USA v. Marseet

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
AKRAM MARSEET,
Defendant.
6:24-cr-6032 (BKS)
Appearances:
For the United States of America:
Michael DiGiacomo
United States Attorney
Everardo A. Rodriguez
Assistant United States Attorney
100 State Street, Suite 500
Rochester, New York 14614
Defendant pro se:
Akram Marseet
603979
Monroe County Jail
130 South Plymouth Avenue
Rochester, NY 14614
Standby Counsel for Defendant Akram Marseet:
David C. Pilato
Pilato Law, PLCC
30 West Broad Street, Suite 100
Rochester, NY 14614
Hon. Brenda K. Sannes, Chief United States District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. 	INTRODUCTION
Defendant Akram Marseet is charged with threatening two United States judges in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B) and 18 U.S.C. § 115(b)(4) as well as transmitting an
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interstate threatening communication in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). (Dkt. No. 22).
Defendant has been in custody throughout the pendency of this action.
Throughout criminal proceedings, courts “must remain alert to issues of competence,” an
obligation that “takes on increased significance where, as here, a criminal defendant elects to
proceed pro se.” 1 United States v. Dimartino, 949 F.3d 67, 71–72 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting United
States v. Arenburg, 605 F. 3d 164, 169 (2d Cir. 2010)). Accordingly, the Court “shall order . . . a
hearing [to determine the mental competence of the defendant] on its own motion, if there is
reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease
or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the
nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.” 18
U.S.C. § 4241(a). “Whether ‘reasonable cause’ to hold a hearing exists is a highly particularized
assessment that ‘varies in each case.’” Dimartino, 949 F.3d at 71 (quoting United States v. Zhou,
428 F.3d 361, 379 (2d Cir. 2005)). A court is “constitutionally required” to inquire as to
competency where there is “any reasonable ground to doubt a defendant’s competency.” Musaid
v. Kirkpatrick, 114 F.4th 90, 111 (2d Cir. 2024) (emphasis in original).
Here, the Court finds reasonable grounds to doubt Defendant’s competency. Defendant
has submitted relevant mental health records, (Dkt. No. 91-1, at 2–3), and although a “history of
mental impairment alone does not require the trial court sua sponte to order a competency
hearing,” prior psychiatric history may make it appropriate for a court to do so. Shaut v. Bennet,
1 A defendant may be found competent to stand trial, but not competent to proceed pro se. United States v.
Nyenekor, 784 F. App’x 810, 814 (2d Cir. 2019). The Second Circuit reviews such decisions for clear error, and has
found that it is not clear error to insist on counsel where the defendant’s mental illness “made him fixate on certain
legal issues and made him unable to focus on actually preparing a defense or realistically to understand events, and
that his mental condition would cause him to disrupt proceedings if he were permitted to represent himself.” Id. at
814–15.
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289 F. Supp. 2d 354, 361 (W.D.N.Y. 2003). The Court’s decision to order a competency
evaluation is further supported by the fact that Defendant has repeatedly made comments about
potentially wanting a mental health evaluation, (see Dkt. No. 65, at 58, 132, 137, 140; Dkt. No.
92, at 5).2
Furthermore, reasonable grounds exist where “a defendant consistently exhibits behavior
and beliefs” that are “bizarre.” United States v. Auen, 846 F.2d 872, 878 (2d Cir. 1988). In Auen,
the Second Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in failing to consider
competency where the defendant relayed a story that could “only be characterized as the product
of a disturbed mind,” threatened government attorneys, set forth irrational and paranoid beliefs
concerning the nature of this country’s tax laws and the basis for the prosecution against him,
rambled about his fear of persecution, and argued that the government, the court and lawyers in
general were somehow responsible for his unjustified incarceration. Id. Here, Defendant has
similarly and repeatedly espoused irrational and paranoid beliefs, including that Rochester
Institute of Technology (“RIT”) attempted to “kill/assassinate/cause [his] death” and is a
“Terrorist Organization.” (Dkt. No. 52, at 6, 13–14, 37; Dkt. No. 65, at 46; Dkt. No. 65, at 92–
94). Defendant also believes that he “is experiencing conspiracies by this venue,” (Dkt. No. 52,
at 12, 49), and that he needs protection “from any possible murdering and/or any possible
torture,” (id. at 23), because he has “high confidence that the Government will assassinate [him]
to prevent him from exposing the Judicial misconduct of this venue and as a retaliation against
[him].” (Dkt. No. 90, at 4). He worries that this venue and/or the Government “want [him] to be
tortured or killed.” (Dkt. No. 52, at 23). He refers to himself as a “hostage” with “exposure to
2 Although Defendant has also suggested that he may raise an insanity defense under 18 U.S.C. § 17, (Dkt. No. 52, at
45; Dkt. No. 58, at 101; Dkt. No. 65, at 83, 147–48; Dkt. No. 70, at 2), when the Court directly asked Defendant at an
ex parte hearing on February 7, 2025 if he sought an expert for that purpose, he withdrew his request.
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torture” who was “kidnapped” by the venue. (Dkt. No. 54, at 14; Dkt. No. 58, at 2; Dkt. No. 65,
at 3, 135).
Additionally, reasonable cause to consider competence exists where the defendant does
not understand the nature and object of the proceedings. In one case, the Second Circuit found
reasonable cause where, inter alia, the defendant “stated that the jurors might be ‘blamed’ for
‘the drug trade’ if they did not ‘find the government and these people guilty of this crime’”
because, “[s]imply put, the government was not on trial, and defendant’s argument suggest[ed]
that he labored under a fundamental misunderstanding of the ‘nature and object of the
proceedings.’” Arenburg, 605 F.3d at 171. Here, Defendant is extremely fixated on the merits of
his civil case against RIT and the perceived judicial and prosecutorial misconduct against him,
despite the Court’s efforts to refocus him on the scope of this criminal case. (See Dkt. No. 52, at
4–10; Dkt. No. 54, at 13; Dkt. No. 58, at 8–27, 113–154; Dkt. No. 65, at 11–14, 28–31, 85, 145–
46, 159– 219, 311). Defendant even went as far as to say that the Court “is wrong that the Severe
and shameful Judicial misconduct by Judges Payson, Geraci, and Wolford in the civil case and
what RIT has committed aganst [sic] the Defendant is irrelevant,” because “the evidence . . . is
supper [sic] relevant.” (Dkt. No. 69, at 10, 12). Defendant’s briefing seems to suggest that he
views this criminal case as an opportunity to put the prosecution, judges, and RIT on trial, which
could indicate that he does not understand the nature and object of the proceedings.
Lastly, “rigid adherence to . . . erroneous views” and an “inability to explore their
correctness is one factor indicating that a delusional process is at work.” United States v.
Sandoval, 365 F. Supp. 2d 319, 327 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). Here, Defendant has rigidly adhered to his
belief that the phone call wherein he allegedly made the threatening statement at issue in this
case was recorded. (Dkt. No. 52, at 14–15, 18, 29, 43; Dkt. No. 54, at 3; Dkt. No. 58, at 31, 84,
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91, 101; Dkt. No. 65, at 15, 46, 60, 74, 78, 150; Dkt. No. 69, at 10; Dkt. No. 90, at 2, 11, 59; Dkt.
No. 95, at 3). Despite the Court and the Government repeatedly telling Defendant that there is no
such recording, he seems unable or unwilling to accept that fact.
Accordingly, the Court finds “there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may
presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the
extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against
him or to assist properly in his defense.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). Thus, the Court further finds that a
mental examination and hearing concerning Defendant’s mental condition are warranted. Id. at §
4241(b) and (c). Accordingly, it is hereby:
ORDERED that Defendant is committed, “to be examined for a reasonable period, but
not to exceed thirty days . . . to the custody of the Attorney General for placement in a suitable
facility” for a psychiatric or psychological examination to determine his current mental
competence, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241 and 4247; and it is further
ORDERED that the examining psychiatrist or psychologist shall conduct an examination
and prepare and file a report in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 4247(b) and (c) assessing whether
Defendant is (1) competent to stand trial and (2) competent to represent himself. Once the
examination is complete and the report has been filed, the Court will schedule a hearing pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241(c) and 4247(d); and it is further
ORDERED that Assistant United States Attorney Everardo A. Rodriguez, or other
members of the United States Attorney’s Office, shall provide to the facility to which the
Defendant is transported for this examination a copy of the Superseding Indictment, mental
health records, and other investigative materials or statements concerning the circumstances of
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the charges and Defendant’s conduct in custody for use by medical personnel in aid of the mental
examination; and it is further
ORDERED that Standby Counsel David C. Pilato be given the opportunity to provide to
the examiner information, documents, medical reports or other materials regarding Defendant in
order to assist the examiner in evaluating Defendant.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 1, 2025
Syracuse, New York
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