Simpson v. Loricchioandola et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
THEODORE SIMPSON,
Plaintiff,
9:25-CV-0545
v. 	(GTS/TWD)
ANN E. LORICCHIOANDOLA, et al.,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
THEODORE SIMPSON
Plaintiff, pro se
96-A-3862
Eastern NY Correctional Facility
Box 338
Napanoch, NY 12458
HON. LETITIA JAMES 	SHAWN C. GRAHAM, ESQ.
New York State Attorney General 	Ass't Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants
The Capitol
Albany, NY 12224
GLENN T. SUDDABY
Senior United States District Judge
DECISION and ORDER
I. 	INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Theodore Simpson commenced this action by filing a pro se civil rights
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"), together with an application to
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proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP"). Dkt. No. 1 ("Compl."); Dkt. No. 2 ("IFP Application"). By
Decision and Order entered on June 25, 2025, the Court granted the IFP Application,
reviewed the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b),
dismissed certain claims without prejudice, and found that plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment
medical indifference claims against Doctor Loricchioandola, Doctor Solomon Sarra, and
Doctor Guzman survived sua sponte review. See Dkt. No. 4 (“June 2025 Order”).
Thereafter, plaintiff filed, among other things, an amended complaint. Dkt. No. 20
("Am. Compl."). By Decision and Order entered on December 9, 2025, the amended
complaint was accepted for filing, and the following claims survived sua sponte review: (1)
plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claims against defendants Trone, Nurse Faulkner, and
Dr. Loricchioandola; and (2) plaintiff's Eighth Amendment medical indifference claims against
defendants Trone, Nurse T. Faulkner, Dr. Loricchioandola, Dr. Guzman, and Dr. Sarra. Dkt.
No. 24.
Presently before the Court is plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. Dkt. No. 21
("Motion for Injunctive Relief"). Counsel has opposed the motion. Dkt. No. 22.
II. 	MOTION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
A. 	Overview of Plaintiff's Motion for Injunctive Relief
Plaintiff seeks an order “direct[ing] (ALL) staff personnel [at Eastern Correctional
Facility] not to interrupt [his] medical care and M.A.T. treatment[,] [w]hich [he] receives
for extreme and chronic pain management, and other medically known chronic pain issues.”
See Motion for Injunctive Relief at 1. Plaintiff bases his request on allegations that
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“a new trainee nurse falsified information” on October 17, 2025, which resulted in non-party
P.A. Yarsoslava Milov “abruptly stop[ping]” plaintiff’s medication “without consent” from
plaintiff’s primary care physician. Id. Plaintiff further states that non-party P.A. Yarsoslava
Milov has also stopped his medication and threatened him in the past. Id.
B. 	Analysis
"In general, district courts may grant a preliminary injunction where a plaintiff
demonstrates 'irreparable harm' and meets one of two related standards: 'either (a) a
likelihood of success on the merits, or (b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits of
its claims to make them fair ground for litigation, plus a balance of the hardships tipping
decidedly in favor of the moving party.'" Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians v. New York State
Dep't of Fin. Servs., 769 F.3d 105, 110 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Lynch v. City of N.Y., 589
F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)). However, when the moving
party seeks a "mandatory injunction that alters the status quo by commanding a positive act,"
the burden is even higher. Cacchillo v. Insmed, Inc., 638 F.3d 401, 406 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing
Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 35
n.4 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted)). A mandatory preliminary injunction
"should issue only upon a clear showing that the moving party is entitled to the relief
requested, or where extreme or very serious damage will result from a denial of preliminary
relief." Cacchillo, 638 F.3d at 406 (citing Citigroup Global Mkts., 598 F.3d at 35 n.4) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also Tom Doherty Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Entertainment, Inc.,
60 F.3d 27, 33-34 (2d Cir. 1995) (a plaintiff seeking a mandatory injunction must make a
"clear" or "substantial" showing of a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim). The
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same standards used to review a request for a preliminary injunction govern consideration of
an application for a temporary restraining order. Local 1814, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n,
AFL-CIO v. New York Shipping Ass'n, Inc., 965 F.2d 1224, 1228 (2d Cir. 1992).
The district court has wide discretion in determining whether to grant preliminary
injunctive relief. Moore v. Consol. Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 409 F.3d 506, 511 (2d Cir.
2005). "In the prison context, a request for injunctive relief must always be viewed with great
caution so as not to immerse the federal judiciary in the management of state prisons."
Fisher v. Goord, 981 F. Supp. 140, 167 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 846-47 (1994)) (other citations omitted).
Upon review, plaintiff's motion is deficient for several reasons. First, plaintiff has failed
to offer any admissible evidence in support of his claims of wrongdoing, which, by itself, is
grounds for denying the requested relief. See, e.g., Hancock v. Essential Resources, Inc.,
792 F. Supp. 924, 928 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("Preliminary injunctive relief cannot rest on mere
hypotheticals."); Ivy Mar Co. v. C.R. Seasons Ltd., 907 F. Supp. 547, 561 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)
("[B]are allegations, without more, are insufficient for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction."); Fox v. Anthony, No. 6:10-CV-839 (GTS/ATB), 2010 WL 3338549, at *2
(N.D.N.Y. July 15, 2010) ("Plaintiff has submitted no evidence, other than his own speculation
that defendants ... will retaliate against him when they find out that he filed this law suit. The
same claim could be made by any inmate who names corrections officers as defendants in
any action."), report and recommendation adopted by 2010 WL 3338558 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 23,
2010); Groves v. Davis, No. 9:11-CV-1317 (GTS/RFT), 2012 WL 651919, at *8 (N.D.N.Y.
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Feb. 28, 2012) ("Plaintiff's allegations, standing alone, are not sufficient to entitle him to
preliminary injunctive relief.").
Second, plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is based on past harm he experienced
on one occasion, and his apparent fear that he may experience similar harm in the future.
However, injunctive relief cannot be based solely on past harm and speculative, remote or
future injury. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111-12 (1983); Kamerling v. Massanari,
295 F.3d 206, 214 (2d Cir. 2002) (preliminary relief cannot be founded on irreparable harm
that is "remote or speculative"). Rather, a plaintiff seeking to satisfy the irreparable harm
requirement must demonstrate that "absent a preliminary injunction [he or she] will suffer an
injury that is neither remote nor speculative, but actual and imminent, and one that cannot be
remedied if a court waits until the end of trial to resolve the harm." Bisnews AFE (Thailand),
437 Fed. App'x at 58 (quoting Faiveley, 559 F.3d at 118); Garcia v. Arevalo, No. 93-CV-8147,
1994 WL 383238, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 1994) ("It is well settled that an allegation of the
mere possibility of irreparable harm is insufficient to justify the drastic remedy of preliminary
injunction. . . . A party who seeks the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction must
show the alleged irreparable harm to be imminent, not remote or speculative, and the alleged
injury to constitute one that is incapable of being fully remedied by monetary damages."
(citations omitted)); Fisher v. Goord, 981 F. Supp. 140, 168 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) ("A preliminary
injunction cannot be issued based [solely] on past harm."); Haden v. Hellinger, No. 9:14-CV-
0318, 2016 WL 589703 at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2016) (same); Agostini v. Backus, No. 14-
CV-6188, 2015 WL 1579324, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2015) ("Plaintiff's request for injunctive
relief must be denied, since Plaintiff's concern about future retaliation, even if sincere, is
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speculative, and therefore is not sufficient to establish irreparable harm."); Ward v. LeClaire,
No. 9:07-CV-0026 (LEK/RFT), 2007 WL 1532067, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. May 24, 2007) ("Plaintiff's
request for injunctive relief against future threats or harassment by inmates and/or prison
officials is too speculative to meet the irreparable harm requirement.").
Third, insofar as plaintiff seeks injunctive relief directing one or more officials to not
interfere with his access to medication, the request is, in essence, a request that these
officials obey the law. "Obey the law" injunctions are vague, do not require a defendant to do
anything more than that already imposed by law, subject the defendant to contempt rather
than statutorily prescribed sanctions, and are not readily capable of enforcement. As such,
these injunctions are not favored. N.L.R.B. v. Express Pub. Co., 312 U.S. 426, 435-36
(1941); see also Rowe v. New York State Division of Budget, No. 1:11-CV-1150 (LEK/DRH),
2012 WL 4092856, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2012); New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation,
560 F. Supp. 2d 186, 189 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). According to the Second Circuit, "'[u]nder Rule
65(d), an injunction must be more specific than a simple command that the defendant obey
the law."" S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Clorox Co., 241 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting
Peregrine Myanmar Ltd. v. Segal, 89 F.3d 41, 51 (2d Cir. 1996)).
Fourth, insofar as plaintiff seeks injunctive relief against non-party officials who
stopped or interfered with plaintiff’s access to certain medication, a request for injunctive
relief against non-parties is available only under very limited circumstances, none of which
are clearly present here. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2); Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Reinert &
Duree, P.C., 191 F.3d 297, 302-03 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Regan, 858 F.2d 115, 120
(2d Cir. 1988); see also In re Rationis Enterprises, Inc. of Panama, 261 F.3d 264, 270 (2d
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Cir. 2001) ("A court may not grant a final, or even an interlocutory, injunction over a party
over whom it does not have personal jurisdiction.").
For all of these reasons, plaintiff's request for injunctive relief is denied without
prejudice.
III. 	CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, it is hereby
ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief (Dkt. No. 21) is DENIED without
prejudice as set forth above; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk serve a copy of this Decision and Order on the plaintiff.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 29, 2025
Syracuse, NY
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