed 12/22/25 Page 26 of 34

27
Special Agent Smith observed was Defendant’s rental vehicle departing his
residence at 2:35 p.m. (Id.)
6. 	October 26, 2024: At 3:49 p.m. Special Agent Smith observed, via electronic
surveillance, an unknown associate of Defendant exiting the side door of
the residence and getting into a grey sedan parked in the driveway. (Id. ¶
55.) At 3:50 p.m. a red sedan pulled into the driveway, a white male walked
towards the grey sedan, and within a minute walked back to his red sedan
and left. (Id. ¶ 56.)
7. 	December 19, 2024: 	At 3:15 p.m. Special Agent Smith observed a green
Dodge Charger park in the driveway of the residence where Defendant’s
vehicle was parked. (Id. ¶ 61.) A person exited the vehicle, walked to the
side door of the residence, and left at approximately 3:16 p.m. (Id.)
In addition, on December 5, 2024, Special Agent Smith observed a grey Dodge
Ram park in the driveway of 29 Castlewood Drive and then observed Defendant’s
vehicle park in the driveway. (Id. ¶ 58.) Defendant walked towards the Dodge Ram
and, one minute later, walked away from the Ram holding a small black bag. (Id. ¶
59.) Defendant and the individual then went into the residence. (Id.) An agent
conducted a drive-by and identified the driver of the Ram as Brandon Owens, the
individual who CS-3 indicated was selling drugs with Defendant. (Id.) During the
Case 6:25-cr-06046-EAW-MJP Document 54 Filed 12/22/25 Page 27 of 34

28
investigation agents had observed the same Dodge Ram parked in the driveway of
the residence on multiple occasions. (Id. ¶ 59.)
In addition to the foregoing information, during the investigation a concerned
citizen who resided near Defendant complained to agents that Defendant installed
security cameras when he moved in and that he/she has “observed routine frequent
short-stay traffic that [he/she] believe[s] to be drug sales from this location.” (Id.
¶ 63.)
After obtaining the warrant for Defendant’s Apple account, agents reviewed
the extracted data and found data labeled “Licks” that listed over ten phone numbers.
(Id. ¶ 64.) Special Agent Smith explained that “Lick” is a slang term used by drug
dealers to refer to their customers. Of note, agents found a phone number belonging
to a male from Canandaigua, New York, who’s mother’s vehicle was the black Lincoln
SUV that agents had observed at Defendant’s residence for short periods of time. (Id.
¶ 65.) Agents believe that the son was driving the vehicle on those occasions. (Id.) In
addition, agents found a phone number belonging to a male who was observed at
Defendant’s residence on August 9, 2024, driving a gray Mitsubishi Mirage. (Id.) The
Mitsubishi is registered to an individual who shares an address with that male. (Id.)
While Defendant argues that law enforcement did not provide any “direct
evidence . . . that places narcotics nor proceeds of narcotics dealing in [Defendant’s]
hands, nor the hands of any individual visiting 29 Castlewood Drive,” one can infer
that Defendant stored and sold drugs at 29 Castlewood Drive based upon the evidence
amassed, including information obtained from the CIs, controlled purchases between
Case 6:25-cr-06046-EAW-MJP Document 54 Filed 12/22/25 Page 28 of 34

29
Defendant and an undercover officer, the agents’ observations at 29 Castlewood
Drive, the information from the concerned citizen, Defendant’s affiliation with
Brandon Owens, and the information obtained from the warrant executed on
Defendant’s Apple account. Indeed, investigators do not need to observe a defendant
bringing drugs into or out of a residence to be searched to establish probable cause.
Singh, 390 F.3d at 182 (“A showing of nexus does not require direct evidence and may
be based on reasonable inference from the facts presented based on common sense
and experience.” (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Based 	on 	the 	foregoing, 	the 	undersigned 	finds 	that 	the 	totality 	of 	the
circumstances provided a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
would be found at Defendant’s residence at 29 Castlewood Drive. Accordingly, the
undersigned believes it was reasonable, viewing the evidence amassed by Special
Agent Smith, to determine that there was a substantial basis to conclude that the
search warrant was supported by probable cause.
The Good Faith Exception Applies
Even if the warrants for Defendant’s cellular phone with assigned number
(626) 267-1100, his Apple account, and for his residence lacked probable cause and
Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated when law enforcement seized
Defendant’s cellular device and his Apple account, and searched his residence, the
exclusionary rule does not automatically operate to suppress the seized evidence.
“Indeed, exclusion has always been our last resort, not our first impulse.” Herring v.
United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation
Case 6:25-cr-06046-EAW-MJP Document 54 Filed 12/22/25 Page 29 of 34

30
omitted). The exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is
a “prudential” remedy, crafted by the Supreme Court to “compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty.” Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236 (2011) (citations
omitted). Neither a “personal constitutional right” nor a means to “redress the injury”
of an unconstitutional search, the exclusionary rule is designed to deter future Fourth
Amendment violations. Id. 236–37 (citations omitted).
Because the remedy exacts a heavy toll on the justice system, however, the
exclusionary rule does not apply whenever suppressing evidence “might provide
marginal 	deterrence.” 	Herring, 	555 	U.S. 	at 	141 	(citation 	omitted). 	The 	rule’s
corrective value justifies its cost “[w]hen the police exhibit deliberate, reckless, or
grossly negligent disregard for Fourth Amendment rights.” United States v. Stokes,
733 F.3d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 2013), quoting Davis, 564 U.S. at 238. “But when the police
act with an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct is lawful, or
when their conduct involves only simple, isolated negligence . . . exclusion cannot pay
its way.” Davis, 564 U.S. at 238 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Considering these principles, courts have recognized that evidence obtained by
officers “in objectively reasonable reliance” on a warrant subsequently invalidated by
a reviewing court is not generally subject to exclusion. United States v. Falso, 544
F.3d 110, 125 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 933 (2009) (citing United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. at 922). When an officer genuinely believes that he has obtained a
valid warrant from a magistrate and executes that warrant in good faith, there is no
conscious violation of the Fourth Amendment, “and thus nothing to deter.” Leon, 468
Case 6:25-cr-06046-EAW-MJP Document 54 Filed 12/22/25 Page 30 of 34

31
U.S. at 920–21. However, the good faith exception cannot shield even an officer who
relies on a duly issued warrant in at least four circumstances: “(1) where the issuing
magistrate has been knowingly misled; (2) where the issuing magistrate wholly
abandoned his or her judicial role; (3) where the application is so lacking in indicia of
probable cause as to render reliance upon it unreasonable; and (4) where the warrant
is so facially deficient that reliance upon it is unreasonable.” Clark, 638 F.3d at 100
(citations omitted). The Supreme Court clarified that these limitations apply not
merely in cases of deliberate police misconduct, but also in situations where an officer
is “reckless” or “grossly negligent” in seeking or executing a warrant. Herring, 555
U.S. at 144.
“The burden is on the government to demonstrate the objective reasonableness
of the officers’ good faith reliance on an invalidated warrant.” Clark, 638 F.3d at 100
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Moreover, as counseled by the
Second Circuit, in assessing whether the government has met its burden, a court
must consider that “in Leon, the Supreme Court strongly signaled that most searches
conducted pursuant to a warrant would likely fall within [the good faith exception’s]
protection.” Id.
Here, Defendant does not address whether the good faith exception would
apply if the warrants lacked probable cause. Regardless, there is no evidence that
any of the four circumstances under which the good faith exception would be
inapplicable exists. At oral argument, Defendant asserted that omissions were relied
upon to obtain the warrant for Defendant’s cellular phone and that the warrant
Case 6:25-cr-06046-EAW-MJP Document 54 Filed 12/22/25 Page 31 of 34

32
lacked specificity. However, this was in the context of Defendant seeking a Franks
hearing, which the undersigned denied. Defendant did not argue, either in his papers
or at oral argument, that Judge Dollinger, Judge Hahn, or the undersigned were
“knowingly misled” when issuing the warrants and there is no evidence to support
any claim even if it had been made. Indeed, while it is the government’s burden to
establish the good faith of its officers as provided in Clark, 638 F.3d at 100, to even
obtain a hearing on whether a law enforcement affidavit contains knowing or reckless
falsehoods, a defendant must make “a ‘substantial preliminary showing’ that a
deliberate falsehood or statement made with reckless disregard for the truth was
included in the warrant affidavit and the statement was necessary to the judge’s
finding of probable cause.” Falso, 544 F.3d at 125 (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438
U.S. 154, 155–56 (1978)). Defendant has not done so here.
In addition, there is also no assertion or evidence that Judge Dollinger, Judge
Hahn, or the undersigned in any way abandoned his or her judicial role in authorizing
the warrants. With respect to the third consideration, the undersigned already
addressed above that he believes the government demonstrated that probable cause
existed to issue the warrants such that reliance upon them by the executing officers
would not be unreasonable.
Finally, Defendant does not assert that the warrants are facially deficient and
there has been no evidence demonstrating otherwise. In Leon, the Supreme Court
observed that “a warrant may be so facially deficient—i.e., in failing to particularize
the place to be searched or the things to be seized—that the executing officers cannot
Case 6:25-cr-06046-EAW-MJP Document 54 Filed 12/22/25 Page 32 of 34

33
reasonably presume it to be valid.” 468 U.S. at 923. However, the undersigned already
found that information regarding the cellular phone, Apple account, and residence
sought to be seized/searched as contained in the affidavits of Special Agents Smith
and Walker, which Judge Dollinger, Judge Hahn, and the undersigned incorporated
into their respective search warrants, was sufficiently detailed. Accordingly, the
undersigned reports and recommends to the District Judge that the government is
entitled to claim the benefit of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, and
that she deny Defendant’s motion to suppress the seized evidence.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned reports and recommends that the
District Judge DENY that part of Defendant’s motion seeking suppression of
tangible evidence. (ECF No. 42.)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), it is hereby
ORDERED, that this Report and Recommendation be filed with the Clerk of
the Court.
ANY OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with
the Clerk of this Court within fourteen (14) days after receipt of a copy of this Report
and Recommendation in accordance with the above statute and Rule 59(b) of the
Local Rules of Criminal Procedure for the Western District of New York.
The 	district 	court 	will 	ordinarily 	refuse 	to 	consider 	on 	de 	novo 	review
arguments, case law and/or evidentiary material which could have been, but was not,
presented to the magistrate judge in the first instance. See, e.g., Paterson-Leitch Co.
v. Mass. Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 840 F.2d 985 (1st Cir. 1988).
Failure to file objections within the specified time or to request an
extension of such time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s Order.
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Small v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 892
F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989); Wesolek v. Canadair Ltd., 838 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1988).
Case 6:25-cr-06046-EAW-MJP Document 54 Filed 12/22/25 Page 33 of 34

34
The parties are reminded that, pursuant to Rule 59(b) of the Local Rules of
Criminal Procedure for the Western District of New York, “[w]ritten objections . . .
shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings and recommendations
to which objection is made and the basis for such objection and shall be supported by
legal authority.” Failure to comply with the provisions of Rule 59(b) may
result in the District Court’s refusal to consider the objection.
Let the Clerk send a copy of this Order and a copy of the Report and
Recommendation to the attorneys for the parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: December 22, 2025
Rochester, New York
_________________________________
MARK W. PEDERSEN
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 6:25-cr-06046-EAW-MJP Document 54 Filed 12/22/25 Page 34 of 34