Brown v. New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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BRANDON BROWN,
Plaintiff,
-v- 	9:24-CV-1474 (DNH/TWD)
FAKHR,
Defendant.
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DAVID N. HURD
United States District Judge
ORDER ON REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
On December 5, 2024, pro se plaintiff Brandon Brown (“plaintiff”) filed this
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that defendants violated his rights under the
U.S. Constitution and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (“RLUIPA”). Dkt. No. 1. Because plaintiff had failed to pay the filing fee
or move for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Application”), the Court
initially directed the Clerk to administratively close the file. Dkt. No. 2.
However, plaintiff later filed an IFP Application, Dkt. Nos. 4, 7, the case
was reopened, Dkt. No. 5, and, after an initial review of plaintiff’s pleading,
defendant Imam Fakhr was directed to answer certain claims alleged in the
complaint. Dkt. No. 8. In lieu of an answer, defendant filed a motion for
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summary judgment and/or to dismiss. Dkt. No. 18. Plaintiff was warned of
the consequences of failing to respond to that motion. Dkt. No. 19. But after
the Court extended the deadline in which to respond (at plaintiff’s request),
Dkt. No. 25, other mailings to plaintiff were returned as undeliverable, Dkt.
Nos. 23, 26.
On November 24, 2025, after the motion deadlines expired without any
further word from plaintiff, U.S. Magistrate Judge Thérèse Wiley Dancks
advised by Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) that defendant’s motion be
denied. Dkt. No. 28. Importantly, however, the R&R ordered plaintiff to
notify the Court of his current mailing address by December 19, 2025. Id. If
he failed to do so, the R&R warned plaintiff that “this matter may be sua
sponte dismissed for failure to prosecute and failure to follow Court orders
and directives.” Id.
Plaintiff has not lodged objections to the R&R. The time period in which
to do so has expired. Nor has he communicated with the Court or attempted
to update his mailing address, which he is required to keep current under the
Local Rules. Judge Dancks repeatedly attempted to warn plaintiff that his
failure to keep his address current would result in sanctions, including the
dismissal of this action. Dkt. Nos. 22, 25, 28.
Under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a trial court may
dismiss an action “[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these
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rules or a court order.” F ED. R. C IV . P. 41(b); Tylicki v. Ryan, 244 F.R.D. 146,
147 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) (explaining that “these rules” includes the Federal Rules
and a district’s local rules of practice). Although the Rule itself speaks about
a defendant’s motion to dismiss, it is “unquestioned that Rule 41(b) also gives
the district court authority to dismiss a plaintiff’s case sua sponte for failure
to prosecute.” LeSane v. Hall’s Sec. Analyst, Inc., 239 F.3d 206, 209 (2d Cir.
2001).
Of course, the outright dismissal of a case is a “harsh remedy to be utilized
only in extreme situations,” U.S. ex rel. Drake v. Norden Sys., Inc., 375 F.3d
248, 254 (2d Cir. 2004), and courts should be particularly hesitant to dismiss
a pro se litigant’s case for simple procedural deficiencies, Lucas v. Miles, 84
F.3d 532, 535 (2d Cir. 1996).
Even so, the authority to dismiss an action that a litigant—even a pro se
one—has failed to prosecute “is vital to the efficient administration of judicial
affairs and provides meaningful access for other prospective litigants to
overcrowded courts.” Lyell Theatre Corp. v. Loews Corp., 683 F.3d 37, 42 (2d
Cir. 1982). To determine whether dismissal instead of some lesser sanction is
warranted, a district court must weigh:
(1) whether the plaintiff “caused a delay of significant
duration”;
(2) whether the plaintiff was “given notice that further
delay would result in dismissal”;
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(3) whether the defendant was “likely to be prejudiced
by further delay”;
(4) 	whether 	dismissal 	would 	balance 	“the 	need 	to
alleviate court calendar congestion . . . against [the]
plaintiff’s right to an opportunity for a day in court”;
and
(5) whether lesser sanctions would be effective.
Drake, 375 F.3d at 254. “No single factor is generally dispositive.” Baptiste
v. Sommers, 768 F.3d 212, 216 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
Measured against this general legal standard, this action must be sua
sponte dismissed. First off, plaintiff has caused a significant delay. He has
failed to communicate with the Court since at least June 16, 2025. Dkt. No.
21. Judge Dancks extended the response deadline for the pending motion
and repeatedly ordered plaintiff to update his address. This delay, which
amounts to over four months and is now approaching six, is “presumptive
evidence of lack of prosecution,” N.D.N.Y. L.R. 41.2(a), and courts regularly
find that this factor weighs in favor of dismissal where the delay stretches
beyond five or six months, Sessoms ex rel. V.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2022
WL 511646, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2022) (collecting cases).
Second, plaintiff has been given ample notice and warning that continued
delay would result in dismissal. Judge Dancks repeatedly ordered plaintiff to
bring his address current. These orders were served at the address plaintiff
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left on file with the Court. Although these mailings bounced back, Dkt. Nos.
23, 26, this Court specifically instructed plaintiff at the outset of this action
that he was “required to promptly notify, in writing, the Clerk’s Office and all
parties or their counsel of any change” in his address and cautioned plaintiff
that “failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action.” Dkt. No. 8.
Notably, the warning from this Court did not bounce back. But even if, in
light of these repeated mailings, plaintiff still did not receive actual notice of
the filings instructing him to update his address, the “responsibility for that
miscommunication lies with [him].” Sessoms, 2022 WL 511646, at *2.
Third, defendant is likely to be prejudiced by any further delay, which has
already stretched well into a sixth month. Courts generally presume that the
defendant is likely to suffer prejudice when, as here, plaintiff has caused an
“unreasonable delay.” LeSane, 239 F.3d at 209; Lyell Theatre Corp., 682 F.2d
at 43 (“Prejudice to defendants resulting from unreasonable delay may be
presumed.”).
Fourth, the need to alleviate calendar congestion and move cases toward
trial outweighs plaintiff’s right to receive a further chance to be heard in this
case. Fifth and finally, lesser sanctions would be effective. Plaintiff has been
granted IFP status, which means he almost certainly cannot afford any kind
of monetary sanction (conditional, nominal, or otherwise).
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More importantly, plaintiff has been unresponsive in this matter since at
least June. He has not responded to any of the Court’s orders, instructions,
or directives. There is no indication under these circumstances that a lesser
sanction than dismissal (a sanction that would necessarily come in the form
of a further order) would prompt a different outcome (or even be received in
light of plaintiff’s ongoing failure). See, e.g., Ruzsa v. Rubenstein & Sendy
Attys at Law, 520 F.3d 176, 178 (2d Cir. 2008). Accordingly, even accounting
for plaintiff’s pro se status, the relevant factors weigh strongly in favor of
dismissal with prejudice for a failure to prosecute.
Therefore, it is
ORDERED that
1. The Report & Recommendation (Dkt. No. 28) is ACCEPTED;
2. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 18) is DENIED;
and
3. Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED for failure to prosecute.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate the pending motions, enter
a judgment accordingly, and close the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 22, 2025
Utica, New York.
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