Vatalaro v. Popeo et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________________________
SANDRA VATALARO,
Plaintiff,
-v- 	6:26-CV-156 (AJB/ML)
GARLAND POPEO et al.,
Defendants.
_____________________________________
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
SANDRA VATALARO
Plaintiff, Pro Se
1661 Dudley Avenue
Utica, NY 13501
Hon. Anthony Brindisi, U.S. District Judge:
ORDER ON REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
On January 30, 2026, pro se plaintiff Sandra Vatalaro (“plaintiff”) filed this civil action
against Judge Garland Popeo, the New York State DMV Commissioner, and the Oneida County
District Attorney. 	Dkt. No. 1. 	Along with her complaint, plaintiff sought leave to proceed in
forma pauperis (“IFP Application”). Dkt. No. 2. Plaintiff also moved on an emergency basis for
a temporary restraining order. Dkt. No. 3.
On February 2, 2026, U.S. Magistrate Judge Miroslav Lovric reviewed plaintiff’s pleading,
concluded that the complaint was illegibly drafted, and directed plaintiff to re-file the document in
a legible format. Dkt. No. 5. Plaintiff’s IFP Application was denied without prejudice to refiling
in connection with a legible pleading. Id. Thereafter, plaintiff filed an amended complaint, Dkt.
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No. 8, and renewed her IFP Application, Dkt. No. 9. Soon after, plaintiff also filed a letter motion
requesting that her temporary restraining order be granted immediately. Dkt. No. 10.
On February 19, 2026, this Court reviewed plaintiff’s filings, denied her motion for a tem-
porary restraining order, and referred the amended complaint and renewed IFP Application to
Judge Lovric for an initial review. Dkt. No. 11. The next day, plaintiff filed an emergency petition
for a writ of mandamus, Dkt. No. 12, which was later denied as moot in light of the Court’s deci-
sion to deny the temporary restraining order, Dkt. No. 14.
On February 20, 2026, Judge Lovric conducted a review of plaintiff’s amended complaint
and concluded—as before—that certain pages were not legible. Dkt. No. 13. Judge Lovric denied
plaintiff’s IFP Application without prejudice and invited her to re-file a completely legible com-
plaint along with a renewed IFP application. 	Id. 	Thereafter, plaintiff filed a second amended
complaint, Dkt. No. 15, and a renewed IFP Application, Dkt. No. 16. The next day, plaintiff also
filed another emergency motion for a temporary restraining order. Dkt. No. 17. This Court denied
the motion for emergency relief and referred the case to the magistrate judge for an initial review
in due course. Dkt. No. 18.
On March 3, 2026, Judge Lovric granted plaintiff’s IFP Application and, after conducting
an initial review of the operative pleading, advised by Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) that
plaintiff’s second amended complaint be dismissed without leave to amend. 	Dkt. No. 19. 	As
Judge Lovric explained, plaintiff’s second amended complaint appeared to allege that between
2010 and 2012, plaintiff was charged with multiple state-court crimes, pleaded guilty to those
crimes under duress, and, despite having completed her sentence and paid her fines, is still subject
to an ignition interlock device as a result of a change in relevant state law. See id.
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Based on his review of the pleading, Judge Lovric determined that plaintiff’s second
amended complaint was deficient because it lacked an arguable basis in law or fact, i.e., it was
“frivolous and nonsensical.” Dkt. No. 19. Even assuming otherwise, Judge Lovric concluded that
defendants were immune from suit, either on the basis of judicial immunity and/or Eleventh
Amendment immunity (as to defendants Popeo and the DMV Commissioner) or the basis of pros-
ecutorial immunity (was to defendants Oneida County District Attorney or attorneys). Id. To the
extent that one or more federal-law claims might otherwise be permissible against one or more of
these defendants, Judge Lovric explained that plaintiff’s claims were either barred by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine or failed on the merits based on the applicable limitations period. Id. As relevant
here, Judge Lovric concluded that further amendment would be unwarranted. Id.
Plaintiff has lodged objections. 	Dkt. No. 20. 	Shortly thereafter, plaintiff filed an emer-
gency motion seeking Judge Lovric’s recusal, Dkt. No. 21, and lodged supplemental objections to
the R&R. Dkt. No. 22. Judge Lovric has denied plaintiff’s motion for recusal. Dkt. No. 23.
Upon de novo review, Judge Lovric’s R&R is accepted and will be adopted. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C). First, the Court agrees that plaintiff’s motion for recusal failed to establish a valid
basis for relief. Second, after reviewing the objections, the Court concludes that plaintiff’s filings
do not warrant any relief from the R&R, either.
To the extent that plaintiff might be seeking to collaterally attack certain state-law conse-
quences flowing from her state-law criminal conviction from the early 2010s, any such claim
would in fact be time-barred (and would not, contrary to plaintiff’s objections, be subject to the
“continuing violation” doctrine). Such a claim would also be subject to dismissal for the reasons
set forth in Judge Lovric’s R&R, including but not limited to the various constitutional immunity
principles he has identified.
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Alternatively, to the extent that plaintiff’s second amended complaint might be understood
as some kind of § 1983 procedural due process challenge to the New York State DMV’s continued
imposition of the ignition interlock device, plaintiff has been given several opportunities to try to
allege some details about how her state-law property rights might have been violated or how the
process she received (if any) was constitutionally inadequate. She has not done so.
But even if she had, the general consensus among the federal trial courts is that the place
to pursue such a challenge to formal or established DMV action or inaction would be in a state-
court Article 78 proceeding. See, e.g., Forjone v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 414 F. Supp. 3d 292,
303–04 (N.D.N.Y. 2019); Collins v. Saratoga Cnty. Support Collection Unit, 2012 WL 2571288,
at *6–*7 (N.D.N.Y. July 3, 2012) (analyzing similar claim under “the more onerous state-proce-
dure analysis” but concluding that an Article 78 proceeding remained a sufficient remedy regard-
less of whether it was a random, unauthorized act or the intentional application of a state policy).
In sum, plaintiff’s second amended complaint does not plausibly allege any constitutional
claims that would give rise to federal-court jurisdiction, and based on a review of the filings and
the procedural history of this case it does not appear that granting plaintiff leave to further amend
would be productive. 	To the extent that plaintiff believes that she is wrongfully suffering from
continuing collateral consequences from her state-court conviction, her remedy almost certainly
lies in the form of some state-court post-conviction proceeding, such as habeas corpus.
Therefore, it is
ORDERED that
1. The Report & Recommendation (Dkt. No. 19) is ACCEPTED; and
2. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint (Dkt. No. 15) is DISMISSED without prejudice
but without leave to further amend.
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The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate the pending motion, enter a judgment ac-
cordingly, and close the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 3, 2026
Utica, New York.
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