Harris v. Oneida County Sheriff

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
TRACY B. HARRIS,
Petitioner,
v. 	9:25-CV-1563
(AMN)
ONEIDA COUNTY SHERIFF,
Respondent.
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
TRACY B. HARRIS
Petitioner, pro se
8884
Oneida County Correctional Facility
6075 Judd Road
Oriskany, New York 13424
ANNE M. NARDACCI
United States District Judge
DECISION and ORDER
I. 	INTRODUCTION
Petitioner seeks federal habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Dkt. No.
2, Amended Petition ("Am. Pet."). 1 Petitioner also remitted the statutory filing fee. See Dkt.
Entry for Pet. dated 11/05/25 (identifying receipt information from the filing fee transaction).
1 PeƟƟoner’s iniƟal pleading sought federal habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Dkt. No. 1, PeƟƟon. State
prisoners must bring challenges both to the execuƟon of a sentence and to underlying convicƟons under secƟon 2254,
which governs peƟƟons filed by "a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he
is in custody in violaƟon of the ConsƟtuƟon or laws or treaƟes of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); accord, Cook v.
New York State Div. of Parole, 321 F.3d 274, 278 (2d Cir. 2003). Conversely, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 provides that "the Supreme
Court, any jusƟce thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respecƟve jurisdicƟons" may grant a writ of
habeas corpus to a peƟƟoner "in custody in violaƟon of the ConsƟtuƟon or laws or treaƟes of the United States." 28
U.S.C. § 2241(a), (c)(3). “In rare circumstances, state prisoners who are pretrial detainees may challenge state detenƟon
pursuant to secƟon 2241.” Blanchard v. New York, No. 9:18‐CV‐0448 (GTS/CFH), 2018 WL 2324054, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. May 22,
2018) (ciƟng cases).
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For the reasons which follow, the petition is dismissed without prejudice.
II. 	THE PETITION
Petitioner is a pretrial detainee in Oneida County. Am. Pet. at 1. A search of the
VINElink database indicates that petitioner was taken into custody on December 6, 2024.
See VINElink, https://www.vinelink.com/person-detail/offender/43626621;tabIndexToSelect=0
(last visited 12/01/25).2
On or about January 23, 2025, petitioner was named in an indictment with a
codefendant. Am. Pet. at 6. Petitioner does not indicate the offense for which he was
indicted. On January 31, 2025, the “[i]ndictment . . . was only dismissed on [petitioner;]”
however, petitioner claims he remains listed on the indictment even though he was allegedly
dismissed from it. Id.
Petitioner’s case was re-submitted to a second grand jury. Am. Pet. at 6. It appears
that petitioner was again indicted; however, as with the first indictment, Petitioner does not
provide the details of the second indictment.
During the fall of this year, petitioner claims to have filed a pro se motion challenging
his pretrial detention pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law §30.30(1)(a). Am. Pet.
at 2 (explaining that his 30.30 motion was filed on October 22, 2025; however, it was rejected
on September 22, 2025); see also Am. Pet. at 5 (indicating that petitioner’s 30.30 motion was
filed on “October 22, 2025 – October 29, 2025 – March 5, 2025”). 	Petitioner states that his
motion was rejected by the state court; however, the date of the attached letter from the trial
Here, peƟƟoner is not yet in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court. Instead, he is awaiƟng his criminal trial
and subject to pretrial detenƟon. Therefore, secƟon 2241 is the more appropriate provision under which to consider the
present pleading.
2 “VINE is the naƟon’s leading vicƟm noƟficaƟon network [which] allows [the general public] . . . to access Ɵmely and
reliable informaƟon about offenders or criminal cases in U.S. jails and prisons.” VINE available at
hƩps://www.vinelink.com/.
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court rejecting petitioner’s pro se motion predates the range of dates which petitioner
provides for when his 30.30 was filed. See Am. Pet. at 2, 3, 5; see also Am. Pet. at 13
(correspondence from the Oneida County Court Judge, dated September 22, 2025,
explaining that the trial court will not accept pro se motions from a represented criminal
defendant). Thus, it is unclear whether the rejection letter is, in fact, related to the 30.30
motion. Regardless, it does not appear that this was the first time one of petitioner’s pro se
motions had been denied by the trial judge since petitioner also attaches another letter from
the trial court, dated March 31, 2025, which also returns a rejected pro se motion. See Am.
Pet. at 10 (correspondence from the Oneida County Court Judge explaining that the court will
not accept pro se motions from a represented criminal defendant). Neither of the trial court’s
letters identifies the type of pro se motion that was filed or the kind of relief the motion sought.
It is also unclear whether any of these motions were subsequently re-filed by petitioner’s
criminal attorney.
Petitioner seeks federal habeas relief because (1) the “District Attorney continues to
prosecute [petitioner] on a dismissed indictment,” Am. Pet. at 6; (2) the prosecution and
presiding state court judge “used tactical advantages to adjourn and delay [pretrial hearings]
well over (103) days[,]” id.; and (3) the prosecution has “[f]ail[ed] to prosecute [petitioner]
pursuant to 30.30(1)(a)[,]” id. Petitioner seeks his immediate release, due to speedy trial
violations, and dismissal of the second indictment “with no other resubmissions.” Id. at 7.
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Younger doctrine
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Petitioner seeks absolution from his pending criminal case in the Oneida County
Court. Specifically, petitioner asks this court to dismiss a pending state court indictment and
release petitioner. Am. Pet. at 7.
"Under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), a federal district court must abstain
from adjudicating claims seeking to dismiss or enjoin pending state criminal proceedings."
Griffin v. Warden of Otis Bantum Corr. Ctr., No. 1:20-CV-1707, 2020 WL 1158070, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2020). Specifically, the court considers whether “three conditions are met:
(1) there is an ongoing state proceeding; (2) an important state interest is implicated in that
proceeding; and (3) the state proceeding affords the federal plaintiff an adequate opportunity
for judicial review of the federal constitutional claims.” Diamond "D" Constr. Corp. v.
McGowan, 282 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2002).
Here, petitioner acknowledges that there is an ongoing state court proceeding.
Second, the Second Circuit has stated that “[t]here is no question that [an] ongoing
prosecution implicates important state interests[.]” Davis v. Lansing, 851 F.2d 72, 76 (2d Cir.
1988). Finally, petitioner has not argued, and there is no reason to conclude, that the state
court proceedings available to petitioner fail to provide him with an adequate opportunity for
judicial review. Accordingly, with respect to claims that involve his pending state criminal
proceedings, like the lawfulness or sufficiency of the charging documents, this Court must
abstain. 3
In sum, petitioner cannot use a federal habeas action to attempt to circumvent the
state criminal trial process. See Blanchard v. New York, No. 9:18-CV-0448 (GTS/CFH), 2018
3 The Second Circuit has noted that under certain "unusual circumstance[s]" excepƟons to the Younger doctrine may
apply. See Diamond "D" Constr. Corp., 282 F.3d at 198. However, peƟƟoner fails to argue, and the undersigned cannot
idenƟfy, any such excepƟons here.
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WL 2324054, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. May 22, 2018) (citing cases). "If [petitioner] wishes to litigate
the claims raised in this [petition] or raise objections to the ongoing criminal proceedings, he
should file the appropriate motion in the criminal action." Thomas v. Ramos, No. 1:20-CV-
3422, 2020 WL 2192716, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2020). Furthermore, "if [petitioner] is not
satisfied with the result, he may raise the issue on direct appeal," or in a proper habeas
petition thereafter. Id.4
B. 	Exhaustion
Even if petitioner’s claims are not barred by the Younger abstention doctrine, they are
premature. Regardless of whether petitioner makes these challenges right now, as a pretrial
detainee, or later, in the event he becomes a convicted state inmate, he would still have to
exhaust his challenges in state court. See Blanchard, 2018 WL 2324054, at *2-*3
(concluding that failure to exhaust under either § 2254 or § 2241 renders the petition
premature); Harrison v. Wolcott, No. 6:20-CV-6270, 2020 WL 3000389, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. June
4, 2020) (explaining the differences between exhaustion of a § 2254 petition and a § 2241
petition and concluding that exhaustion is required in both instances).
“[T]o fully exhaust his claims, petitioner ‘must give the state courts one full opportunity
to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s established
appellate review process.’” Blanchard, 2018 WL 2324054, at *5 (citing O'Sullivan v.
Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999)).
Here, petitioner seems to be sporadically engaging in state court challenges.
However, it is unclear what the procedural posture of those challenges are. While there have
4 While the Ramos case involved a peƟƟoner seeking the federal court's involvement, via a federal habeas corpus peƟƟon,
in a pending federal criminal maƩer, the undersigned can think of no reason why the same logic would not apply when the
peƟƟoner is seeking a federal court's involvement, via a habeas peƟƟon, in a pending state criminal maƩer.
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been attempts to commence various state court actions, it is unclear whether they have
ultimately been properly initiated. Further, it appears none have been appealed to the
highest level available. While both petitioner and his counsel have engaged in at least some
pretrial motion practice, the undersigned is mindful that "a petitioner may not attempt to
litigate constitutional defenses prematurely in federal court." Blanchard, 2018 WL 2324054,
at *5 (citing cases).
In sum, petitioner does not allege that he has fully exhausted his available state court
remedies before filing the instant petition. Accordingly, to the extent the petition could be
liberally construed to include additional claims outside of a direct challenge to the pending
state court criminal charges, the petition is dismissed without prejudice as premature and
unexhausted. Petitioner may re-file any claims, not related to dismissal of his pending state
prosecution, once petitioner's claims have been fully exhausted and the state court
proceedings have concluded.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, it is
ORDERED that the Petition, Dkt. No. 1, is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and it
is further
ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to serve a copy of this Order on petitioner in
accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 10, 2025
Albany, NY
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