Fahrer v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________________
LAURIE A. F.,
Plaintiff,
v. 	CASE NO. 1:24-cv-00464
(JGW)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
____________________________________________
J. Gregory Wehrman, U.S. Magistrate Judge,
MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER
The parties consented in accordance with a standing order to proceed before the
undersigned. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The matter is presently before the Court on the parties’ cross-motions for judgment on
the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Docs. 16,
20.) Upon review of the administrative record and consideration of the parties’ filings,
Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on Pleadings (Doc. 16) is DENIED, Defendant’s Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 20) is GRANTED, and the decision of the
Commissioner is AFFIRMED.
I. 	RELEVANT BACKGROUND
A. Procedural Background
On May 12, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Title II application for a period of disability and
disability insurance benefits, alleging a disability onset date of April 19, 2018. 	(Tr. 178,
325-26.) Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially and on reconsideration. (Tr. 196, 216.) She
Case 1:24-cv-00464-JGW Document 22 Filed 01/12/26 Page 1 of 21

2
then timely requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and appeared
with counsel for a telephonic hearing before ALJ Bryce Baird on August 30, 2022. 	(Tr.
148-76.) 	On February 6, 2023, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision, finding that
Plaintiff was not disabled. 	(Tr. 13-33). 	The Appeals Council denied her request for
review, (Tr. 1-7), and Plaintiff timely filed her appeal to this Court.
B. 	Factual Background1
Plaintiff was born on May 13, 1964, and alleged disability beginning on April 19,
2018. 	(Tr. 177-78.) 	Plaintiff had a high school education. 	(Tr. 159.) 	Her disabling
conditions were initially alleged to include back injury, neck injury, asthma, anxiety,
shoulder injury, and arthritis. (Tr. 178.) At the hearing, Plaintiff explained that she had a
fusion of both her cervical and lumbar spine. (Tr. 155.) She did not testify to any mental
impairments or resulting limitations.
Initially, the ALJ inquired as to the record support for disabling limitations resulting
from Plaintiff’s impairments, and Plaintiff’s counsel indicated that “[m]uch of it would come
from her subjective statements as well as the testimony from today.” (Tr. 156.) The ALJ
also sought to clarify the theory of disability in light of the fact that Plaintiff admitted she
was able to “complete laundry, do personal laundry completely, travel independently, take
her own medications, manage her own finances, maintain a house alone or with only
occasional assistance, for example heavy work domestic help, plans, prepares, and
serves adequate meals independently, takes care of all shopping needs independently.”
(Tr. 157.) Plaintiff’s counsel indicated that those tasks took a significant amount of time
to complete because Plaintiff required regular breaks. (Id.) Plaintiff explained that doing
1 This recitation of facts primarily includes testimony from the hearing before the ALJ. Other facts will be
developed throughout the opinion as relevant to the Court’s analysis.
Case 1:24-cv-00464-JGW Document 22 Filed 01/12/26 Page 2 of 21

3
a single load of laundry took all day due to the pain she experienced. (Tr. 165-66.) She
similarly testified that she could clean her house, but she must take breaks between the
tasks. 	(Tr. 166.) 	Plaintiff described that she was only able to sleep two to three hours
per night and indicated that she napped during the day. (Tr. 168.) She further explained
that she was able to walk for about fifteen minutes and could also drive. (Id.)
C. 	ALJ’s Decision
Generally, in his decision, the ALJ made the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
1. 	The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act
through December 31, 2022. (Tr. 18.)
2. 	The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 19,
2018, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq.). (Tr. 18)
3. 	The claimant has the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease
of the lumbar spine status post fusion, degenerative disc disease of the cervical
spine status post fusion, asthma, and insomnia (20 CFR 404.1520(c)). (Tr. 19.)
4. 	The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20
CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and
404.1526). (Tr. 20.)
5. 	After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the claimant has the
residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR
404.1567(b) except she can lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10
pounds frequently, can stand and/or walk with normal breaks for a total of 4
hours in an 8 hour workday, can sit with normal breaks for a total of 6 hours in
an 8 hour workday, she is limited to occasional climbing of ramps or stairs, no
climbing of ladders, ropes or scaffolds, occasional balancing, occasional
stooping, occasional kneeling, occasional crouching, and no crawling. She is
limited to environments where there is no exposure to excessive cold, no
concentrated exposure to pulmonary irritants such as fumes, odors, dusts,
gases, and poor ventilation, no exposure to excessive vibration, and no
exposure to hazards such as unprotected heights or moving machinery. She is
limited to frequent reaching with the right dominant arm. (Tr. 21.)
Case 1:24-cv-00464-JGW Document 22 Filed 01/12/26 Page 3 of 21

4
6. 	The claimant is capable of performing past relevant work as a Collections Clerk
and Secretary, both as actually performed and as generally performed, but is
unable to perform the past relevant work of Auto Repair Estimator, either as
actually performed or as generally performed. This work does not require the
performance of work-related activities precluded by the claimant’s residual
functional capacity (20 CFR 404.1565). (Tr. 26.)
7. 	The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security
Act, from April 19, 2018, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(f)).
(Tr. 27.)
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. 	Standard of Review
“In reviewing a final decision of the SSA, this Court is limited to determining
whether the SSA’s conclusions were supported by substantial evidence in the record and
were based on a correct legal standard.” Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir.
2012). Substantial evidence is defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 496, 501
(2d Cir. 2009). “To determine on appeal whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by
substantial evidence, a reviewing court considers the whole record, examining evidence
from both sides, because an analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must also
include that which detracts from its weight.” Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d
Cir. 1988). 	If the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the
Commissioner’s determination must be upheld. McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 149 (2d
Cir. 2014). “Where an administrative decision rests on adequate findings sustained by
evidence having rational probative force, the court should not substitute its judgment for
that of the Commissioner.” Yancey v. Apfel, 145 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 1998).
Case 1:24-cv-00464-JGW Document 22 Filed 01/12/26 Page 4 of 21

5
B. 	Standard to Determine Disability
To be disabled under the Social Security Act (“Act”), a claimant must establish an
inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death, or which has
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.
20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a). The Commissioner must follow a five-step sequential evaluation
to determine whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Act. 20 C.F.R. §
416.920(a).
At step one, the claimant must demonstrate that he is not engaging in substantial
gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). At step two, the claimant must demonstrate that
he has a severe impairment or combination of impairments that limits the claimant’s ability
to perform physical or mental work-related activities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). If the
impairment meets or medically equals the criteria of a disabling impairment as set forth
in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of Regulation No. 4 (the “Listings”), and satisfies the durational
requirement, the claimant is entitled to disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). If the
impairment does not meet the criteria of a disabling impairment, the Commissioner
considers whether the claimant has sufficient residual functional capacity (RFC) for the
claimant to return to past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e)-(f). If the claimant is
unable to return to past relevant work, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner to
demonstrate that the claimant could perform other jobs which exist in significant numbers
in the national economy, based on claimant’s age, education, and work experience. 20
C.F.R. § 416.920(g).
Case 1:24-cv-00464-JGW Document 22 Filed 01/12/26 Page 5 of 21

6
III. 	ANALYSIS
Plaintiff asserts two arguments in support of remand. First, she contends that the
ALJ erred in assessing her mental impairments and insomnia throughout his sequential
analysis. 	(See Doc. 16-1 at 17.) 	Second, she argues that the ALJ erred by relying on
stale opinions from non-examining agency psychologists. (See id. at 26.)
A. The ALJ Properly Assessed Plaintiff’s Mental Impairments and Insomnia
Throughout his Analysis.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly evaluated her mental impairments by
relying only on the evidence that supported his findings of none to mild limitations in the
Paragraph B criteria. 	(See Doc. 16-1 at 18-19.) 	She also contends that he substituted
his own analysis of Plaintiff’s activities of daily living and participation during the hearing
rather than relying on expert opinions. (See id. at 21.) 	Finally, Plaintiff argues that the
ALJ failed to assess the combined impact of all Plaintiff’s mental impairments when
formulating the RFC. (See id. at 22.)
A claimant’s RFC is the most she can still do despite her limitations and is based
on all relevant evidence in the record. 	See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.945(a)(1),
(a)(3); SSR 96-8p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,474-01 (July 2, 1996). 	The regulations explicitly
provide that the RFC is an administrative finding reserved to the Commissioner and not
a medical finding. 	20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); Schillo v. Kijakazi, 31 F.4th 64, 78 (2d Cir.
2022) 	(recognizing 	that 	“the 	ALJ 	bears 	‘the 	final 	responsibility’ 	for 	making 	RFC
determinations”); see also Desirae D. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 20-cv-00054-JGW, 2021
WL 2042576, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. May 21, 2021). 	As such, the RFC conclusion “need not
perfectly match any single medical opinion in the record, so long as it is supported by
substantial evidence.” Schillo, 31 F.4th at 78. Indeed, an ALJ is permitted to “weigh all
Case 1:24-cv-00464-JGW Document 22 Filed 01/12/26 Page 6 of 21

7
of the evidence available to make an RFC finding that [is] consistent with the record as a
whole.” Matta v. Astrue, 508 F. App’x 53, 56 (2d Cir. 2013).
This naturally requires the ALJ to reconcile conflicting medical evidence in the
record. Veino v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 578, 588 (2d Cir. 2002). It is well-settled that, when
formulating an RFC, an ALJ is permitted to accept or reject portions of medical opinions
to the extent they are inconsistent with the record. See April W. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
No. 1:24-cv-00044-MAV, 2024 WL 4804778, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2024) (recognizing
that an ALJ “is free to reject portions of medical-opinion evidence not supported by
objective evidence”) (quoting Demeca P. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No 1:22-cv-0504, 2024
WL 4505265, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2024)).
However, “an ALJ is not permitted to ‘cherry pick’ evidence that supports his RFC
finding.” Michelle J. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:21-CV-00306 CJS, 2023 WL 2623587,
at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2023) (defining cherry-picking as “inappropriately crediting
evidence that supports administrative conclusions while disregarding differing evidence
from the same source”) (citations omitted). 	“Courts frequently remand an ALJ's decision
when it ignores or mischaracterizes medical evidence or cherry-picks evidence that
supports his RFC determination while ignoring other evidence to the contrary.” Jackson
v. Kijakazi, 588 F. Supp. 3d 558, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2022). However, “an allegation of cherry-
picking is seldom successful because crediting it would require a court to re-weigh record
evidence,” and “what a claimant may label as cherry-picking can often be described more
neutrally as weighing the evidence.” Regina M. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:23-CV-
06629 EAW, 2025 WL 899008, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2025) (quoting Lisa T. v. Kijakazi,
Case 1:24-cv-00464-JGW Document 22 Filed 01/12/26 Page 7 of 21

8
No. 3:20-CV-1764 (SVN), 2022 WL 2207613, at *3 (D. Conn. June 21, 2022)) (quotations
and citations omitted).
The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s anxiety disorder and depressive disorder were
non-severe impairments, supporting his conclusion with his analysis of the paragraph B
criteria:
The 	first 	functional 	area 	is 	understanding, 	remembering 	or 	applying
information. In this area, the claimant has no limitation. The claimant
reported that she has no problems with memory, and is able to manage her
own medications and finances, and is able to drive a car (Ex. 5E/5, F21,
107, Hearing Testimony). Notations in the record indicate that the claimant
had no difficulty with memory (Ex. 12F/4, 20F/71, 24F/3, 26F/6, 15, 28). At
her psychological consultative examination she recalled 3 out of 3 objects
immediately, and three out of three objects after a delay, she recited six
digits forwards, and three in reverse, and her cognitive ability was noted to
be average (Ex. 12F/4). Finally, when asked questions at the hearing, the
claimant was able to recall information with no apparent difficulty. For these
reasons, I find that the claimant has no limitation with understanding,
remembering, or applying information.
The next functional area is interacting with others. In this area, the claimant
has no limitation. The claimant reported that she has no problems getting
along with friends, family, or neighbors (Ex. 5E/5). Treating medical service
providers described the claimant as conversant and cooperative, well
groomed, and with good eye contact, end even described her mood as
euthymic (Ex. 5F/81, 6F/38, 12F/3, 20F/38, 71, 89, 21F/20, 22F/5, 25F/3,
26F/36, 15, 28). Finally, the claimant was able to interact appropriately with
the people present at the hearing. For these reasons, I find that the claimant
has a [sic] no limitation in interacting with others.
The third functional area is concentrating, persisting or maintaining pace. In
this area, the claimant has no limitation. The claimant reported difficulty
concentrating for more than twenty minutes at a time (Ex. 5E, Hearing
Testimony). She also reported that she “eventually” finishes tasks she has
started, suggesting that completion of tasks takes her much longer than it
used 	to 	(Id.). 	Notations 	in 	the 	record 	indicates 	that 	the 	claimant’s
concentration was intact and that she could perform simple one-step and
two-step mathematical calculations and Serial 7’s (Ex. 12F/4). She also
reported that she is able to engage in activities of daily living that generally
require an ability to concentrate and maintain attention such as preparing
simple meals, shopping, using a computer, watching television, listening to
the 	radio, 	and 	socializing 	with 	friends 	(Ex. 	12F/4, 	13F/2, 	Hearing
Case 1:24-cv-00464-JGW Document 22 Filed 01/12/26 Page 8 of 21

9
Testimony). Finally, the claimant was able to participate throughout the
hearing for the duration of the hearing with no apparent difficulty. For these
reasons, I find that the claimant has no limitation concentrating, persisting,
or maintaining pace.
The fourth functional area is adapting or managing oneself. In this area, the
claimant has mild limitation. The claimant reported difficulty with some
activities of daily living, such as preparing meals, which she reported take
two to three times longer than it used to take (Ex. 5E). she also reported
that she is not able to perform tasks such as yardwork and relies on her
husband to do such tasks (Id.). Further, the claimant is able to manage the
demands of many activities of daily living such as cooking, cleaning,
laundry, shopping, and tending to personal care (Ex. 13F/2, Hearing
Testimony). For these reasons, I find that the claimant has mild limitations
in adapting or managing oneself.
(Tr. 19-20.)
The ALJ also addressed Plaintiff’s insomnia:
Turning to the claimant’s impairment of insomnia, the claimant reported
difficulty falling asleep and staying asleep, even with medication (Ex. 12F/2-
3, 14F/7, 19F/19, 25, 20F/53). She reported fatigue and trouble sleeping
affected her day-to-day functioning and mood (Ex. 20F/70, 21F/9). A sleep
study suggests possible sleep apnea (Ex. 5F/50). She was noted to be
positive for insomnia and was assessed with insomnia (Ex. 14F/26, 21F/42).
However, 	the 	objective 	record 	is 	not 	consistent 	with 	the 	claimant’s
allegations. First, the claimant reported sleeping “too much” at times (Ex.
20F/61). At other times, she denied sleep pattern disturbances or excessive
daytime sleeping (Ex. 7F/9, 24F/3). Indeed, she reported improved sleep,
and that she is able to fall back asleep better than before (Ex. 7F/126,
20F/88). 	At 	physical 	exams, 	neurological 	findings 	were 	generally
unremarkable (Ex. 3F/16, 8F/18). Such evidence suggests that the claimant
is not limited to the extent alleged by insomnia.
(Tr. 23-24.)
Having carefully reviewed the evidence, the Court finds ALJ Baird’s analysis of
Plaintiff’s mental impairments and insomnia2 to be supported by substantial evidence.
2 Plaintiff’s sole argument regarding the ALJ’s analysis of her insomnia is that the ALJ failed to explain how
the RFC accommodated this impairment. (See Doc. 16-1 at 24.) However, the ALJ plainly stated that he
found the objective evidence inconsistent with Plaintiff’s claimed impact on her functional abilities. (See Tr.
23-24.) And Plaintiff does not identify any evidence supporting specific functional limitations resulting from
insomnia. The Court finds no error.
Case 1:24-cv-00464-JGW Document 22 Filed 01/12/26 Page 9 of 21

10
The record generally reflects that Plaintiff engaged in rather conservative treatment,
including medication and counseling. (See Tr. 127-47, 1029-34, 1235-1329, 1505-1534.)
Notably, as of the alleged onset date, Plaintiff was not engaged in therapy, and she did
not begin therapy until July 2021—more than three years after the alleged onset date.
(See Tr. 1030) (referencing in February 2021 that Plaintiff was beginning an anti-anxiety
medication and counseling); (Tr. 1289) (initial assessment by Endeavor Health Services
in July 2021). 	While the record does reflect that Plaintiff was hospitalized due to her
mental impairments, the hospitalization occurred in 1990—almost thirty years before the
relevant period. (See Tr. 1290.)
Further, as rightly noted by the ALJ, although Plaintiff experienced depression and
anxiety, the record does not contain any evidence that these conditions significantly limit
her functional abilities—a requirement for an impairment to be found severe. 	See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) (noting that an impairment must be “severe,” which means it
significantly limits an individual’s ability to perform basic work activities). In fact, Plaintiff
acknowledges that she can independently perform activities of daily living, noting only
that it may take her longer as a result of her physical limitations, which are not at issue in
this case. (See Tr. 379-84.) She also indicated she is able to follow instructions, engages
in social situations, maintains relationships, and performs activities that require some
level of concentration. 	(See Tr. 382-83.) 	Additionally, she notes that her routines
constantly change, demonstrating some ability to adapt and manage herself. 	(See Tr.
384.)
Moreover, the record reflects relatively unremarkable mental health examinations
and positive engagement and interaction with her providers. Her objective mental
Case 1:24-cv-00464-JGW Document 22 Filed 01/12/26 Page 10 of 21

11
examinations consistently describe Plaintiff as alert, fully oriented, generally normal (or
even euthymic) mood, normal effect, kind demeanor, cooperative, appropriate interactive
skills, adequate memory, no suicidal or homicidal ideations, and good judgment. 	(See,
e.g., Tr. 128, 131, 140, 1000, 1302-05, 1430, 1501-02, 1516-17, 1658.)
The Court disagrees with Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ failed to consider
evidence favorable to Plaintiff. 	While Plaintiff relies on evidence reflecting suicidal
ideation and significant periods of exacerbated anxiety and depression, the Court notes
this evidence is limited to certain situational stressors and occurred primarily either before
or early in her mental health therapy. For example, in the early period following her last
car accident, Plaintiff had severe anxiety related to driving a car. (See Tr. 778) (reporting
that Plaintiff had “increased anxiety, panicking, and vomiting when trying to drive her old
car”); (see Tr. 929) (Plaintiff reported an increase in depression and anxiety following her
last car accident and would not get into cars until her husband helped her through it).
However, in her counseling records at Endeavor Health Services, there is no mention of
any anxiety related to driving a car. 	Instead, Plaintiff’s anxiety and depression therapy
during this period primarily centered around her relationships with her family members or
her significant other. (See, e.g., Tr. 128, 140, 142, 146, 1247, 1275, 1277, 1279, 1283,
1285, 1324, 1326, 1506, 1511, 1532.) 	These records also recognize anxiety following
her move from Colorado and getting established in a new state while living with a difficult
family member. (See, e.g., Tr. 1322.) 	Situational stress does not generally support a
finding of disability. See Deborah R. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-CV-1235F, 2022 WL 34458, at *4
(W.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2022) (recognizing that “deficits in mental health brought upon by
Case 1:24-cv-00464-JGW Document 22 Filed 01/12/26 Page 11 of 21

12
situational stress are not necessarily disabling.”) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
More importantly, the record reflects that Plaintiff’s conditions improved throughout
her counseling. Indeed, her scores on the diagnostic testing reflected improvement after
beginning therapy. (See Tr. 1049-50) (reflecting a score on the PHQ-9 of 25 in January
2021); (Tr. 1051) (reflecting a GAD-7 score of 18 in early 2021); (Tr. 1283) (reflecting a
score of 5 on the PHQ-9 and a 6 on the GAD-7 in November 2021). And in August 2022,
Plaintiff even reported she “believe[d] she could begin the process of closing out
treatment.” 	(See Tr. 1532.) Moreover, throughout 2022, as noted above, her mental
health evaluations were stable and she did not reflect suicidal ideation. (See, e.g., Tr.
1505-06, 1510-11,1513-14, 1516-17,1519-20,1532.)
Additionally, the Court finds that the ALJ did not improperly substitute his judgment
for that of the medical experts. There can be no dispute that it is entirely appropriate for
an ALJ to consider Plaintiff’s activities of daily living and hearing testimony in formulating
an RFC. While Plaintiff argues that this evaluation ignores the opinions of “treating and
examining specialists, all of whom clearly perceived some level of impairment in these
areas,” (see Doc. 16-1 at 21), Plaintiff does not identify which opinions she contends
supports any greater limitation in her alleged mental impairments. 	To the contrary, the
agency reviewers concluded that Plaintiff’s mental impairments were non-severe, finding
only a mild limitation in adapting or managing oneself. (See Tr. 187, 207.)
Furthermore, while Dr. Santarpia found a “mild to moderate impairment” in
“regulating 	emotions, 	controlling 	behavior, 	and 	maintaining 	well-being,” 	she 	also
acknowledged that Plaintiff’s difficulties were “caused by stressors” and found that her
Case 1:24-cv-00464-JGW Document 22 Filed 01/12/26 Page 12 of 21

13
mental impairments were not “significant enough to interfere with [Plaintiff’s] ability to
function on a daily basis.” 	(See Tr. 1032-33.) As the ALJ rightly recognized, the whole
of the record does not contain evidence supporting any limitations on Plaintiff’s ability to
regulate emotions, control behavior, or maintain her own well-being. 	(See Tr. 26.) 	Nor
does Plaintiff point to any specific evidence suggesting otherwise. To the extent that Dr.
Santarpia’s opinion can be viewed as conflicting with the ALJ’s conclusion, the ALJ is
permitted to reject portions of medical opinions that are inconsistent with the record as a
whole. See April W., 2024 WL 4804778, at *5. Nonetheless, there is no medical opinion,
including Dr. Santarpia’s, which concludes that Plaintiff’s mental impairments impact her
ability to function, or which sets forth specific functional abilities that are limited by
Plaintiff’s mental conditions.
For this same reason, the ALJ’s decision not to include any restrictions pertaining
to Plaintiff’s mental impairments was proper. 	The ALJ found three of the four relevant
functional areas to be without limitation, eliminating any requirement for additional
discussion at step four. 	See Annette A. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Case no. 23-cv-6087-
FPG, 2024 WL 2956906, at *3 (June 12, 2024) (citing Wells v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 1061,
1065 n.3 (10th Cir. 2013)) (noting that a finding of “none” in a functional area “obviate[s]
the need for further analysis at step four,” since the impairment necessarily “pose[s] no
restriction on the claimant’s work activities”). 	And the ALJ found that Plaintiff was only
mildly limited in the fourth functional area, and a mild limitation in only one functional
category at step two “does not necessarily imply a corresponding limitation in a claimant’s
RFC.” 	See Janine T. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 23-cv-384, 2024 WL 1678128, at *3
(W.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2024) (rejecting the theory that “because the ALJ found, at step two,
Case 1:24-cv-00464-JGW Document 22 Filed 01/12/26 Page 13 of 21

14
that Plaintiff was mildly limited in her abilities to interact with others and concentrate and
maintain pace, the ALJ was required to include some limitation related to her depression
in the RFC.”) See also Kendra C. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 21-CV-1131MWP, 2024
WL 	1242413, 	at 	*10 	(W.D.N.Y. 	Mar. 	22, 	2024) 	(recognizing 	that 	“if 	a mental
impairment causes only mild limitations that do not result in any functional work-related
restrictions, the ALJ does not necessarily err by formulating an RFC without mental
limitations or restrictions”); Grace M. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 20-CV-1023SR, 2022
WL 912946, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2022) (noting that “even though mild limitations may
cause functional restrictions, such limitations do not compel the inclusion of mental
limitations in the RFC”). And as noted above, the record does not contain, nor does
Plaintiff identify, specific functional abilities limited by Plaintiff’s mental impairments.
Although Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to consider these non-severe mental
impairments in his RFC, the above analysis suggests otherwise,3 and it is well-settled
that an ALJ’s failure to identify every piece of evidence does not mean it was not
considered in his analysis. See Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 683 F.3d 443, 448
(2d Cir. 2012) (citing Black v. Apfel, 143 F.3d 383, 386 (8th Cir. 1998). 	Moreover, the
burden to show the necessity of a more restrictive RFC is on Plaintiff, and Plaintiff has
3 As discussed throughout this section, the Court is able to glean the ALJ’s rationale in evaluating Plaintiff’s
mental impairments and their relation to the resulting RFC. While Plaintiff takes issue with the clarity of his
analysis, the Court notes the ALJ specifically indicated in the conclusion of his step two analysis that “[t]he
following residual functional capacity assessment reflects the degree of limitation I have found in the
‘paragraph B’ mental function analysis.” (Tr. 20.) The Court does not agree that the ALJ should repeat his
thorough analysis of Plaintiff’s mental impairments in his RFC analysis when he otherwise concludes there
are no functional impacts resulting from these impairments. See Cynthia M. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No.
1:23-CV-00955-CJS, 2024 WL 4289537, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2024) (concluding that “the ALJ's failure
to expressly discuss Plaintiff's mild mental impairments in the RFC discussion does not require remand,
since the ALJ's reasons for not including additional limitations in the RFC finding are apparent from the
decision as a whole, and, in particular, from his discussion at step three of the sequential evaluation.”)
(citing Donna L. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 5:23-CV-0655 (GTS/TWD), 2024 WL 3738067 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 9,
2024)).
Case 1:24-cv-00464-JGW Document 22 Filed 01/12/26 Page 14 of 21

15
not carried her burden. 	See Smith v. Berryhill, 740 F. App’x 721, 726 (2d Cir. 2018)
(recognizing that the plaintiff has the burden to prove a more restrictive RFC).
Plaintiff’s 	reliance 	on 	Novas 	v. 	Kijakazi 	is 	misplaced. 	No. 	22-cv-1020
(MKV)(BCM), 	2023 	WL 	2614362, 	at 	*1 	(S.D.N.Y. 	Mar. 	8, 	2023), 	report 	and
recommendation adopted by Novas v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2023 WL 2613550, (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 23, 2023). 	In that case, the ALJ found mild limitations in each area of mental
functioning, and the record contained evidence suggesting specific limitations resulting
from the plaintiff’s mental impairments that may have prevented the plaintiff from
performing her prior work. See id. at *13. In light of this evidence and the absence of any
exchange between the ALJ and the vocational expert regarding the impact of these
supported mental limitations, that court recommended remand. See id.
In sum, while Plaintiff generally takes issue with the ALJ’s analysis, and points the
Court to other facts she contends supports an alternative conclusion, those facts create
at most a conflict within the evidence, which is to be resolved by the ALJ. 	Veino, 312
F.3d at 588. And, once resolved by the ALJ, it cannot be overturned by this Court unless
“a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude otherwise.” 	Brault, 683 F.3d at 448
(emphasis in original) (citation omitted). The Court is plainly prohibited from re-weighing
the evidence as Plaintiff requests. See also Krull v. Colvin, 669 F. App’x 31, 32 (2d Cir.
2016) (“Krull’s disagreement is with the ALJ’s weighing of the evidence, but the deferential
standard of review prevents us from reweighing it.”). Simply put, Plaintiff’s disagreement
with the ALJ’s resolution of conflicting evidence is not grounds for remand. See David C.
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:23-cv-06510-CJS, 2024 WL 4347151, *18 (W.D.N.Y. Sept.
30, 2024) (citing Lisa M. o/b/o J.S. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:21-cv-00292 EAW, 2023
Case 1:24-cv-00464-JGW Document 22 Filed 01/12/26 Page 15 of 21

16
WL 3943997, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. June 12, 2023) (“A disagreement with how the ALJ weighed
the evidence is not a valid basis to challenge the ALJ’s determination.”).
B. The ALJ Properly Evaluated the Medical Opinions.
Plaintiff makes two arguments regarding the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical
opinions. First, she seems to argue that the ALJ erred in finding the agency reviewer
opinions more persuasive than the opinion by examining consultative psychiatrist Dr.
Santarpia. (See Doc. 16-1 at 26.) Plaintiff contends that Dr. Santarpia’s opinion is entitled
to more weight because she examined Plaintiff, and the ALJ wrongly discounted the
opinion by substituting his lay judgment in place of Dr. Santarpia’s. 	(See id.) 	Next,
Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ further erred by relying on the agency reviewer opinions
which were stale because the record did not yet reflect any psychiatric diagnosis or
contain any treatment records. (See id. at 27.)
Pursuant to the Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence
(“Revisions to Rules”), 2017 WL 168819, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844, at 5867-68 (Jan. 18, 2017),
applicable to claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, the Commissioner is no longer
required to afford any specific evidentiary weight to medical opinions, but is obligated to
consider all medical opinions and evaluate their persuasiveness based on the following
five factors: (1) supportability; (2) consistency; (3) relationship with the claimant; (4)
specialization; and (5) other factors, with particular importance placed upon consistency
and supportability. Jacqueline L. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 515 F. Supp. 3d 2, 7 (W.D.N.Y.
2021) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a) & (c)). To allow a reviewing court to trace the path
of an ALJ’s reasoning, an ALJ is required to explain his consideration of the supportability
Case 1:24-cv-00464-JGW Document 22 Filed 01/12/26 Page 16 of 21

17
and consistency factors by pointing to specific evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s
findings regarding medical opinions. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2)).
To be sure, “medical source opinions that are conclusory, stale, and based on an
incomplete medical record may not be substantial evidence to support an ALJ finding.”
Camille v. Colvin, 104 F. Supp. 3d 329, 343 (W.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d, 652 F. App’x 25 (2d
Cir. 2016). While a medical opinion is not necessarily stale based on its age, it may be
stale if it does not account for a plaintiff’s deteriorating condition. 	See Samantha T. v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Case No. 1:22-cv-139 (JGW), 2024 WL 4582825, at *5 (W.D.N.Y.
Oct. 25, 2024) (internal citations omitted). 	That said, “[a] more dated opinion may
constitute 	substantial 	evidence 	if 	it 	is 	consistent 	with 	the 	record 	as 	a 	whole
notwithstanding its age.” 	Anthony F. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Case No. 23-cv-33-FPG,
2023 WL 7294874, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2023) (internal quotation omitted). 	“Where
the submitted evidence did not directly contradict a doctor's opined limitations, and
further, the ALJ analyzed the recent evidence, the doctor's opinion was not impermissibly
stale.” Robin H. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:21-CV-507-DB, 2023 WL 3645489, at *13
(W.D.N.Y. May 25, 2023). 	Plaintiff bears the burden of showing that her condition
deteriorated after the medical opinions were provided. 	See Christopher C. v. Comm’r
Soc. Sec., Case No. 20-cv-1774, 2022 WL 16797970, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2022)
(citing Vincent B. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 561 F. Supp. 3d 362, 367 (W.D.N.Y. 2021)).
The ALJ carefully evaluated the expert evidence pertaining to Plaintiff’s alleged
mental impairments:
The claimant’s medical records were reviewed by O. Fassler, Ph.D., in May
2021, and L. Dekeon, Ph.D., in August 2021, both of whom stated that the
claimant has mild limitations in adapting and managing herself, but no
limitations in any other area of mental functioning (Ex. 1A, 3A). The prior
Case 1:24-cv-00464-JGW Document 22 Filed 01/12/26 Page 17 of 21

18
administrative medical findings of Drs. Fassler and Dekeon are consistent
with objective record. First, although the claimant did report that she does
not handle stress well, she did report that her routines are constantly
changing, which suggests an ability to adapt and manage situations (Ex.
5E/7). Indeed, notations in the record indicate that the claimant had no
difficulty with memory (Ex. 12F/4, 20F/71, 24F/3, 26F/6, 15, 28). Next,
treating medical service providers described the claimant as conversant
and cooperative, well groomed, and with good eye contact, end [sic] even
described her mood as euthymic (Ex. 5F/81, 6F/38, 12F/3, 20F/38, 71, 89,
21F/20, 22F/5, 25F/3, 26F/36, 15, 28). Further, she also reported that she
is able to engage in activities of daily living that generally require an ability
to concentrate and maintain attention such as preparing simple meals,
shopping, using a computer, watching television, listening to the radio, and
socializing 	with 	friends 	(Ex. 	12F/4, 	13F/2, 	Hearing 	Testimony). 	Such
evidence 	is 	consistent 	with 	and 	suggestive 	of 	non-severe 	mental
impairments. Drs. Fassler and Dekeon supported the prior administrative
medical findings with a review of the evidence available to [them at] that
time as well as a narrative explaining the prior administrative medical
findings and providing references to the objective record. Overall, I find the
prior administrative medical findings of Drs. Fassler and Dekeon are
persuasive.
Consultative examiner Susan Santarpia, Ph.D., opined on the claimant’s
physical [sic] functioning following an in-person evaluation performed in
February 2021 (Ex. 12F). Dr. Santarpia opined that the claimant has mild to
moderate impairments in regulating emotions, controlling behavior, and
maintaining well-being (Ex. 12F/4-5). The opinion of Dr. Santarpia is not
consistent with the objective record because the medical evidence of record
does not suggest limitations in regulating emotions or behaviors. For
example, although the claimant did report that she does not handle stress
well, she did report that her routines are constantly changing, which
suggests an ability to adapt and manage situations (Ex. 5E/7). Indeed, the
record contains a general lack of evidence that would indicate that the
claimant had difficulty regulating emotions or behaviors. The claimant
reported that she has no problems getting along with friends, family, or
neighbors (Ex. 5E/5). Treating medical service providers described the
claimant as conversant and cooperative, well groomed, and with good eye
contact, end [sic] even described her mood as euthymic (Ex. 5F/81, 6F/38,
12F/3, 20F/38, 71, 89, 21F/20, 22F/5, 25F/3, 26F/36, 15, 28). Such
evidence 	suggests that 	different 	limitations than those 	stated by 	Dr.
Santarpia. The statements are supported by the findings and conclusions
of 	Dr. 	Santarpia 	following 	in-person 	evaluation, 	as 	well 	as 	narrative
explaining the findings. Nonetheless, this was a one-time exam. Overall, I
find the opinion of Dr. Santarpia is not persuasive.
(Tr. 25-26.)
Case 1:24-cv-00464-JGW Document 22 Filed 01/12/26 Page 18 of 21

19
The Court does not find Plaintiff’s argument to be well-taken. 	First, the ALJ
adequately detailed the reasoning supporting his conclusions, including the factors of
supportability and consistency. 	As set forth in his analysis, the ALJ found the objective
medical evidence and Plaintiff’s engagement in activities of daily living consistent with the
agency reviewer opinions. 	(Tr. 25-26.) 	The ALJ also concluded that Dr. Santarpia’s
opinion regarding Plaintiff’s ability to regulate emotions, control her behavior, and manage
her well-being was not supported by the record based on Plaintiff’s ability to maintain
relationships, positively engage with her providers, and manage constantly changing
routines. 	(See Tr. 26.) While the ALJ recognized that Dr. Santarpia’s opinion was
supported by her in-person evaluation, he correctly considered it in light of the record as
a whole—which did not support her assignment of a mild to moderate limitation in this
functional area. (See id.)
Further, while Plaintiff contends that the ALJ should have afforded more weight to
Dr. Santarpia’s opinion, the Court disagrees. First, the plethora of caselaw cited by
Plaintiff for this proposition relates to treating providers with established relationships with
the plaintiff—not a one-time examining provider. (See Doc. 16-1 at 27-29.) And it is well-
settled that state agency reviewer’s opinion can serve as substantial evidence to support
an ALJ’s finding when that opinion is consistent with the record as a whole. See Frye ex
rel. A.O. v. Astrue, 485 F. App’x 484, 487 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The report of a State Agency
medical consultant constitutes expert opinion evidence which can be given weight if
supported by medical evidence in the record.”).
Additionally, the Court does not agree that the agency reviewer opinions are stale.
As a threshold matter, the mere fact the opinions were rendered before certain evidence
Case 1:24-cv-00464-JGW Document 22 Filed 01/12/26 Page 19 of 21

20
was received does not automatically invalidate the opinions. Indeed, “the Second Circuit
has affirmed that an ALJ is entitled to assign great weight to the opinion of a state agency
consultant who has not reviewed the entire longitudinal record, so long as the subsequent
treatment notes and opinion evidence does not differ materially from the evidence
reviewed by the consultant.” 	Stephani G. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:21-CV-00435,
2024 WL 493501, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2024); see also Camille v. Colvin, 652 F. App’x
25, 28 n.4 (2d Cir. 2016). Here, the ALJ analyzed the entire record, including the evidence
received 	after 	the 	agency 	reviewer 	opinions, 	and 	Plaintiff 	has 	not 	identified 	any
subsequent evidence that is inconsistent with the agency reviewer opinions. Notably, Dr.
Santarpia’s opinion, which Plaintiff advocates was deserving of more weight, was
rendered before the agency reviewer opinions, and was expressly considered by the
reviewers.
For these reasons, the Court finds no error in the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical
opinions.
Case 1:24-cv-00464-JGW Document 22 Filed 01/12/26 Page 20 of 21

21
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds no basis for remand. ACCORDINGLY, it
is:
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 16) is
DENIED, and it is further
ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 20) is
GRANTED.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close this case.
Dated: January 12, 2026 	J. Gregory Wehrman
Rochester, New York 	HON. J. Gregory Wehrman
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 1:24-cv-00464-JGW Document 22 Filed 01/12/26 Page 21 of 21