Lottie v. Commissioner of Social Security

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________
DORCAS L.,
Plaintiff,
8:25-CV-625
v. 	(DJS)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
____________________________________
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
COLLINS, HASSELER & 	LAWRENCE D. HASSELER, ESQ.
SIMSER LAW, PLLC
Attorney for Plaintiff
225 State Street
Carthage, New York 13619
U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN. 	GEOFFREY M. PETERS, ESQ.
Attorney for Defendant
6401 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, Maryland 21235
DANIEL J. STEWART
United States Magistrate Judge
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER1
Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking review of a
decision by the Commissioner of Social Security that Plaintiff was not disabled. 	Dkt.
1 Upon Plaintiff’s consent, the United States’ general consent, and in accordance with this District’s General Order,
this matter has been referred to the undersigned to exercise full jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. Dkt. No. 5; General Order 18.
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No. 1. Currently before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
and Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Dkt. Nos. 7, 9, & 10. For the
reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is denied and
Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is granted.
I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Plaintiff was born in 1961. 	Dkt. No. 6, Admin. Tr. (“Tr.”) at p. 152. 	She is a
high school graduate. Tr. at p. 157. She has not worked since April 2018. Id. She has
past work experience as a home health aide and nursing home certified nursing assistant,
and as a retail sales associate. Id. Plaintiff alleges disability based on: blindness or low
vision pressure in the eyes; degenerative disc disease in the back; chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease (“COPD”); chronic arthritis in the hips, back, hands, neck, and legs;
chronic depression with anxiety; gastroesophageal reflux disease (“GERD”); and high
cholesterol. Tr. at p. 156.
B. Procedural History
Plaintiff applied for disability and disability insurance benefits on June 27, 2018.
Tr. at pp. 77-78. She alleged a disability onset date of April 26, 2018. 	Id. 	Plaintiff’s
application was initially denied on September 12, 2018, Tr. at pp. 79-83, after which she
requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). 	Tr. at pp. 88-89.
Plaintiff appeared at a hearing before ALJ Dory Sutker on November 21, 2019, at which
Plaintiff and a vocational expert (“VE”) testified. 	Tr. at pp. 29-61. 	On December 4,
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2019, the ALJ issued a written decision (the “2019 Decision”) finding Plaintiff was not
disabled. 	Tr. at pp. 11-22. 	On September 15, 2020, the Appeals Council denied
Plaintiff’s request for review, thereby making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of
the Commissioner. Tr. at pp. 1-5.
In 2020, Plaintiff filed suit in the Northern District of New York seeking review
of the ALJ’s decision (the “2020 Case”). Tr. at pp. 978-79. The Court issued a decision
remanding the matter to the ALJ for further proceedings. Tr. at pp. 958-69; see also Tr.
at pp. 970-71. Plaintiff appeared at further hearings before the ALJ on August 16, 2023,
and May 3, 2023, at which Plaintiff and a VE testified. Tr. at pp. 888-935. On January
23, 2024, the ALJ issued a partially favorable decision (the “2024 Decision”). Tr. at pp.
855-72. 	On April 1, 2025, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review,
thereby making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. 	Tr. at pp.
845-50. This action followed.
C. The ALJ’s 2024 Decision
In her decision, the ALJ made the following findings of fact and conclusions of
law. First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Social
Security Act through December 31, 2023. 	Tr. at p. 857. 	Second, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date. Id.
Third, the ALJ found that, since the April 26, 2018 alleged onset date, Plaintiff has had
the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease, COPD, obesity, and knee
osteoarthritis. Tr. at pp. 857-58. The ALJ also found that, beginning on the January 1,
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2023 established onset date of disability, in addition to the aforementioned severe
impairments, Plaintiff’s polycythemia was also a severe impairment. 	Tr. at p. 858.
Fourth, the ALJ found that, since the April 26, 2018 alleged onset date, Plaintiff has not
had an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the
severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (the
“Listings”). Tr. at p. 860. Fifth, the ALJ found that, prior to January 1, 2023, the date
that Plaintiff became disabled, Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to
perform sedentary work, except that:
[she] needed the option to change positions between sitting and standing
at her discretion. She could not climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolding. She
could not crawl. She could occasionally climb ramps or stairs, and could
occasionally balance, stoop, and kneel[]. 	[She] could not be exposed to
temperature extremes or vibration, and she needed to avoid concentrated
exposure to dust, fumes, odors, and other respiratory irritants.
Tr. at p. 861. 	The ALJ also found that, beginning on January 1, 2023, Plaintiff, in
addition to having the aforementioned RFC, would be “off-task 20% of the workday.”
Tr. at p. 868. Sixth, the ALJ found that, since April 26, 2018, Plaintiff has been unable
to perform any past relevant work. Tr. at p. 870. Seventh, the ALJ found that, prior to
the January 1, 2023 established onset date of disability, Plaintiff “was an individual of
advanced age,” but that she “subsequently changed age category to closely approaching
retirement age.” 	Id. 	Eighth, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has at least a high school
education. 	Id. 	Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff “has acquired work skills from past
relevant work.” Id. The ALJ then determined that, based on Plaintiff’s age, education,
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work experience, and RFC, prior to January 1, 2023, there were jobs that existed in
significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could have performed, but,
beginning on January 1, 2023, there are no jobs that exist in significant numbers in the
national economy that Plaintiff can perform. 	Tr. at pp. 870-71. 	The ALJ, therefore,
concluded that Plaintiff “was not disabled prior to January 1, 2023, but became disabled
on that date and has continued to be disabled” through the date of the ALJ’s 2024
Decision. Tr. at p. 872.
II. RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Standard of Review
A court reviewing a denial of disability benefits may not determine de novo
whether an individual is disabled. 	42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Wagner v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). 	Rather, the Commissioner’s
determination will be reversed only if the correct legal standards were not applied, or it
was not supported by substantial evidence. 	See Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986
(2d Cir. 1987) (“Where there is a reasonable basis for doubt whether the ALJ applied
correct legal principles, application of the substantial evidence standard to uphold a
finding of no disability creates an unacceptable risk that a claimant will be deprived of
the right to have her disability determination made according to the correct legal
principles.”); accord Grey v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1983); Marcus v.
Califano, 615 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 1979). 	“Substantial evidence” is evidence that
amounts to “more than a mere scintilla,” and has been defined as “such relevant evidence
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as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Where evidence is deemed susceptible to more than
one rational interpretation, the Commissioner’s conclusion must be upheld. Rutherford
v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982).
“To determine on appeal whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence, a reviewing court considers the whole record, examining evidence from both
sides, because an analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must also include that
which detracts from its weight.” Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988).
If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s finding must be sustained
“even where substantial evidence may support the plaintiff’s position and despite that
the court’s independent analysis of the evidence may differ from the [Commissioner’s].”
Rosado v. Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). In other words, this Court
must afford the Commissioner’s determination considerable deference and may not
substitute “its own judgment for that of the [Commissioner], even if it might justifiably
have reached a different result upon a de novo review.” 	Valente v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 733 F.2d 1037, 1041 (2d Cir. 1984).
B. Standard to Determine Disability
The Commissioner has established a five-step evaluation process to determine
whether an individual is disabled as defined by the Social Security Act. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520, 416.920. 	The Supreme Court has recognized the validity of this sequential
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evaluation process. 	Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). 	The five-step
process is as follows:
First, the [Commissioner] considers whether the claimant is currently
engaged in substantial gainful activity. 	If he is not, the [Commissioner]
next considers whether the claimant has a “severe impairment” which
significantly limits his physical or mental ability to do basic work
activities. If the claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is
whether, 	based 	solely 	on 	medical 	evidence, 	the 	claimant 	has 	an
impairment which is listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. 	If the
claimant has such an impairment, the [Commissioner] will consider him
disabled without considering vocational factors such as age, education,
and work experience; the [Commissioner] presumes that a claimant who
is afflicted with a “listed” impairment is unable to perform substantial
gainful activity. Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment,
the fourth inquiry is whether, despite the claimant’s severe impairment, he
has the residual functional capacity to perform his past work. Finally, if
the claimant is unable to perform his past work, the [Commissioner] then
determines whether there is other work which the claimant could perform.
Under the cases previously discussed, the claimant bears the burden of the
proof as to the first four steps, while the [Commissioner] must prove the
final one.
Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982); accord McIntyre v. Colvin, 758
F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 2014). “If at any step a finding of disability or non-disability can
be made, the SSA will not review the claim further.” Barnhart v. Thompson, 540 U.S.
20, 24 (2003).
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff raises five claims of error for review in this proceeding. First, Plaintiff
argues that “[t]he ALJ failed to follow the directive from the District Court that she
consider all of Plaintiff’s impairments in the RFC determination regardless of their
severity.” 	Dkt. No. 7, Pl.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 14-16. 	Second, Plaintiff asserts that
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“[t]he ALJ explicitly failed to consider the combined effects of Plaintiff’s physical and
mental impairments on her ability to sustain the on-task and attendance requirements of
full-time work prior to January 2023.” 	Id. at pp. 16-19. 	Third, Plaintiff claims that
“[t]he ALJ’s assertion that Plaintiff’s statements are not entirely consistent with the
medical evidence remains unexplained and unsupported.” 	Id. at pp. 19-22. 	Fourth,
Plaintiff argues that “[t]he ALJ failed to support her rejection of opinions from treating
providers.” 	Id. at pp. 22-23. 	Finally, Plaintiff asserts that, “[a]t Step 5, the ALJ
erroneously relied upon vocational testimony that there is only one possible occupation
available, at reduced numbers, to find that Plaintiff could perform other available work.”
Id. at pp. 23-24. Defendant responds that the ALJ properly complied with this Court’s
prior decision, and that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings at Steps Two
and Five. Dkt. No. 9, Def.’s Mem. of Law.
A. Consideration of Impairments in the RFC Determination
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to follow the Court’s prior 	directive
instructing the ALJ to consider all of Plaintiff’s impairments in the RFC determination
regardless of their severity. Pl.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 14-16. For the reasons that follow,
the Court finds no error.
1. Physical Impairments
Plaintiff first contends that the ALJ erred in the 2024 Decision by not considering
Plaintiff’s 	physical 	impairments 	of 	“bilateral 	carpal 	tunnel 	syndrome, 	diabetes,
ophthalmic migraines, and blurred vision with suspected glaucoma,” which the ALJ had
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found to be non-severe, when determining Plaintiff’s RFC. 	Id. at p. 14. 	In response,
Defendant seeks to limit the Court’s prior directive regarding the 2019 Decision to the
ALJ’s consideration of only Plaintiff’s mental impairments and not her physical
impairments. Def.’s Mem. of Law at p. 5. Defendant further asserts that, in any event,
the 	ALJ 	sufficiently 	explained 	in 	the 	2024 	Decision 	why 	Plaintiff’s 	physical
impairments required no RFC limitations. Id. at pp. 8-11.
This Court previously concluded that the ALJ erred in the 2019 Decision by not
considering Plaintiff’s mental impairments, despite finding them to be non-severe, when
determining Plaintiff’s RFC. 	Tr. at pp. 964-68. 	That ruling comports with Second
Circuit decisions that have determined that, even where substantial evidence supports
an ALJ’s finding that an impairment is non-severe, the ALJ must nevertheless consider
such impairments when assessing the claimant’s RFC. See Parker-Grose v. Astrue, 462
F. App’x 16, 18 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(2)) (“We will consider
all of your medically determinable impairments of which we are aware, including your
medically determinable impairments that are not ‘severe [ ]’ . . . when we assess your
[RFC].”)). 	The 	principle 	that 	an 	ALJ 	must 	consider 	a 	claimant’s 	non-severe
impairments when assessing the claimant’s RFC is applicable not only where the
impairment is mental, but also where the impairment is physical. 	See, e.g., Brown v.
Berryhill, 2018 WL 2979097, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. June 14, 2018) (remanding where ALJ
concluded that the claimant’s diabetes diagnosis was non-severe at step two, but “did
not consider it when assessing [the claimant’s] RFC”).
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a. Bilateral Carpal Tunnel Syndrome
Turning first to Plaintiff’s alleged bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, at Step Two,
the ALJ recounted that Plaintiff “testified that she has carpal tunnel syndrome in her
hands, which makes it difficult to use her hands for more than a few minutes” and that
“she had surgery several years ago, but still has pain and difficulty using her hands.”
Tr. at p. 858. The ALJ explained that Plaintiff “was diagnosed with right carpal tunnel
syndrome and had a carpal tunnel release in 2017.” Id. The ALJ also stated that Plaintiff
“complained of some tingling in her fingers and . . . exhibited positive Tinel’s signs in
a 2019 evaluation.” Id.; see also Tr. at p. 2138.
Upon further review of Plaintiff’s medical records, however, the ALJ noted that
Plaintiff “did not have much treatment for carpal tunnel syndrome or related symptoms
after her surgery in 	2019.” 	Tr. at p. 858. 	Additionally, 	during “consultative
examinations in 2018 and 2021, [she] did not complain of difficulty with either hand
and she exhibited intact hand and finger dexterity with full grip strength bilaterally.” Id.
(citing Tr. at pp. 304-15 & 2391-97). 	The ALJ also drew attention to the fact that
Plaintiff “usually described crocheting, playing games, and working on a computer, all
of which require some use of her hands.” 	Id. (citing Tr. at pp. 1431 & 2385-90); see
also Tr. at p. 2393 (stating that Plaintiff’s hobbies include crocheting, sewing, and using
the computer). Consequently, the ALJ concluded that the “evidence does not show that
this impairment more than minimally limits [Plaintiff’s] ability to perform basic work
activities.” Tr. at p. 858.
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When determining Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ did not explicitly refer to Plaintiff’s
carpal tunnel syndrome. See generally Tr. at pp. 861-70. However, the ALJ stated that
Plaintiff had “full strength in all extremities and intact grip strength and normal dexterity
in both hands.” Tr. at p. 862 (citing Tr. at p. 308). Additionally, when discussing the
opinion of Andrew Williams, M.D. (“Dr. Williams”), the ALJ recounted Dr. Williams’
statement that Plaintiff “was limited for reaching, handling, fingering, and feeling,” Tr.
at p. 866, but concluded that this was “not consistent with or supported by the medical
evidence 	of 	record,” 	including 	consultative 	examinations, 	which 	“did 	not 	show
significant upper extremity limitations and no loss of motor strength or hand dexterity,”
id. (citing Tr. at pp. 305-15 & 2385-89), as well as Plaintiff’s activities, which involved
gardening, weeding, mulching, and doing other household projects.” 	Id. 	Likewise,
when discussing the opinion of Elke Lorensen, M.D. (“Dr. Lorensen”), the ALJ noted
that “[e]xaminations have not consistently shown significant limitations to shoulder or
arm motion, loss of strength in the upper extremities, or other evidence” to support the
“significant reaching restrictions” opined by Dr. Lorensen. 	Tr. at p. 867 (citing Tr. at
pp. 1770-72, 1941, & 2391-97).
Accordingly, in determining Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ addressed Plaintiff’s
bilateral 	carpal 	tunnel 	syndrome 	by 	considering 	whether 	Plaintiff 	suffered 	an
impairment to her hands.
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b. Diabetes
As for Plaintiff’s alleged diabetes, at Step Two, the ALJ acknowledged that
Plaintiff “has also been evaluated for diabetes mellitus,” but that this has “been managed
with medication and providers did not observe significant abnormalities.” Tr. at p. 858
(citing, inter alia, Tr. at pp. 1878-80 (progress notes dated April 2020 stating that
Plaintiff’s “Type 2 diabetes mellitus” was “without complication” and “without long-
term current use of insulin”)). The ALJ thus concluded that “[t]he record does not show
that . . . [this] condition[] limit[s] [Plaintiff]’s ability to perform work activities.” Id.2
When determining Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ did not explicitly refer to Plaintiff’s
diabetes. See generally Tr. at pp. 861-70. However, there was no need to do so. The
ALJ did not need to “consider would-be impairments whose symptoms are controlled
with medication.” Perez v. Colvin, 2014 WL 4852848, at *3 (D. Conn. Sept. 29, 2014).
“A successfully treated . . . impairment is ipso facto not an impairment.” 	Id. (citing
Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1039 (2d Cir. 1983)).
Plaintiff has presented no argument disputing that her diabetes has been managed
with medication or otherwise explaining how her diabetes might interfere with her work-
related abilities. See generally Dkt. No. 7. As such, there was no need for the ALJ to
include 	any 	additional 	limitations 	related 	to 	Plaintiff’s 	diabetes 	in 	the 	RFC
determination. 	See, e.g., Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2018 WL 3829119, at *3
2 The ALJ made the same findings with regard to Plaintiff’s alleged hypertension, GERD, and hyperlipidemia. Tr.
at p. 858. Plaintiff does not appear to challenge the ALJ’s treatment of these alleged impairments. See generally
Dkt. Nos. 7 & 10.
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(W.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2018) (holding that “Plaintiff . . . has not demonstrated that the ALJ
should have included any additional limitations in his RFC analysis as a result of
Plaintiff’s headaches” where “Plaintiff’s headaches ceased when he took his psychiatric
medications as prescribed” and “Plaintiff has not proffered any explanation for how
headaches that are completely controlled by medication might interfere with his work-
related abilities”).
Accordingly, the ALJ did not need to explicitly refer to Plaintiff’s diabetes in the
RFC determination because Plaintiff’s diabetes was managed with medication.
c. Ophthalmic Migraines and Blurred Vision with Suspected Glaucoma
The 	ALJ 	recognized 	that 	Plaintiff 	was 	evaluated 	for 	“ophthalmic
migraines . . . and blurred vision and providers noted that she was a glaucoma suspect.”
Tr. at p. 859 (citing Tr. at pp. 1519-46). 	On the other hand, however, the ALJ noted
that: 	“examinations 	showed 	20/20 	vision 	with 	correction, 	with 	no 	evidence 	of
retinopathy or other long-term vision deficits,” id. (citing Tr. at pp. 2034-37); “[Plaintiff]
had laser surgery for her glaucoma in 2020 with no negative effects,” id. (citing Tr. at
pp. 2391-97); “[s]he did not complain of ophthalmic migraines on a long-term basis”;
and “[her] ophthalmologist opined that [her] eye impairments caused no functional
limitations.” Id. (citing Tr. at pp. 1551-54).
“While remand is necessary where an ALJ’s RFC determination fails to account
for 	greater-than-minimal 	limitations 	stemming 	from 	a 	plaintiff’s 	non-severe
impairments, here there was no evidence of record suggesting that any such limitations
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existed.” Suzanne H. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2021 WL 5309718, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Nov.
15, 2021). Indeed, Plaintiff has not argued that her migraines or blurred vision interfere
with her work-related abilities. 	See generally Dkt. No. 7. 	Further, as noted by
Defendant, “Plaintiff points to nothing suggesting greater limitations from these
conditions.” Def.’s Mem. of Law at p. 9 (citing Pl.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 14-16).
Accordingly, the ALJ supported with substantial evidence her finding that
Plaintiff’s ophthalmic migraines and blurred vision with suspected glaucoma did not
cause functional limitations, and Plaintiff has not presented evidence to the contrary.
2. Mental Impairments
Plaintiff also maintains that the ALJ’s consideration of Plaintiff’s mental
impairments in the 2024 Decision was “cursory” and “inadequate.” Pl.’s Mem. of Law
at pp. 15-16. More specifically, Plaintiff insists that the ALJ’s RFC analysis in the 2024
Decision did not address the worsening of Plaintiff’s depression and anxiety. 	Id.
Defendant, on the other hand, contends that the 2024 Decision complies with the Court’s
directive “by providing a lengthy and robust analysis of the impact of Plaintiff’s mental
impairments on the RFC finding.” Def.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 8-11.
Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “mental impairments of depressive disorder
and anxiety disorder . . . did not cause more than minimal limitation in [her] ability to
perform basic mental work activities and was therefore nonsevere.” 	Tr. at p. 859. 	In
making this determination, the ALJ expressly “considered the four broad areas of mental
functioning set out in the disability regulations.” Id.
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When determining Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ stated that, “[c]onsistent with the
District Court’s Order, the [ALJ] ha[d] considered [Plaintiff’s] mental impairments in
evaluating [her] [RFC],” but concluded that “the medical evidence of record does not
support 	any 	additional 	limitations 	in 	the 	[RFC] 	related 	to 	[Plaintiff’s] 	mental
impairments.” 	Tr. at p. 864. 	The ALJ explained that Plaintiff “complained of
depression and anxiety related to her pain and a history of trauma” and “exhibited a
depressed or anxious mood at times,” but “overall . . . appeared stable with a[] normal
mood at times and no notable cognitive deficits.” Tr. at pp. 864-65.
The ALJ noted that, “[i]n a 2018 consultative examination, [Plaintiff] complained
of poor sleep, depression, and anxiety, but she had a normal appearance, normal
speech, . . . was polite and cooperative, with a depressed mood, normal attention and
memory, and good insight and judgment.” 	Tr. at p. 865. 	While Plaintiff “reported
periodic increased . . . depression over time, . . . [m]ental status examinations showed
no change despite these increased complaints, as she was usually polite and cooperative,
with normal speech, good concentration, and good mood.” 	Id. 	Additionally, the ALJ
discussed a 2021 consultative examination, stating:
[Plaintiff] complained of depression, anxiety, low motivation, fatigue, and
nervousness in crowds, but she denied any thought disorder or cognitive
deficits. [She] reported being mildly irritable, but she interacted well with
Dr. Alexander, who observed good grooming and hygiene, and normal
speech. [Her] memory appeared mildly impaired due to nervousness, but
she 	generally 	had 	intact 	memory 	and 	concentration, 	with 	average
cognitive functioning, and good insight and judgment. [She ] reported that
she could cook, clean, do laundry, shop, handle personal care, watch
television, work on her computer, and play games.
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Id. The ALJ also considered later evaluations, which the ALJ stated revealed that, while
Plaintiff “complained of periods with increased anxiety and depression, . . . she reported
some improvement with medication” and “[m]ental status examinations showed no
significant change over time.” Id.
The ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff’s “depression and anxiety caused some
persistent symptoms,” but concluded that she “has been able to manage these symptoms
on a daily basis with counselling and medication.” Id. While Plaintiff “alleged memory
and concentration problems, . . . examinations consistently showed normal functioning
in these areas.” 	Id. 	The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff “has been able to manage daily
activities from a cognitive standpoint, as she can do chores, manage finances, go
shopping, and even direct her husband in tasks when necessary.” Id.
The 	ALJ 	considered 	the 	state 	agency 	psychological 	consultants’ 	prior
administrative findings and found them to be persuasive. 	Tr. at p. 867. 	The ALJ
explained that each consultant “found that [Plaintiff] had no more than a mild limitation
in any area of mental functioning and did not assess any functional limitations related
to mental impairments.” Id. The ALJ also noted that “[t]he consultative examinations
showed normal behavior and largely normal memory and concentration,” and “[o]ther
mental status examinations also showed few abnormalities,” which the ALJ explained
“supports a finding that [Plaintiff]’s mental impairments do not result in any functional
limitations.” Id.
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Additionally, the ALJ considered the opinions of Dennis Noia, Ph.D. (“Dr.
Noia”), and Dante Alexander, Psyd. (“Dr. Alexander”). 	Id. 	The ALJ recounted Dr.
Noia’s opinion that Plaintiff “had mild limitations for understanding, remembering, or
applying complex instructions, mild limitations for regulating emotions, controlling,
behavior, and maintaining well-being, with no limitations in any other areas.” Id. The
ALJ also discussed Dr. Alexander’s opinion that Plaintiff “had mild limitations for
interacting with others, and regulating emotions controlling behavior, and maintaining
wellbeing, but not limitations in any other areas,” and noted that he stated that Plaintiff’s
“psychiatric problems did not appear significant enough to interfere with [her] ability to
function on a daily basis.” 	Id. 	The ALJ thereby concluded that Plaintiff’s “mental
impairments do not cause any functional limitations.” Id.
The ALJ was not as persuaded by the moderate limitations opined by Alex
Dickinson, LCSW (“Mr. Dickinson”) and Ronald Thesee, M.D. (“Dr. Thesee”). Tr. at
pp. 867-68. “Mr. Dickinson opined that [Plaintiff] had no more than a mild limitation
for understanding, remembering, and carrying out instructions and making judgments
on complex work-related decisions,” and found that she “had moderate limitations for
interacting with others or responding to usual work situations and changes in a routine
work setting.” 	Id. 	“Dr. Thesee opined that [Plaintiff] had moderate limitations for
making judgment on work-related decisions with no more than mild limitations in any
other areas.” Tr. at p. 868. The ALJ found these opinions “not entirely consistent with
or supported by the medical evidence of record.” 	Id. 	Among other things, the ALJ
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noted that mental status examinations showed that Plaintiff had “normal cognitive
functioning” and “normal concentration,” as well as “few abnormalities.” Id. The ALJ
also noted that Mr. Dickinson and Dr. Thesee provided their opinions in a checklist style
form that did not provide many objective findings or cite to other evidence in support.
Id.
Thus, as correctly stated by Defendant:
the ALJ explicitly considered Plaintiff’s non-severe mental impairments
beyond 	step 	two. 	And 	there 	was 	nothing 	“cursory” 	or 	“woefully
inadequate” about the ALJ’s lengthy discussion of Plaintiff’s non-severe
mental impairments in the RFC portion of the decision.
Def.’s Mem. of Law at p. 7.
B. Consideration of the Combined Effects of Plaintiff’s Impairments
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ “did not consider the impact of all Plaintiff’s
impairments in combination when assessing RFC,” but rather “segregate[d] the effects
of each impairment.” Pl.’s Mem. of Law at p. 16. In particular, Plaintiff complains that:
the ALJ failed to consider how Plaintiff’s “non-severe” but worsening
depression and anxiety, combined with Plaintiff’s multiple physically
debilitating musculoskeletal and respiratory impairments, impact her
ability to remain on task sufficiently to sustain non-exertional work-
related activities . . . . Nowhere in the portion of her decision devoted to
explaining why Plaintiff was not disabled did the ALJ wrestle with the
issue of whether Plaintiff . . . would be able to sustain work-related
activities and functions throughout a work week – five days straight, for
eight hours per day.
Id. at p. 17 (emphasis in original). 	Defendant responds that “the ALJ properly and
explicitly considered Plaintiff’s mental complaints in combination with her complaints
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of physical pain and fatigue when evaluating her RFC prior to January 1, 2023,” but
“reasonably concluded that no disabling limitations were warranted.” Def.’s Mem. of
Law at p. 13 (citing Tr. at pp. 864-65 (ALJ noting Plaintiff “complained of depression
and anxiety related to her pain” and that complaints of “fatigue” related to depression
and anxiety”)). The Court finds Plaintiff’s argument to be unfounded.
“An ALJ is obligated to consider the combined effect of a claimant’s physical
and mental impairments.” Kelly C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2023 WL 3343908, at *5
(W.D.N.Y. May 10, 2023) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1523(c), 416.923(c)). 	“As the
Second Circuit has noted, an ALJ ‘must evaluate [the physical and mental impairments’]
combined 	impact 	on 	a 	claimant’s 	ability 	to 	work, 	regardless 	of 	whether 	every
impairment is severe.’” Id. (quoting McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 151-52 (2d Cir.
2014)) (alteration in original). The ALJ did precisely that here.
In Joseph C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., the plaintiff argued that “the ALJ erred by
failing to ‘adequately consider’ the combined effect of Plaintiff’s severe and non-severe
impairments when making the RFC finding.” 	2024 WL 4043185, at *11 (W.D.N.Y.
Sept. 4, 2024). 	The court found that there was “no merit to [p]laintiff’s contention”
because, among other things, “[t]he ALJ expressly noted the ALJ’s obligation to
consider ‘all of the claimant’s impairments, including impairments that are not severe.’”
Id. 	The court further explained that it was “fallacious for Plaintiff to argue that the
absence of additional limitations in the RFC finding to account for his mild mental
limitations proves that the ALJ failed to properly consider his non-severe impairments.”
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Id. 	Here, like in Joseph C., the ALJ expressly noted her obligations to, among other
things, “consider all of the claimant’s impairments, including impairments that are not
severe,” Tr. at p. 857, and “evaluate the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the
claimant’s symptoms to determine the extent to which they limit the claimant’s work-
related activities.” Tr. at p. 861. The ALJ also stated that she “considered all symptoms
and the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with
the objective medical evidence and other evidence.” Tr. at p. 861. She further explained
that she determined Plaintiff’s RFC “based upon review of the complete record as well
as consideration of all opinions within the record, the testimony of the claimant, and the
claimant’s severe and nonsevere impairments.” Tr. at p. 870.
Additionally, in Kelly C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., in response to plaintiff’s
argument that “the ALJ failed to consider the combined impact of her physical and
mental impairments on her ability to work,” the court noted that the ALJ had “concluded
that [claimant’s] severe impairments, either singularly or in combination, did not meet
or medically equal the severity of a listed impairment.” 2023 WL 3343908, at *5. Here,
like in Kelly C., the ALJ concluded that, “[s]ince April 26, 2018, [Plaintiff] has not had
an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the
severity of one of the listed impairments in [the Listings].” Tr. at p. 860.
Further, while the ALJ stated that she “considered [Plaintiff’s] reported pain and
other symptoms” and acknowledged that “all of these factors affect her [RFC],” the ALJ
determined that “the objective findings in the medical evidence of record do not support
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greater limitations than those outlined.” Tr. at p. 864. In analyzing each of Plaintiff’s
alleged impairments, the ALJ provided a detailed discussion explaining why evidence
in the record did not support greater limitations than those contained in the RFC. Tr. at
pp. 862-68. 	Among other things, the ALJ repeatedly drew attention to the fact that
Plaintiff “has been able to handle daily activities independently,” Tr. at p. 860, and had
“good activity levels.” 	Tr. at p. 864. 	Specifically, the ALJ described how Plaintiff
“engaged in both indoor and outdoor activities despite her pain complaints,” including:
doing 	household 	projects, 	spending 	time 	with 	her 	grandchildren,
mowing, . . . gardening, . . . weeding[,] . . . cooking, doing some chores,
shopping, 	crocheting, . . . working 	on 	her 	computer[,] . . . manag[ing]
finances, . . . and even direct[ing] her husband in tasks when necessary.
Tr. at pp. 864-66.
“[I]t was within the ALJ’s purview to review all the evidence before h[er]
(including the various opinions of record), resolv[e] any inconsistencies therein, and
mak[e] a determination consistent with the evidence as a whole.” Marion A. v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 2019 WL 13499951, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2019) (citing cases).
“[Plaintiff’s] suggestion that the ALJ did not consider the combined effect of her
physical and mental impairments is grounded in little more than speculation,” and
appears to “boil[] down to a disagreement with the ALJ’s analysis and weighing of the
evidence.” Kelly C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2023 WL 3343908, at *5. “However, it is
not the function of this Court to reweigh the evidence—so long as the ALJ’s conclusions
are supported by substantial evidence (which the Court has already found for the reasons
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set forth above), they must be affirmed.” 	Kimberly H. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 671 F.
Supp. 3d 328, 338 (W.D.N.Y. 2023) (citing Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 683
F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012)).
To the extent that Plaintiff’s argument centers on the fact that, beginning on
January 1, 2023, the ALJ added to Plaintiff’s RFC the additional limitation of Plaintiff
being “off-task 20% of the workday,” Tr. at p. 868, and questions why the ALJ did not
find that the same limitation existed prior to January 1, 2023, see Pl.’s Mem. of Law at
pp. 17-18, the Court need look no further than the ALJ’s decision for an explanation.
As previously stated, the ALJ did not find that, prior to January 1, 2023, the evidence in
the record supported greater limitations than those contained in the RFC. See supra at
pp. 21-22. Further, in her decision, the ALJ stated that January 2023 blood testing
confirmed that Plaintiff had polycythemia. Tr. at p. 869. The ALJ explained that it was
this “newly developed polycythemia,” combined with “some increased respiratory
symptoms” and Plaintiff’s “pain and overall fatigue from all of her impairments,” that
“support[ed] a finding that [Plaintiff] would be significantly off-task in a work
environment,” not her prior “musculoskeletal impairments.” Id.; see also Tr. at p. 870
(explaining that medical opinions that “support a finding that [Plaintiff] could not
sustain work activities on a regular and continuing basis” were “more persuasive in the
context of the [Plaintiff]’s new diagnosis and increase symptoms during the relevant
period”).
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Accordingly, the ALJ did not fail to consider the combined effects of Plaintiff’s
physical and mental impairments on her ability to work prior to January 2023.
C. Consistency of Plaintiff’s Statements with the Medical Evidence
Plaintiff claims that “the ALJ is required to take into account Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints of various symptoms,” and erred in her determination that the
evidence only partially supports Plaintiff’s claims. Pl.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 19-20.
Plaintiff contends that “the ALJ appeared to subscribe to the mistaken notion that
a finding of disability requires that an individual be unable to function 24 hours a day,
seven days a week, with no waxing and waning of symptoms.” 	Id. at p. 20. 	More
specifically, Plaintiff remarks that the ALJ: “suggest[ed] that significant degenerative
changes in the lumbar spine are canceled out by an absence of nerve root compression
or objective evidence of abnormalities in the cervical spine or shoulders”; “suggested
that findings of abnormal gait are simply canceled out by other findings of normal gait”;
“noted rare respiratory exacerbations prior to January 2023 but did not explain just how
many exacerbations would be necessary for her to determine that Plaintiff’s ongoing
respiratory impairments interfered with work functioning”; and “went on at length about
Plaintiff’s ability to engage in some of the most basic activities of daily living, including
spending time with grandchildren, cooking, and participating in some household
chores.” Id. (citing Tr. at p. 864). Initially, the Court notes that these examples do not
appear to relate to Plaintiff’s subjective complaints but rather are seemingly based on
objective evidence in the record. 	See Regan v. Astrue, 2010 WL 1459194, at *10
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(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2010) (distinguishing subjective complaints from “clinical findings
consistent with laboratory and diagnostic tests”). In any event, the Court addresses each
of Plaintiff’s examples in turn, and finds that none amount to reversible error on the part
of the ALJ.
First, with regard to the ALJ’s findings regarding Plaintiff’s lumbar spine and
gait, Plaintiff appears to simply take issue with how the ALJ weighed conflicting
evidence in the record. “The ALJ must weigh all the available evidence . . . to make an
RFC finding consistent with the record as a whole and may resolve disputes between
conflicting evidence.” 	Santiago v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2020 WL 1922363, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2020). That is precisely what the ALJ did here. It is not the role of
a court to “re-weigh evidence,” Lewis v. Colvin, 122 F. Supp. 3d 1, 7 (N.D.N.Y. 2015)
(quotation and internal quotation marks omitted), because “a reviewing court ‘defer[s]
to the Commissioner’s resolution of conflicting evidence’” where that resolution is
supported by substantial evidence. Id. (quoting Cage v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 692 F.3d
118, 122 (2d Cir. 2012)).
As 	for 	Plaintiff’s 	respiratory 	exacerbations, 	Plaintiff 	seeks 	to 	impose 	a
requirement on the ALJ that does not exist, as the ALJ had no obligation to expressly
specify “how many exacerbations would be necessary for her to determine that
Plaintiff’s ongoing respiratory impairments interfered with work functioning.” 	Pl.’s
Mem. of Law at p. 20. 	The ALJ sufficiently explained that Plaintiff’s “respiratory
function 	remained 	steady . . . ,without 	many 	exacerbations” 	and 	that 	she 	“rarely
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experienced any exacerbations,” Tr. at p. 864, and further noted that Plaintiff “has not
had exacerbations requiring hospitalizations or emergency treatment.” Tr. at p. 861.
The ALJ also did not err by considering Plaintiff’s daily activities. In fact, “[t]he
Regulations state that it is appropriate for the ALJ to consider a claimant’s daily
activities when evaluating . . . subjective symptoms.” Thomas F.W. v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 2022 WL 22329498, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2022) (citing 20 C.F.R. §
404.1529(c)(3)(i)). 	“Plaintiff’s daily activities were relevant to making an accurate
assessment of h[er] abilities and limitations, and the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s daily
activities were not entirely consistent with h[er] alleged symptoms.” Id.
Insofar as Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ “noting that Plaintiff had declined
referrals for several of her alleged symptoms, suggesting less severe symptoms than
alleged,” Pl.’s Mem. of Law at p. 21 (citing Tr. at p. 864), the Court again finds no error.
Courts in the Second Circuit “have specifically recognized that a pattern of conservative
medical treatment . . . . is a proper factor for an ALJ to consider.” Thomas v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec. Admin., 479 F. Supp. 3d 66, 89 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (quotation, internal
quotation marks, and citation omitted) (cleaned up).
D. Rejection of the Opinions of Plaintiff’s Treating Providers
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by rejecting the opinions from Plaintiff’s
treating providers, Dr. Williams and Dr. Thesee. Pl.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 17-21. The
Court disagrees.
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“[U]nder the Social Security Administration’s latest regulations, which apply
because [Plaintiff] filed her claim for benefits after March 27, 2017, no special deference
is given to the opinion of the treating physician.” Tibbles v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2023
WL 3477127, at *2 (2d Cir. May 16, 2023) (citation omitted); Tr. at pp. 77-78
(indicating that Plaintiff filed her claim for benefits on June 27, 2018). 	Instead, ALJs
are “to consider the submitted medical opinions based on several factors set forth in the
regulations and to explain how the two most important factors – supportability and
consistency – applied to each opinion.” Rushford v. Kijakazi, 2023 WL 8946622, at *1
(2d Cir. Dec. 28, 2023) (quotations omitted). Plaintiff acknowledges this standard. Pl.’s
Mem. of Law at p. 22 (stating that “the ALJ is no longer required to accord great
deference to treating source opinions,” but arguing that the ALJ “must properly consider
the supportability of that opinion and whether it is consistent with the evidence of
record”).
Here, in finding the opinions of Dr. Williams and Dr. Thesee unpersuasive, the
ALJ properly explained how the opinions are not supported by objective evidence and
not consistent with other opinions of record. 	With regard to Dr. Williams, the ALJ
recounted Dr. Williams’ opinion that Plaintiff would be: “incapable of even the minimal
requirements of the sedentary exertional level, suggesting significant restrictions for
sitting, standing, and walking, while needing a cane to walk even short distances”;
“limited for reaching, handling, fingering, and feeling”; and able to “only climb three
steps and 	never 	perform other 	postural maneuvers, 	while never 	tolerating 	most
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environmental conditions.” 	Tr. at p. 866. 	The ALJ acknowledged Dr. Williams’ role
as Plaintiff’s “primary care provider,” but concluded that his opinions were “not
consistent with or supported by the medical evidence of record.” Id.
More specifically, the ALJ explained that the restrictions imposed by Dr.
Williams were inconsistent with the consultative evaluations, which “did not show
significant upper extremity limitations and no loss of motor strength or hand dexterity,”
id. (citing Tr. at pp. 305-15 & 2385-89), and “many” of which “showed no gait or
balance problems and no need for a cane,” id. (citing Tr. at pp. 1317, 1363-64, 1704,
1733, & 1765), as well as “[m]ore recent pain evaluations,” which “only showed a slight
right leg weakness at most, with good motion and strength in both upper extremities and
still a normal gait.” 	Id. (citing Tr. at pp. 1729-34 & 1765-68). 	Additionally, the ALJ
found the “limitations . . . inconsistent with [Plaintiff]’s activities during this time,
including gardening, weeding, mulching, and doing other household projects.” Id. The
ALJ also noted that “Dr. Williams provided his opinion in checklist-style forms, with
little reference to any objective findings to support his assessments.” 	Id. 	Further, as
observed by Defendant, Dr. Williams “left blank every section on every page asking for
medical or clinical findings supporting the identified limitations.” Def.’s Mem. of Law
at p. 19 (citing Tr. at pp. 371-76, 725-30, 1478-83, & 1570-75) (emphasis in original).
Likewise, with regard to Dr. Thesee, the ALJ discussed how Dr. Thesee opined
that Plaintiff “had moderate limitations for making judgment on work-related decisions
with no more than mild limitations in any other areas,” and noted Plaintiff’s “report that
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she has difficulty concentrating and struggles prioritizing and completing tasks.” Tr. at
p. 868. The ALJ found this “assessment . . . not entirely consistent with or supported by
the medical evidence of record.” 	Id. 	The ALJ explained that Plaintiff’s mental status
examinations “consistently showed” that Plaintiff “had normal concentration and
showed few abnormalities,” id. (citing Tr. at pp. 1371, 1374, 1379, 1404, 1408, 1415,
1441, 	1446-47, 	& 	2640-49), 	and 	“[c]onsultative 	examinations 	also 	showed 	few
abnormalities in examinations.” 	Id. (citing Tr. at pp. 295-300 & 2385-90). 	The ALJ
also noted that “Dr. Thesee provided his opinion in a checklist style form and did not
provide any other support for this opinion.” Id.
Accordingly, the ALJ adequately explained her consideration of the factors of
supportability and consistency in her rationale for finding the restrictions that Dr.
Williams and Dr. Thesee assessed to be unpersuasive.
E. VE Testimony
Plaintiff asserts that the VE was “required to identify at least three available
jobs,” Pl.’s Mem. of Law at p. 23, but was “unable to provide more than one
representative occupation,” and “was also vague about the number of jobs available and
the extent to which those numbers would be reduced by a ‘sit/stand option.’” Id. at p.
24. This argument is without merit.
Here, at Step Five of the sequential analysis, the ALJ relied on the testimony of
the VE in determining that, prior to January 1, 2023, there were jobs that existed in
significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could have performed. Tr. at
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pp. 870-71. 	Upon considering Plaintiff’s RFC, the VE testified that Plaintiff could
perform the job of “customer order clerk.” 	Tr. at p. 54. 	With regard to Plaintiff’s
argument as to the number of jobs identified by the VE, the Court finds no error, as
“[t]he Commissioner need show only one job existing in the national economy that
[Plaintiff] can perform.” 	Shana H. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2026 WL 592605, at *5
(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2026) (alteration in original) (quoting Bavaro v. Astrue, 413 F. App’x
382, 384 (2d Cir. 2011)) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 	In fact,
Plaintiff acknowledges that “courts in the Second Circuit have allowed a vocational
expert to offer fewer than three representative jobs.” Pl.’s Mem. of Law at p. 23.
As for Plaintiff’s argument regarding the VE’s alleged vagueness about the
number of customer order clerk jobs available, id. at p. 24, the Court again finds no
error. The VE testified that there are 62,000 customer order clerk jobs nationally. Tr.
at pp. 54-55. The VE also explained that the job of customer order clerk “is a sedentary
exertion level.” 	Tr. at p. 54. 	In response to the ALJ’s hypothetical regarding an
individual who would need (1) “a sit/stand option at the individual’s discretion” and (2)
“to change position after 20 minutes,” the VE indicated that those limitations would
likely reduce the number of jobs by ten percent, Tr. at pp. 56-57, thereby yielding
approximately 55,800 jobs nationally. As such, the VE’s testimony as to the number of
jobs available was not vague.3
3 Notably, as Defendant correctly points out, Plaintiff seemingly “does not challenge the ALJ’s finding that the
Customer Order Clerk occupation exists in significant numbers in the national economy.” Def.’s Mem. of Law at
p. 22.
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Finally, Plaintiff argues that “the hypotheticals posed by the ALJ to the
VE . . . did not accurately portray Plaintiff’s physical and mental impairments,” and
complains that the ALJ did not pose certain hypotheticals to the VE. Pl.’s Mem. of Law
at p. 24. 	For the reasons explained more fully in the preceding sections, Plaintiff has
not pointed to a reversible error in the ALJ’s RFC finding. See supra at pp. 8-28. As
correctly noted by Defendant, impairments not adopted in the RFC need not be included
in the ALJ’s hypothetical questions to the VE. 	Def.’s Mem. of Law at p. 23 (citing,
inter alia, Priel v. Astrue, 453 F. App’x 84, 87-88 (2d Cir. 2011) (summary order)
(“[T]he ALJ properly declined to include in her hypothetical question symptoms and
limitations that [she] had reasonably rejected.”)).
Accordingly, the ALJ did not err by relying upon the VE’s testimony to
determine that, prior to January 1, 2023, there were jobs that existed in significant
numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could have performed.
IV. CONCLUSION
ACCORDINGLY, it is
ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED;
and it is further
ORDERED, 	that 	Defendant’s 	Motion 	for 	Judgment 	on 	the 	Pleadings 	is
GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED, that Defendant’s decision partially denying Plaintiff disability
benefits is AFFIRMED and the Complaint is DISMISSED; and it is further
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ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court shall serve copies of this Memorandum-
Decision and Order on the parties.
Dated: May 28, 2026
Albany, New York
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