Estes v. Bisignano

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 8:25-cv-00749-MJK Document18 Filed 05/18/26 Page1of21

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Kayla E.,!
Plaintiff,
V. 8:25-CV-749
(MJK)
Frank Bisignano,
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant.

Mark Schneider Esq., for Plaintiff
Hugh Dun Rappaport Esq., Special Asst. U.S. Attorney, for Defendant

Mitchell J. Katz, U.S. Magistrate Judge

MEMORANDUM DECISION & ORDER
Kayla E. brought this action under the Social Security Act (42

U.S.C. § 405(g)) seeking judicial review of the Social Security
Commissioner’s final decision denying her application for benefits. (Dkt.
1.). Kayla E. consented to the jurisdiction of a Magistrate Judge. (Dkt.
7). Both parties filed briefs (Dkts. 10, 16, 17) which the Court treats as
motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), in accordance with General Order

18.

1 This decision will identify the plaintiff using only her first name and last initial to
protect her privacy.

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I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 15, 2023, Kayla E. filed an application for Title IJ and

XVI disability insurance and supplemental social security income
benefits, alleging disability beginning June 30, 2020. (T. 10).2 The Social
Security Administration denied the claim initially on November 6, 2023,
and again upon reconsideration on December 7, 2023. Ud.). Kayla E.
requested a hearing 7 days later. Ud.) On September 9, 2024,
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Asad Ba-Yunus held a hearing. (T.
102-122). At the hearing, Kayla Hebert represented Kayla E. (T. 38).
There, ALJ Ba-Yunus confirmed that Kayla E. wished to withdraw her
Title II claim and amend her alleged onset date to June 22, 2023. (T.
10); see also (T. 106-107). Both Kayla E. and the Vocational Expert,
Cherie Plante, testified. (T. 108-117; 117-122). On September 27, 2024,
ALJ Ba-Yunus issued an unfavorable decision. (T. 10-19). The appeals

council later denied Kayle E.’s appeal. (T. 1-3).

2 All page references to the Administrative Transcript (“T.”) and not the page
numbers assigned by the CM/ECF pagination system.

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II. GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAW

A. Disability Standards

To be considered disabled, plaintiffs seeking disability insurance
or supplemental security income benefits must establish that they are
“unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death, or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months ...” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382c(a)(8)(A). In addition, plaintiffs’

physical or mental impairment or impairments [must be] of

such severity that [they are] not only unable to do [their]

previous work but cannot, considering [their] age, education,

and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial

gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless

of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which

[they] live[], or whether a specific job vacancy exists for

[them], or whether [they] would be hired if [they] applied for
work.

42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(38)(B).

The Commissioner uses a five-step process, set forth in 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520 and 416.920, to evaluate disability insurance and
supplemental security income disability claims.

First, the [Commissioner] considers whether the claimant is

currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If [they are]
not, the [Commissioner] next considers whether the claimant

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has a “severe impairment” which significantly limits [their]
physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. If the
claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is
whether, based solely on medical evidence, the claimant has
an impairment which meets or equals the criteria of an
impairment listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the
claimant has such an impairment, the [Commissioner] will
consider [them] disabled without considering vocational
factors such as age, education, and work experience ...
Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the
fourth inquiry is whether, despite the claimant’s severe
impairment, [they have] the residual functional capacity to
perform [their] past work. Finally, if the claimant is unable to
perform [their] past work, the [Commissioner] then
determines whether there is other work which the claimant
can perform.

Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982); see also 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520, 416.920. Plaintiffs have the burden of establishing
disability at the first four steps. See Selian v. Astrue, 708 F.3d 409, 418
(2d Cir. 2013). If they establish that their impairment prevents them
from performing their past work, the burden then shifts to the
Commissioner to prove the final step. Id.

B. Scope of Review

When reviewing a final decision of the Commissioner, courts must
determine whether the correct legal standards were applied and

whether substantial evidence supported the decision. Jd. at 417; see also

Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’, 683 F.3d 4438, 448 (2d Cir. 2012); 42

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U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012). It must be “more
than a scintilla” of evidence scattered throughout the administrative
record. Jd. Yet this standard is a very deferential standard of review “—
even more so than the ‘clearly erroneous standard.” Brault, 683 F.3d at
448. “To determine on appeal whether an ALJ’s findings are supported
by substantial evidence, reviewing courts consider the whole record,
examining the evidence from both sides, because an analysis of the
substantiality of the evidence must also include that which detracts
from its weight.” Williams ex rel. Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258
(2d Cir. 1988). But reviewing courts may not substitute their
interpretation of the administrative record for that of the Commissioner
if the record contains substantial support for the ALJ’s decision. Id.; see
also Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982).

ALJs need not explicitly analyze every piece of conflicting
evidence in the record. See Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1040 (2d
Cir. 1983); see also Miles v. Harris, 645 F.2d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 1981)

(“[W]e are unwilling to require an ALJ explicitly to reconcile every

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conflicting shred of medical testimony].]”). But ALJs cannot “pick and
choose’ evidence in the record that supports [their] conclusions.” Cruz v.
Barnhart, 343 F. Supp. 2d 218, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); see also Fuller v.
Astrue, No. 09-CV-6279, 2010 WL 5072112, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 6,
2010).

Ill. FACTS

The record includes Kayla E.’s medical and mental health
treatment records which the parties are familiar with. The Court will
refer to the pertinent records and the hearing testimony in its analysis

of the parties’ claims as appropriate.

IV. THE ALJ’S DECISION
At Step One of the five-step-sequential analysis, ALJ Ba-Yunus

determined that Kayla E. has “not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since June 22, 2023, the alleged onset date.” (T. 13) (cleaned
up).

At Step Two, ALJ Ba-Yunus concluded that Kayla E. “has the
following severe impairments: anxiety disorder, posttraumatic stress
disorder [(PTSD)], depressive disorder, and attention deficit

hyperactivity disorder [(ADHD)].” (T. 13) (cleaned up). At the same step,

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ALJ Ba-Yunus concluded that Kayla E.’s “learning disability is a non-
severe impairment.”(T. 13).

At Step Three, ALJ Ba-Yunus determined that Kayla E. “does not
have an impairment, or combination of impairments, that medically
equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part
404, Subpart. P, Appendix. 1.” (T. 13) G@nternal citations omitted).

Next, ALJ Ba-Yunus discussed the “paragraph B’ criteria. (T. 13-
14). “To satisfy the paragraph B criteria,” mental impairments “must
result in one extreme limitation or two marked limitations in a broad
area of functioning.” See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, §
12.00(A)(2)(b) (cleaned up). The four broad areas of mental functioning
are: (1) understanding, remembering, or applying information; (2)
interacting with others; (8) maintaining concentration, persistence, or
pace; and (4) adapting and managing oneself. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404,
subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.00(C). Here, ALJ Ba-Yunus found that Kayla E.
did not meet the “paragraph B’” criteria because he determined that
Kayla E. had moderate limitations in all four areas. (T. 13-14).

ALJ Ba-Yunus also considered the “paragraph C” criteria. (T. 14).

The “paragraph C” criteria require a documented medical history of the

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existence of the disorder over a period of at least two years, with
evidence of both (a) medical treatment, mental health therapy,
psychosocial support(s), or a highly structured setting(s) that is ongoing
and that diminishes the symptoms and signs of the mental disorder;
and (b) marginal adjustment, that is, minimal capacity to adapt to
changes in environment or to demands that are not already part of daily
life. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.00(A)(2)(c). Here, ALJ
Ba-Yunus noted that the “paragraph C” criteria were not met. (T. 14).
After this, ALJ Ba-Yunus determined that Kayla E. had the
residual function capacity (“RFC”) to perform:
a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the
following nonexertional limitations: she may only perform
simple tasks, may have occasional interaction with

supervisors, coworkers, and the general public, and can
tolerate occasional changes to a routine work setting.

(T. 15).

To make this finding, ALJ Ba-Yunus considered “the medical
opinion(s) and prior administrative medical finding(s)” pursuant to 20
C.F.R. § 416.920c. (d.).

At Step Four, ALJ Ba-Yunus reasoned that Kayla E. has “no past

relevant work,” was within the “younger individual age 18-49” category,

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has “limited education,” and “transferability of skills is not an issue.”
(T. 18).

Finally, at Step Five, ALJ Ba-Yunus concluded that “considering”
Kayla E.’s “age, education, work experience, and residual functional
capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that” she “can perform.” (T. 18). Accordingly, ALJ Ba-Yunus
determined that Kayla E. is not disabled as defined by the Social

Security Act. (T. 19).

V. ISSUES IN CONTENTION
On appeal, Kayla E. argues that ALJ Ba-Yunus erred: (1) when

evaluating Brett Hartman Psy.D.’s and Licensed Medical Social Worker
(“LMSW”) Nashua Malko’s medical opinions; (2) when analyzing her
subjective statements; and (3) when finding her borderline intelligence
a non-severe impairment at Step Two. (PI Br. at pgs. 11-25). The

Commissioner challenges every argument. (Def. Br. at pgs. 2-12).

VI. DISCUSSION

Substantial evidence does not support ALJ Ba-
Yunus’s decision because he improperly analyzed Dr.
Hartman’s and LMSW Malko’s medical opinions.

The Court finds that substantial evidence does not support ALJ

Ba-Yunus’s RFC. When reviewing an agency’s decision, the reviewing

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court must determine if substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
decision. Here, ALJ Ba-Yunus’s decision is riddled with errors and
conclusory analysis. In consequence, the Court reverses and remands
the ALJ’s decision.

RFC is “what [the] individual can still do despite [their]
limitations. Ordinarily, RFC is the individual’s maximum remaining
ability to do sustained work activities in an ordinary work setting on a
regular continuing basis ... A ‘regular and continuing basis’ means eight
hours a day, five days a week, or an equivalent work schedule.” Balles v.
Astrue, No. 11-CV-1386 (MAD), 2013 WL 252970, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Jan.
23, 2013) (quoting Melville v. Apfel, 198 F. 3d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1999))
(quoting SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *2).

In their RFC determinations, ALJs must consider objective
medical facts, diagnoses, and medical opinions based on such facts, as
well as a plaintiffs subjective symptoms, including pain and
descriptions of other limitations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945; see
also Martone v. Apfel, 70 F. Supp. 2d 145, 150 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (“the
ALJ must consider the claimant's RFC, age, education, past work

experience, and transferability of skills to determine if the claimant can

10

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perform other work existing in the national economy.”); Genier v.
Astrue, 606 F. 3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 2010) (“When determining a claimant's
RFC, the ALJ is required to take the claimant’s reports of pain and
other limitations into account, but is not required to accept the
claimant’s subjective complaints without question; he may exercise
discretion in weighing the credibility of the claimant’s testimony in light
of the other evidence in the record.”) (internal citations omitted).

ALJs must specify the functions a plaintiff can perform and may
not simply make conclusory statements regarding a plaintiffs
capacities. See Roat v. Barnhart, 717 F. Supp. 2d 241, 267 (N.D.N.Y.
2010); see also Martone, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 150 (citing Ferraris v.
Heckler, 728 F.2d 582, 588 (2d Cir. 1984)). The RFC assessment must
also include a narrative discussion, describing how the evidence
supports the ALJ’s conclusions, citing specific medical facts, and non-
medical evidence. See Natashia R. v. Berryhill, No. 17-CV-01266 (TWD),
2019 WL 1260049, at *11 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2019) (citing SSR 96-8p,
1996 WL 374184, at *7); see also Angelo Michael G. v Kijakazi, No. 22-
CV-00892 (TWD), 2023 WL 4763792 (N.D.N.Y. July 26, 2023) (quoting

Ferraris, 728 F. 2d at 587). “[A]n RFC finding is administrative in

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nature, not medical, and its determination is within the province of the
ALJ.” Curry v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., 855 F. App’x 46, 49 n.3 (2d Cir.
2021) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)).

Dr. Hartman, a consultative examiner, opined limitations stricter
than ALJ Ba-Yunus. In his report, Dr. Hartman noted that Kayla E.,
among other things, has “mild difficulty using reasoning and judgment,
mild difficulty sustaining an ordinary routine, moderate difficulty
sustaining concentration, moderate to marked difficulty understanding
remembering and applying complex directions, moderate to marked
difficulty interacting adequately with others, [and] marked difficulty
regulating her emotions.” (T. 436) (cleaned up). When making this
finding, Dr. Hartman noted that Kayla E. appeared dysphoric, nervous,
and that both her attention and concentration, and her recent and
remote memory were mildly impaired. (T. 435). Dr. Hartman also noted
that Kayla E. reported panic attacks and panic attack symptoms like
heart palpitations, breathing difficulties, trembling, chest pressure,
feeling overwhelmed when there is a conflict, and fear of dying. (T. 434).

Kayla E. stated that she avoids social settings. (T. 434).

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But ALJ Ba-Yunus rejected all of Dr. Hartman’s stricter
limitations. Rejecting Dr. Hartman’s moderate to marked limitations in
interacting with others and regulating emotions, ALJ Ba-Yunus decided
that Dr. Hartman’s stricter limitations were “inconsistent with the
record which shows that the [Kayla E.] was cooperative during the
consultative examination and during the multiple examinations at
Behavioral Health Services North.” (T. 17). ALJ Ba-Yunus also rejected
Dr. Hartman’s moderate to marked limitations in understanding,
remembering, and applying complex directions because “the record .. .
shows grossly intact recent and remote memory, grossly intact
attention, and a normal fund of knowledge.” (T. 17).

Substantial evidence does not support ALJ Ba-Yunus’s rejection of
Dr. Hartman’s moderate to marked limitation interacting with others
and regulating emotions. To start, “[t]he fact that [Kayla E.] was
described as pleasant and cooperative . . . does not negate the severity
of her mental impairments, as individuals with mental illnesses often
adopt a highly restricted and/or inflexible lifestyle within which they
appear to function well.” Callahan v. Berryhill, No. 17-CV-06245, 2018

WL 1616058, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2018). Indeed, “[a] claimant’s

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ability to perform adequately when she is in structured, supportive
settings—such as medical or psychiatric appointments, which have
lowered psychological pressures and interpersonal demands—does not
necessarily predict performance and ability to cope in the competitive
work environment.” Jd. This makes sense. “The reaction to the demands
of work (stress) is highly individualized, and mental illness is
characterized by adverse responses to seemingly trivial circumstances.”
Titles II & XVI: Capability to Do Other Work-Themedical-Vocational
Rules As A Framework for Evaluating Solely Nonexertional
Impairments, SSR 85-15 (S.8.A. 1985). But ALJ Ba- Yunus seems to
ignore the complexities of mental illness when rejecting Dr. Hartman’s
moderate to marked limitation. ALJ Ba-Yunus, in essence, interpreted
raw data to support his finding that Kayla E. can occasionally interact
with supervisors, coworkers, and the public. This was error. See, e.g.,
Heaman v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., No. 3:16-CV-1459 (TWD), 2018 WL
11468023, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2018) (noting that ALJs err when
they interpret raw medical data); see also Rucker v. Kijakazi, 48 F.4th
86, 92 (2d Cir. 2022) (“[a] medical diagnosis will often be informed by

the patient’s subjective description of his or her symptoms... That is

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all the more true in cases involving mental health, which tend to be less
susceptible to objective testing and assessment.”).

LMSW Malko, Kayla E.’s treating psychotherapist, also opined
limitations stricter than ALJ Ba-Yunus. LMSW Malko, who began
treating Kayla E. in September 2023, treats Kayla E. bimonthly for 45
minutes. (T. 366, 502). With this lengthy treating relationship, LMSW
Malko opined that Kayla E. has, among others, moderate limitations in
interacting with others, moderate limitations in concentration,
moderate limitations in persisting, marked limitations in maintaining
pace, marked limitations in adapting in the workplace, and marked
limitations in managing oneself in the workplace. (T.504) LMSW Malko
also opined that Kayla E. would be off task for 25% of the time or
longer. (T. 505).

ALJ Ba-Yunus rejected LMSW Malko’s marked limitations. To
make this finding, ALJ Ba-Yunus reasoned that the marked limitations
were “[nJot consistent with the examination notes of record, which
indicate [Kayla E.’s] limitations” would not “be marked in nature.” It is
also inconsistent with [Kayla E.’s] own reports to Dr. Hartman that she

goes shopping with assistance, occasionally drives, and spends her days

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looking after her children, doing chores, cooking, taking care of her pets,
and going online.” (T. 18).

Examining that reasoning and the record as whole, the Court
finds that substantial evidence does not support ALJ Ba-Yunus’s
rejection of LMSW Malko’s marked limitations. ALJ Ba-Yunus’s first
statement—that LMSW Malko’s findings are inconsistent with the
record because the records indicate less limitations—is conclusory,
which is error. See, e.g., Ron I. v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., No. 23-CV-489,
2024 WL 4678398, at *12 (D. Vt. Nov. 5, 2024) (remanding the ALJ’s
decision where the ALJ consistently noted that a doctor’s opinion is
inconsistent with the record overall but the ALJ failed to support that
conclusion). “Simply stating that an opinion is not consistent with the
overall record, without citing examples of inconsistencies or discussing
the inconsistencies in the record, is an insufficient rationale ...” Erica B.
v. Comm of Soc. Sec., No. 21-CV-06202, 2023 WL 5154640, at *3
(W.D.N.Y. July 27, 2023). Likewise, ALJ Ba-Yunus’s second argument
does not pass muster because his entire rejection of LMSW Malko’s
opinion relies on activities of daily living. True, ALJs must consider a

claimant’s activities of daily living. See, e.g., Michelle B. v. Comm’ of

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Soc. Sec., No. 20-CV-332, 2021 WL 3022036, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. July 16,
2021) (“[t]he Regulations explicitly direct the ALJ to consider a
claimant’s activities of daily living when assessing the ultimate
question of disability.”) But “[i]t is legal error to give excessive weight to
a claimant’s ability to perform basic daily activities when assessing
[their] ability to engage in substantial gainful activity.” Moss v. Colvin,
No. 13-CV-731, 2014 WL 4631884, at *33 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2014).
Indeed, “[t]here are critical differences between activities of daily living
(which one can do at [their] own pace when [they are] able) and keeping
a full-time job.” Id. A person’s, here Kayla E.’s, ability to take care of
themselves, “does not, in itself, contradict a claim of disability, as people
should not be penalized for enduring the pain of their disability in order
to care for themselves.” Brown v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., No. 06-CV-3174,
2011 WL 1004696, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2011); see also Balsamo v.
Chater, 142 F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir.1998) (finding “that a claimant need not
be an invalid to be found disabled under the Social Security Act.”).

A review of the record shows that Kayla E. suffers from serious
mental health issues. During her consultative examination, Kayla E.

presented as dysphoric and nervous. (T. 435). Kayla E. reported that

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she received mental health treatment on and off since she was a child.
(T. 4383). Kayla E. “was diagnosed with PTSD, ADHD, and [generalized
anxiety disorder] when she was seven years old.” (T. 58). Her mental
health issues often lead to “sadness, low energy, crying spells, social
isolation, feeling overwhelmed, irritability, loss of interest, and low self-
esteem.” (T. 434). This report mirrors Kayla E.’s reports to LMSW
Malko. In their sessions, LMSW Malko notes that Kayla E. “struggle[s]
with anxiety” and “she has panic attacks every day and rarely leaves
her house.” (T. 457). In a February 2024 meeting with LMSW Malko,
Kayla E. presented as anxious, depressed, and tearful. (T. 459). Kayla
E. repeatedly presented as anxious and depressed. (T. 440, 447, 454,
465, 470, 475, 830). Crying is also common for Kayla E. See, e.g., (T.
801) (“Kayla [E.] shared that she recently ‘broke down’ and cried while
on a walk with her kids.”). In fact, Kayla E. told LMSW Malko that: “I
try to act like I’m ok. But it’s eating me up inside.” (T. 801). Objective
evidence supports Kayla E.’s statement because she scored a 17 on the
PHQ-9 and an 18 on the GAD7. See Clarke v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., No.
19-CV-7213, 2021 WL 2481909, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2021) (noting

that the PHQ-9 measures depression, GAD7 measures anxiety, anda

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score of 17 on the GAD7 means the claimant suffers from severe
anxiety); see also Rodriguez v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., No. 22 CV. 10665,
2024 WL 1342834, at *2 n. 4(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2024) (noting that PHQ-
9 ranks severity in the following way: “[a] rating of 1 to 5 equates with
minimal depression, 5 to 9 with mild depression, 10 to 14 with moderate
depression, 15 to 19 with moderately severe depression and 20 to 27
with severe depression.”); Rivera v. Commr of the Soc. Sec. Admin., No.
19-CV-4630, 2020 WL 8167136, at *4 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2020)
(cleaned up) (noting that PHQ-9 test is reliable). In sum, the record
shows that Kayla E. suffers from serious mental health issues.

ALJ Ba-Yunus’s decision to dismiss the evidence is curious. ALJ
Ba-Yunus relied on the fact of Kayla E.’s activities of daily living, child
rearing, normal mental health exams, and conclusory statements to
reject Kayla E.’s claim. See (T. 15-18). What the Court can glean from
this is that ALJ Ba-Yunus discredited Kayla E.’s statements to the
medical sources. “But well-established case law cautions against
reflexively rejecting subjective reports in mental health cases because

29

mental health diagnoses necessarily rely on self-reported statements.

Nunez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 164 F.4th 60, 75 (2d Cir. 2025). “The

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ALJ’s approach on this issue,” rejecting all subjective statements, “was
erroneous.” Id. Simply put, ALJ Ba-Yunus’s decision falls far short of
being supported by substantial evidence.
ke

All in all, substantial evidence does not support ALJ Ba-Yunus’s
decision. ALJ Ba-Yunus’s decision is riddled with errors and conclusory
analysis. Those errors demonstrate that substantial evidence does not
support the decision. In consequence, the Court reverses and remands

ALJ Ba-Yunus’s decision.

The Court does not decide the remaining issues because it is
remanding the ALJ’s decision on the substantial evidence and
subjective complaints issues. See, e.g., Tyler W. v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec.,
No. 3:22-CV-01345 (CFH), 2024 WL 1075209, at *14 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 12,
2024) (“[a]s remand is required, the Court need not reach plaintiff's

remaining arguments’).

20

VII. CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based on the findings above, it is
ORDERED, that Kayla E.'s motion for judgment on the pleadings
(Dkt. 10) be GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Commissioner's motion for judgment on the
pleadings (Dkt. 16) be DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED, that the decision of the Commissioner be
REVERSED and REMANDED.
Dated: May 18, 2026
21
Digitally signed by
� C).___ V:.J--- Mitchell J Katz
U � Date: 2026.05.18
]] ·08·55 -04'00'
Hon. Mitchell J. Katz
U.S. Magistrate Judge
Case 8:25-cv-00749-MJK Document 18 Filed 05/18/26 Page 21 of 21