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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

TAMMY A., 1
Plaintiff,
V.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,

Defendant.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FILED

OCT 13 2026

ANDREW W. MOELLER, CLERK
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NY

24-CV-965 (JLS)

# DECISION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Tammy A. brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) of the
Social Security Act, seeking review of the decision of the Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration that she was not disabled. Dkt. 1. Plaintiff moved for
judgment on the pleadings. Dkt. 5. The Commissioner responded and cross-moved
for judgment on the pleadings, to which Plaintiff replied. Dkts. 11, 12. For the
reasons that follow, the Court denies Plaintiff's motion and grants the
Commissioner's cross motion.

1 Pursuant to the Western District of New York's November 18, 2020 Standing
Order regarding the naming of plaintiffs in Social Security decisions, this decision
and order identifies Plaintiff by first name and last initial.

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# PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This action originates from Plaintiff's application for Supplemental Security
Income ("SSI"), filed on November 18, 2021.2 Tr. 230-39.3 Plaintiff's application
was initially denied, and she requested a hearing before an administrative law
judge ("ALJ"). Id. at 118-29, 147-49. Following the hearing, at which Plaintiff was
represented by counsel, ALJ Paul Georger issued a decision finding that Plaintiff
was not disabled. Id. at 19-29, 34-62. Plaintiff's request for Appeals Council
review was denied, after which Plaintiff commenced this action. Id. at 1-3; Dkt. 1.

# LEGAL STANDARDS

## I. DISTRICT COURT REVIEW

Judicial review of disability claims under the Act is limited to whether the
Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the
correct legal standards were applied. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Cichocki v. Astrue, 729
F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013). The Commissioner's factual findings are conclusive
when supported by substantial evidence. See Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 99
(2019). "Substantial evidence" is "more than a mere scintilla" and "means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation modified).

2 Plaintiff applied for SSI, which "provides benefits to each aged, blind, or disabled
individual who does not have an eligible spouse and whose income and resources
fall below a certain level." Clark v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 140, 142 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)) (citation modified).

3 The filing at Dkt. 3 is the transcript of the proceedings before the Social Security
Administration. All references to Dkt. 3 are hereby denoted "Tr. _. "

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The Court does not determine de novo whether the claimant is disabled, but
the Commissioner's conclusions of law are not given the same deferential standard
of review. See Byam v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 172, 179 (2d Cir. 2003). If there is a
reasonable basis of doubt about whether the ALJ applied the correct legal
standards, then upholding the determination "creates an unacceptable risk that a
claimant will be deprived of the right to have his or her disability determination
made according to correct legal principles." Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986
(2d Cir. 1987); see Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Cruz
v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1990)) (the Court's review for legal error ensures
"that the claimant has had a full hearing under the . . . regulations and in
accordance with the beneficent purposes of the . . . Act.").

## II. DISABILITY DETERMINATION

Disability under the Act is determined under a five-step test. See Bowen v.
City of N.Y., 476 U.S. 467, 470-71 (1986); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. First, the ALJ must
determine whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity.
20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). "Substantial gainful activity" is work activity that involves
significant physical or mental activities and is normally done for pay or profit. Id.
§ 416.972. If the ALJ finds that the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful
activity, the claimant cannot claim disability. Id. § 416.920(b).

Second, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a medically
determinable impairment or a combination of impairments that significantly limits

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the claimant's ability to perform basic work activities. Id. § 416.920(c). Absent such
impairment, the claimant may not claim disability. Id.

Third, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant meets or medically
equals the criteria of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1. Id. § 416.920(d). If such criteria are met, then the claimant is declared
disabled. Id. § 416.920(d).

Even if the claimant is not declared disabled under the third step, the ALJ
may still find disability under the next two steps of the analysis. The ALJ must
determine the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC"). Id. § 416.920(e).
The RFC is a holistic assessment of the claimant's medical impairments, both
severe and non-severe, that evaluates the claimant's ability to perform physical or
mental work activities on a sustained basis, notwithstanding limitations for
collective impairments. Id. § 416.945.

In the fourth step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has the
RFC to perform past relevant work. Id. § 416.920(f). If the claimant is capable of
performing past relevant work, then the claimant is not disabled. Id.
§ 416.960(b)(3). If the ALJ finds that the claimant is unable to perform past
relevant work, the analysis proceeds to the fifth and final step. Id. § 416.920(g)(1).

In this final analytical step, the ALJ must decide whether the claimant is
able to perform any other relevant work corresponding with her RFC, age,
education, and work experience. Id. § 416.960(c). Here, the burden of proof shifts
from the claimant to the Commissioner to prove that a significant number of jobs in

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the national economy exists that the claimant can perform given her RFC, age,
education, and work experience. Id. §§ 416.920(g), 416.960(c); see Rosa v. Callahan,
168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999).

# DISCUSSION

## I. THE ALJ'S DECISION

The ALJ first determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since November 18, 2021, the date her application was filed. Tr. 21.
The ALJ also found that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments:
"degenerative joint disease of the bilateral knees" and "fracture of the left foot." Id.
(citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c)). The ALJ concluded, however, that Plaintiff's severe
impairments did not meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments in
20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Id. at 22.

After considering the entire record, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the
RFC to perform medium work, as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(c), with the
following limitations:

[Plaintiff can] frequent[ly] handl[e], finger[], and feel[] bilaterally;
can climb ramps and stairs frequently; climb ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds occasionally; and [can] balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and
crawl frequently. In addition, [Plaintiff] can tolerate only
frequent twisting of the cervical (neck) and lumbar (waist) spine.

Id. at 22-23.

The ALJ then found that Plaintiff had no past relevant work. Id. at 27. But
the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled because her age, education,
work experience, and RFC allowed her to perform jobs existing in significant

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numbers in the national economy. Id. at 27-28. As such, the ALJ concluded
Plaintiff had not been under a disability-as defined by the Social Security Act-
since the date her application was filed. Id. at 29.

## II. PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT

Generously reading Plaintiff's motion, she raises three arguments. See Dkt.
5-1, at 9-18. First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to consider adequately the
consistency between the opinions of D. Brauer, M.D .; M. Kirsch, M.D .; Nikita Dave,
M.D .; John Schwab, D.O .; and Joshua Usen, D.O. Id. at 9-12. Second, Plaintiff
argues that the ALJ improperly formulated the RFC based on his lay opinion. Id.
at 12-17. Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to develop the record with
opinion evidence. Id. at 17-18. For the reasons that follow, the Court disagrees.

## III. ANALYSIS

### A. The ALJ properly evaluated the opinion evidence.

Under 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c, an ALJ must articulate how he or she considered
certain factors in assessing medical opinions and prior administrative medical
findings. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920c(a)-(c). Those factors are: (1) supportability,
(2) consistency, (3) relationship with the claimant (which has five sub-factors of its
own to consider), (4) specialization, and (5) other factors. Id. § 416.920c(c). An ALJ
must explain his or her approach with respect to the first two factors when
considering a medical opinion or prior administrative medical finding but need not
expound upon the remaining three. Id. § 416.920c(b)(2).

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With respect to supportability, "[t]he more relevant the objective medical
evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support
his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), the more
persuasive the medical opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be."
Id. § 416.920c(c)(1). As to consistency, "[t]he more consistent a medical opinion(s) or
prior administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other medical
sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical
opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be." Id. § 416.920c(c)(2).

On April 7, 2022, Dr. Brauer completed a physical RFC assessment of
Plaintiff. See Tr. 70-75. Dr. Brauer opined that she could sit, stand, and walk for
about six hours in an eight-hour workday, could lift ten pounds frequently and
twenty pounds occasionally, and should avoid concentrated exposure to fumes,
odors, dusts, gases, poor ventilation, and other hazards. Id. at 70-72. Dr. Brauer
concluded that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work.4 Id. at 74-75.
Dr. Kirsch later reviewed the record and affirmed Dr. Brauer's findings. See id.
at 87-92.

The ALJ found the opinions of Drs. Brauer and Kirsch "unpersuasive." Id.
at 26. The ALJ noted that, "[w]hile they [we]re supported by explanation and
inclusion of findings from the record, they [we]re inconsistent with the overall

4 The regulations define "light work" as work that "involves lifting no more than 20
pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10
pounds[,] ... a good deal of walking or standing, or ... sitting most of the time with
some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b).

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evidence." Id. More specifically, the ALJ found the opinions to be inconsistent with
largely unremarkable consultative examinations and treatment notes from
Plaintiff's primary care provider. Id .; see id. at 566-70 (finding the patient "healthy
and well developed" with "[n]o signs of acute distress" during a physical exam).

On March 9, 2022, Dr. Dave completed an internal medicine examination of
Plaintiff. See id. at 349-52. Dr. Dave opined that Plaintiff had mild limitations in
"repetitive bending and twisting of the cervical and lumbar spine [and in]
maintaining an awkward position of the head and neck for prolonged periods of
time." Id. at 352. Dr. Dave also opined that Plaintiff had mild limitations in "heavy
lifting, carrying, pushing, and pulling . . . [, and] repetitive crouching and kneeling."
Id.

The ALJ found Dr. Dave's opinion "minimally persuasive." Id. at 26. The
ALJ explained that it was "supported by exam findings showing decreased cervical
and lumbar range of motion, with tautness and spasms in [Plaintiff's] trapezius."
Id. The ALJ found, however, that the opinion was "inconsistent with the overall
evidence[,]" including treatment notes showing normal cervical range of motion, id.
at 344, 372, 581, unremarkable lumbar spine imaging, id. at 353, and Plaintiff's
decision not to seek treatment for neck or back pain during the period at issue. Id.
at 359 ("[Plaintiff] does not want a cortisone injection at the moment.").

On July 13, 2022, Dr. Schwab completed an internal medicine examination of
Plaintiff. See id. at 538-45. Dr. Schwab opined that Plaintiff had a "fair" prognosis
and only a "mild restriction to prolonged exertion." Id. at 541.

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The ALJ found Dr. Schwab's opinion "minimally persuasive." Id. at 27. The
ALJ noted that it was "generally consistent with the overall evidence showing
largely unremarkable exams." Id. The ALJ also found that it was "supported by
[Dr. Schwab's] exam findings[ showing full strength in all extremities and intact
fine motor skills." Id.

Finally, on September 8, 2023, Dr. Usen, Plaintiff's primary care provider,
completed a treating source statement on Plaintiff's behalf. See id. at 605-10.
Dr. Usen opined that Plaintiff could stand for thirty minutes at a time and could sit
for two hours at a time, but could never do either during the workday. Id. at 609.
Dr. Usen also found that Plaintiff could occasionally lift up to five pounds and bend,
but could not lift any weight on a frequent basis, work around dangerous
equipment, or stoop. Id. at 609-10.

The ALJ found Dr. Usen's opinion "unpersuasive" despite Dr. Usen's status
as "her treating provider." Id. at 27. The ALJ noted that the opinion was
"unsupported by explanation and [ internally inconsistent." Id. The ALJ also
noted that it was "inconsistent with [Dr. Usen's] largely unremarkable exam
findings, showing only diffuse thoracic spine tenderness and tight muscles." Id.

Of course, the ALJ could have-and perhaps should have-discussed the
regulatory factors in greater detail. But the ALJ addressed how well each provider
supported their opinion and how consistent each opinion was with the record, see
Tr. 22-27, just as the regulations required him to do, see Spottswood v. Kijakazi,
No. 23-54-CV, 2024 WL 89635, at *1-2 (2d Cir. Jan. 9, 2024). And "[a]n ALJ need

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not recite every piece of evidence that contributed to the decision, so long as the
record 'permits us to glean the rationale of [that] decision." Cichocki, 729 F.3d
at 178 n.3 (quoting Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1040 (2d Cir. 1983)).

Nonetheless, Plaintiff argues that, in evaluating each opinion, the ALJ erred
by failing to acknowledge the consistencies between them. See Dkt. 5-1, at 11-12.
But contrary to Plaintiff's suggestion, the ALJ was not required to compare each
individual medical opinion to every other individual medical opinion; instead, the
ALJ needed only to address the consistency of the opinions with the remainder of
the record. See Villier o/b/o N.D.D.R. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 23-893-CV, 2024
WL 2174236, at *3 (2d Cir. May 15, 2024) (summary order) (explaining that an ALJ
need not "discuss the consistency of each medical opinion with specific other
opinions") (citing Cichocki, 729 F.3d at 178 n.3); David C. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,
1:22-CV-965, 2024 WL 376598, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2024) ("Notwithstanding the
ALJ's apparent reference to the consistency between the opinions . . . , he was not
required to specifically assess the consistency between their opinions as long as he
considered their consistency with the record as a whole."). And, as Plaintiff
acknowledges, the ALJ did just that. See Dkt. 5-1, at 11 ("[T]he ALJ evaluated
these opinions' consistency with the record as a whole[.]"); Tr. 25-27 (evaluating
and weighing the medical opinions).

Moreover, Plaintiff overstates the consistency between each opinion. See
Dkt. 5-1, at 11-12. For example, Dr. Schwab found that Plaintiff had only mild
limitations to prolonged exertion and identified no specific limitations. Tr. 541.

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Dr. Usen, on the other hand, found Plaintiff more limited, opining that Plaintiff
could never sit or walk during the workday and could lift, at most, five pounds
occasionally. See id. at 609. Dr. Dave found Plaintiff more limited than
Dr. Schwab, but less limited than Dr. Usen, opining that Plaintiff had mild
limitations in various areas of physical functioning. See id. at 352 (limiting
"repetitive bending and twisting" of the spine, heavy exertion, and "repetitive
crouching and kneeling."). A more detailed analysis of internal consistency,
therefore, would not change the ALJ's evaluation of the discounted opinions.

Upon review, the ALJ appropriately considered the supportability and
consistency of Drs. Brauer, Kirsch, Dave, Schwab, and Usen's opinions in light of
their own records and the other evidence in the record. See Spottswood, 2024 WL
89635, at *1-2; Cichocki, 729 F.3d at 178 n.3.

### B. The ALJ's RFC determination was supported by substantial evidence.

An ALJ must "weigh all of the evidence available to make an RFC finding
that [is] consistent with the record as a whole." Matta v. Astrue, 508 F. App'x 53, 56
(2d Cir. 2013); accord Schillo v. Kijakazi, 31 F.4th 64, 78 (2d Cir. 2022). That does
not mean that an RFC must "perfectly correspond with any of the opinions of
medical sources cited in [an ALJ's] decision," Matta, 508 F. App'x at 56, or even be
based on opinion evidence, see Rubin v. Martin O'Malley, Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 116
F.4th 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2024) ("There is no blanket requirement that [an ALJ's]
decision must be supported by a congruous medical opinion"). So long as an ALJ
considers all the medical evidence and appropriately analyzes any medical opinions,

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an RFC consistent with the record is not error. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.945; see also
Cichocki, 729 F.3d at 177 (joining five other circuits in holding that remand is not
necessary "[w]here an ALJ's analysis at Step Four ... affords an adequate basis for
meaningful judicial review, applies the proper legal standards, and is supported by
substantial evidence").

Here, there was ample evidence in the record to support the ALJ's decision.
For example, and as noted above, the ALJ considered the opinions of Drs. Dave and
Schwab. See Tr. 26-27. Dr. Dave opined, among other things, that Plaintiff had
mild limitations in bending and twisting the cervical and lumbar spine and in
maintaining prolonged awkward positions of the head and neck. Id. at 352.
Dr. Schwab later examined Plaintiff and found only a mild limitation in prolonged
exertion. Id. at 541.

The ALJ ultimately crafted an RFC that largely reflected Dr. Dave's and
Dr. Schwab's opinions. See Tr. 22-23. Indeed, whereas Dr. Dave found that
Plaintiff had mild limitations in bending and twisting of the cervical and lumbar
spine and mild limitations in crouching and kneeling, id. at 352, the ALJ restricted
Plaintiff to only frequent twisting of the cervical and lumbar spine and only
frequent kneeling, crouching, and crawling, id. at 23. Likewise, while Dr. Schwab
found Plaintiff to have just a mild limitation in prolonged exertion, id. at 541, the
ALJ restricted Plaintiff to only medium work, id. at 22.

Moreover, the ALJ considered various treatment notes and examination
findings, concluding that, "[t]he objective medical evidence . .. d[id] not support the

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degree of limitation alleged." Id. at 24. For example, the ALJ noted that, at visits
with Plaintiff's orthopedist, Kafai Lai, M.D., Plaintiff reported improved knee pain
with home exercises and bracing. See id. at 25. The ALJ discussed further that,
apart from a finding of thoracic spine tenderness, Plaintiff's annual physical yielded
largely unremarkable results. Id. at 26. And the ALJ recounted a July 2022
consultative examination, which revealed normal gait, full range of motion in the
cervical spine, and full upper and lower extremity strength. Id. at 25.

Finally, the ALJ considered Plaintiff's activities of daily living, finding that
they did not support the degree of limitation she alleged. Id. at 24. Citing
Plaintiff's function report and medical records, the ALJ indicated that she
"prepare[d] simple meals, care[d] for a small dog, ... [and went] out alone." Id .; see
id. at 266-69, 543. The ALJ noted further that Plaintiff "d[id] some cooking,
cleaning, and laundry." Id.

At its core, Plaintiff's argument is a disagreement with the ALJ's weighing of
the evidence. But it is not the function of this Court to re-weigh evidence or
determine de novo whether Plaintiff is disabled. See Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496,
501 (2d Cir. 1998). Because the ALJ was "entitled to weigh all of the evidence
available to make an RFC finding that was consistent with the record as a whole,"
Matta, 508 F. App'x at 56, and a searching review of the record reveals that
consistency, his decision is supported by substantial evidence, and this Court will
not second-guess it. See Biestek, 587 U.S at 103 ( "[T]he threshold for [substantial]
evidentiary sufficiency is not high" in the SSA context); Genier v. Astrue, 606 F.3d

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46, 49 (2d Cir. 2010) ("Even where the administrative record may adequately
support contrary findings on particular issues, the ALJ's factual findings must be
given conclusive effect so long as they are supported by substantial evidence.").

### C. The ALJ did not err with respect to his duty to develop the record.

Because a hearing on disability benefits is a non-adversarial proceeding, "the
ALJ generally has an affirmative obligation to develop the administrative record."
Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 47 (2d Cir. 1996). But "where there are no obvious gaps
in the administrative record, and where the ALJ already possesses a complete
medical history, the ALJ is under no obligation to seek additional information in
advance of rejecting a benefits claim." Rosa, 168 F.3d at 79 n.5 (citation modified);
see also Janes v. Berryhill, 710 F. App'x 33, 34 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order) (An
ALJ "is not required to develop the record any further when the evidence already
presented is adequate for [the ALJ] to make a determination as to disability."
(citation modified)).

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ "should have developed the record for some
opinion evidence upon which to rely in assessing the RFC." Dkt. 5-1, at 17. In
particular, Plaintiff contends that because "all five of [the medical] opinions were
rejected," the ALJ's findings were based "upon his own lay opinion" in violation of
this circuit's guidance. Id. at 11, 17. Because the ALJ did not in fact reject all five
medical opinions and, in any case, based his opinion upon legitimate medical
evidence in the record, Plaintiff's argument fails.

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This circuit has repeatedly held that an ALJ "cannot arbitrarily substitute
his own judgment for [a] competent medical opinion," nor can an ALJ set his or her
"own expertise against that of a physician." McBrayer v. Sec'y of Health and Hum.
Servs., 712 F.2d 795, 799 (2d Cir. 1983). Petitioner is therefore correct that where
an ALJ rejects all medical opinions without citing any other medical opinion or
evidence, this circuit has remanded for reconsideration-but that is not the case
here. See Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d 75, 81-82 (2d Cir. 1998) (remanding in part
due to the ALJ's reliance on non-medical evidence to reject the medical opinions of
each treating physician). While the ALJ found the opinions of Drs. Brauer, Kirsch,
and Usen to be "unpersuasive," Tr. 26-27, he found the opinions of Drs. Dave and
Schwab "minimally persuasive." Id.

Moreover, and as noted above, an ALJ's decision need not be based on opinion
evidence to be adequately supported by the record. See Rubin, 116 F.4th at 155.
Even were the ALJ to have rejected all five of the medical opinions in the record-
and he did not do so-an ALJ's factual determinations may be "adequately
supported by more than a mere scintilla of evidence" when based on a
comprehensive evidentiary record in the absence of a medical opinion. Monroe v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 676 F. App'x 5, 9 (2d Cir. 2017) (citing Tankisi v. Comm'r of
Soc. Sec., 521 F. App'x 29, 34 (2d Cir. 2013)). The hearing transcript contains 292
pages of medical records, including reports on orthopedic exams and regular
checkups authored by Dr. Lai, see Tr. 424-536, and pain management sessions with
Dr. Amrit Singh, id. at 321-22, 391-94. In addition to the ALJ's careful

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consideration of the medical opinions from Drs. Brauer, Kirsch, Usen, Dave, and
Schwab, his comprehensive step-four review directly cites Dr. Lai's findings, id.
at 25. And during the hearing, the ALJ explored Dr. Singh's treatment history and
outcomes with the Plaintiff. Id. at 55. Nothing in the opinion indicates that the
ALJ "rel[ied] on his own lay read of the record with no functional assessment to
inform" him, as Petitioner claims. Dkt. 5-1, at 17.

The medical opinions of Drs. Dave and Schwab and the diagnostic medical
evidence in the record-e.g., Drs. Lai and Singh's reports-provided a substantial
basis for the ALJ's decision, without an "obvious gap" demanding further
development. Rosa, 168 F.3d at 79 n.5. The ALJ thus did not err with respect to
his duty to develop the record.

# CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court GRANTS the Commissioner's cross motion for
judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. 11) and DENIES Plaintiff's motion for judgment
on the pleadings (Dkt. 5). The Clerk of the Court shall close this case.

SO ORDERED.

Dated:
October 13, 2026
Buffalo, New York

JOHN L. SINATRA, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE