Houle v. New York State DOCCS et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________________________
WILLIAM LAWRENCE HOULE,
Plaintiff,
-v- 	9:25-CV-54 (AJB/TWD)
GJ KALIES, JANE DOE #1, and
JOHN DOE #1,
Defendants.
_____________________________________
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
WILLIAM LAWRENCE HOULE
Plaintiff, Pro Se
P.O. Box 109
Gorham, NY 14461
HON. LETITIA JAMES 	CHI-HSIN E. ENGELHART, ESQ.
New York State Attorney General 	Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant GJ Kalies
State Capitol
Albany, NY 12224
Hon. Anthony Brindisi, U.S. District Judge:
ORDER ON REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
On January 10, 2025, pro se plaintiff William Lawrence Houle (“plaintiff”), an individual
who was until recently held in the custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and
Community Supervision (“DOCCS”), filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that defendant
GJ Kalies and a Jane and John Doe (the “Does”) violated his constitutional rights while he was
being held at Mohawk Correctional Facility. Dkt. No. 1. Along with his complaint, plaintiff
moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Application”). Dkt. Nos. 2, 3.
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On February 5, 2025, this Court granted plaintiff’s IFP Application and, after conducting
an initial review of the pleading, determined that plaintiff’s § 1983 Eighth Amendment excessive
force and failure-to-intervene claims required a response from defendants, and ordered service
on named defendant Kalies (but not the Does, who were unidentified). Dkt. No. 7.
Thereafter, defendant Kalies appeared through counsel, Dkt. No. 28, and, in lieu of an
answer, moved for summary judgment under Rule 56 or, in the alternative, for dismissal under
Rule 12(b)(6), because plaintiff allegedly failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before
commencing this action. Dkt. No. 29. That motion was fully briefed. Dkt. Nos. 33, 35, 37, 39.
On December 1, 2025, U.S. Magistrate Judge Thérèse Wiley Dancks advised by Report
& Recommendation (“R&R”) that defendant’s motion be denied. Dkt. No. 41. First, after a
review of the factual allegations, Judge Dancks determined that plaintiff had plausibly alleged
claims for excessive force against defendant. Id. Second, as to the question of administrative
exhaustion, Judge Dancks conducted an independent review of the record and determined that,
viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, there was a question of fact regarding whether
plaintiff might have been prevented from taking advantage of the prison grievance process
through “misrepresentation.” Id. Accordingly, the R&R advised that defendant’s motion for
summary judgment should be denied without prejudice to renew after discovery. Id.1
Defendant has lodged objections. Dkt. No. 42. There, defendant argues that the R&R
should be rejected because: (1) plaintiff’s subjective knowledge of the DOCCS grievance system
is irrelevant; (2) the grievance entitled “FPT-1832-23,” which plaintiff admittedly filed, did not
mention any of the alleged misconduct in this action; and/or (3) plaintiff has had “extensive
opportunities to be heard and because a full discovery on the merits would be futile.” See id.
1 Judge Dancks rejected as premature the possibility of an exhaustion hearing at this time.
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Upon de novo review, Judge Dancks’s R&R is accepted and will be adopted. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Although exhaustion is “mandatory,” it is excused where administrative
remedies are deemed “unavailable.” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 639 (2016). As relevant here,
exhaustion is “unavailable” when “prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage
of the grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Hayes v.
Dahlke, 976 F.3d 259, 268 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Ross, 578 U.S. at 643–44).
As Judge Dancks noted, plaintiff indicated in his filings that he was not “fully aware” of
the grievance process, he “was immediately shipped to an isolation chamber,” and was “simply
told” by a prison hearing officer “to appeal to the Commissioner.” Judge Dancks concluded that
these assertions, when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff and if construed liberally in
light of plaintiff’s status as a pro se litigant, tended to indicate there was a question of fact about
whether the prison administrative remedies were “available” under these circumstances.
In his objections, defendant parses plaintiff’s statements more thinly to try to achieve a
result that would be favorable to him. For instance, defendant points out that “availability” is an
objective test, argues that defendant’s subjective knowledge (or his lack thereof) of the grievance
process writ large is irrelevant, faults the R&R for being too lenient to plaintiff, and emphasizes
that plaintiff himself has claimed that the grievance marked “FPT-1832-23” (which was filed at
Five Points, not Mohawk) was his attempt to exhaust the claims in this action.
Those conclusions might be conclusively borne out by discovery. But in light of his pro
se status, the Court agrees with Judge Dancks that, at this early stage, it cannot be said that there
is no dispute of fact over whether “machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation” by a prison
administrator thwarted plaintiff’s attempt to properly grieve the incident. Although a subjective
lack of knowledge does not excuse exhaustion, defendant’s arguments still require the reader to
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draw one or more assumptions in favor of the defendant, e.g., that plaintiff’s lack of knowledge
caused him to fail to properly pursue a grievance, or that, despite his pro se status, plaintiff’s
meager (and perhaps contradictory) pre-answer submissions are a sufficient basis on which to
resolve this issue as a matter of law.
The Court disagrees. At this early stage of the case, the Court is obligated to draw those
kind of inferences in favor of the non-movant. One favorable inference that could be drawn
from this limited set of facts—but certainly not the only one—is that plaintiff was assaulted and
immediately moved to Five Points and/or immediately placed in an “isolation chamber,” and that
these facts, combined with his admittedly limited knowledge of the grievance process, made him
(or would make a similarly situated person of ordinary firmness) susceptible to “machination,
misrepresentation, or intimidation” by officials that interfered with his pursuit of relief. In short,
the Court cannot say on this record that this is the rare case in which pre-answer summary
judgment should be granted against an unrepresented litigant who was incarcerated at the
relevant time.
Therefore, it is
ORDERED that
1. The Report & Recommendation (Dkt. No. 41) is ACCEPTED; and
2. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment or to dismiss (Dkt. No. 29) is DENIED.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate the pending motions and set an answer
deadline.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 14, 2026
Utica, New York.
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