Walker v. McAvoy

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
8:26-CV-1125
(AJB/MJK)
Tyrone Walker,
Plaintiff/Creditor,
v.
Judge Thomas J. McAvoy,
Defendant/Respondent.
Tyrone Walker, Plaintiff pro se
Mithcell J. Katz, U.S. Magistrate Judge
To: Anthony J. Brindisi, U.S. District Court Judge
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER
Walker commenced this action on May 26, 2026, by filing a
Complaint. (Dkt. 1 (“Compl.”)). Walker also filed an application to
proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (Dkt. 2). The Clerk has sent the
Complaint and IFP application to the Court for review.
I. 	BACKGROUND
From what the Court can glean from the Complaint, Walker’s
claims against Senior U.S. District Court Judge McAvoy arise from his
criminal proceeding over which Senior U.S. District Court Judge
McAvoy presided. See generally (Dkt. 1, Compl.). The Complaint
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references various sections of the New York Estates, Power and Trust
Law; New York Uniform Commercial Code; New York General
Obligations Law; and New York Lien Law. Walker also refers to Title
15 of the United States Code, Title 17 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, and Title 11 of the United States Code.
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Walker seeks relief from an officer or employee of a
governmental entity, the Court must consider the sufficiency of the
allegations set forth in the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and
1915A.1 Section 1915(e)(2) of Title 28 of the United States Code directs
that, “when a plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma pauperis, . . . the court
shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that – . . . (B)
the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief.” Ismail v. Albany City Sch.
Dist., No. 26-CV-297 (AJB/DJS), 2026 WL 1266259, at *2 (N.D.N.Y.
1 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h) provides that “[a]s used in this section, the term ‘prisoner’
means any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of,
convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law
or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary
program.”
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Apr. 2, 2026) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)) (internal quotation
omitted), report and recommendation adopted, 2026 WL 1266275
(N.D.N.Y. May 8, 2026).
Similarly, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a court must review any
“complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity”
and must “identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of the complaint, if the complaint . . . is frivolous, malicious, or
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or . . . seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b). The term “prisoner” includes pretrial detainees.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c).
Additionally, when reviewing a complaint, the Court must also
look at Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, which states that a claim for relief shall
contain, inter alia, “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “The
purpose of Rule 8 is to give fair notice of the claim being asserted so as
to permit the adverse party the opportunity to file a responsive answer
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and prepare an adequate defense.” Ismail, 2026 WL 1266259, at *3
(internal quotation omitted).
A court should not dismiss a complaint if the plaintiff has stated
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
While the court should construe the factual allegations in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all
of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Rule 8 “demands more than an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. Thus,
a pleading that contains only allegations which “are so vague as to fail
to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them” is
subject to dismissal. Maurer v. Zulauf, No. 26-CV-359 (AMN/MJK),
2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95196, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2026) (quoting
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Sheehy v. Brown, 335 Fed. App’x 102, 104 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary
order)).
The Court will construe the allegations in the Complaint with the
utmost leniency. See, e.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)
(holding that a pro se litigant’s complaint is to be held “to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”).
III. 	IFP APPLICATION
Walker declares in his IFP applications that he is unable to pay
the filing fee. (Dkt. 5). After reviewing Walker’s application, this Court
finds that he is financially eligible for IFP status.
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. The Court recommends dismissing Walker’s
Complaint with because it is frivolous.
The Court recommends dismissing the Complaint with prejudice
and without leave to amend because it is frivolous.
Even accounting for Walker’s pro se status, the Complaint should
be dismissed sua sponte because it is frivolous. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v.
First East Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363–64 (2d Cir.
2000) (per curiam). To be clear, the Court’s use of the word “frivolous” is
not intended to demean or belittle Walker or his subjective beliefs about
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the alleged harms he seeks to remedy in this action. Instead, the word
“frivolous” is a legal term of art used in federal court when a civil action
lacks “an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
First, a review of the Complaint demonstrates that this civil
action is “factually frivolous.” A civil action is factually frivolous if “the
facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible,
whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to
contradict them.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992).
Walker’s Complaint fits this definition—it is irrational and wholly
incredible. Although the allegations in the Complaint are robust, a
liberal construction of the pleading indicates that Walker has alleged
theories of law have that have no context within the purview of an
action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Compl., pg. 1). For example,
Walker and Senior U.S. District Court Judge McAvoy are not in a
debtor-creditor relationship which most of the allegations in the
Complaint describe. In fact, no relationship of any kind exists between
Walker and Senior U.S. District Court Judge McAvoy.
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Walker’s subjective belief about what purportedly transpired
within the context of his criminal matter—however strongly this belief
may be held—is not a substitute for plausible factual allegations. For
instance, a federal judge’s adjudication of a criminal suit filed in their
judicial district over which they presided is obviously not a valid basis
on which to maintain a § 1983 claim. Where, as here, a plaintiff alleges
only his subjective beliefs and/or conclusory suspicions in the absence of
any supporting, non-conclusory factual predicate, the pleading is
“factually frivolous” and is subject to dismissal. See Baron v. Lambert,
No. 25-CV-166 (AJB/DJS), 2025 WL 1735532, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. June 23,
2025) (collecting cases).
Second, a review of the Complaint demonstrates that this action is
“legally frivolous.” An action is legally frivolous when it is based on “an
indisputably meritless legal theory” or “a dispositive defense clearly
exists on the face of the complaint.” Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage
Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) (cleaned up). Walker’s Complaint
meets this definition. Broadly construed, Walker complains about
misconduct attributable to Senior U.S. District Court Judge McAvoy
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under 42 U.S. § 1983 in the context of a criminal matter over which he
presided.
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the
violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United
States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a
person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988). Walker’s Complaint, however construed, is subject to dismissal
under this general body of law. “Section 1983 creates a cause of action
based on personal liability and predicated upon fault.” Vance v. Peters,
97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 520
U.S. 1230 (1997). A § 1983 claim holds an individual personally liable
for the role their acts or omissions played in violating someone’s
constitutional rights. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.
Here, Senior U.S. District Court Judge McAvoy has absolute
immunity for judicial acts performed in his judicial capacity. See Mireles
v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (per curiam); see also Shtrauch v. Dowd,
651 F. App’x 72, 73-74 (2d Cir. 2016) (summary order) (“Generally, acts
arising out of, or related to, individual cases before the judge are
considered judicial in nature.” (cleaned up)) “Judicial immunity applies
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even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously or corruptly.” Coon
v. Merola, No. 19-CV-394 (DNH/ATB), 2019 WL 1981416, at *3
(N.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2019) (cleaned up). ‘“The only two circumstances in
which judicial immunity does not apply is when [the judge] takes action
‘outside’ [their] judicial capacity [or] when the judge takes action that,
although judicial in nature, is taken ‘in absence of jurisdiction.’” Id.
(citing Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12). Plausibly construed, and extending
Walker the solicitude he is entitled to as a pro se litigant, the Complaint
alleges purported acts taken by Senior U.S. District Court Judge
McAvoy in the context of presiding over Walker’s criminal matter. As a
result, Senior U.S. District Court Judge McAvoy is immune.
In sum, Walker’s action is subject to sua sponte dismissal because
it is factually and legally frivolous.
B. The Court recommends that Walker not be allowed
to amend his Complaint.
Generally, before the court dismisses a pro se complaint or any
part of the complaint sua sponte, the court should afford a plaintiff the
opportunity to amend at least once; however, leave to re-plead may be
denied where any amendment would be futile. See Ruffolo v.
Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993). Amending is
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futile when a plaintiff’s complaint contains substantive problems that
cannot be cured by better pleading. 	See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d
99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
Here, the Court recommends that Walker not be granted leave to
file an amended pleading because any amendment would be futile.
There are no circumstances under which Walker could plausibly allege
a claim against Senior U.S. District Court Judge McAvoy.
IV. CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based on the findings above, it is hereby
ORDERED, that Walker’s application to proceed in forma
pauperis (Dkt. 2) is GRANTED, and it is further
RECOMMENDED that:
1. Walker’s Complaint (Dkt. 1) be DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE and WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as
FRIVOLOUS, and
2. The District Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be
taken in good faith and that IFP status be denied for the
purpose of any appeal, and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide Walker with a copy of this
Order and Report-Recommendation, along with copies of the
unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with the Second
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Circuit decision in Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per
curiam).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen (14)
days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report.2
Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE
TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE
REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v.
Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.
Dated: June 10, 2026.
2 If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Report-Recommendation and
Order by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period,
meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the Report-Recommendation
and Order was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d). If the
last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then
the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday,
Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C).
_________________________
Hon. Mitchell J. Katz
U.S. Magistrate Judge
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Ismail v. Albany City School District, Slip Copy (2026)
2026 WL 1266259
WESTLAW © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
2026 WL 1266259
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, N.D. New York.
Salim S. ISMAIL, Plaintiff,
v.
ALBANY CITY SCHOOL
DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.
1:26-CV-297 (AJB/DJS)
|
Signed April 2, 2026
Attorneys and Law Firms
SALIM S. ISMAIL, Plaintiff, Pro Se, Albany, New York
12210
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION and ORDER
Daniel J. Stewart, United States Magistrate Judge
*1 The Clerk has forwarded for review a Complaint filed by
Plaintiff. Dkt. No. 1, Compl. The filing fee in this action has
not been paid, but Plaintiff has filed a motion to proceed in
forma pauperis. Dkt. No. 2. That Motion has been granted.
The matter has been referred to the undersigned for an initial
review pursuant to L.R. 72.3.
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT
The Complaint is allegedly brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, 28 U.S.C. § 1343, 28 U.S.C. §
1350, C.P.L.R. § 1411, C.P.L.R. § 7803, 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a),
and 18 U.S.C. § 2441. Compl. at ¶ 19. Named as Defendants
to this action are Albany City School District, Albany City
School District Board of Education, Lynne C. Rutnik, City
of Albany, Robert G. Magee, John Doe, United States of
America, United States Department of Justice, and Pamela J.
Bondi. Id. at p. 1. Ms. Rutnik is identified in the Complaint
as “the incumbent Assistant Superintendent for Secondary
Instruction.” Id. at ¶ 40. The Complaint asserts that “she is
de facto the Attorney General for the Albany City School
District.” Id. Mr. Magee is identified as “the corporate counsel
for the City of Albany,” and is alleged to be “de facto the
Attorney General for the City of Albany.” Id. at ¶ 44. Each of
the individual Defendants named in the Complaint are sued
in their official capacities. Id. at ¶¶ 41, 45, & 50.
The nature of Plaintiff's allegations is unclear. The Complaint
raises issue with “Albany City School District's utter refusal
to enroll [Plaintiff] in the AP Calculus BC Class like [he]
wanted & needed for [his] future.” Id. ¶ 12. According to
the Complaint, this decision was made by Plaintiff's then-
counselor, Laurie Bebb, 1 who allegedly refused to enroll
Plaintiff in the course. Id. ¶ 13. The Complaint also takes
issue with “Albany City School District removing [Plaintiff]
from and refusing to let [him] take the SAT on 4 Nov.
2023 at Albany High School pursuant to their 2 Nov. 2023
stay order.” Id. at ¶ 12. The Complaint further explains that
Plaintiff “was issued a stay away order on 2 Nov. 2023
from Lori A. McKenna, then-Assistant Superintendent for
Secondary Instruction, and Vincent Thompson, then-Director
of Safe Schools and Violence Prevention, that was served
to [Plaintiff] by Albany Police officer Nicholas A. Schuler 2
and a few other Albany Police officers.” Id. The Complaint
also challenges Defendants’ “refusal to send [Plaintiff's]
counsellor letter of recommendation & transcript ... so that
[he] could go to School on a multitude of occasions.” Id.
at ¶ 12. As to this claim, the Complaint states that Plaintiff
asked Ms. Bebb “to sign and send an ED agreement to several
Schools ..., but she refused.” Id. at ¶ 15.
1 Ms. Bebb is not named as a party to this action. See
Compl. at p. 1.
2 Ms. McKenna, Mr. Thompson, and Mr. Schuler are
not named as parties to this action. See id.
The Complaint further alleges that “Albany City School
District[ ] refus[ed] to put [Plaintiff's] summer PreCalc &
AP Calculus AB classes on [his] transcript and remove the
failed PreCalc from [his] transcript,” id. at ¶ 21, and “did
not get [his] money back from CollegeBoard” with regard
to his removal from the SAT. Id. at ¶ 22. According to the
Complaint, Plaintiff was a student at Albany High School
from 2019 to 2023, and graduated in June of 2023. Id. at ¶ 26.
II. GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARD
*2 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) directs that, when a plaintiff seeks
to proceed in forma pauperis, “(2) ... the court shall dismiss
the case at any time if the court determines that – ... (B)
the action ... (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a
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Ismail v. Albany City School District, Slip Copy (2026)
2026 WL 1266259
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claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 3
3 To determine whether an action is frivolous, a court
must look to see whether the complaint “lacks an
arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
In reviewing a pro se complaint, the court has a duty to show
liberality toward pro se litigants, see Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d
605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam), and should exercise
“extreme caution ... in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a
pro se complaint before the adverse party has been served
and both parties (but particularly the plaintiff) have had an
opportunity to respond,” Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37,
41 (2d Cir. 1983) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, a
court should not dismiss a complaint if the plaintiff has stated
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Although a court should construe the factual allegations in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, “the tenet that a
court must accept as true all of the allegations contained
in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id.
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
(citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[W]here
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged - but it has not show[n] - that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “demands
more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-
me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Thus, a pleading
that only “tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual
enhancement” will not suffice. Id. (internal quotation marks
and alterations omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Request for Recusal
The Court first addresses Plaintiff's Letter Motion requesting
recusal. Dkt. No. 3. Plaintiff seeks recusal of all judges in the
Northern District of New York. Id.
“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), ‘[a]ny justice, judge, or
magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself
in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably
be questioned.’ ” Sposato v. Carey, 2023 WL 10365030, at
*1 (N.D.N.Y. July 27, 2023), report and recommendation
adopted, 2024 WL 637423 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2024) (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 455(a)). “In cases where a judge's impartiality
might reasonably be questioned, the issue for consideration
is not whether the judge is in fact subjectively impartial, but
whether the objective facts suggest impartiality.” Lewis v.
Quiros, 2018 WL 11462398, at *1 (D. Conn. Jan. 19, 2018)
(quotation, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). In
other words, “[t]he ultimate inquiry is whether a reasonable
person, knowing all the facts, [would] conclude that the
trial judge's impartiality could reasonably be questioned.” Id.
(quotation and internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration
in original). “It is well settled that a judge maintains discretion
in the first instance in determining whether to disqualify him
or herself, because ‘[t]he judge presiding over a case is in the
best position to appreciate the implications of those matters
alleged in a recusal motion.’ ” Sposato v. Carey, 2023 WL
10365030, at *1 (quoting In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc.,
861 F.2d 1307, 1312 (2d Cir. 1988)) (citation omitted).
*3 Here, in arguing that recusal is necessary, Plaintiff
primarily references prior cases filed by pro se plaintiffs
that were ultimately dismissed, Dkt. No. 3 at pp. 3-6, and
summarily concludes that, consequently, “the prejudice of the
Judges of this Court can reasonably be questioned.” Id. at
p. 4. Plaintiff also takes issue with the result of a prior case
he filed—Case No. 1:24-cv-982 (GTS/PJE)—that was before
a different Magistrate Judge and a different District Court
Judge. Id. at pp. 4 & 6. Plaintiff asserts that, “after seeing” the
way that case was handled, he is “not willing to gamble with
the others to see whether or not they will be the same way.”
Id. at p. 6.
Plaintiff has not, however, offered any objective facts to
suggest that any of the judges in the Northern District of New
York have any personal bias against him. Although Plaintiff
might disagree with this Court's recommendations in prior
actions, “that disapproval alone does not ‘constitute a valid
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basis for a bias or partiality motion.’ ” Sposato v. Carey, 2023
WL 10365030, at *2 (quoting Liteky v. U.S., 510 U.S. 540,
555 (1994)).
The undersigned, therefore, denies the request to recuse
himself from this matter. It is further recommended that
Plaintiff's Letter Motion requesting recusal of all Northern
District of New York judges, Dkt. No. 3, be denied. Having
determined that recusal is not warranted, the Court proceeds
with its review of the Complaint pursuant to L.R. 72.3.
B. Rules 8 and 10
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
a pleading must contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's
jurisdiction ...;
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief
in the alternative or different types of relief.
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). The purpose of Rule 8 “is to give
fair notice of the claim being asserted so as to permit the
adverse party the opportunity to file a responsive answer [and]
prepare an adequate defense.” Hudson v. Artuz, 1998 WL
832708, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1998) (quoting Powell v.
Marine Midland Bank, 162 F.R.D. 15, 16 (N.D.N.Y. 1995)).
Moreover, Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides, in part:
(b) Paragraphs; Separate Statements.
A party must state its claims or
defenses in numbered paragraphs,
each limited as far as practicable to
a single set of circumstances. A later
pleading may refer by number to
a paragraph in an earlier pleading.
If doing so would promote clarity,
each claim founded on a separate
transaction or occurrence – and each
defense other than a denial – must be
stated in a separate count or defense.
“The purpose of Rule 10 is to provide an easy mode of
identification for referring to a particular paragraph in a prior
pleading.” Flores v. Graphtex, 189 F.R.D. 54, 55 (N.D.N.Y.
1999) (internal quotation omitted). A complaint that fails to
comply with basic pleading requirements presents too heavy
a burden for defendants to craft a defense, “provides no
meaningful basis for the Court to assess the sufficiency of [the
plaintiff's] claims,” and may properly be dismissed. Gonzales
v. Wing, 167 F.R.D. 352, 355 (N.D.N.Y. 1996).
Here, the Complaint fails to comply with the aforementioned
pleading requirements and thus does not provide the notice
to Defendants that Rules 8 and 10 require. To illustrate the
insufficiency of the Complaint, the Court provides but a few
examples.
First, the Complaint names as Defendants Rutnik, Magee,
and Bondi, as well as the Albany City School District Board
of Education, the United States of America, and the United
States Department of Justice. See Compl. at pp. 1 & 11-13.
Yet, the Complaint provides no factual support explaining
how any of these Defendants violated any of the named
statutes to support their inclusion in this action. As a result, the
Complaint does not provide these Defendants with fair notice
of the claims being asserted against them by Plaintiff so as
to permit them to assess the sufficiency of the Complaint and
give them the opportunity to prepare an adequate defense.
*4 Additionally, none of the eight “count[s]” contained in
the Complaint indicate which Defendants they are brought
against, and several merge together numerous different
alleged violations. See generally Compl. at pp. 39-52. For
example, “Count 1,” which is entitled “Refusal to give me AP
Calculus BS or to even participate in it,” id. at p. 39, contains
a slew of factual allegations and then summarily concludes
that “[a]ll of that violates Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1), CPLR 3211(a)(2), the 4th Amendment, the 5th
Amendment, the 8th Amendment, the 14th Amendment, and
the UN Declaration of Human Rights Article 26.” Id. at
¶ 187. Similarly, “Count 5,” which is entitled “Unreleased
documents,” id. at p. 46, asserts numerous factual allegations
and then states “[a]ll of that violates FERPA 99.10(b),
New York Education Law 3222(1), the 4th Amendment, 5th
Amendment, the 8th Amendment, and the 14th Amendment.”
Id. at ¶ 226.
The Complaint is also subject to dismissal on the basis that it
fails to state a claim. The Complaint brings suit pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1985 alleging that: “Albany City School District ...
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refus[ed] to give [Plaintiff] AP Calculus BC,” Compl. at ¶ 19;
Plaintiff “did not get [his] money back from CollegeBoard”
after he was removed from the SAT, id. at ¶ 22; and Albany
City School District, the Albany Police Department, John
Doe, and other law enforcement agencies “refused to send
[Plaintiff's] documents as [he] needed to go to School.” Id.
at ¶¶ 23-25. However, “Plaintiff fails to allege any factual
basis to support a meeting of the minds between [D]efendants
to achieve an unlawful end and, further, fails to allege that
[D]efendants acted with an invidious discriminatory animus
to deprive him of constitutionally protected rights,” both of
which are necessary to state a Section 1985 claim. Roberts v.
Fleury, 2024 WL 1242231, at *14 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2024).
Additionally, the Complaint seeks to raise claims pursuant
to C.P.L.R. § 1411, Compl. at ¶¶ 19, 21, & 23, but that is
an affirmative defense pertaining to the amount of damages
recoverable in actions “for personal injury, injury to property,
or wrongful death.” C.P.L.R. § 1411.
Given its lack of clarity, the Complaint is clearly subject to
dismissal. “[A] court should not dismiss a complaint filed
by a pro se litigant without granting leave to amend at least
once ‘when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any
indication that a valid claim might be stated.’ ” Bruce v.
Tompkins Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. ex rel. Kephart, 2015 WL
151029, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2015) (quoting Branum v.
Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991)). Accordingly, the
Court recommends that the Complaint be dismissed, but that
Plaintiff be afforded an opportunity to amend.
The Court advises Plaintiff that, should he be permitted to
amend his Complaint, any amended pleading he submits
must comply with Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Any such amended complaint, which
shall supersede and replace in its entirety the previous
Complaint filed by Plaintiff, must contain sequentially
numbered paragraphs containing only one act of misconduct
per paragraph. Thus, if Plaintiff claims that his civil and/
or constitutional rights were violated by more than one
defendant, or on more than one occasion, he should include
a corresponding number of paragraphs in his amended
complaint for each such allegation, with each paragraph
specifying: (i) the alleged act of misconduct; (ii) the date,
including the year, on which such misconduct occurred; (iii)
the names of each and every individual who participated in
such misconduct; (iv) where appropriate, the location where
the alleged misconduct occurred; and (v) the nexus between
such misconduct and Plaintiff's civil and/or constitutional
rights.
*5 Plaintiff is further cautioned that no portion of his
prior Complaint shall be incorporated into his amended
complaint by reference. Any amended complaint submitted
by Plaintiff must set forth all of the claims he intends to assert
against the Defendants and must demonstrate that a case or
controversy exists between the Plaintiff and the Defendants
which Plaintiff has a legal right to pursue and over which this
Court has jurisdiction. If Plaintiff is alleging that the named
defendant violated a law, he should specifically refer to such
law.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, it is hereby
ORDERED, that Plaintiff's request to recuse the undersigned
be DENIED; and it is further
RECOMMENDED, that the remaining parts of Plaintiff's
Letter Motion requesting recusal (Dkt. No. 3) be DENIED;
and it is further
RECOMMENDED, that Plaintiff's Complaint (Dkt. No. 1)
be DISMISSED without prejudice; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this
Report-Recommendation and Order upon the parties to this
action.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen
(14) 4 days within which to file written objections to the
foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk
of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT
WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL PRECLUDE
APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89
(2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human
Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72 & 6(a).
4 If you are proceeding pro se and are served with
this Order by mail, three additional days will be
added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you
have seventeen days from the date the order was
mailed to you to serve and file objections. FED. R.
CIV. P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period
falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then
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the deadline is extended until the end of the next
day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.
FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a)(1)(C).
All Citations
Slip Copy, 2026 WL 1266259
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Ismail v. Albany City School District
© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
History (2)
Direct History (2)
1. SALIM S. ISMAIL, Plaintiff, v. ALBANY CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants. Additional Party
Names: Albany City School District Board of Education, City of Albany, Lynne C. Rutnik, Pamela J. Bondi,
Robert G. Magee, UNITED STATES, United States Department of Justice
2026 WL 1266259 , N.D.N.Y. , Apr. 02, 2026
Report and Recommendation Adopted by
2. Ismail v. Albany City School District
2026 WL 1266275 , N.D.N.Y. , May 08, 2026
Case 8:26-cv-01125-AJB-MJK Document 7 Filed 06/10/26 Page 17 of 42

Ismail v. Albany City School District
© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
Filings
There are no Filings for this citation.
Case 8:26-cv-01125-AJB-MJK Document 7 Filed 06/10/26 Page 18 of 42

Ismail v. Albany City School District
© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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Baron v. Lambert, Slip Copy (2025)
2025 WL 1735532
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2025 WL 1735532
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, N.D. New York.
Timothy A. BARON, Plaintiff,
v.
John LAMBERT et al., Defendants.
3:25-CV-166 (AJB/DJS)
|
Signed June 23, 2025
Attorneys and Law Firms
Timothy A. Baron, Bronx, NY, Pro Se.
Gregg Tyler Johnson, Johnson & Laws, LLC, Clifton Park,
NY, for Defendants.
DECISION and ORDER
Anthony J. Brindisi, United States District Judge:
I. INTRODUCTION
*1 On February 6, 2025, pro se plaintiff Timothy A. Baron
(“plaintiff”) filed this civil action “in his sovereign and
private capacity” alleging that defendants Otsego County
Court Judge John F. Lambert (“Judge Lambert”), Otsego
County District Attorney John M. Muehl (“DA Muehl”), and
two attorneys from the Cooperstown area named James P.
Ferrari (“Attorney Ferrari”), and Joseph Simons (“Attorney
Simons”) may have violated a whole host of federal laws,
treaties, and constitutional provisions. Dkt. No. 1.
The case was initially administratively closed because
plaintiff had failed to pay the filing fee or submit an
application to proceed in forma pauperis, Dkt. No. 2, but it
was reopened when plaintiff paid the fee, Dkt. No. 4, and
submitted an amended complaint, Dkt. No. 3. Thereafter, DA
Muehl answered. Dkt. No. 14. The remaining defendants have
yet to appear, see generally Docket, and it is unclear from the
existing record whether they have been served with process.
On April 30, 2025, DA Muehl moved under Rule 12(c) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for a judgment on the
pleadings. Dkt. No. 16. According to DA Muehl, plaintiff's
operative complaint is incoherent and cannot be deciphered.
See id. Plaintiff, for his part, has opposed DA Muehl's motion.
Dkt. No. 21. Plaintiff has also filed a panoply of motions and
other documents using the Court's electronic filing system.
Plaintiff's filings include, but are not limited to, an
“emergency motion for mandatory judicial notice,” Dkt. No.
19, a “motion for final judgment or dismissal with prejudice,”
Dkt. No. 22, a series of sealed filings, Dkt. Nos. 24, 26, 28,
34, an “ex parte notice of enforced exit from commercial
control and demand for final restitution and release,” Dkt.
No. 23, a “statement of principle,” Dkt. No. 36, copies of a
“final criminal referral notice, order of dismissal, demand for
restitution, motion to waive fees, venue objection, and claim
for property forfeiture,” Dkt. Nos. 35, 39, 40, and copies of a
“final order and judgment,” Dkt. Nos. 41, 42, 43, 44.
For the reasons explained below, plaintiff's operative
complaint is sua sponte dismissed because it lacks an arguable
basis in law or fact. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319
(1989).
II. DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, plaintiff is entitled to some special
consideration because he is pro se. Broadly speaking, this
means that his pleadings, motions, and other filings must
be held to less stringent standards than those drafted by an
attorney. See, e.g., Ahlers v. Rabinowitz, 684 F.3d 53, 60
(2d Cir. 2012). The Second Circuit has repeatedly held that
pro se filings should be construed liberally, given “special
solicitude,” and interpreted to raise the strongest claims they
suggest. See, e.g., Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 515 (2d
Cir. 2013).
However, even accounting for his pro se status, plaintiff's
operative complaint—whether construed as his initial forty-
eight-page pleading or the shorter, twelve-page amended
pleading that plaintiff submitted after he paid the filing fee—
must be sua sponte dismissed because it is “frivolous.” See,
e.g., Fitzgerald v. First East Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221
F.3d 362, 363–64 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (holding that
“district courts may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte
even when the plaintiff has paid the required filing fee”);
Bayne v. Health Ins. Portability & Accountability Act, 2012
WL 119617, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2012) (collecting cases).
*2 To be clear, the Court's use of the word “frivolous” is not
intended to demean or belittle plaintiff or his beliefs about the
alleged harms he seeks to remedy in this action. Instead, it is
a legal term of art used in federal court when a civil action
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lacks “an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
First, a review of plaintiff's pleadings, documents, and other
filings demonstrate that this action is “factually frivolous.” A
civil action is factually frivolous if “the facts alleged rise to
the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or
not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict
them.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992).
Plaintiff's complaint fits this definition. His initial pleading
begins with a pages-long, seriatim list of federal civil and
criminal statutes, treaties, and constitutional provisions that
run the gamut from comfortably familiar territory, such as the
Fourteenth Amendment or 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, to
areas of federal law that are downright arcane, such as the
“Convention on International Road Traffic of the 19th Day of
September 1949.” See Dkt. No. 1 at 1–3. 1
1 Pagination corresponds to CM/ECF headers.
On the other side of this laundry list of statutes and
constitutional provisions, plaintiff's initial pleading sets forth
an introductory statement where he alleges that:
I, Timothy Baron, am here to establish and lay on the table,
for the record, that I am a living being my blood flows
and my flesh lives. I, Timothy Baron, am Sovereign, and
nothing stands between me and the Divine. I humbly ask
for remedy, cure, and maintenance. I, Timothy Baron, did
not consent to anything the defendants did or wrote about
my person.
With all due care, Plaintiff has continuously been a victim
of discrimination, racial profiling, torture, and abuse by
people who pretend to be officials and officers who
took an oath to uphold the Constitution of the United
States in the State of New York .... The defendants have
also neglected the Plaintiff from exercising his religious
liberty and equal, inalienable rights with their tricks and
schemes. They prohibited the Plaintiff from participating in
interstate commerce through unfair practices and malicious
prosecution .... The Plaintiff did not consent and refused
to be treated in the same manner as the late Martin Luther
King Jr., when “United States” local, state, and federal
government agencies were found guilty of conspiring to
assassinate Dr. King by a Memphis jury, far too late,
in 1999 .... The officials and officers have deliberately
inflicted severe physical and emotional pain on the
Plaintiff. They have retaliated against the Plaintiff for
standing firm against their bullying practices ....
....
As we turn the table around, it has come to light that the
mentally ill D.A. John Muehl was involved in a range
of tricks orchestrated, staged, plotted criminal activities,
malicious prosecution misconduct such as money
laundering, scheme or artifice, staging, extortion, taxing,
self-dealing, arson, trapping, blackmailing, framing,
bribing, collaborating, fixing, kidnapping, trafficking,
monopolizing, exploiting, and organizing crimes with the
aid and accessory of his fraternity, Judge John Lambert,
Judge Lucy P. Bernier, James Ferrari, Joseph Simons
(White Supremacy and KKK members in mock trials,
conflict of interest) and others who failed to intervene.
This discovery highlights the importance of reviewing all
previous cases involving these individuals to ensure they
were handled fairly without bias and prejudice on grounds
of race, color, national origin, sex, religion, age, marital
status, sexual orientation, gender identity, military status,
disability ethnicity or nuisance.
*3 It's time to hold government workers accountable
when they violate and deprive universal rights and civil
liberty, Americans Against Qualified Immunity. Let's
continue to commit ourselves to righting the wrongs of the
past and enforcing existing civil rights.
Dkt. No. 1 at 3, 40 (so in original).
Respectfully, the Court cannot make heads or tails out of
this introductory statement. It does not describe or explain
what did or did not happen to plaintiff, let alone what any
named defendant might have done or failed to do. And rather
than expounding in any level of factual detail, the remainder
of plaintiff's complaint goes on to quote a further series
of legal standards and other principles that might or might
not be related to the generalized accusations levied in his
introductory statement. See id. In sum, plaintiff's initial, forty-
eight-page complaint does not set forth any meaningfully
descriptive and/or non-conclusory factual allegations tending
to establish what might have occurred, or when, or how, or to
whom. See id.
Plaintiff's amended complaint provides even less factual
detail, in conclusory fashion or otherwise. Dkt. No. 3.
Instead, this pleading recites a similarly broad-ranging series
of federal- and state-court cases and statutory provisions,
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including but not limited to the “former presidents act,”
the “hate crimes prevention act,” language suggesting that
plaintiff thinks the United States has filed an unopposed
motion to intervene in this action, and a citation to at least
one case that discusses the “legality of Alternative Organ
Donation Practices.” See id. Again, just as with his initial
pleading, nowhere does plaintiff identify any non-conclusory
factual allegations tending to establish what might have
occurred, or when, or how, or to whom, let alone how one
or more of the named defendants might be responsible for it.
See id.
Plaintiff's other submissions are of a similar thematic nature.
For instance:
Plaintiff's “Emergency Motion for Mandatory Judicial
Notice” cites a similar series of federal legal provisions,
cautions that “time is of the essence,” and seeks a judicial
order finding that “Plaintiff's rights to privacy, secrecy, and
immediate compensation are preserved.”
Dkt. No. 19.
Plaintiff's “Amended Ex Parte Notice of Enforced
Exit from Commercial Control and Demand for Final
Restitution and Release” notifies the “Court and all
parties of an immediate and irrevocable exit from
all unlawful commercial presumptions and declares
that “[a]ny unauthorized bonding, securitization, or
commercial use of Plaintiff's identity, estate, or account
shall be deemed constructive fraud and a breach of
fiduciary duty, triggering immediate redress under equity,
statute, and public trust doctrine.” This filing also
“formally charges all named defendants” with violations of
several federal criminal laws.
Dkt. No. 24. 2
Plaintiff's “Statement of Principle” explains that he “bow[s]
not to men, titles, or artificial authority, but to the
eternal principles enshrined in the Constitution,” cautions
that “[t]his bow is not of submission, but of sovereign
acknowledgement,” gives notice of a “criminal referral,”
and proposes that the Court find that plaintiff has, inter alia,
“lawfully exited commercial jurisdiction.”
*4 Dkt. No. 36.
2 Plaintiff has filed certain documents ex parte.
Those documents were placed under seal by the
Clerk of the Court as a cautionary measure. The
Court has reviewed these filings and determined
that they should be unsealed in light of the strong
presumption in favor of access to court records. See
Brown v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41, 47 (2d Cir. 2019).
In short, it is abundantly clear from plaintiff's pleading,
documents, and other filings that he believes that one or
more actors or entities—perhaps even the named defendants
—have done or tried to do something inappropriate to him,
possibly in connection with their official duties (as a state-
court judge, a county district attorney, and/or private members
of the practicing bar).
However, it is impossible to decipher from any of these filings
what those improprieties might be or have been. Aside from
repeated references to a strongly held but seemingly entirely
subjective belief that wrongdoing occurred, the primary
unifying theme of plaintiff's filings is that they lack any of
the basic factual information that might permit a reader to
plausibly infer that any actionable misconduct is attributable
to any particular party, named or otherwise.
Plaintiff's subjective beliefs about the misconduct of others
—however strongly held those beliefs may be—are not a
substitute for plausible factual allegations. Where, as here,
a plaintiff has alleged only his subjective beliefs and/or
conclusory suspicions in the absence of any supporting
non-conclusory factual predicate, the pleading is subject to
dismissal because it is “factually frivolous.” See, e.g., Nobile
v. Queen Laticia of Spain, 2023 WL 8258336, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 27, 2023) (collecting cases); Liu v. QBE-Commercial
Check #00361360, 2021 WL 4819997, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Oct.
15, 2021) (same).
Second, a review of plaintiff's pleadings and other filings
demonstrate that this action is “legally frivolous.” An action
is legally frivolous when it is based on “an indisputably
meritless legal theory” or “a dispositive defense clearly exists
on the face of the complaint.” Livingston v. Adirondack
Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) (cleaned up).
Plaintiff's pleadings meet this definition. Broadly construed,
plaintiff and defendants are alleged to live and/or work in
the New York State. This means the Court would probably
lack the subject-matter jurisdiction needed to hear this dispute
unless it raised one or more colorable “federal questions,” or
actionable federal-law claims. See Van Buskirk v. United Grp.
of Cos., Inc., 935 F.3d 49, 53–54 (2d Cir. 2019) (explaining
“citizenship” limitation on the exercise of federal diversity
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jurisdiction). As noted supra, plaintiff's initial and amended
pleadings both reference a pages-long list of laws, treaties,
and constitutional provisions. However, because it appears
that plaintiff is complaining about official misconduct that
might have affected his civil rights, the most likely applicable
law is 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
“The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using
the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their
federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims
if such deterrence fails.” Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161
(1992). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege
the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of
the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation
was committed by a person acting under color of state law.”
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
*5 Plaintiff's claims—whatever their precise contours—
would be subject to dismissal under this general body of law.
First, Judge Lambert is entitled to judicial immunity for his
conduct in a state-court proceeding. See Mireles v. Waco,
502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Courts routinely dismiss as legally
frivolous a pro se litigant's § 1983 claims when they are
asserted against a defendant who is allegedly acting in his
judicial capacity. See, e.g., Maltese v. Delta Airlines Corp.,
2024 WL 4581712, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2024) (collecting
cases).
Second, DA Muehl enjoys broad prosecutorial immunity for
virtually any constitutional claims based on his conduct in
a state-court prosecution. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409, 427 (1976). Courts have repeatedly dismissed as
legally frivolous a pro se litigant's § 1983 claims when they
are asserted against the district attorney or another defendant
who is allegedly acting as a prosecutor. See, e.g., Faltine v.
Murphy, 2016 WL 3162058, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 3, 2016);
Gssime v. Kawanta, 2012 WL 3241431, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug.
2, 2012).
Third, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 plaintiff must plausibly allege
that the challenged misconduct constitutes “state action.”
See Fabrikant v. French, 691 F.3d 193, 206 (2d Cir.
2012). “[S]tate action requires both an alleged constitutional
deprivation ‘caused by the exercise of some right or privilege
created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the
State or by a person for whom the State is responsible,’ and
that ‘the party charged with the deprivation must be a person
who may fairly be said to be a state actor.’ ” Am. Mfrs. Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (quoting Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)). But Attorney
Ferrari and Attorney Simons appear to be private actors
who, absent some exceptional circumstances not intelligibly
presented here, cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See,
e.g., Harrison v. New York, 95 F. Supp. 3d 293, 329 (E.D.N.Y.
2015) (collecting cases).
Aside from 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff's initial and amended
pleadings go on to identify a host of other federal statutes
and provisions. To the extent that plaintiff has attempted
to assert one or more civil claims based on any criminal
statute that he has identified, those claims would be subject
to dismissal because a private plaintiff cannot assert them.
See, e.g., Storm-Eggink v. Gottfried, 409 F. App'x 426, 427
(2d Cir. 2011) (summary order) (collecting cases for principle
that federal criminal statutes do not provide private rights
of action). Alternatively, to the extent that one or more of
the remaining statutes plaintiff has identified might provide a
private cause of action, neither plaintiff's initial or amended
pleadings nor any of his other filings give fair notice of what
his actionable claim or claims might be.
In sum, then, plaintiff's action is subject to dismissal because
it is factually and legally frivolous. See, e.g., Neitzke, 490
U.S. 319 at 325. The next question is whether plaintiff should
be given leave to try to further amend. See, e.g., Forjone v.
Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 414 F. Supp. 3d 292, 303 (N.D.N.Y.
2019) (cleaned up) (“[A]lthough district courts in this Circuit
are generally reluctant to dismiss a pro se plaintiff's action
without permitting leave to replead, the Second Circuit has
explained that it is nevertheless appropriate to do so in cases
where it appears that granted leave to amend is unlikely to be
productive.”).
*6 The answer is no. Plaintiff has filed two pleadings and
well over a dozen documents that purport to support his
claims for relief. As discussed supra, the Court has reviewed
each of these filings carefully. None of these filings provide
any indication of a non-frivolous, non-conclusory legal claim
that might be actionable in this forum. Instead, a review
of these filings permits only a single conclusion: plaintiff's
assertions of misconduct—whatever their precise nature and
to whomever they might be directed—are rooted in subjective
beliefs and conclusory suspicions.
Because plaintiff's complaint, his amended complaint, and his
supporting submissions are devoid of any arguable basis in
law or in fact, permitting him to engage in another attempt at
re-pleading is unlikely to be productive. Accordingly, leave
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to amend must be denied. See, e.g., Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222
F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (permitting denial of leave to
amend where, as her, there is no indication plaintiff “has a
claim that [he] has inadequately or inartfully pleaded and that
[he] should therefore be given a chance to reframe”).
Finally, in reaching the conclusion that this action should
come to an end without giving plaintiff an opportunity to try
to further amend (or any advance warning that this matter
appears to be frivolous and an opportunity to try to explain
why it might not be), the Court is mindful of the Second
Circuit's admonition that “[s]ua sponte dismissals without
notice and an opportunity to be heard deviate from the
adversarial system and tend to produce the very effect they
seek to avoid—a waste of judicial resources—by leading to
appeals and remands.” Catzin v. Thank You & Good Luck
Corp., 899 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 2018) (cleaned up).
Even so, the Court concludes that this case falls within
one of the narrow-but-important exceptions that the Second
Circuit has repeatedly recognized: a “dismissal without notice
is permissible when it is ‘unmistakably clear’ that the
underlying case is frivolous or the court lacks jurisdiction.”
Tewari v. Sattler, 2024 WL 177445, at *1 (2d Cir. Jan.
17, 2024) (summary order) (quoting Catzin, 899 F.3d at
82). Indeed, courts in this circuit have almost uniformly
recognized that lawsuits framed in the distinctive language
presented by plaintiff in his pleadings and other filings
warrant summary dismissal. See, e.g., Miller v. Onondaga
County, 2024 WL 2835041, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. June 4, 2024)
(collecting cases refusing to credit “sovereign citizen” or
adjacent legal theories and dismissing those claims as
frivolous); Tyson v. Clifford, 2018 WL 6727538, at *3 (D.
Conn. Dec. 21, 2018) (same).
III. CONCLUSION
This case must be dismissed because it lacks an arguable
basis in law or fact. Plaintiff is cautioned that civil actions
filed in federal court must conform with the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, including Rules 8 and 10, and with the
Local Rules of practice promulgated by each judicial district.
Further lawsuits filed in this federal judicial district that are
deemed factually or legally frivolous will be dismissed and
may be referred to the Chief Judge for additional action.
Therefore, it is
ORDERED that
1. Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED as frivolous;
2. The remaining motions are DENIED as moot; and
3. The Court CERTIFIES pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)
(3) that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and
therefore in forma pauperis status is DENIED for purpose of
an appeal. 3
3 An appellant demonstrates “good faith” for
purposes of the in forma pauperis statute when
he seeks appellate review of an objectively non-
frivolous issue. Coppedge v. United States, 369
U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962). Although Coppedge was
a direct criminal appeal, courts in this circuit apply
this “objective good faith” standard to good-faith
questions in civil matters. See, e.g., Burda Media
Inc. v. Blumenberg, 731 F. Supp. 2d 321, 323
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
*7 IT IS SO ORDERED.
All Citations
Slip Copy, 2025 WL 1735532
End of Document © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
Case 8:26-cv-01125-AJB-MJK Document 7 Filed 06/10/26 Page 24 of 42

Baron v. Lambert
© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
Filings (1)
Title PDF Court Date Type
1. Defendant John Muehl's Rule 12(c) Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings
Timothy A. BARON, in his Sovereign and Private
Capacity, Plaintiff, v. John LAMBERT, in his Official
Capacity as a Stakeholder, in his Judicial and
Administrative Capacity as a Judge, and in his Individual
Capacity, John Muehl, in his Official and Judicial Capacity
as a District Attorney, and in his Individual Capacity,
James P. Ferrari, in his Professional and Judicial Capacity
as a Lawyer, and in his Individual Capacity, Joseph
Simons, in his Professional and Judicial Capacity as a
Lawyer, and in his Individual Capacity, Defendants.
2025 WL 4229106
— N.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2025 Motion
Case 8:26-cv-01125-AJB-MJK Document 7 Filed 06/10/26 Page 25 of 42

Baron v. Lambert
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History
There are no History results for this citation.
Case 8:26-cv-01125-AJB-MJK Document 7 Filed 06/10/26 Page 26 of 42

Baron v. Lambert
© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
Case 8:26-cv-01125-AJB-MJK Document 7 Filed 06/10/26 Page 27 of 42

Coon v. Merola, Not Reported in Fed. Supp. (2019)
2019 WL 1981416
WESTLAW © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
2019 WL 1981416
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, N.D. New York.
Donald James COON, Plaintiff,
v.
Frank MEROLA, et al., Defendants.
1:19-CV-394 (DNH/ATB)
|
Signed 04/08/2019
Attorneys and Law Firms
Donald James Coon, Troy, NY, pro se.
ORDER and REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
Hon. Andrew T. Baxter, U.S. Magistrate Judge
*1 The Clerk has sent to the Court a civil rights complaint
filed by pro se plaintiff Donald James Coon, together with a
motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (Dkt. Nos. 1, 2).
I. In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) Application
A review of plaintiff's IFP application shows that he declares
he is unable to pay the filing fee. (Dkt. No. 2). The court finds
for purposes of this recommendation, that plaintiff meets the
financial criteria for IFP status.
In addition to determining whether plaintiff meets the
financial criteria to proceed IFP, the court must also consider
the sufficiency of the allegations set forth in the complaint
in light of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which provides that the court
shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that
the action is (i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).
In determining whether an action is frivolous, the court must
consider whether the complaint lacks an arguable basis in
law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
Dismissal of frivolous actions is appropriate to prevent abuses
of court process as well as to discourage the waste of judicial
resources. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; Harkins v. Eldridge, 505
F.2d 802, 804 (8th Cir. 1974). Although the court has a duty to
show liberality toward pro se litigants, and must use extreme
caution in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint
before the adverse party has been served and has had an
opportunity to respond, the court still has a responsibility
to determine that a claim is not frivolous before permitting
a plaintiff to proceed. Fitzgerald v. First East Seventh St.
Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that
a district court may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte
even when plaintiff has paid the filing fee).
To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, the complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Bell
Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555). The court will now turn to
a consideration of the plaintiff's complaint under the above
standards.
II. Complaint
Although plaintiff's complaint is very conclusory, a liberal
reading of the allegations contained therein show that plaintiff
is attempting to allege that the Rensselaer County Clerk and
his John/Jane Doe Deputy Clerks have violated plaintiff's
constitutional rights in connection with a state court law suit
that plaintiff has attempted to bring. (Complaint (“Compl.”)
generally) (Dkt. No. 1). In order to understand plaintiff's
allegations in this action, the court must discuss another
action filed by this plaintiff in 2016. In 2016, plaintiff
filed a federal action in this court in which he named
a variety of defendants, including Police Chief George
Bell, the Villages of Cambridge and Greenwich, various
district attorneys, Claverack Insurance Company, Glens Falls
Hospital, Washington County Child Protective Services, and
a police officer. Coon v. Bell, No. 1:16-CV-291 (TJM/DJS).
*2 After initial review of plaintiff's complaint in Coon v.
Bell, Magistrate Judge Daniel Stewart found that plaintiff
failed to state claims against the defendants and recommended
that he be allowed to file an amended complaint in
an effort to cure the deficiencies in the original. (Dkt.
No. 8 in 16-CV-291). United States District Court Judge
Thomas J. McAvoy adopted Magistrate Judge Stewart's
recommendation on May 23, 2016. (Dkt. No. 11 in 16-
CV-291). Plaintiff complied with the court's direction and
filed an amended complaint on May 23, 2016. (Dkt. No. 12
in 16-CV-291).
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Coon v. Merola, Not Reported in Fed. Supp. (2019)
2019 WL 1981416
WESTLAW © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2
Magistrate Judge Stewart conducted an initial review of the
amended complaint and found that plaintiff failed to cure
most of the deficiencies that were in the original. (Dkt. No.
13 in 16-CV-291). Magistrate Judge Stewart recommended
dismissing most of the claims and most of the defendants
from the action, while allowing a Fourth Amendment illegal
search claim and Fourth Amendment excessive force claim
to proceed against defendant Bell. 1 (Dkt. No. 13 in 16-
CV-291). Magistrate Judge Stewart's recommendation was
adopted by Judge McAvoy on November 2, 2016. (Dkt. No.
16 in 16-CV-291).
1 Defendant Bell has since passed away, and his
estate's representative has been substituted as a
party. (Dkt. Nos. 52, 71). Another defendant was
joined to 16-CV-291, and there have been various
other proceedings in that case, but those details are
not relevant to this action.
In Magistrate Judge Stewart's report and recommendation,
he found that plaintiff's defamation claims against defendant
Bell and his attempted contract claims against defendant Bell
and Claverack Insurance Company were, at best, state law
claims. 2 (Dkt. No. 13 in 16-CV-291 at 4). Plaintiff then
states that he “filed said claims” in the Rensselaer County
Supreme Court. (Compl. at 1). Plaintiff states that in 2017,
Judge Andrew G. Ceresia granted plaintiff poor person status,
but that when he went to the Rensselaer County Clerk's office,
defendant Merola told plaintiff that Judge Ceresia's order was
“no good and they wouldn't honor it.” (Compl. at 2). Plaintiff
states that he brought Judge Ceresia's order to the Clerk's
office four more times, and “finally” on March 11, 2019, a
clerk that plaintiff had never seen before stamped the Judge's
order and kept a copy. (Id.)
2 Although plaintiff states in this action that
Magistrate Judge Stewart told plaintiff that the
contract and defamation claims “needed to be
refiled in Supreme Court,” that is not exactly
what Magistrate Judge Stewart said. His exact
words were that “[l]iberally construed, plaintiff
might be attempting to make state law defamation
and intentional interference with a contract
claims. Again, however, Plaintiff's vague and
conclusory allegations fail to plausibly state
such claims.” (Dkt. No. 13 in 16-CV-291 at 4)
(emphasis added). The court merely notes this for
the record. Magistrate Judge Stewart's dismissal
and his language are not relevant to the findings
herein.
Plaintiff alleges that he has been denied his “rightful benefits
and access to the court.” Plaintiff states that he even had “to
choose between the suit or my housing,” and that he was
homeless from January 12, 2018 until April 24, 2018. (Id.)
Plaintiff states that the Rensselaer County Supreme Court
wrote plaintiff “2 times the County Clerk's staff made me pay
for RJI motion I had already paid for. They told me to give
letter [sic] to the Clerk and I would get my monies back.” (Id.)
Plaintiff states that he is seeking “just compensation” for the
Rensselaer County Clerks' actions who refused to recognize
his “poor person status” from 2017 until 2019. Plaintiff
states that he still has not “received anything” from the
“grant[ed] status” because the Clerks refused to grant “my
said status.” (Id.) Plaintiff seeks substantial monetary relief.
(Id.)
III. Judicial Immunity
A. Legal Standards
*3 With minor exceptions, judges are entitled to absolute
immunity for actions relating to the exercise of their judicial
functions. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991). Judicial
immunity has been created for the public interest in having
judges who are “at liberty to exercise their functions with
independence and without fear of consequences.” Huminski v.
Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 74 (2d Cir. 2004). Judicial immunity
applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously
or corruptly. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.12
(1976) (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)).
Judicial immunity is immunity from suit, not just immunity
from the assessment of damages. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472
U.S. 511, 526 (1985). The only two circumstances in which
judicial immunity does not apply is when he or she takes
action “outside” his or her judicial capacity and when the
judge takes action that, although judicial in nature, is taken
“in absence of jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12.
Absolute immunity extends to court clerks who perform
tasks “ ‘which are judicial in nature and an integral part of
the judicial process.’ ” Proctor v. Quinn, No. 19-CV-833,
2019 WL 692935, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2019) (quoting
Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1997)). The
court's “ ‘inherent power to control its docket is part of
its function of resolving disputes between parties’ and is
thus ‘a function for which judges and their supporting staff
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Coon v. Merola, Not Reported in Fed. Supp. (2019)
2019 WL 1981416
WESTLAW © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3
are afforded absolute immunity.’ ” Id. (quoting Rodriguez,
116 F.3d at 66); and citing Pikulin v. Gonzalez, No. 07-
CV-0412 (CBA), 2007 WL 1063353, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr.
5, 2007) (finding that absolute judicial immunity extends to
“the Clerk's Office activities of filing and docketing legal
documents”). However, a court clerk may not be entitled to
absolute immunity where the clerk's refusal to accept the
papers of a litigant seeking to commence an action results in
the deprivation of the individual's constitutional rights. Glass
v. New York Supreme Court Appellate Division, No. 1:17-
CV-226, 2017 WL 9487181, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2017)
(citations omitted).
In determining whether the clerk's conduct in a particular
case is “judicial” in nature, the court takes a “functional
approach” and allows the defendant absolute immunity when
the clerk is performing a “discretionary act, or performing a
duty that inherently relates to resolving a dispute.” Vance v.
State of New York Dep't of Corrections, No. 9:18-CV-748,
2018 WL 6047828, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2018) (quoting
Dzwonczyk v. Suddaby, No. 10-CV-0300, 2010 WL 1704722,
at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2010) (citing Rodriguez, 116 F.3d at
67) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
B. Application
Plaintiff's statements in this case are conclusory and
essentially, he is suing the “clerks” because they would not
file his poor person status order between 2017 and 2019. At
best, he alleges a delay in granting him poor person status
because it appears that a clerk finally took and filed plaintiff's
order, and at the end of his complaint, plaintiff alleges that he
“still” has not “received a thing or any help from the granyted
[sic] status.” (Compl. at 2) (emphasis added). It is unclear
what plaintiff believes he should have “received” or to what
“help” he thinks he is entitled from the clerks beyond filing
his order.
It is also unclear how plaintiff alleges that he was denied
“access to courts” because he states that he filed his state law
claims in the Rensselaer County Supreme Court. (Compl. at
1). However, he claims he was denied his “rightful benefits,”
and that somehow the clerk's actions in delaying the filing
of his poor person order were related to his homelessness
between January 12, 2018 and April 24, 2018. Plaintiff claims
that he had to choose between “the suit” or his housing, but
he does not explain why this is true or why this would be a
denial of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff also states that the
clerks made plaintiff pay for his RJI “motion,” but that he was
told that if he wrote a letter, he would get his money back.
*4 As it is written, plaintiff's complaint is too conclusory
to state a claim against any of the clerks in this action,
whether named or unnamed, 3 and the court will recommend
dismissal.
3 Finally, the court must note that the United States
Marshal would not be able to effect service of
process on a “John or Jane Doe” defendant. In
order for plaintiff to pursue his claims against John
Doe defendants, he would ultimately be required
to ascertain their identity. LaPoint v. Vasiloff, No.
5:15-CV-185, 2015 WL 1524437, at *4 (N.D.N.Y.
Apr. 2, 2015).
IV. Opportunity to Amend
A. Legal Standards
Generally, when the court dismisses a pro se complaint sua
sponte, the court should afford the plaintiff the opportunity
to amend at least once; however, leave to re-plead may be
denied where any amendment would be futile. Ruffolo v.
Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993).
B. Application
In this case, the court will recommend dismissal without
prejudice, even though the court has serious doubts that
plaintiff will be able to amend his complaint to state a
claim. However, because there are situations in which a
clerk would not be entitled to absolute immunity, and
plaintiff in this case has failed to include enough facts
for the court to make an accurate determination, the court
will recommend dismissal without prejudice to plaintiff
submitting an amended complaint.
If the court adopts this recommendation, and plaintiff is
afforded the opportunity to amend, he should be afforded
forty-five (45) days from the date of the order adopting this
court's recommendation. Plaintiff should also be advised that
if he files an amended complaint, it must be a complete
pleading which must supercede the original and may not
incorporate any facts from the original by reference.
WHEREFORE, based on the findings above, it is
ORDERED, that plaintiff's motion to proceed IFP (Dkt. No.
2) be GRANTED for purposes of filing, and it is further
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Coon v. Merola, Not Reported in Fed. Supp. (2019)
2019 WL 1981416
WESTLAW © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4
RECOMMENDED, that the complaint be DISMISSED
based on quasi-judicial immunity and for failure to state
a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and (iii)
WITHOUT PREJUDICE to plaintiff filing an amended
complaint, and it is
RECOMMENDED, that if the District Court adopts this
recommendation, plaintiff be directed to file his amended
complaint or ask for an extension of time to do so within
FORTY-FIVE (45) DAYS from the date of the District
Court's order adopting the recommendation, and it is
RECOMMENDED, that if plaintiff files an amended
complaint within the appropriate time, the court return the
proposed amended complaint to me for initial review, and it is
RECOMMENDED, that if the court adopts this
recommendation, and plaintiff fails to file an amended
complaint or ask for an extension of time to do so at the
expiration of the forty-five (45) days, the complaint be
dismissed with prejudice and the case closed, and it is
ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this
Order and Report-Recommendation on plaintiff by regular
mail.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 72.1(c), the
parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file written
objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be
filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT
TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL
PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette,
984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993)(citing Small v. Secretary of
Health and Human Services, 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(e), 72.
All Citations
Not Reported in Fed. Supp., 2019 WL 1981416
End of Document © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
Case 8:26-cv-01125-AJB-MJK Document 7 Filed 06/10/26 Page 31 of 42

Coon v. Merola
© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
Filings (1)
Title PDF Court Date Type
1. Docket 1:19-CV-00394
Coon v. Merola et al
— N.D.N.Y. Apr. 03, 2019 Docket
Case 8:26-cv-01125-AJB-MJK Document 7 Filed 06/10/26 Page 32 of 42

Coon v. Merola
© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
History (2)
Direct History (2)
1. Coon v. Merola
2019 WL 1981416 , N.D.N.Y. , Apr. 08, 2019
Report and Recommendation Adopted by
2. Coon v. Merola
2019 WL 1978595 , N.D.N.Y. , May 03, 2019
Case 8:26-cv-01125-AJB-MJK Document 7 Filed 06/10/26 Page 33 of 42

| About LexisNexis | Privacy Policy | Terms & Conditions | Copyright © 2026 LexisNexis
Chaim Jaffe
User Name: Chaim Jaffe
Date and Time: Wednesday, June 10, 2026 12:55 PM EDT
Job Number: 286866588
Document (1)
1. Maurer v. Zulauf, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95196
Client/Matter: -None-
Search Terms:
Search Type:
Case 8:26-cv-01125-AJB-MJK Document 7 Filed 06/10/26 Page 34 of 42

Chaim Jaffe
Positive
As of: June 10, 2026 4:55 PM Z
Maurer v. Zulauf
United States District Court for the Northern District of New York
April 30, 2026, Decided; April 30, 2026, Filed
8:26-CV-359 (AMN/MJK)
Reporter
2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95196 *; 2026 LX 293010; 2026 WL 1179721
Rebekah J. Maurer, et. al., Plaintiffs, v. Garrett D.
Zulauf et. al., Defendants.
Subsequent History: Adopted by, Dismissed by,
in part, Dismissed by, Without prejudice, in part
Maurer v. Zulauf, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121215
(N.D.N.Y., June 2, 2026)
Counsel: [*1] Rebekah J. Maurer, Plaintiff, Pro se.
Lauren C. Maurer, Plaintiff, Pro se.
Judges: Hon. Mitchell J. Katz, United States
Magistrate Judge. Honorable Anne M. Nardacci,
U.S. District Judge.
Opinion by: Mitchell J. Katz
Opinion
Mitchell J. Katz, U.S. Magistrate Judge
To The Honorable Anne M. Nardacci, U.S. District
Judge:
ORDER AND REPORT-
RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiffs commenced this action on March 6, 2026,
by filing a Complaint. ("Compl.," Dkt. 1). Plaintiffs
also filed motions for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis ("IFP") and for the appointment of
counsel. (Dkts. 2, 3, 6). The Clerk sent the
Complaint, IFP applications and motion for the
appointment of counsel to the Court for review.
I. BACKGROUND
The Complaint alleges that an officer stopped the
car Plaintiffs were in for an inspection "ignor[ing]
[the] valid inspection." (Dkt. 1, ¶ 4). The officer
"held" Plaintiffs "for about 30 minutes" and
"demanded [Plaintiffs] both to show identification."
(Id.). There was a large police presence and a false
citation was later issued. (Id.). Plaintiffs were "told
[] to try to prove to the judge that [the] inspection
was valid." (Id.). Plaintiffs were "[t]errified and
upset" because of the false citation and the
"excessive police presence." [*2] (Id.). Plaintiffs
allege violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights, and each seeks monetary
damages.
II. IFP APPLICATION
Plaintiffs declare in their IFP application that they
are unable to pay the filing fee. (Dkt. 2). After
reviewing their applications, this Court finds that
Plaintiffs are financially eligible for IFP status.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In addition to determining whether Plaintiffs meet
the financial criteria to proceed IFP, courts must
consider the sufficiency of the allegations set forth
in the complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(i)-
(iii). Courts shall dismiss a case, at any time, if they
determine that the action is (i) frivolous or
malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief
Case 8:26-cv-01125-AJB-MJK Document 7 Filed 06/10/26 Page 35 of 42

Page 2 of 8
may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such
relief. Id.
When determining whether an action is frivolous, a
court must consider whether the complaint lacks an
arguable basis in law or in fact. See Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104
L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989), abrogated on other grounds
by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.
Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1915. Dismissal of frivolous actions is
appropriate to prevent abuses of court process and
discourage the waste of judicial resources. See
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; see also Harkins v.
Eldredge, 505 F.2d 802, 804 (8th Cir. 1974).
Courts have a duty to show liberality toward pro se
litigants and must use extreme caution when [*3]
ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint
before the adverse party has been served and has
had an opportunity to respond. See Fitzgerald v.
First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362,
363 (2d Cir. 2000). But courts must still determine
that a claim is not frivolous before permitting a
plaintiff to proceed. See Id. (finding that a district
court may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte
even when the plaintiff has paid the filing fee).
To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim that is "plausible
on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127
S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). "Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice." Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at
555).
Additionally, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) requires
pleadings to contain a "short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief." Although Rule 8 does not require detailed
factual allegations, it does "demand[] more than an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation." Houston v. Collerman, No. 9:16-CV-
1009 (BKS/ATB), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148106,
2016 WL 6267968, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2016)
(quoting Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678). A pleading that
contains allegations that "'are so vague as to fail to
give the defendants adequate notice of the claims
against them' is subject to dismissal." Id. (citing
Sheehy v. Brown, 335 F. App'x 102, 104 (2d Cir.
2009)).
IV. DISCUSSION
The Court denies Plaintiffs' [*4] motion for the
appointment of counsel without prejudice and
recommends the District Court:
A. dismiss the Complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P.
8 without prejudice and with leave to amend;
B. dismiss the Complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P.
10 without prejudice and with leave to amend;
C. dismiss the Complaint without prejudice and
with leave to amend because the Complaint is
silent as to when Plaintiffs' purported claims
accrued, not allowing the Court to ascertain
whether their claims are timely;
D. dismiss the Complaint against the St.
Lawrence County Sheriff's Department with
prejudice and without leave to amend;
E. dismiss the Complaint without prejudice and
with leave to amend to the extent it alleges a
claim against St. Lawrence County;
F. dismiss the Complaint without prejudice and
with leave to amend to the extent it alleges a
claim against Defendant Zulauf, in his
individual capacity; and
G. dismiss the Complaint with prejudice and
without leave to amend to the extent it alleges a
claim against Defendant Zulauf in his official
capacity; and
H. allow Plaintiffs the opportunity to amend
their Complaint.
2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95196, *2
Case 8:26-cv-01125-AJB-MJK Document 7 Filed 06/10/26 Page 36 of 42

Page 3 of 8
A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8
The Court recommends dismissal of the Complaint
without prejudice and with leave to amend under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Pleadings must contain,
among [*5] other things, three things: first "a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief," second, "a short and
plain statement of the grounds for the court's
jurisdiction," and third, "a demand for the relief
sought[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)-(3). "Although
'no technical form is required,' the Federal Rules
make clear that each allegation contained in the
pleading 'must be simple, concise, and direct.'"
Cole v. Smrtic, No. 1:24-CV-847, 2024 WL
4870495 (MAD/CFH), at *2 (N.D.N.Y. 2024)
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)). Allegations "so
vague as to fail to give the defendants adequate
notice of the claims against them" are subject to
dismissal. Sheehy v. Brown, 335 F. App'x 102, 104
(2d Cir. 2009) (summary order).
Here, the Court cannot glean from the Complaint as
pleaded when the traffic stop took place, whether
Defendant Zulauf, or some other law enforcement
officer, issued Plaintiffs the citation they complain
about, and asked Plaintiffs for their identification
and/or "held" them. (Dkt. 1, ¶ 4). As pleaded, the
Complaint does not comply with Rule 8 and the
Court therefore recommends dismissal without
prejudice and with leave to amend.
B. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10
The Court recommends dismissal of the Complaint
without prejudice and with leave to amend under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 10. "[T]he title of the complaint
must name all the parties." Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). A
party not named in the caption of the
complaint [*6] is not a party to the action. See
Abbas v. U.S., No. 10-CV-0141, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 108367, 2014 WL 3858398, at *2 (W.D.N.Y.
Aug. 1, 2014) (holding that the failure to name the
individual defendants against whom the plaintiff
intends to assert claims makes it "infeasible for the
Court to determine which of the individual officers
mentioned in the body of the complaint should be
deemed to be defendants to which claims").
Here, the Complaint refers to "two sheriff vehicles,
a NY State Trooper, and a border patrol vehicle."
(Dkt. 1, pg. 3). With such scant information, the
Court is unable to discern whether Plaintiffs
intended to name as defendants the sheriffs who
operated the "two sheriff vehicles", the NY State
Trooper, and/or the officers who operated the
"border patrol vehicle." (Dkt. 1). Thus, the Court
recommends dismissal of the Complaint without
prejudice and with leave to amend.
C. Statute of Limitations
"In section 1983 actions, the applicable limitations
period is found in the general or residual [state]
statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions."
Dibenedetto v. Coley, No. 24-CV-1029, 2024 U.S.
App. LEXIS 27858, 2024 WL 4662979, at *1 (2d
Cir. 2024) (quoting Ormiston v. Nelson, 117 F.3d
69, 71 (2d Cir. 1997) (quotation marks omitted). So
"New York's three-year statute of limitations for
unspecified personal injury actions governs section
1983 actions in New York." Id. (citation omitted).
However, "federal law governs the determination of
the [*7] accrual date (that is, the date the statute of
limitations begins to run) for purposes of the statute
of limitations in a section 1983 action." Ormiston,
117 F.3d at 71.
As pleaded, the Complaint is silent as to when
Plaintiffs' purported claims accrued, not allowing
the Court to ascertain whether their claims are
timely. And if untimely, whether equitable tolling
would be applicable to save Plaintiffs' claims. The
Court therefore recommends dismissal without
prejudice and with leave to amend. If the District
Court accepts this recommendation and permits
Plaintiffs to file an amended pleading, they should
be directed to include the date on which the
underlying events took place.
2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95196, *4
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Page 4 of 8
D. The Complaint should be dismissed against
the St. Lawrence County Sheriff's Department.
The Court recommends dismissal of the Complaint
against Defendant St. Lawrence County Sheriff's
Department with prejudice and without leave to
amend because they are not a proper party to this
action. "A department of a municipal entity is
merely a subdivision of the municipality and has no
separate legal existence. Therefore, municipal
departments . . . are not amenable to suit[.]" Coston
v. Conway, No. 19-CV-1552 (GLS/ATB), 2020 U.S.
Dist.LEXIS 131785, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. June 15, 2020)
(quoting Hoisington v. County of Sullivan, 55 F.
Supp. 2d 212, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)). Accordingly,
the Court recommends dismissal of any claims
asserted [*8] against Defendant St. Lawrence
County Sheriff's Department.
The Court assumes that the Plaintiffs intended to
name St. Lawrence County as a defendant. With
that assumption, the Complaint still fails to state a
claim against the County. "[A] municipality can be
held liable under Section 1983 if the deprivation of
the plaintiff's rights under federal law is caused by
a governmental custom, policy, or usage of the
municipality." Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691
F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012). A plaintiff establishes
the existence of a policy or custom by plausibly
alleging: "(1) a formal policy officially endorsed by
the municipality; (2) actions taken by government
officials responsible for establishing the municipal
policies that caused the particular deprivation in
question; (3) a practice so consistent and
widespread that, although not expressly authorized,
constitutes a custom or usage of which a
supervising policy-maker must have been aware; or
(4) a failure by policymakers to provide adequate
training or supervision to subordinates to such an
extent that it amounts to deliberate indifference to
the rights of those who come into contact with the
municipal employees." Kurtz v. Hansell, No. 20-
CV-3401, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56037, 2021 WL
1143619, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2021) (quoting
Brandon v. City of New York, 705 F. Supp. 2d 261,
276-77 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)). Here, the Complaint lacks
any allegations plausibly suggesting that St.
Lawrence [*9] County has a policy, custom or
practice that caused the purported deprivation of
Plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The Court therefore
recommends dismissal without prejudice and with
leave to amend.
E. The Complaint should be dismissed against
Defendant Zulauf in his official capacity.
The Court recommends dismissal of the Complaint
against Defendant Zulauf with prejudice and
without leave to amend to the extent it alleges
claims against him in his official capacity. "It is
settled that a suit against a municipal officer in his
official capacity is functionally equivalent to a suit
against the entity of which the officer is an agent."
Ware v. City of Lackawanna, No. 08-CV-2009,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97941, 2009 WL 3464057,
at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2009) (cleaned up). So
official capacity suits are treated as "another way of
pleading an action against an entity of which an
officer is an agent.'" Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159, 165-66, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114
(1985) (internal citation omitted). Therefore, "[a]s
long as the government entity receives notice and
an opportunity to respond, an official[ ]capacity suit
is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a
suit against the entity." Ware, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 97941, 2009 WL 3464057, at *2 (quoting
Graham, 473 U.S. at 166). And for that reason,
courts routinely dismiss official capacity claims as
redundant or duplicative of claims against the
municipality itself. See Tuff v. Vill. Of Yorkville
Police Dep't, No. 16-CV-473 (TJM), 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12142, 2017 WL 401241 (N.D.N.Y.
Jan. 30, 2017).
Here, the Complaint [*10] alleges claims against
Defendant Zulauf in his official capacity and
possibly St. Lawrence County. Therefore, the Court
recommends dismissing the claims against
Defendant Zulauf, in his official capacity, with
prejudice and without leave to amend.
2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95196, *7
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Page 5 of 8
F. The Complaint should be dismissed against
Defendant Zulauf in his individual capacity.
The Court recommends dismissal of the Complaint
without prejudice and with leave to amend to the
extent it seeks to impose liability against Defendant
Zulauf in his individual capacity because there are
no allegations that describe his personal
involvement in the purported deprivation of
Plaintiffs' constitutional rights. To establish
individual liability under § 1983, "a plaintiff must
show . . . that the defendant caused the plaintiff to
be deprived of a federal right." Raspardo v.
Carlone, 770 F.3d 97, 115 (2d Cir. 2014). Plaintiffs
can establish "personal involvement" by plausibly
alleging that: (1) "[t]he defendant participated
directly in the alleged constitutional violation, (2)
the defendant, after being informed of the violation
through a report or appeal, failed to remedy the
wrong, (3) the defendant created a policy or custom
under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or
allowed the continuance [*11] of such a policy or
custom, (4) the defendant was grossly negligent in
supervising subordinates who committed the
wrongful acts, or (5) the defendant exhibited
deliberate indifference . . . by failing to act on
information indicating that unconstitutional acts
were occurring." Littlejohn v. City of New York,
795 F.3d 297 , 314 (2d. Cir. 2015).
Here, there are no allegations establishing
Defendant Zulauf's personal involvement in the
purported deprivation of Plaintiffs' constitutional
rights. So the Court recommends dismissal of the
Complaint as to Defendant Zulauf, in his individual
capacity, without prejudice and with leave to
amend.
G. Plaintiffs' motion for counsel is denied
without prejudice.
There is no right to the appointment of counsel in
civil matters. See Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787,
789 (2d Cir. 1994). Appointment of counsel must
be done carefully to preserve the "precious
commodity" of volunteer lawyers for those litigants
who truly need a lawyer's assistance. See Cooper v.
A. Sargenti, Inc., 877 F.2d 170, at 172-73 (2d. Cir.
1989). Before the Court conducts a substantive
analysis of Plaintiffs' request, Plaintiffs must make
a showing that they have sought representation and
that their requests have been declined. See Cooper,
877 F.2d at 173 (citing Jenkins v. Chemical Bank,
721 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1983). This showing is
typically satisfied when a plaintiff identifies the
attorneys they have contacted and attaches to their
motion [*12] letters from attorneys declining their
request for representation. See Terpening v.
McGinty, No. 1:21-CV-1215 (GTS/CFH), 2022
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104676, 2022 WL 2115265, at *1
(N.D.N.Y. June 13, 2022) (citations omitted); see
also N.D.N.Y. Pro Se Handbook, at 5.
Courts cannot utilize a bright-line test in
determining whether counsel should be appointed
on behalf of an indigent party. See Hendricks v.
Coughlin, 114 F.3d 390, 392-93 (2d Cir. 1997).
Instead, several factors must be carefully
considered by the Court in ruling upon such a
motion. As a threshold matter, the Court should
ascertain whether the indigent's claims seem likely
to be of substance. Even in a case in which a
litigant's position seems likely of substance, the
appointment of counsel is made only in
"exceptional circumstances." Cardona v. Comm'r of
Soc. Sec., No. 3:20-CV-558, 2020 WL 8575100, at
*2 (D. Conn. Dec. 2, 2020) (quoting Kirkpatrick v.
Astrue, Civ. No. 08-0407, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
29980, 2008 WL 879407, at *1 (W.D. La. Mar. 31,
2008)). When considering whether such
circumstances exist, the court should then consider:
The indigent's ability to investigate the crucial
facts, whether conflicting evidence implicating
the need for cross examination will be the
major proof presented to the fact finder, the
indigent's ability to present the case, the
complexity of the legal issues and any special
reason in that case why appointment of counsel
would be more likely to lead to a just
2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95196, *10
Case 8:26-cv-01125-AJB-MJK Document 7 Filed 06/10/26 Page 39 of 42

Page 6 of 8
determination.
Terminate Control Corp. v. Horowitz, 28 F.3d
1335, 1341 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Hodge v. Police
Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1986)). This is
not to say that all, or indeed any, of these factors
are controlling in a particular case. Rather, each
case must be decided [*13] on its own facts. See
Velasquez v. O'Keefe, 899 F. Supp. 972, 974
(N.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing Hodge, 802 F.2d at 61).
Plaintiffs have not met their initial burden.
Although Plaintiffs allege that they contacted the
Legal Aid Society (Canton, New York) and
Alexander Coffin & Associates, LLC, Plaintiffs do
not include any declination letters. (Dkt. 6, at ¶ 1).
Even if Plaintiffs' motion did include the requisite
declination letters, that does not end the Court's
inquiry. See Local Rule 83.2(c). This action is in its
earliest stages, and, as discussed above, the Court
recommends dismissal of the Complaint. For that
reason, Plaintiffs' motion for the appointment of
counsel is denied without prejudice.
H. Plaintiffs should be given the opportunity to
Amend.
Generally, before the court dismisses a pro se
complaint or any part of the complaint sua sponte,
the court should afford a plaintiff the opportunity to
amend at least once; however, leave to re-plead
may be denied where any amendment would be
futile. See Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d
129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993). Futility is present when
the problem with plaintiff's causes of action is
substantive such that better pleading will not cure
it. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d
Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
Here, there is no futility. The Court therefore
recommends that the Complaint be dismissed
without prejudice and with leave to amend [*14]
except as to Plaintiffs' claim against the St.
Lawrence County Sheriff's Department and
Defendant Zulauf in his official capacity which the
Court recommends be dismissed with prejudice and
without leave to amend.
If the District Court permits this action to proceed
and Plaintiffs amend their pleading, they are
reminded of their obligations under Fed. R. Civ. P.
8, which requires their amended complaint to
contain a short and plain statement showing that
they are entitled to relief. Plaintiffs are also
reminded of their obligations under Fed. R. Civ. P.
10 to specifically identify all potential defendants
in the caption of the action. While the amended
pleading should contain sufficient facts to provide
Defendants with notice of the claims against them,
it should not contain material that is not germane to
their claims.
VI. CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based on the findings above, it is
ORDERED, that Plaintiffs' motions to proceed in
forma pauperis (Dkts. 2, 3) are GRANTED, and it
is further
ORDERED, Plaintiffs' motion for the appointment
of counsel IS DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;
and it is further
RECOMMENDED that the District Court:
A. DISMISS the Complaint under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8 WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND WITH
LEAVE TO AMEND;
B. DISMISS the Complaint under [*15] Fed.
R. Civ. P. 10 WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND
WITH LEAVE TO AMEND;
C. DISMISS the Complaint WITHOUT
PREJUDICE AND WITH LEAVE TO
AMEND because the Complaint is silent as to
when Plaintiffs' claims accrued, not allowing
the Court to ascertain whether their claims are
timely;
D. DISMISS the Complaint as to the St.
Lawrence County Sheriff's Department WITH
PREJUDICE AND WITHOUT LEAVE TO
2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95196, *12
Case 8:26-cv-01125-AJB-MJK Document 7 Filed 06/10/26 Page 40 of 42

Page 7 of 8
AMEND;
E. DISMISS the Complaint WITHOUT
PREJUDICE AND WITH LEAVE TO
AMEND to the extent it alleges a claim against
St. Lawrence County;
F. DISMISS the Complaint WITHOUT
PREJUDICE AND WITH LEAVE TO
AMEND to the extent it alleges a claim against
Defendant Zulauf, in his individual capacity;
G. DISMISS the Complaint WITH
PREJUDICE AND WITHOUT LEAVE TO
AMEND to the extent it alleges a claim against
Defendant Zulauf in his official capacity; and
H. allow Plaintiffs the opportunity to amend
their Complaint.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule
72.1(c), the parties have fourteen (14) days within
which to file written objections to the foregoing
report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk
of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS
REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL
PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v.
Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993)(citing
Small v. Secretary of Health and Human Services,
892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(e), 72.
Dated: April 30, 2026
/s/ Mitchell J. Katz
Hon. Mitchell J. Katz
U.S. Magistrate Judge
United States District Court, N.D. New York.
Eddie HOUSTON, Plaintiff,
v.
COLLERMAN, [*16] et. al., Defendants.
9:16-CV-1009 (BKS/ATB)
Signed 10/26/2016
[EDITOR'S NOTE: THIS DOCUMENT IS
REPORTED AT: 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148106.]
United States District Court, N.D. New York.
Matthew H. COLE, Plaintiff, v. Honorable Michael
W. SMRTIC, et al. Defendants.
No. 1:24-CV-00847 (MAD/CFH)
Signed November 21, 2024
[EDITOR'S NOTE: THIS DOCUMENT IS
REPORTED AT: 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 212620.]
United States District Court, W.D. New York.
Shariff ABBAS, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of
America, Defendant.
No. 10-CV-0141S.
Signed Aug. 1, 2014.
[EDITOR'S NOTE: THIS DOCUMENT IS
REPORTED AT: 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108367.]
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Vincent DIBENEDETTO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
Maurice COLEY, Defendant-Appellee*.
24-1029-cv
November 4, 2024
[EDITOR'S NOTE: THIS DOCUMENT IS
REPORTED AT: 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 27858.]
United States District Court, S.D. New York.
Shveta Kakar KURTZ, Daniel L. Kurtz, A.K., a
minor child, and M.K., a minor child, Plaintiffs, v.
David HANSELL, as the Duly Appointed
Commissioner of the New York City
Administration for Children's Services, Division of
* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption
accordingly.
2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95196, *15
Case 8:26-cv-01125-AJB-MJK Document 7 Filed 06/10/26 Page 41 of 42

Page 8 of 8
Child Protection, New York Comptroller, City of
New York, Yscary Rodriguez, individually and as a
caseworker employed by ACS, Bhojranie Maygoo,
as a caseworker employed by ACS, Eunice
Iwenofu, as a caseworker employed [*17] by ACS,
Brenda Lawson, as an ACS case
manager/supervisor, Esperanza Sandoval, as a
supervisor in the family support unit employed by
ACS, Dr. Peter Fabricant, as a treating physician
and state actor operating under color of law, Dr.
Marie Lupica, treating physician and state actor
operating under color of law, Dr. Ramzi Marwan
Shaykh, as a treating physician, DR. Shari L. Platt,
as a treating physician and state actor operating
under color of law, Dr. Sheena Ranade, as a
treating physician, LSW Karen Glass, as a state
actor, Unnamed ACS Workers and Employees 1-
10, Unnamed Employees and Workers of New
York Presbyterian Hospital/Weill Cornell Medical
Center 1-10, Unnamed Workers and Employees of
Mt. Sinai Hospital 1-10, New York Presbyterian
Hospital/Weill-Cornell Medical Center, Mt. Sinai
Hospital, Administration for Children's Services,
Defendants.
20 Civ. 3401 (PAE)
Signed 03/24/2021
[EDITOR'S NOTE: THIS DOCUMENT IS
REPORTED AT: 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56037.]
United States District Court, N.D. New York.
Jared TUFF, Plaintiff,
v.
VILLAGE OF YORKVILLE POLICE
DEPARTMENT, Village of Yorkville, Police Chief
DeLuca, Officer Guca, Defendants.
6:16-CV-473
Signed 01/30/2017
[EDITOR'S NOTE: THIS DOCUMENT IS
REPORTED AT: 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12142.]
United States District [*18] Court, N.D. New
York.
Tammy TERPENING, Plaintiff,
v.
Anthony MCGINTY, in his judicial and individual
capacities, Defendant.
1:21-CV-1215 (GTS/CFH)
Signed 06/13/2022
[EDITOR'S NOTE: THIS DOCUMENT IS
REPORTED AT: 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104676.]
United States District Court, D. Connecticut.
Gyspy CARDONA
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
3:20 CV 558 (RMS)
Signed 12/02/2020
[EDITOR'S NOTE: THIS DOCUMENT IS
REPORTED AT: 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 250175.]
United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana,
Shreveport Division.
Tanya Patricia KIRKPATRICK
v.
Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner, Social
Security Administration.
Civil Action No. 08-0407.
March 31, 2008.
[EDITOR'S NOTE: THIS DOCUMENT IS
REPORTED AT: 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29980.]
End of Document
2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95196, *16
Case 8:26-cv-01125-AJB-MJK Document 7 Filed 06/10/26 Page 42 of 42