USA v. Bongiovanni, et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JOSEPH BONGIOVANNI,
Defendant.
19-CR-227
DECISION & ORDER
Before the Court are two motions filed by the defendant, Joseph Bongiovanni,
following his second jury trial.1 First, Bongiovanni moves for a judgment of acquittal
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, Docket Item 1446; second, he moves for
an inquiry into alleged juror misconduct, Docket Item 1572. After the government
responded to both motions, Docket Items 1487 and 1580, Bongiovanni replied in
support of his Rule 29 motion, Docket Item 1534. The Court then heard oral argument
and reserved decision on both motions.2 See Docket Items 1558 and 1588. For the
reasons that follow, this Court denies Bongiovanni’s motions.
1 Bongiovanni’s first trial resulted in a mistrial on 12 of 15 counts. See Docket
Item 867. More specifically, the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on
counts 1-11 and 14, acquitted Bongiovanni on count 12, and convicted Bongiovanni on
counts 13 and 15. See id. The Court later granted a judgment of acquittal on count 5.
Docket Item 1077. The remaining 11 counts were retried beginning in July 2024. See
Docket Items 1095 and 1193.
2 The Court also heard argument and reserved decision on the parties’ objections
to the Presentence Investigation Report. See Docket Item 1588. The Court will issue a
separate decision addressing those objections.
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LEGAL PRINCIPLES
I. 	RULE 29 MOTION
A defendant seeking a judgment of acquittal faces a heavy burden: A court can
grant a Rule 29 motion only if no “rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime established beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v.
Cacace, 796 F.3d 176, 191 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Moore, 54 F.3d 92,
100 (2d Cir. 1995)). Stated another way, “[a] court may enter a judgment of acquittal
only if the evidence that the defendant committed the crime alleged is ‘nonexistent or so
meager that no reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” See
United States v. Guadagna, 183 F.3d 122, 130 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v.
White, 673 F.2d 299, 301 (10th Cir. 1982)).
If a court reserves ruling on a Rule 29 motion until after the jury has returned a
verdict, it “must decide the motion on the basis of the evidence at the time the ruling
was reserved.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(b); see also United States v. Velasquez, 271 F.3d
364, 371 (2d Cir. 2001). Here, Bongiovanni first moved under Rule 29 following the
close of the government’s case. See Docket Item 1247. Because the Court first
reserved ruling on Bongiovanni’s Rule 29 motion at that time, see id., it examines
whether the government met its burden based on the evidence presented in the
government’s case in chief.
In conducting its analysis, the Court “must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government, crediting every inference that could have been drawn in
the government’s favor.” United States v. Pauling, 924 F.3d 649, 656 (2d Cir. 2019)
(quoting United States v. Martoma, 894 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2017)). That being said, “if
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the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution gives equal or nearly
equal circumstantial support to a theory of guilt and a theory of innocence, then a
reasonable jury must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt.” United States v.
Glenn, 312 F.3d 58, 70 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
II. 	INQUIRY INTO ALLEGED JUROR MISCONDUCT
“[A] defendant who seeks a new trial based on allegations of juror misconduct
faces a very high hurdle.” United States v. Stewart, 317 F. Supp. 2d 432, 436 (S.D.N.Y.
2004). A post-verdict inquiry of jurors is appropriate only when there is “clear, strong,
substantial[,] and incontrovertible evidence . . . that a specific, non-speculative
impropriety has occurred.” United States v. Ianniello, 866 F.2d 540, 543 (2d Cir. 1989)
(quoting United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1234 (2d Cir. 1983)); see
Anderson v. Miller, 346 F.3d 315, 327 (2d Cir. 2003) (explaining “that possible internal
abnormalities in a jury will not be inquired into except ‘in the gravest and most important
cases’” (quoting United States v. Dioguardi, 492 F.2d 70, 79 n.12 (2d Cir. 1974))).
Moreover, “an allegation of intra[-]jury pressure that does not rise to the level of physical
coercion is insufficient to require a post-verdict jury inquiry.” See United States v.
Yeagley, 706 F. Supp. 2d 431, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (emphasis omitted).
Additionally, Rule of Evidence 606(b)(1)—sometimes referred to as the “no-
impeachment rule”—“assure[s] jurors that, once their verdict has been entered, it will
not later be called into question based on the comments or conclusions they expressed
during deliberations.” Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 580 U.S. 206, 211 (2017). The rule
explicitly provides that:
[d]uring an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not
testify about any statement made or incident that occurred during the jury’s
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deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or another juror’s vote; or
any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment. 	The
court may not receive a juror’s affidavit or evidence of a juror’s statement
on these matters.
Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)(1). That rule is subject to only three narrow exceptions: “A juror
may testify about whether” the jury improperly considered “extraneous prejudicial
information”; whether “an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any
juror”; or whether the jury made a clerical mistake when completing the verdict form. Id.
(b)(2).
DISCUSSION3
I. 	RULE 29 MOTION
A. 	Count 1
Count 1 charged Bongiovanni with conspiring to defraud the United States in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. See Docket Item 1193 at 4-17.4 Bongiovanni first argues
that there was a prejudicial variance because the conspiracy charged in the indictment,
which included bribery, was not the conspiracy that the government proved.
As an initial matter, inconsistency between a jury’s verdict on a conspiracy count
and its verdict on a related substantive count is not a basis for a judgment of acquittal.
See United States v. Acosta, 17 F.3d 538, 544-45 (2d Cir. 1994) (explaining that “it has
long been established that inconsistency in jury verdicts of guilty on some counts and
not guilty on others is not a ground for reversal of the verdicts of guilty”). The exception
3 The Court assumes the reader’s familiarity with the factual background and will
recount the facts only as necessary to explain its decision.
4 Page numbers in docket citations refer to ECF pagination.
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to this rule is if “the necessary proof on the substantive charge is identical [to] that
required to convict on the conspiracy count.” United States v. Chen, 378 F.3d 151, 164
(2d Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Palmieri, 456 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1972)). But
here, even assuming that the evidence and necessary proof on the substantive bribery
count were identical to the evidence and necessary proof on the conspiracy charge, that
would not dispose of count 1.
As the government observes, Docket Item 1487 at 89, count 1 charged a
conspiracy with two separate objectives—(1) to defraud the United States and the Drug
Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) and (2) to commit bribery, see Docket Item 1193 at
4-5—and the government had to prove only one of those objectives. Thus, the jury
could convict Bongiovanni on count 1 if it found that he defrauded the United States and
the DEA without receiving money in exchange for his efforts. And in fact, there was
ample evidence suggesting that Bongiovanni did just that.
Nor is it true, as Bongiovanni contends, that he was not on notice of the charged
conduct absent bribery. On the contrary, the manner and means section of the
indictment alleges that
[i]t was part of the conspiracy that, in exchange for payments he received
and in order to ingratiate himself to individuals whom he believed were
members 	and 	associates 	of 	[Italian 	Organized 	Crime], 	[Bongiovanni]
utilized his position as a DEA [special agent] to attempt to dissuade other
members 	of 	law 	enforcement: 	from 	conducting 	investigations 	of 	his
coconspirators, friends, associates[,] and individuals [Bongiovanni] believed
to be connected to or associated with [Italian Organized Crime].
Id. at 5 (emphasis added). Thus, even if the government proved only that Bongiovanni
defrauded the DEA without accepting bribes, that would be sufficient to maintain the
conviction on count 1.
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Bongiovanni also argues that the jury’s special finding about the amount of drugs
in count 3 necessarily means that it found that he did not conspire with Michael
Masecchia and others in the Serio Drug Trafficking Organization (“DTO”) as charged in
count 1. Docket Item 1446 at 9. According to Bongiovanni, the jury’s finding that less
than 50 kilograms of marijuana was foreseeable to him indicates that the jury found him
guilty only of conspiring to protect his longtime friend, Lou Selva, with respect to the
basement grow at Selva’s house, not of conspiring to protect the much larger DTO. Id.
But to reach that conclusion, this Court must speculate as to what was in the
jurors’ minds—which the Second Circuit has explicitly prohibited. See Acosta, 17 F.3d
at 545. Indeed, even when verdicts are clearly inconsistent, “the court is not to try to
guess which of the inconsistent verdicts is the one the jury really meant.” Id. (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted). As the Supreme Court explained in United
States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (1984), “the jury, though presumed to follow the
instructions of the trial court, may make its ultimate decisions ‘for impermissible
reasons,’ such as ‘mistake, compromise, or lenity,’ [and] its power to do so is
‘unreviewable.’” Acosta, 17 F.3d at 545 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Powell, 469
U.S. at 63, 65).
Here, the only definitive conclusion the Court can draw from the jury’s verdict on
count 3 is that the government did not prove that Bongiovanni could reasonably foresee
that the conspiracy involved more than 50 kilograms of marijuana. To infer that the jury
also concluded that Bongiovanni did not conspire with Masecchia is mere speculation.
Moreover, there was ample evidence that Bongiovanni used his position as a DEA
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agent to cover for Masecchia even if Bongiovanni received no bribes and even if he did
not know the full scope of the drug conspiracy.
Based on the same theory—that the jury must have convicted him only of
“protecting Lou Selva and not reporting to the DEA that Selva was growing marijuana in
his residence,” Docket Item 1446 at 23—Bongiovanni argues that the government failed
to prove a Klein conspiracy. See United States v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1957);
United States v. Ballistrea, 101 F.3d 827, 832 (2d Cir. 1996) (explaining that to prove a
Klein conspiracy, “the government [must] show (1) [that defendant] entered into an
agreement (2) to obstruct a lawful function of the government (3) by deceitful or
dishonest means and (4) at least one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy” (citation
omitted)). That argument fails for the same reason. Bongiovanni asks the Court to do
precisely what the Second Circuit has clearly instructed courts not to do: speculate on
the jury’s rationale for reaching its decision. See Acosta, 17 F.3d at 545.
For all those reasons, this Court denies Bongiovanni’s rule 29 motion with
respect to count 1.
B. 	Count 3
Bongiovanni’s argument on count 3 is similar. Essentially, Bongiovanni says that
because the jury attributed only the smallest amount of marijuana to him, “the trial
lacked proof that he conspired to help Selva possess any marijuana [Selva] grew with
an intent to distribute it.” Docket Item 1446 at 31. “At best,” Bongiovanni says, the
evidence “could establish only knowledge of Selva’s simple possession under 21 U.S.C.
§ 844.” Docket Item 1446 at 31.
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Once again, Bongiovanni asks this Court to read too much into the jury’s verdict.
As explained above, the only thing the Court can glean from the jury’s verdict is that the
government failed to prove that more than 50 kilograms of marijuana was reasonably
foreseeable to Bongiovanni as part of the conspiracy. But that does not, as
Bongiovanni claims, permit the inference that the jury found only that he protected
Selva’s small grow operation or that the government’s proof on Bongiovanni’s
involvement in the Serio DTO conspiracy was lacking. Again, this Court is not permitted
to speculate as to why the jury reached its verdict. See Acosta, 17 F.3d at 545.
What is more, there is a perfectly reasonable explanation for the jury’s
conclusion: Viewing Selva’s testimony in the light most favorable to the government,
there was plenty of evidence that Bongiovanni knew that Selva was distributing
marijuana—with or without Masecchia—and agreed to protect either or both of them.
And that might be true even if the government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that Bongiovanni could reasonably foresee more than 50 kilograms of marijuana was
involved in the conspiracy.
For all those reasons, the Court denies Bongiovanni’s Rule 29 motion with
respect to count 3.
C. 	Count 6
Count 6 charged Bongiovanni with obstructing justice in connection with the
DEA-6 report dated November 4, 2014, in which he said that Robert Kaiser was “no
longer viable” as a confidential source. See Docket Item 1193 at 15, 29. Bongiovanni
again argues that the jury’s drug weight finding on count 3 makes it clear that the jury
did not connect him to the Serio DTO. This Court rejects that conclusion for the same
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reason that it rejected it in connection with counts 1 and 3. Any determinations beyond
the marijuana drug weight about what the jury thought as to whom and what the
conspiracy involved is impermissible speculation.
D. 	Count 7
Count 7 charged obstruction of justice related to the DEA-6 report dated January
28, 2015, which closed the Wayne Anderson case file. Bongiovanni argues that he
should be acquitted on this count because the statements in that report were
“undeniably factually true.” See Docket Item 1446 at 43. For example, the case file
was in fact closed. Id. at 45.
The government counters that Bongiovanni is taking too narrow a view of what it
means to “falsify” a record. See Docket Item 1487 at 105. Rather than meaning that
the words on the page must literally be false, the government explains, falsifying a
document also includes “creat[ing] a document that misrepresents the truth.” Id.
(quoting United States v. Rowland, 826 F.3d 100, 108 (2d Cir. 2016)). Moreover, the
government says, there were statements in the report that were in fact false, such as
the representation that Kaiser was “no longer viable” as a source. Id. at 105-06.
The Court agrees with the government that there was sufficient evidence for the
jury to find that the January 2015 DEA-6 was a document that misrepresented the truth
as part of Bongiovanni’s overall scheme to protect his friends. The obstruction
conviction on count 7 therefore stands. See Rowland, 826 F.3d at 108.
E. 	Count 8
Count 8 charged Bongiovanni with obstruction of justice related to his statements
about the extent of his relationship with Peter Gerace. Bongiovanni argues that his
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statement that he had only had “minimal in-person contact” with Gerace that “primarily
consisted of random telephonic communication” was true. See Docket Item 1446 at 48-
49.
But as the government observes, that argument fails to view the facts in the light
most favorable to the government, as is required on a Rule 29 motion. See Docket Item
1487 at 110. The jury saw numerous text message exchanges between Bongiovanni
and Gerace, as well as photographs of them socializing over the years. See id. at 110-
11. That is more than enough evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that
Bongiovanni obstructed justice by minimizing his contacts with Gerace.
Thus, Bongiovanni’s motion is denied as to count 8.
F. 	Count 10
Count 10 charged obstruction of justice based on Bongiovanni’s statements in a
memorandum dated January 28, 2019, about Gerace and DEA Special Agent Anthony
Casullo. More specifically, count 10 charged that Bongiovanni “made false and
misleading statements . . . relating to the nature of his relationship and extent of his
communications with [Gerace], in order to cover up, mislead, create a false justification
for, and misrepresent the true relationship between [Bongiovanni and Gerace] and to
misrepresent the true nature of the relationship between [Gerace] and [Casullo].”
Docket Item 1193 at 32-33.
Bongiovanni first argues that his memorandum could not have misrepresented
his relationship with Gerace because the memorandum does not discuss that
relationship; rather, it discusses only the alleged relationship between Casullo and
Gerace. See Docket Item 1446 at 51. But as the government observes, “a rational jury
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could have concluded that [Bongiovanni] was trying to divert attention away from his
own corrupt relationship with Gerace and undermine his colleague’s credibility.” Docket
Item 1487 at 115. And “[b]ecause a rational jury could have concluded that
[Bongiovanni]’s stated purpose for writing the memorandum was false, it could have
concluded both that the record was falsified and that [he] acted with corrupt intent.” Id.
This Court agrees with the government.
Bongiovanni also argues that the memo could not have obstructed justice
because at the time it was submitted, Casullo was not responsible for investigating
Gerace. Docket Item 1446 at 53. But that misses the point. The government’s theory
was not that Bongiovanni wrote the memorandum to interfere with Casullo’s
investigation; rather, it was that that Bongiovanni was attempting to discredit Casullo
because Casullo “had first-hand knowledge of [Bongiovanni]’s . . . efforts to protect
Gerace.” See Docket Item 1487 at 115. In other words, according the to government,
Bongiovanni wrote the memorandum to keep any federal authorities who were
investigating the relationship between Gerace and Bongiovanni off Bongiovanni’s trail.
See id. at 115-16.
For all those reasons, Bongiovanni’s motion is denied with respect to count 10.
G. 	Count 11
Count 11 charged that in an interview with Special Agent David Carpenter on
March 29, 2019, Bongiovanni, among other things, falsely “denied ever initiating contact
with . . . Gerace.” See Docket Item 1193 at 33. Bongiovanni says that because the
question of whether he ever initiated contact with Gerace was so vague and ambiguous,
he should be acquitted on this count. Docket Item 1446 at 54-56. The government
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counters first that this should have been raised on a Rule 12 motion to dismiss, Docket
Item 1487 at 117-18, and second that the question was not vague, id. at 118-19.
This Court agrees with the government. Even if Bongiovanni did not waive this
argument by not raising it sooner, the question of whether someone “ever initiat[ed]
contact” with someone else is fairly straightforward—especially when viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the government. Perhaps there were multiple
ways to understand this question and the government therefore did not prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Bongiovanni purposefully made a false statement; that was a
reasonable argument for the jury to consider. But the jury rejected that argument, and
there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s conclusion.
For all those reasons, the Court denies Bongiovanni’s motion as to count 11.
II. 	MOTION FOR FURTHER INQUIRY
On June 20, 2025, the Court disclosed to the parties that it had received an
unsolicited letter from one of the jurors in Bongiovanni’s first trial. See Docket Item
1568 at 1. Among other things, the letter stated the following:
Before the trial even began [a juror] stated she would be attending Mr.
Bongiovanni’s sentencing. 	Another juror let her know she should at least
wait for the trial to begin before she plans for that. 	The [first juror] replied
the 	government 	has 	the 	charges 	against 	him, 	he must 	be 	guilty 	of
something (after the trial she and several other jurors were concerned with
letting the government down as they felt obligated to not disappoint them
after all of the time and money they had spent on this trial)[.] So many jurors
had seen news coverage and had already formed an opinion from the
beginning. 	Then the trial ended and deliberations began. 	The first thing
that occurred upon entering the deliberation room was a vote to determine
who thought Mr. Bongiovanni was guilty and who thought he was not guilty.
There was no prior discussion of what he was guilty of. 	There was no
discussion at all as required to make a fair decision before the vote took
place. 	There was yelling and name calling by the guilty voters. 	They
wanted the not guilty voters to prove his innocence. It’s easy to understand
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how someone could change their mind just to not have to endure this
especially for weeks.
Id. at 2. Based on the contents of that letter, Bongiovanni moves for “an evidentiary
hearing . . . and, if warranted, further inquiry into possible juror misconduct and jurors’
failure to follow instructions.” Docket Item 1573 at 2.
As noted above, a post-verdict inquiry into alleged juror misconduct is
permissible only when there is “clear, strong, substantial[,] and incontrovertible evidence
. . . that a specific, non-speculative impropriety has occurred.” Ianniello, 866 F.2d at
543 (quoting United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1234 (2d Cir. 1983)). For the
reasons that follow, the unsolicited letter from the juror in the first trial does not meet this
high bar.
To start, this Court already has addressed the allegation that “the not guilty
voters” were asked by other jurors “to prove [Bongiovanni’s] innocence.” See Docket
Item 1568 at 2. Following his first trial, Bongiovanni moved for a new trial on the counts
on which he was convicted under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33. Docket Item
908. Among other things, Bongiovanni argued that a note written by a juror during
deliberations—which indicated to the Court that other jurors had made comments,
including “I knew [Bongiovanni] was guilty from day 1” and “[y]ou have to prove to us
that he is innocent”—warranted a new trial. Id. at 12; see United States v. Bongiovanni,
2024 WL 3487914, at *12 (W.D.N.Y. July 19, 2024). This Court denied the rule 33
motion, finding that “those comments d[id] not necessarily show that the jurors did not
follow the Court’s instructions.” Bongiovanni, 2024 WL 3487914, at *12.
“The first comment,” the Court explained, “while indicating a tentative conclusion,
does not conclusively demonstrate that the juror refused to keep an open mind in
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deliberations.” Id.; see Brown v. Greiner, 2003 WL 22964395, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 2,
2003) (“Our criminal justice system does not contemplate that jurors will avoid forming
tentative conclusions about the guilt or innocence of a defendant before all the evidence
has been presented and the judge releases them to the jury room for deliberations. All
that is required of a juror is that he or she keep an ‘open mind’ and remain receptive to
the parties[’] arguments and evidence.”). “And the second comment,” the Court
continued, “could easily have occurred in the context of a holdout situation during
deliberations, i.e., asking the juror in the minority to convince the others of her
conclusion, rather than a failure to apply the proper burden of proof.” Bongiovanni,
2024 WL 3487914, at *12. Moreover, the Court found, “[t]his conclusion is bolstered by
the fact that the jury reached a not-guilty verdict on one count and failed to reach a
verdict on 12 others.” Id.
Those same conclusions apply here. Contrary to the allegation that a juror had
prejudged Bongiovanni’s guilt, the jury unanimously found Bongiovanni not guilty on one
of the obstruction counts. And all the jurors—including the juror who wrote the note—
found Bongiovanni guilty on the two counts on which he was convicted at the first trial.
In addition, as the government observes, Docket Item 1580 at 10-11, the timing
of the juror’s alleged comments regarding Bongiovanni’s guilt is not clear. The
comments might have been made before the Court gave its preliminary instructions or
even before voir dire began, in which case the comments give no indication that the
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juror did not follow the instructions once given. So the note does not provide
“incontrovertible evidence” of misconduct.5 See Ianniello, 866 F.2d at 543.
Finally, any inquiry that would address the allegations in the juror’s note is barred
by Rule 606(b). See United States v. Baker, 899 F.3d 123, 132 (2d Cir. 2018)
(explaining that “Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibited the jurors from
impeaching their verdict by testifying about the effect of such deliberations on the
verdict”). Here, the bulk of the juror’s allegations deal with the internal workings of the
jury rather than purported outside influences.6 Thus, the requested inquiry would be
“futile from the start.” See id.; see also United States v. Richards, 241 F.3d 335, 343
(3rd Cir. 2001) (affirming denial of motion for new trial based on juror’s post-trial affidavit
attesting that he “overheard two jurors comment in the presence of other jurors and
prior to the close of the evidence that they believed [the defendant] was guilty” because
inquiry into “whether or not the premature statements affected their verdict” would be
prohibited by Rule 606(b)).
5 Additionally, as the government observes, this particular juror appears to be far
from impartial. See Docket Item 1580 at 7-8. In addition to the excerpt above, the
juror’s letter stated that Bongiovanni “has always been an exemplary citizen and an
outstanding[,] accomplished member of the DEA his entire career.” Docket Item 1568
at 2. The juror further implored the Court not to sentence Bongiovanni to time in prison.
See id. Moreover, the Court has observed this juror with Bongiovanni’s family at
several court proceedings following the first trial.
6 The one possible exception is that the juror alleges that “many jurors had seen
news coverage and had already formed an opinion from the beginning.” Docket Item
1568 at 2. The Court extensively questioned the jurors about exposure to news
coverage during voir dire, and it is true that many jurors had seen some coverage. But
all of them assured the Court that they could still be impartial, and the letter does not
give any indication—other than pure speculation—that those answers were untruthful.
Nor does the letter give any nonspeculative indication that the jurors failed to follow this
Court’s instruction to shield themselves from any further news coverage once they had
been sworn in as jurors.
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As the Second Circuit has recognized, “[b]ecause . . . of the ‘evil consequences’
likely to result from post-verdict inquiries—‘subjecting juries to harassment, inhibiting
juryroom deliberation, burdening courts with meritless applications, increasing
temptation for jury tampering[,] and creating uncertainty in jury verdicts’—such inquiries
are not undertaken in the absence of reasonable grounds.” Baker, 899 F.3d at 131
(quoting Ianniello, 866 F.2d at 543). For the reasons explained above, the juror’s note
here does not meet the high bar for such an inquiry, and Bongiovanni’s motion therefore
is denied.
CONCLUSION
For all those reasons, this Court DENIES Bongiovanni’s motions for a judgment
of acquittal under Rule 29, Docket Item 1446, and for inquiry into alleged juror
misconduct, Docket Item 1572.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: 	August 27, 2025
Buffalo, New York
/s/ Lawrence J. Vilardo
LAWRENCE J. VILARDO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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