Nason v. Franklin County et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Rob Rickner, Esq., for Plaintiff
Stephen M. Groudine, Esq., for Defendants
Hon. Elizabeth C. Coombe, United States District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Bonnie Nason, as administrator of the Estate of Alisha Patricia Nason (Nason),
began this action by filing a Complaint against Defendants Franklin County (County), the Franklin
County Sheriff’s Department (Sheriff’s Department), Glenn Schroyer,1 Lisa Clark, and three
unidentified individuals on April 4, 2025. Complaint (Compl.), Dkt. No. 1. The Complaint alleges
violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New York
state law in connection with Nason’s death while detained in the Franklin County Jail.
Presently before the Court is a motion to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) filed by the named defendants (Defendants). Dkt. No. 7.
1 The Complaint does not spell Schroyer’s name consistently, and this decision uses the spelling
in the caption.
BONNIE NASON, as Administrator of the
Estate of Alisha Patricia Nason,
Plaintiff,
v.
FRANKLIN COUNTY, FRANKLIN
COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT,
GLENN SCHROYER, MD, LISA CLARK,
RN, and JOHN/JANE DOES 1-3,
Defendants.
9:25-cv-435
(ECC/CBF)
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The motion is fully briefed. See Dkt. Nos. 7-9, 12, 13. For the following reasons, the motion to
dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.
I. 	FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2
On December 27, 2023, Nason3 “was first incarcerated in the Franklin County Jail.”
Compl. ¶ 16. “Nason suffered from opiate addiction and had been receiving methadone to manage
the illness.” Id. Defendants Glenn Shroyer, MD and Lisa Clark, RN provided medical care at the
jail. Id. at ¶¶ 13, 14.
On approximately January 4, 2024, Defendant Schroyer prescribed “Sublocade in place of
methadone” for Plaintiff. 	Compl. ¶ 17. 	“Sublocade is an opiate addiction management
medication that only requires an injection every 30 days” and “releases buprenorphine slowly over
time.” 	Id. at ¶ 18. 	“Sublocade has a Food and Drug Administration (‘FDA’) required Risk
Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (‘REMS’).” Id. at ¶ 20. 	“A REMS is a strategy to manage
known or potential risks associated with a drug and is required by the FDA to ensure the benefits
of the drug outweigh its risks.” Id. 	“Sublocade is administered monthly only by subcutaneous
injection in the abdominal region by a healthcare provider and is only available through a restricted
distribution called the Sublocade REMS.” Id.
“Sublocade operates by creating a mass in the injection site.” Compl. ¶ 22. “It must be
injected subcutaneously into the patient’s abdomen.” 	Id. 	“There, the medication forms a solid
mass that dissolves over time.” Id. “The training to administer Sublocade comes with multiple
2 These facts are drawn from the Complaint. The Court assumes the truth of, and draws reasonable
inferences from, the well-pleaded factual allegations, see Lynch v. City of New York, 952 F.3d 67,
74–75 (2d Cir. 2020), but does not accept as true any legal conclusions, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
3 “Nason was a transgender man who was receiving gender-affirming care, and went by J.B.
Nason, but as of the time of his death had not changed his name.” Compl. ¶ 10. Consistent with
the Complaint, masculine pronouns are used for Nason.
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stark warnings.” Id. at ¶ 23. 	“If it is injected intramuscularly, it dissolves faster than it should,
causing an overdose.” 	Id. 	“If injected intravenously, or allowed to otherwise leak into the
bloodstream, the medication becomes clots that can cause numerous problems, like pulmonary
embolisms.” Id. Those “trained to administer Sublocade learn[] one lesson, repeatedly: Sublocade
is administered monthly only by subcutaneous injection in the abdominal region.” Id. at ¶ 24. “An
injection anywhere else carries a serious risk of death.” 	Id. 	After “Sublocade is administered,
particularly for the first time, the patient must be monitored carefully for signs of respiratory
distress, overdose, and other serious symptoms.” 	Id. at ¶ 25. 	“The manufacturer encourages
Narcan prescriptions along with Sublocade, so that an overdosing patient can save themselves in
the event the medication dissolves too quickly.” Id.
“On January 6, 2024, at 10:35 a.m., Nurse Clark gave . . . Nason a 300mg injection of
Sublocade intramuscularly,” and not “subcutaneously in the abdomen,” creating “an immediate
danger of death by overdose and embolisms from blood clots.” Compl. ¶ 26. “Nason was then
left without any medical staff to monitor him, and without Narcan.” Id. at ¶ 27. “By the evening,
he started feeling sick and demonstrating obvious signs of overdose, and he asked for medical help
repeatedly, but his requests were ignored, either because there was no medical staff, or because
the correction officers did not want to get” him help. Id. at ¶ 28. “The Sublocade was dissolving
too quickly, giving him 30 days of medication all at once.” Id. at ¶ 29. “Nason died within 24
hours of receiving the Sublocade injection.” Id. at ¶ 30. 	“Nason died from lethal levels of
buprenorphine, the active ingredient in Sublocade, and from fluid collecting in his lungs.” Id. at
¶ 29.
On April 2, 2024, Plaintiff, as proposed administrator of Nason’s estate, served the County
with a notice of claim for injuries that “includ[ed] physical and emotional pain and suffering before
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death, wrongful death, loss of enjoyment of life, and economic damages.” 4 Dkt. No. 7-2 at 1, 2.5
On December 23, 2024, the Franklin County Surrogate’s Court filed a decree granting
letters of administration with limitations to Plaintiff as administrator of Nason’s estate, “limited to
the prosecution and defense of the cause of action set forth in the petition.” Dkt. No. 7-8 at 1. The
petition included a “[l]awsuit against state of NY for wrongful death.”6 Id. at 3. On March 19,
2025, Plaintiff, as “Administrator” of Nason’s estate, served an “amended notice of claim” on
Franklin County. Dkt. No. 7-6 at 1.
On October 2, 2025, more than two months after Defendants filed their motion to dismiss,
the Surrogate’s Court filed an amended decree granting letters of administration to Plaintiff as
Administrator of Nason’s estate, “limited to the prosecution and defense of the cause of action set
forth in the petition.” Dkt. No. 12-2 at 1. 	The attached petition included a “[l]awsuit against
County of Franklin for causes of action, inter alia, medical negligence, negligent hiring, wrongful
death, violations of the United States Constitution and New York State Constitution, and, to the
extent necessary, fil[ing] a late notice of claim.” Dkt. No. 12-2 at 3.
4 The Court takes judicial notice of the notices of claim as documents incorporated by reference in
the Complaint and integral to it. See DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir.
2010) (“In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a
district court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint
as exhibits, and documents incorporated by reference in the complaint.”); Subaru Distributors
Corp. v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 425 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 2005) (“In determining the adequacy of
the complaint, the court may consider any written instrument attached to the complaint as an
exhibit or incorporated in the complaint by reference, as well as documents upon which the
complaint relies and which are integral to the complaint.”).
5 Unless otherwise noted, citations to page numbers refer to pagination generated by the Court’s
ECF system.
6 The Court takes judicial notice of the decree granting letters of administration and the decree
granting amended letters of administration as public records. See Williams v. New York City Hous.
Auth., 816 F. App’x 532, 534 (2d Cir. 2020) (noting that courts “may consider public records that
may be judicially noticed in ruling on motions made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure”).
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
“A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1)
when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Makarova v.
United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)). “In resolving a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the district court must take all uncontroverted facts in the
complaint . . . as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party asserting
jurisdiction.” Tandon v. Captain’s Cove Marina of Bridgeport, Inc., 752 F.3d 239, 243 (2d Cir.
2014) (citation omitted). 	A court may also “refer to evidence outside the pleadings” and “take
judicial notice of documents in the public record, including state court filings.” Krajisnik Soccer
Club, Inc. v. Krajisnik Football Club, Inc., No. 20-cv-1140 (LEK/TWD), 2021 WL 2142924, at
*2 (N.D.N.Y. May 26, 2021) (quoting Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113 and Windward Bora, LLC v.
Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. 19-cv-858, 2020 WL 7042761, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2020)).
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
“a complaint must provide ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Citigroup, Inc., 709 F.3d 129, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 	“Although a complaint need not contain
detailed factual allegations, it may not rest on mere labels, conclusions, or a formulaic recitation
of the elements of the cause of action, and the factual allegations ‘must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.’” Lawtone-Bowles v. City of New York, No. 16-cv-4240, 2017
WL 4250513, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2017) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A court must
accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences
in the plaintiff’s favor. See EEOC v. Port Auth., 768 F.3d 247, 253 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing ATSI
Comm’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007)). However, “the tenet that a
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court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
III. 	DISCUSSION
The Complaint asserts two federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants: (1)
deprivation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, Compl. at ¶¶ 34–40 and (2) failure
to intervene and conspiracy to deprive Nason of his rights, id. at ¶¶ 41–46. The Complaint also
asserts three claims under New York law: (1) medical negligence against all Defendants except
the Sheriff’s Department, id. at ¶¶ 47–51; (2) negligent hiring, screening, retention, supervision,
and training against the County and the Sheriff’s Department, id. at ¶¶ 52–23; and (3) deprivation
of due process under the New York State Constitution against all Defendants, id. at ¶¶ 54–57.
A. Jurisdiction
Defendants move to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because (1) Plaintiff was
not the duly appointed administrator of Nason’s estate when she filed the Complaint, Defendants’
Memorandum of Law (Def. Mem.) at 10–11, Dkt. No. 7-9, and (2) regarding the state law claims,
Plaintiff did not comply with New York’s notice of claim requirements for suits against
municipalities,7 id. at 8–10. Plaintiff responds that (1) although “the letters of administration had
a technical defect,” that defect has been corrected, and at most, that defect affects capacity to sue,
a non-jurisdictional requirement, Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law (Pl. Mem.) at 14–15, Dkt. No.
12, and (2) the New York State Court of Appeals has plainly decided that next of kin may serve
notices of claim, id. at 11.
7 Defendants do not explicitly state that this is a jurisdictional argument, and there appears to be a
split in authority about whether New York’s notice of claim requirements are jurisdictional or
procedural, Yennard v. Herkimer BOCES, No. 6:16-cv-556 (GTS/ATB), 2017 WL 11317859, at
*14 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2017) (collecting cases), but it is not necessary to reach that issue.
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1. 	Notice of Claim
Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not comply with New York County Law § 52 and New
York General Municipal Law § 50-e because she was only a proposed administrator of Nason’s
estate when she first served the County with a notice of claim, and although she was the
administrator of Nason’s estate when she served the amended notice of claim, her authority was
limited to a suit against New York State. Def. Mem. 8–10. According to Defendants, “a notice of
claim alleging wrongful death may only be filed after ‘the appointment of a representative of the
decedent’s estate.’” Id. at 9 (quoting New York General Municipal Law § 50-e). Plaintiff responds
that the New York State Court of Appeals decided this issue in Winbush v. City of Mount Vernon,
306 N.Y. 327 (1954), and next of kin may serve a notice of claim on municipalities in wrongful
death actions before appointment as an administrator. 	Pl. Mem. 11–12. 	Defendants reply that
“[c]ourts in New York State, well after” Winbush “have repeatedly and recently held that a
proposed administrator does not have the legal capacity to act on behalf of an estate” for notice of
claim purposes, citing decisions from Orange and Nassau County Courts. 	Defendants’ Reply
Memorandum of Law (Def. Reply) at 4, Dkt. No. 13.
New York County Law § 52 states: “[a]ny claim or notice of claim against a county for . . .
injury or death . . . alleged to have been caused or sustained in whole or in part by or because of
any misfeasance, omission of duty, negligence or wrongful act on the part of the county, its
officers, agents, servants or employees, must be made and served in compliance with [New York
General Municipal Law § 50-e].” New York General Municipal Law § 50-e states: “[i]n any case
founded upon tort where a notice of claim is required by law as a condition precedent to the
commencement of an action or special proceeding against a public corporation . . . or any officer,
appointee or employee thereof, the notice of claim shall . . . be served in accordance with the
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provisions of this section within ninety days after the claim arises; except that in wrongful death
actions, the ninety days shall run from the appointment of a representative of the decedent’s
estate.”
“The primary purpose of [New York General Municipal Law § 50-e], as often stated by
the courts, is to give to a municipality prompt notice of . . . claims, so that investigation may be
made before it is too late for investigation to be efficient.” Winbush, 306 N.Y. at 333. “While no
one except an administrator or executor may bring a death action, there is no reason, in statute or
in reason, why a person, who is one of the next of kin to be benefited by a death action, may not
file a notice of claim. . . .” Id. at 334; see Cook v. Maine-Endwell Cent. Sch. Dist., 236 A.D.3d
1167, 1171 n.3 (3d Dep’t 2025) (noting that “it has long been established that the next of kin—
and even a nonrelative friend—may file and serve a timely notice of claim”) (citing Winbush, 306
N.Y. at 330–34).
Here, Plaintiff served the County with a notice of claim on April 2, 2024, and that was less
than 90 days after Nason’s death. See Dkt. No. 7-2 at 1. Plaintiff later served the County with an
amended notice of claim on March 19, 2025, and that was less than 90 days after she was appointed
administrator of Nason’s estate. See Dkt. No. 7-6 at 1. Both of the notices of claim were acceptable
because Plaintiff was Nason’s next of kin and served notice within the time period prescribed by
New York General Municipal Law § 50-e.
Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff complied with the notice requirements except that
she served the first notice when she was merely the proposed administrator, and she served the
second notice when she was the administrator, but her authority was for a suit against New York
State. As a result, the gist of their argument appears to be that they received notice too early. Def.
Mem. at 9 (“notice of claim alleging wrongful death may only be filed after ‘the appointment of a
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representative of the decedent’s estate’”). 	But “there is no reason, in statute or in reason” why
next of kin may not serve the notice of claim before appointment as the administrator. Winbush,
306 N.Y. at 334. 	The New York State Court of Appeals has never overruled Winbush, and the
Third Department Appellate Division cited it favorably last year. See Cook, 236 A.D.3d at 1171
n.3. That clear statement of law is binding on this Court. 10012 Holdings, Inc. v. Sentinel Ins.
Co., Ltd., 21 F.4th 216, 221 (2d Cir. 2021) (“In construing New York law, we are ‘bound . . . by
the law of New York as interpreted by the New York Court of Appeals. . . .’”) (quoting Licci ex
rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 739 F.3d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 2013)). The decisions from
lower New York courts cited by Defendants do not affect this. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is
denied on this basis.
2. 	Authority to Bring Suit
Defendants argue that only “the decedent’s duly appointed personal representative” may
bring wrongful death suits in New York, and that Plaintiff “does not have the legal authority or
standing to bring this cause of action,” because when the complaint was filed, Plaintiff was not yet
the duly appointed administrator of Nason’s estate and “the state of NY” is not a defendant. Def.
Mem. at 10–11. 	Plaintiff admits that the letters of administration appointing her administrator
“had a technical defect,” but argues that defect was corrected. 	Def. Mem. at 15. 	Plaintiff also
responds that even if she were not the duly appointed administrator, this would affect only capacity
to sue and that is a non-jurisdictional issue that could be cured by substitution. Def. Mem. at 14–
15.
Standing and capacity to sue are “distinct concepts.” Fletcher v. City of New London, No.
3:16-cv-241, 2017 WL 690533, at *3 (D. Conn. Feb. 21, 2017). 	Standing is jurisdictional and
requires the plaintiff to “have suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is ‘fairly traceable to the challenged
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action of the defendant’ and ‘it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury
will be redressed by a favorable decision.’” Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560-61 (1992)). “[S]tanding in federal court is a question of federal law, not state law,” and “no
matter its reasons,” the fact that a state “thinks that a private party should” or should not have
standing “cannot override [federal] settled law to the contrary.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S.
693, 715 (2013).
On the other hand, capacity to sue, “involves a party’s personal right to litigate in federal
court.” 	Fletcher, 2017 WL 690533, at *3. 	Unlike jurisdictional issues including standing, that
“can be raised at any time, lack of capacity must be raised ‘by a specific denial, which must state
any supporting facts that are peculiarly within the party’s knowledge.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ.
P. 9(a)). Moreover, “[l]ack of capacity is generally not considered jurisdictional and is therefore
waived if not specifically raised.” E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co., 160 F.3d
925, 936 (2d Cir. 1998).
Capacity to sue for a representational plaintiff like Plaintiff, is determined “by the law of
the state where the court is located.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(3). New York law therefore applies
here. See DuBois v. Beaury, No. 1:20-cv-86 (FJS/CFH), 2020 WL 7024393, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Nov.
30, 2020) (applying New York law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(3)).
In New York, for wrongful death actions, “[t]he personal representative, duly appointed in
this state or any other jurisdiction, of a decedent who is survived by distributees may maintain an
action to recover damages for a wrongful act, neglect or default which caused the decedent’s death
against a person who would have been liable to the decedent.” N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law
§ 5-4.1(l). 	A “personal representative” is “a person who has received letters to administer the
estate of a decedent.” 	N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 1-2.13. 	“The Court of Appeals has
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instructed, repeatedly, that [New York’s wrongful death] statute must be construed ‘strictly.’” In
re September 11 Litig., 760 F. Supp. 2d 433, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (collecting cases).
When Plaintiff filed the Complaint, she had standing to sue because she sought damages
for an “injury in fact,” that is Nason’s death, and she alleged that the injury was “fairly traceable”
to actions taken by the Defendants. See Fletcher, 2017 WL 690533, at *6 (explaining that “while
the Estate lacked capacity and was not the real party in interest, it did have standing” to sue for
wrongful death); see also id. at *4 (stating that it was “incorrect” to “equate [a] lack of capacity
with a lack of standing and subject matter jurisdiction,” and refusing to dismiss the complaint filed
by the pro se plaintiff for initial lack of capacity); Purcell ex rel. Est. of Tyree v. City of New York,
No. 18-cv-3979, 2020 WL 2559796, at *6–7 (E.D.N.Y. May 19, 2020) (rejecting argument
“equat[ing] Plaintiff’s lack of a capacity with a lack of standing, which would trigger a
jurisdictional defect”).
Nonetheless, New York law is clear that only a duly appointed personal representative of
the decedent’s estate may bring a wrongful death action. Carrick v. Cent. Gen. Hosp., 51 N.Y.2d
242, 250 n.2 (1980) (“It is well established that the existence of a qualified administrator is
essential to the maintenance of the action and that the statutory right to recover for wrongful death
does not even arise until an administrator has been named through the issuance of letters of
administration.”) (citation omitted). 	When Plaintiff filed the Complaint, she did not have the
capacity to sue because she had received letters of administration, but they were limited to a
wrongful death suit against New York State. 	Plaintiff did not become a qualified administrator
and duly appointed representative until the Surrogate Court issued her the amended letters of
administration on October 2, 2025.
The proper remedy is to allow Plaintiff to substitute herself in her capacity as the duly
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appointed representative of Nason’s estate by amending the Complaint. “A Rule 17(a) substitution
of plaintiffs should be liberally allowed when the change is merely formal and in no way alters the
original complaint’s factual allegations as to the events or participants.” Advanced Magnetics, Inc.
v. Bayfront Partners, Inc., 106 F.3d 11, 20 (2d Cir. 1997). The Second Circuit allowed amendment
where:
First, “[t]he complaint’s only pertinent flaw was the identity of the party pursuing
those claims.” 	In other words, the proposed amended complaint sought only to
substitute one name for another; the factual and legal allegations of the complaint
would remain unaltered. Second, there was no indication of “bad faith or . . . an
effort to deceive or prejudice the defendants.” 	Finally, the proposed substitution
did not threaten to prejudice the defendants, who had timely notice of the substance
of the allegations, the relevant parties, and their claims.
Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v. Hellas Telecommunications, S.a.r.l, 790 F.3d 411, 422 (2d Cir.
2015) (quoting Advanced Magnetics, 106 F.3d at 20–21) (citations omitted). Those requirements
are all present here. 	Plaintiff is therefore directed to amend the complaint within 30 days to
substitute herself in her capacity as the duly appointed representative of Nason’s estate, and the
Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied on this basis.
B. Merits
1. 	Uncontested Claims
Plaintiff does not contest the dismissal of all claims against the Sheriff’s Department
because it is an administrative arm of the County. 	Pl. Mem. at 22; see Arrotta v. Ulster Cnty.
Sheriffs Dep’t/Emps., No. 22-cv-638 (GLS/TWD), 2022 WL 4235463, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 14,
2022) (“[U]nder New York law, departments that are merely administrative arms of a municipality
do not have a legal identity separate and apart from the municipality and, therefore, cannot sue or
be sued.”) (alteration in original) (quotation and citation omitted). Defendants’ motion is therefore
granted on this basis, and all claims against the Sheriff’s Department are dismissed. Plaintiff also
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does not contest the dismissal of the § 1983 claims against Schroyer and the unidentified
defendants. Pl. Mem. at 22. Defendants’ motion is therefore granted on this basis, and the § 1983
claims against Schroyer and the unidentified defendants are dismissed. Further, the Plaintiff does
not contest the dismissal of the § 1983 failure to intervene and conspiracy claim against all
Defendants, Pl. Mem. at 22, and that claim is dismissed against all Defendants. Finally, Plaintiff
does not contest dismissal of the state law claim for negligent hiring, screening, retention,
supervision, and training against the County and the Sheriff’s Department, Pl. Mem. at 22, and
that claim is dismissed.
2. 	§ 1983 Due Process – Deliberate Indifference
a. 	Individual Liability
Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Clark arguing that she did
not sufficiently plead subjective intent, the allegations “reflect at most negligent conduct,” and she
cannot establish deliberate indifference. Def. Mem. at 12. Plaintiff responds that Defendants do
not accurately state the deliberate indifference requirements and that the allegations in the
Complaint demonstrate at least reckless conduct. Pl. Mem. at 16–17.
A Fourteenth Amendment due process claim relying on deliberate indifference to the
medical needs of a pretrial detainee “must meet two requirements: (1) that [the detainee] had a
serious medical need . . . and (2) that [the defendants] acted with deliberate indifference to such
need[].” Charles v. Orange Cnty., 925 F.3d 73, 86 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 105 (1976)).
“[D]eliberate indifference . . . can be shown by something akin to recklessness, and does
not require proof of a malicious or callous state of mind.” Charles, 925 F.3d at 86 (citing Darnell
v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 33–34 (2017)). “Deliberate indifference . . . can be established by either
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a subjective or objective standard. . . .” Id. at 87. “A plaintiff can prove deliberate indifference
by showing that the defendant official ‘recklessly failed to act with reasonable care to mitigate the
risk that the condition posed to the pretrial detainee even though the defendant-official knew, or
should have known, that the condition posed an excessive risk to [the plaintiff’s] health or safety.’”
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Darnell, 849 F.3d at 35). In the context of pretrial detention, a
plaintiff “can allege either that the defendants knew that failing to provide the complained of
medical treatment would pose a substantial risk to [the detainee’s] health or that the defendants
should have known that failing to provide the omitted medical treatment would pose a substantial
risk to the detainee’s health.” Id. Nonetheless, a “plaintiff must show ‘something more than mere
negligence’ to establish deliberate indifference in the Fourteenth Amendment context.” 	Id.
(quoting Wyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 856 (2d Cir. 1996)). “Thus, ‘mere medical malpractice is
not tantamount to deliberate indifference, but it may rise to the level of deliberate indifference
when it involves culpable recklessness, i.e., an act or a failure to act . . . that evinces a conscious
disregard of a substantial risk of serious harm.’” Id. (quoting Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99,
107 (2d Cir. 2000)). Whether a defendant “knew or should have known of the substantial risk of
harm to the detainee is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including
inference from circumstantial evidence.” Id.
Here, Plaintiff has alleged a deliberate indifference claim against Clark. According to the
Complaint, Nason was a pretrial detainee with a serious medical need, that is to have his opiate
addiction managed with Sublocade in a safe manner. The Complaint also adequately alleges that
Clark was deliberately indifferent to that need by alleging that (1) the FDA has a risk mitigation
strategy for Sublocade, (2) training to administer Sublocade includes “stark warnings,” (3) Clark
failed to heed the warnings, (4) Clark administered Sublocade improperly, and (5) Clark failed to
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monitor or treat Nason, resulting in his death. Compl. ¶¶ 20, 23–25, 37. Viewing the allegations
as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor as required at this stage of the
litigation, these allegations are sufficient to allege “culpable recklessness” demonstrating
deliberate indifference. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied as to Clark on the
§ 1983 deliberate indifference claim.
b. 	Municipal Liability
Defendants argue that the Complaint does not allege facts sufficient to support § 1983
liability for the County under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Def. Mem. at
20–21. Plaintiff responds that the Complaint adequately alleges Monell liability based on a failure-
to-train theory. Pl. Mem. at 18–19.
“To hold a [municipality] liable under § 1983, a plaintiff is required to plead and prove
three elements: (1) an official policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a
denial of a constitutional right.” 	Lucente v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 980 F.3d 284, 297 (2d Cir. 2020)
(alteration in original) (quoting Wray v. City of New York, 490 F.3d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 2007) and
citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91).
“To establish a municipal policy, practice, or custom, a plaintiff must provide evidence of
(1) a formal policy endorsed by the municipality; (2) actions taken or decisions made by the
municipality’s policymakers, which caused the alleged civil rights violation; (3) a practice so
widespread that it constitutes ‘a custom or usage;’ or (4) a failure by the municipality’s
policymakers to properly train or supervise their subordinates.” Beckwith v. City of Syracuse, 642
F. Supp. 3d 283, 292–93 (N.D.N.Y. 2022) (citing Green v. City of New York, 465 F.3d 65, 80–82
(2d Cir. 2006)). 	A “pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is
‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.”
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Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011) (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v.
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997)). The Supreme Court has, however, “left open the possibility
that, ‘in a narrow range of circumstances,” a pattern of similar violations might not be necessary
to show deliberate indifference.” Id. at 63 (quoting Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 409). In other words,
the “Court sought not to foreclose the possibility, however rare, that the unconstitutional
consequences of failing to train could be so patently obvious that a city could be liable under §
1983 without proof of a pre-existing pattern of violations.” Id.
As an initial matter, the requirements articulated in Connick apply to motions to dismiss.
See Simms v. City of New York, 480 F. App’x 627, 630–31 (2d Cir. 2012) (affirming district court’s
decision to dismiss complaint and applying Connick’s requirements). Applying Connick here, the
Complaint does not sufficiently allege Monell liability under a failure-to-train theory. 	The
Complaint does not allege any prior incidents of improper Sublocade administration resulting in
death or serious injury at the Franklin County Jail. In addition, the Complaint’s allegations do not
fall into the “narrow range of circumstances” where failure-to-train liability can result from a single
incident because the Complaint does not allege, for example, that detainees regularly receive
Sublocade or that death or serious injury is a highly predictable result of that medication. 	See
Connick, 563 U.S. at 63 (explaining the limits of the exception to the pattern requirement).
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted as to the County on the surviving § 1983
claim.
3. 	Medical Negligence
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s medical negligence claim against the County should be
dismissed because the County cannot be liable under a respondeat superior theory given that the
Complaint does not allege that Schroyer and Clark were County employees. Def. Mem. at 16.
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Plaintiff responds that, drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, she “is obviously claiming
that these Defendants were County employees. Pl. Mem. at 19.
As Plaintiff points out, when deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, this
Court must draw all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor. EEOC v. Port Auth., 768 F.3d 247,
253 (2d Cir. 2014). The Complaint alleges that Schroyer and Clark “provided medical care in the
Franklin County Jail.” Compl. ¶¶ 13, 14. Although the Complaint could have specifically alleged
that Schroyer and Clark were County employees—and may be amended to do so—it is a fair
inference that Schroyer and Clark were County employees. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion is
denied on this basis.
4. 	New York State Constitution Due Process
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims under the New York State Constitution should be
dismissed because they are duplicative of her § 1983 claims. 	Def. Mem. at 21–22. 	Plaintiff
responds that her claim is not duplicative as to the County because no other claim would allow her
to bring a due process violation claim on a respondeat superior theory. Pl. Mem. at 20–21.
“The New York State Constitution provides a private right of action where remedies are
otherwise unavailable at common law or under § 1983.” Allen v. Antal, 665 F. App’x 9, 13 (2d
Cir. 2016) (citing Brown v. State of New York, 89 N.Y.2d 172, 192 (1996)). Even when § 1983
provides a remedy against individuals for a constitutional violation, a plaintiff may still bring a
due process claim against a municipality under the New York State Constitution relying on a
respondeat superior theory. See Buari v. City of New York, 530 F. Supp. 3d 356, 409 (S.D.N.Y.
2021) (allowing a due process claim under the New York State Constitution to proceed on a
respondeat superior theory against a municipality even after dismissing the individual defendants);
see id. (collecting cases).
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Here, the New York State Constitution is the only means for Plaintiff to assert a respondeat
superior theory against the County for a due process violation. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion
is denied as to this claim.
5. 	Punitive Damages
Defendants argue that Plaintiff may not seek punitive damages from government entities
and individuals acting in their official capacity. Def. Mem. at 22–23. Plaintiff does not respond.
See generally Pl. Mem.
Municipalities are immune from punitive damages in § 1983 actions. City of Newport v.
Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981). 	Municipalities are also immune from punitive
damages for actions under New York law. Sharapata v. Town of Islip, 56 N.Y.2d 332, 339 (1982).
Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks punitive damages against the County or the
individual Defendants acting in their official capacities, the motion to dismiss that portion of the
prayer for relief is granted.
IV. 	LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff seeks, in the alternative, to amend the Complaint. 	Pl. Mem. at 21. 	Except for
circumstances not relevant here, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) allows a party to “amend
its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(1)–(2). 	A court should “freely give leave when justice so requires, but it may, in its
discretion, deny leave to amend ‘for good reason, including futility, bad faith, undue delay, or
undue prejudice to the opposing party.’” MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Hereford Ins. Co.,
66 F.4th 77, 90 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Bensch v. Est. of Umar, 2 F.4th 70, 81 (2d Cir. 2021)).
Here, the Court will permit Plaintiff to file an amended complaint within 30 days, but she
may not amend her claims against the Sheriff’s Department because amendment would be futile.
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The amended complaint must substitute Plaintiff as the duly appointed representative of Nason’s
estate. In addition, the amended complaint will replace the existing complaint, and it must be a
complete pleading that does not rely upon or incorporate by reference any pleading or document
previously filed with the court. See Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir.
1994) (“It is well established that an amended complaint ordinarily supersedes the original, and
renders it of no legal effect.”) (quoting Int’l Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 556 F.2d 665, 668 (2d Cir.
1977)).
V. 	CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 7, is GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART; it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims against the Franklin County Sheriff’s Department are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Defendant Schroyer and the unidentified
defendants; Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Defendant Franklin County; Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim
for failure to intervene and conspiracy; and Plaintiff’s state law claim for negligent hiring,
screening, retention, supervision, and training are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; it is
further
ORDERED that any portion of Plaintiff’s prayer for relief seeking punitive damages
against the County or the individual Defendants acting in their official capacities is DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE; it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff is granted leave to amend to the extent authorized in this
Memorandum-Decision and Order; it is further
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ORDERED that Plaintiff must amend the Complaint to substitute herself in her capacity
as the duly appointed representative of Nason’s estate within 30 days.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 18, 2026
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