USA v. Busch et al

1:09-cr-00331Nywd18.02.2014

Gesamter Gesetzestext

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v. ORDER
09-CR-331-A
MATTHEW DEYNES,
Defendant.
The defendant, Matthew Deynes, has filed a motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
3142(f)(2) for reconsideration of a Decision and Order of Magistrate Judge Hugh B.
Scott, entered on February 28, 2011, that denied defendant Deynes release from
pretrial detention. (Dkt. No. 190). Defendant is charged in a Fourth Superseding
Indictment with racketeering conspiracy (Count 1), drug conspiracy (Count 62), and
possession of firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking (Count 63). The Court
assumes familiarity with the prior proceedings in this case.
As an threshold matter, the United States argues defendant Deynes alleges
no changed circumstances sufficient to justify re-opening the detention hearing
under § 3142(f)(2). However, the Court finds that the passage of an additional
three years during which defendant has been in pretrial detention, and the
availability of property to be posted as security valued by defense counsel at oral
argument at approximately $50,000 more than was previously available to secure
defendant’s pretrial release, are circumstances obviously sufficient under 18
U.S.C. § 3142(f) to justify re-opening the detention hearing.
Case 1:09-cr-00331-RJA-HBS Document 1217 Filed 02/18/14 Page 1 of 5
Based upon consideration of all of the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) and the
evidence proffered by the United States and defendant Deynes, the Court finds
there are strong reasons to conclude that defendant committed the very serious
offenses charged in Counts 1, 62, and 63 in the Fourth Superseding Indictment.
The circumstances and characteristics of those offenses, together with the history
and characteristics of defendant, strongly support the conclusion that defendant
has not met his burden to overcome the presumptions of dangerousness and
serious risk of flight that arise under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(2), and the proffered
evidence supporting those presumptions. The Court also specifically finds that no1
available condition or combination of conditions will adequately protect the safety of
the community.
The Court has carefully considered that defendant Deynes’ continuing
pretrial detention since February 9, 2010 raises serious questions under the Due
Process Clause about the propriety of his continuing detention without trial. See
U.S. Const. amend. V. When the duration of a defendant’s pretrial detention
becomes so prolonged that it amounts to punishment that does not serve purposes
of flight prevention or community protection, the pretrial detention violates due
process. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739, 747-49 (1987); United States v. Millan, 4 F.3d 1038, 1043 (2d Cir. 1993).
The Court is not considering an unsupported allegation by the United States that1
defendant was involved during his pretrial detention in secreting an assault weapon. The
United States declined to proffer facts in support of the allegation in a sealed filing.
2
Case 1:09-cr-00331-RJA-HBS Document 1217 Filed 02/18/14 Page 2 of 5
Upon such violation, a defendant will be released on conditions, ordered to trial, or
both.
There is generally a three-part test for determining when an otherwise
legitimate pretrial detention becomes too long to be tolerated under the Due
Process Clause: (1) the length of delay; (2) the extent to which the prosecution is
responsible for delay of the start of the trial; and (3) “the strength of the evidence
upon which the detention was based.” United States v. Orena, 986 F.2d 628, 630
(2d Cir. 1993). The question whether the pretrial detention of defendant Deynes
violates due process turns on whether the above-listed factors establish that the
duration of his detention is excessive in relation to the non-punitive purposes
served by the detention. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979).
After lengthy and involved pretrial proceedings in this complex case
concerning an 11-year span of alleged racketeering involving four murders, 12
attempted murders, numerous assaults, and extensive drug trafficking, defendant
Deynes is scheduled for jury selection and trial on March 25, 2014. Because the
defendant’s pretrial detention continues to be necessary to protect the community
from additional crimes and to prevent the defendant from fleeing to avoid
conviction, a sentence to a mandatory-minimum term of 10 years imprisonment, up
to a sentence of life imprisonment, and because his trial will begin March 25, 2014,
it does not, at this time, violate due process.
During oral argument, the parties acknowledged that defendant Deynes’
3
Case 1:09-cr-00331-RJA-HBS Document 1217 Filed 02/18/14 Page 3 of 5
transfer to pretrial detention in a facility approximately 70 miles from the
Courthouse in Mayville, New York, is impeding his trial preparation. Counsel for
the United States undertook to attempt to assist defense counsel to make
arrangements to mitigate the problems attendant the distance defense counsel has
to travel to prepare for trial with defendant. The parties shall appear for a status
conference on Friday, February 21, 2014 at 10:00 a.m. to report on the status of
the parties’ efforts to mitigate problems attendant the distance defense counsel has
to travel to prepare for trial with defendant.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the motion of defendant Matthew Deynes for
reconsideration pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2) of his pretrial detention is
denied. The defendant is a danger to the community and a risk of flight for which
no available conditions or combination of conditions of release will adequately
protect the community and assure his appearances in court as required. Although
the continuing 48-month pretrial detention of defendant is very long, it does not
violate due process in the unique circumstances of this case. The parties shall
appear for a status conference February 21, 2014, at 9:00 a.m.
SO ORDERED.
Richard J. Arcara
HONORABLE RICHARD J. ARCARA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: February 18, 2014
4
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1 printed pages contain little extracted OCR body text; searchable legal-body completeness has not been established for those pages.

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 1:09-cr-00331-RJA-HBS Document1217_ Filed 02/18/14 Pagelof5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

V. ORDER
09-CR-331-A
MATTHEW DEYNES,

Defendant.

The defendant, Matthew Deynes, has filed a motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
3142(f)(2) for reconsideration of a Decision and Order of Magistrate Judge Hugh B.
Scott, entered on February 28, 2011, that denied defendant Deynes release from
pretrial detention. (Dkt. No. 190). Defendant is charged in a Fourth Superseding
Indictment with racketeering conspiracy (Count 1), drug conspiracy (Count 62), and
possession of firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking (Count 63). The Court
assumes familiarity with the prior proceedings in this case.

As an threshold matter, the United States argues defendant Deynes alleges
no changed circumstances sufficient to justify re-opening the detention hearing
under § 3142(f)(2). However, the Court finds that the passage of an additional
three years during which defendant has been in pretrial detention, and the
availability of property to be posted as security valued by defense counsel at oral
argument at approximately $50,000 more than was previously available to secure
defendant's pretrial release, are circumstances obviously sufficient under 18

U.S.C. § 3142(f) to justify re-opening the detention hearing.

Based upon consideration of all of the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) and the
evidence proffered by the United States and defendant Deynes, the Court finds
there are strong reasons to conclude that defendant committed the very serious
offenses charged in Counts 1, 62, and 63 in the Fourth Superseding Indictment.
The circumstances and characteristics of those offenses, together with the history
and characteristics of defendant, strongly support the conclusion that defendant
has not met his burden to overcome the presumptions of dangerousness and
serious risk of flight that arise under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(2), and the proffered
evidence supporting those presumptions. The Court also specifically finds that no1
available condition or combination of conditions will adequately protect the safety of
the community.
The Court has carefully considered that defendant Deynes’ continuing
pretrial detention since February 9, 2010 raises serious questions under the Due
Process Clause about the propriety of his continuing detention without trial. See
U.S. Const. amend. V. When the duration of a defendant’s pretrial detention
becomes so prolonged that it amounts to punishment that does not serve purposes
of flight prevention or community protection, the pretrial detention violates due
process. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739, 747-49 (1987); United States v. Millan, 4 F.3d 1038, 1043 (2d Cir. 1993).
The Court is not considering an unsupported allegation by the United States that1
defendant was involved during his pretrial detention in secreting an assault weapon. The
United States declined to proffer facts in support of the allegation in a sealed filing.
2
Case 1:09-cr-00331-RJA-HBS Document 1217 Filed 02/18/14 Page 2 of 5

Upon such violation, a defendant will be released on conditions, ordered to trial, or
both.
There is generally a three-part test for determining when an otherwise
legitimate pretrial detention becomes too long to be tolerated under the Due
Process Clause: (1) the length of delay; (2) the extent to which the prosecution is
responsible for delay of the start of the trial; and (3) “the strength of the evidence
upon which the detention was based.” United States v. Orena, 986 F.2d 628, 630
(2d Cir. 1993). The question whether the pretrial detention of defendant Deynes
violates due process turns on whether the above-listed factors establish that the
duration of his detention is excessive in relation to the non-punitive purposes
served by the detention. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979).
After lengthy and involved pretrial proceedings in this complex case
concerning an 11-year span of alleged racketeering involving four murders, 12
attempted murders, numerous assaults, and extensive drug trafficking, defendant
Deynes is scheduled for jury selection and trial on March 25, 2014. Because the
defendant’s pretrial detention continues to be necessary to protect the community
from additional crimes and to prevent the defendant from fleeing to avoid
conviction, a sentence to a mandatory-minimum term of 10 years imprisonment, up
to a sentence of life imprisonment, and because his trial will begin March 25, 2014,
it does not, at this time, violate due process.
During oral argument, the parties acknowledged that defendant Deynes’
3
Case 1:09-cr-00331-RJA-HBS Document 1217 Filed 02/18/14 Page 3 of 5

transfer to pretrial detention in a facility approximately 70 miles from the
Courthouse in Mayville, New York, is impeding his trial preparation. Counsel for
the United States undertook to attempt to assist defense counsel to make
arrangements to mitigate the problems attendant the distance defense counsel has
to travel to prepare for trial with defendant. The parties shall appear for a status
conference on Friday, February 21, 2014 at 10:00 a.m. to report on the status of
the parties’ efforts to mitigate problems attendant the distance defense counsel has
to travel to prepare for trial with defendant.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the motion of defendant Matthew Deynes for
reconsideration pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2) of his pretrial detention is
denied. The defendant is a danger to the community and a risk of flight for which
no available conditions or combination of conditions of release will adequately
protect the community and assure his appearances in court as required. Although
the continuing 48-month pretrial detention of defendant is very long, it does not
violate due process in the unique circumstances of this case. The parties shall
appear for a status conference February 21, 2014, at 9:00 a.m.
SO ORDERED.
Richard J. Arcara
HONORABLE RICHARD J. ARCARA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: February 18, 2014
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Case 1:09-cr-00331-RJA-HBS
Document 1217 Filed 02/18/14 Page 5 of 5
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