USA v. Perez

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
DECISION AND ORDER
v. 	6:25-CR-06009 CJS
JULIO PEREZ,
Defendant.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Julio Perez (“Perez”) is charged by Indictment returned on January
21, 2025, with possession of fentanyl with intent to distribute in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). (Dkt. 18). This matter has been referred to the undersigned
to address all pre-trial matters. (Dkt. 20).
Perez has filed pre-trial motions seeking the following: (1) inspection of grand
jury minutes; (2) a bill of particulars; (3) discovery pursuant to Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 16; (4) disclosure of Brady1 material; (5) disclosure of witness
statements and Jencks Act materials; (6) suppression of statements; (7) disclosure of
evidence pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b), 608, and 609; (8) production
of Giglio 2 material; (9) to preclude evidence described in Field Interview Forms
(“FIFs”) and Crime Investigation Reports (“CIRs”); (10) release of the disciplinary
records of the investigating and arresting officers; and (11) preservation of rough
1 	Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
2 	Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
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notes. (Dkt. 31). The government has opposed Perez’s motions. (Dkt. 32).
The Court held oral argument on Perez’s motions on June 26, 2025. (Dkt. 33).
At that time, the defense requested an opportunity to submit supplemental briefing
with respect to the motion to suppress statements. The Court set a deadline of July
10, 2025, for the filing of a supplemental brief and reserved decision on Perez’s
motions. (Id.). On July 14, 2025, defense counsel advised the Court that the defense
would not be making any further submissions. (Dkt. 34).
The Court’s analysis and recommended disposition of Perez’s motions for
suppression of statements and inspection of grand jury minutes are set forth in a
contemporaneously issued Report and Recommendation. (Dkt. 35). Below, the Court
sets forth its resolution of Perez’s remaining motions.
BACKGROUND
On May 7, 2018, Perez pleaded guilty in this District to one count of possession
with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and
851. United States v. Perez, No. 6:18-CR-6059 CJS, Dkt. 5 (W.D.N.Y. May 7, 2018).
Perez was subsequently sentenced to 60 months of imprisonment and six years of
supervised release. United States v. Perez, No. 6:18-CR-6059 CJS, Dkt. 15 (W.D.N.Y.
Sept. 14, 2018). Perez was released to supervision on January 14, 2022.
On 	June 	26, 	2024, 	law 	enforcement 	executed 	a 	state-authorized 	search
warrant at Perez’s residence at 38 Harris Street, Rochester, New York. (See Dkt. 32
at 1). In Perez’s bedroom and ensuite bathroom, which were located in the basement,
law enforcement located 25.61 grams of fentanyl and approximately $10,000 in
United States currency. (Id.). The fentanyl was found secreted in an area in the
ceiling above the ensuite bathroom. (Id.).
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During the afternoon of June 26, 2024, Perez called United States Probation
Officer Ryan Varecka in a panic and stated in sum and substance that he had “messed
up,” and that the police had just searched his house and took his truck and money,
but did not find any guns. (Id. at 10). Officer Varecka asked Perez what the police
found, and Perez replied that the police found drugs in the house, that he did not
know what kind of drug it was, and that it was possibly fentanyl. (Id. at 10-11). For
several days after the search warrant was executed, Perez called Officer Varecka
daily to ask if he should turn himself in to be arrested. (Id. at 11).
DISCUSSION
I. 	Motion for a Bill of Particulars
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(f) provides that “[t]he court may direct
the government to file a bill of particulars.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(f). “Rule 7(f) . . . permits
a 	defendant 	to 	seek 	a 	bill 	of 	particulars 	in 	order 	to 	identify 	with 	sufficient
particularity the nature of the charge pending against him, thereby enabling
defendant to prepare for trial, to prevent surprise, and to interpose a plea of double
jeopardy should he be prosecuted a second time for the same offense.” United States
v. Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d 572, 574 (2d Cir.1987). “A bill of particulars is required ‘only
where the charges of the indictment are so general that they do not advise the
defendant of the specific acts of which he is accused.’” United States v. Chen, 378 F.3d
151, 163 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37, 47 (2d Cir.
1999)). “However, a bill of particulars is not a general investigative tool, a discovery
device or a means to compel the government to disclose evidence or witnesses to be
offered prior to trial.” United States v. Griffith, 515 F. Supp. 3d 106, 121 (S.D.N.Y.
2021) (quotation and alteration omitted); see also United States v. Bielli, 697 F. Supp.
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2d 403, 408 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[I]t is well-established that the Government may not
be compelled to provide a bill of particulars disclosing the manner in which it will
attempt to prove the charges, the precise manner in which the defendant committed
the crimes charged, or a preview of the Government’s evidence or legal theories.”)
(quotation omitted)). “The decision whether to grant a bill of particulars rests within
the district court’s discretion.” United States v. Chalmers, 410 F. Supp. 2d 278, 283
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
Perez argues that a bill of particulars is necessary in this case “because the
allegations set forth in the Indictment are conclusory, vague, overly broad, and fail to
set forth with specificity the time, place and manner in which the Defendant
committed the offenses charged.” (Dkt. 31 at 4). Perez further contends that he “also
needs a bill of particulars to protect his right to a jury trial and to establish his
potential sentencing exposure.” (Id. at 5).
The Court is unpersuaded by these arguments. The Indictment contains a
single count, alleging that on June 26, 2024, in the Western District of New York,
Perez knowingly and intentionally possessed with intent to distribute fentanyl. (Dkt.
18). The government has also provided the defense with “copies of search warrants
and supporting affidavits, copies of police reports generated from the execution of the
search warrants as well as the arrest of the defendant, photographs, lab reports and
other documentary and tangible evidence.” (Dkt. 32 at 6); see Walsh, 194 F.3d at 47
(“a bill of particulars is not necessary where the government has made sufficient
disclosures 	concerning 	its 	evidence 	and 	witnesses 	by 	other 	means”). 	“The
straightforward 	Indictment, 	as 	supplemented 	by 	the 	law 	enforcement 	reports,
sufficiently puts [Perez] on notice of the details of the alleged conduct.” United States
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v. Penhollow, No. 24-CR-122-RJA-JJM, 2025 WL 1501892, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. May 27,
2025) (denying motion for bill of particulars as to two-count indictment charging
possession with intent to distribute five or more grams of methamphetamine).
Accordingly, Perez’s motion for a bill of particulars is denied.
II. 	Motion for Discovery Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 16
Perez has moved for discovery pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
16, as to items that “have not been disclosed in the course of voluntary discovery.”
(Dkt. 31 at 7). The government confirmed in response that it has complied with Rule
16 and will continue to do so, including by promptly forwarding further information
should it become available. (Dkt. 32 at 7). Based on these representations by the
government, the Court finds no basis to issue an order pursuant to Rule 16.
Perez also included in his motion for discovery a request for information
regarding the government’s witnesses, including any confidential witnesses. (Dkt. 31
at 8-10). Rule 16 does not require the government to disclose the identity of its
witnesses prior to trial. United States v. Green, 144 F.R.D. 631, 639 (W.D.N.Y. 1992).
Further, “[t]he government is not generally required to disclose the identity of
confidential informants.” United States v. Fields, 113 F.3d 313, 324 (2d Cir. 1997). A
defendant seeking such disclosure “bears the burden of showing the need for
disclosure of an informant’s identity, and to do so must establish that, absent such
disclosure, he will be deprived of his right to a fair trial.” Id. (citations omitted). “The
defendant is generally able to establish a right to disclosure where the informant is
a key witness or participant in the crime charged, someone whose testimony would
be significant in determining guilt or innocence.” United States v. Saa, 859 F.2d 1067,
1073 (2d Cir. 1988) (quotation omitted). The Second Circuit has explained that:
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Speculation 	that 	disclosure 	of 	the 	informant’s 	identity 	will 	be 	of
assistance is not sufficient to meet the defendant's burden; instead, the
district court must be satisfied, after balancing the competing interests
of the government and the defense, that the defendant’s need for
disclosure 	outweighs 	the 	government’s 	interest 	in 	shielding 	the
informant’s identity.
Field, 113 F.3d at 324. Here, Perez has failed to demonstrate that disclosure of the
identity of any confidential informants is necessary to his defense of this case.
For these reasons, Perez’s motion for discovery is denied.
III. 	Motions for Disclosure of Brady and Giglio Materials
Perez seeks disclosure of information pursuant to Brady and Giglio. (See Dkt.
31 at 10, 23-24). The Court has previously issued an order in this case confirming the
government’s obligations under Brady and its progeny. (Dkt. 4). The government has
represented that it “is not aware of any affirmatively exculpatory evidence in this
case” 	and 	has 	acknowledged 	its 	continuing 	obligation 	to 	disclose 	exculpatory
material. (Dkt. 32 at 9). At oral argument, the Court confirmed that the defense was
not asserting that there had been a Brady violation in this case or that any specific
Brady material had not been turned over. The government has further confirmed that
it will turn over any Giglio materials two weeks before the commencement of the trial
of this matter, to afford the defense sufficient time to effectively use such materials
at trial. (Id.).
“There is no pre-trial right to Giglio material, which specifically concerns
impeachment,” and “[c]ourts in the Second Circuit generally do not compel immediate
disclosure of Brady/Giglio materials where (1) the Government represents it is aware
of and will comply with its Brady/Giglio obligations, and (2) the Defense does not
provide any reason for suspecting the Government will not comply.” United States v.
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Mohamed, 148 F. Supp. 3d 232, 246 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). Perez’s motions for immediate
disclosure 	of 	Brady/Giglio 	materials 	are 	denied 	with 	prejudice, 	based 	on 	the
government’s representations and the lack of any evidence of a Brady or Giglio
violation. See United States v. Terrell, No. S1 22-CR-343 (JMF), 2023 WL 7220736,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2023) (“[T]o the extent that these motions seek evidence
pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.
150 (1972), and their progeny, they are denied on the basis of the Government’s
representation that it has complied with its obligations and will continue to do so[.]”).
IV. 	Motion for Disclosure of Witness Statements (Jencks Act Material)
Perez has moved for early disclosure of witness statements pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3500 (the “Jencks Act”) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.2. (Dkt.
31 at 16-17, 19-21). In response, the government has stated that it “agrees to provide
such information two weeks before the commencement of trial in this case.” (Dkt. 32
at 9-10).
The Jencks Act provides that “no statement or report in the possession of the
United States which was made by a Government witness or prospective Government
witness (other than the defendant) shall be the subject of subpoena, discovery, or
inspection until said witness has testified on direct examination in the trial of the
case.” 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a). “[D]istrict courts lack the power to mandate early
production of Jencks Act material.” United States v. Morgan, 690 F. Supp. 2d 274,
285 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); see United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 145–46 (2d Cir. 2001).
The Court accordingly denies Perez’s request for early disclosure of Jencks Act
material.
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V. 	Motion For Disclosure Under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), 608, and 609
Perez asks the Court to order that the government immediately “notify him of
any evidence that the government contends would be admissible under Fed. R. Evid.
404(b),” and further disclose “all evidence of prior bad acts that the government
intends to use for impeachment of the Defendant, should he testify at trial, pursuant
to F.R.E. 608(b) and 609(a).” (Dkt. 31 at 21). As discussed at oral argument, the Court
finds that the timing of disclosures under these Rules of Evidence is appropriately
left to the discretion of the trial judge. The Court therefore denies this motion without
prejudice.
VI. 	Motion to Preclude Evidence Described in FIFs and CIRs
Perez has moved for an “Order precluding introduction of the information
contained in” FIFs and CIRs produced in the course of voluntary discovery. (Id. at
25). At oral argument, defense counsel agreed that this issue would properly be
decided in a motion in limine made before the trial judge, should the government seek
to admit any of these documents at trial. Accordingly, this motion is denied without
prejudice.
VII. 	Motion 	for 	Release 	of 	Disciplinary 	Records 	of 	Investigating 	and
Arresting Officers
Perez 	moves 	for 	“an 	Order 	compelling 	the 	Government 	to 	produce 	all
documents 	relating 	to 	disciplinary 	employment 	records 	of 	all 	officers 	and/or
employees of the United States of America, the New York State Police, the DEA, City
of Rochester Police Department, and every other law enforcement official that was
involved and/or present during the investigation, questioning, arrest and/or detention
of the Defendant Julio Perez[.]” (Dkt. 31 at 26) (quotation and original alteration
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omitted). At oral argument, defense counsel clarified that the defense is seeking such
information to the extent it qualifies as Giglio material. The Court therefore denies
this motion for the same reasons discussed above with respect to Perez’s motion for
disclosure of Giglio materials—namely, that the government has represented that it
will comply with its Giglio obligation and that no evidence has been presented to
contradict that representation.
VIII. 	Motion for Preservation of Rough Notes
Perez has moved to require the preservation of rough notes. (Dkt. 31 at 26-27).
The government did not respond to this motion or make any supplemental argument
regarding it at oral argument. “Agents need not preserve their rough notes if the
agents incorporate these notes into formal reports[.]” United States v. Coon, No.
10CR110A, 2010 WL 4455831, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2010). However, Perez “may
be entitled to production of at least a portion of the notes at trial if they were still in
existence at the time of trial and were discoverable under the provisions of the Jencks
Act.” United States v. Cobb, 544 F. Supp. 3d 310, 331 (W.D.N.Y. 2021) (citation
omitted and granting motion to preserve rough notes). The Court accordingly grants
Defendant’s motion and directs the government to preserve rough notes, to the extent
it has not already done so.
IX. 	Leave to File Further Motions
Perez 	requests 	the 	right 	to 	“submit 	subsequent 	motions, 	should 	facts
determined through discovery, Brady, these motions or hearings relating to these
motions, indicate that such subsequent motions are necessary or appropriate.” (Dkt.
31 at 28). The government makes no objection to this reservation. (Dkt. 32 at 13-14).
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Defense counsel confirmed at oral argument that Perez was not seeking leave to bring
any further motions at this time. To the extent that the defense believes subsequent
developments in this case necessitate further motion practice, defense counsel should
promptly bring such matters to the Court’s attention.
CONCLUSION
For 	all 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	Perez’s 	motions 	for 	a 	bill 	of 	particulars,
discovery 	pursuant 	to 	Federal 	Rule 	of 	Criminal 	Procedure 	16, 	disclosure 	of
Brady/Giglio materials, disclosure of Jencks Act materials, disclosure of evidence
pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b), 608, and 609, to preclude evidence
described in FIFs and CIRs, for release of the disciplinary records of the investigating
and arresting officers, and for preservation of rough notes are resolved as set forth
above.
SO ORDERED.
_______________________________
COLLEEN D. HOLLAND
United States Magistrate Judge
DATED: 	July 28, 2025
Rochester, New York
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