Sims v. Syracuse Haulers Waste Removal, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
DILLON SIMS, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
v.
SYRACUSE HAULERS WASTE REMOVAL,
INC.,
Defendant.
5:25-cv-1080
(ECC/MJK)
Carter T. Hastings, Esq., for Plaintiff
Katherine S. McClung, Esq., for Defendant
Hon. Elizabeth C. Coombe, United States District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Dillon Sims, suing individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
brings this action against Defendant Syracuse Haulers Waste Removal, Inc. alleging violations of
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., and the New York Labor
Law. Dkt. No. 1. Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for conditional certification and
notice to putative collective members under the FLSA. Dkt. No. 36. The motion is fully briefed.
Dkt. Nos. 41, 47, 48. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion is granted in part.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed an “Original Collective/Class Action Complaint” on August 12, 2025. Dkt.
No. 1. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant is a “full-service solid waste company providing waste
collection, recycling, and disposal services to commercial, industrial, and residential customers.”
Id. at ¶ 25. As relevant to this motion, Plaintiff alleges that he and other putative collective
members employed by Defendant were subject to a “regular practice” by which Defendant would
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“deduct a 30-minute meal-period from [their] wages for a meal break they did not receive.” Id. at
¶ 6. This deduction resulted in Plaintiff and the putative collective members “working straight time
hours and overtime hours for which they were [] not compensated” at the rates required by the
FLSA. Id. at ¶ 47.
To date, thirteen individuals in addition to Plaintiff have consented to opt-in to a FLSA
collective action. See Dkt. Nos. 5, 7, 8, 17, 31, 33, 39, 40, 54, 55, 56.
A. 	Plaintiff’s Submissions
In support of the motion to conditionally certify a FLSA collective, Plaintiff submitted
declarations from himself and six other former and current employees of Defendant. The seven
declarants worked for Defendant as “non-exempt Waste Disposal Driver[s]” and were paid by the
hour. See Dkt. No. 36-2 ¶¶ 2-3 (Dillon Sims Decl.); Dkt. No. 36-3 ¶¶ 2-3 (Devon Thomason Decl.);
Dkt. No. 36-4 ¶¶ 2-3 (Marc Snow Decl.); Dkt. No. 36-5 ¶¶ 2-3 (Nathaniel Jefferson Decl.); Dkt.
No. 36-6 ¶¶ 2-3 (James Chappell Decl.); Dkt. No. 36-7 ¶¶ 2-3 (Mark Myers Decl.); Dkt. No. 36-8
¶¶ 2-3 (Luke Given Decl.).1 All declarants assert that they worked at Defendant’s Syracuse, New
York facility; Mr. Jefferson states that he also worked at Defendant’s Rome, Dewitt, and
Fayetteville facilities in New York. Dkt. Nos. 36-2–36-8 ¶ 2. Their duties “included the collection,
transportation and disposal of waste for Syracuse Haulers and/or its clients in the Syracuse, New
York area.” Dkt. Nos. 36-2–36-8 ¶ 4.
According to declarants, Defendant “automatically deducted a thirty-minute meal period
from [their] daily hours, even though [they] regularly worked through [their] meal period on
[Defendant’s] behalf.” Dkt. Nos. 36-2–36-8 ¶ 7. They assert that Defendant “was aware” that they
1 Mark Myers refers to himself as both a “Waste Disposal Residential Helper” and a “Waste
Disposal Driver[].” Dkt. No. 36-7 ¶¶ 2-3, 9-10.
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did not take their meal breaks because their weekly routes “were so time-consuming that [they]
could not complete them and take an uninterrupted thirty-minute lunch break” and because
Defendant had cameras in the trucks and tracked the vehicles’ GPS signals. Dkt. Nos. 36-2–36-8
¶¶ 10-12; see also Dkt. No. 36-3 ¶ 11 (Mr. Thomason declaring that the drivers used “two way
radios” to let Defendant know when breaks were taken).
Plaintiff Sims asserts that, if he did not “fill in a lunch time” on his route sheets, his manager
“Jessica” told him to “fix it and put a 30 minute lunch down,” “regardless of whether” a meal break
was actually taken. Dkt. No. 36-2 ¶ 11. Mr. Myers was “instructed by [his] supervisors Jessica
Jakeway, and Crystal Hunter that [he] needed to write down a lunch time even if [he] didn’t
actually take a break.” Dkt. No. 36-7 ¶ 11. Some of the drivers were told that “there was no way
to reverse the break deduction when [they] asked to be paid for working through [the] break.” Dkt.
Nos. 36-3 ¶ 11; 36-6 ¶ 11; 36-7 ¶ 11.
These seven individuals also state that their “fellow drivers had the same routine . . . and
either ate while working or did not take a meal break at all.” Dkt. Nos. 36-2–36-8 ¶ 9. The co-
workers talked “on a regular basis about this issue.” Id.
B. 	Defendant’s Submissions
In opposition to Plaintiff’s motion, Defendant submitted a number of declarations and
exhibits which generally can be categorized as (1) evidence of Plaintiff’s counsel’s advertising
attempts aimed at former and current employees of Defendant; (2) time data for Plaintiff, Mr.
Myers, Mr. Snow, and Mr. Jefferson with computations regarding how often, and by how many
minutes, these drivers returned earlier than the scheduled end time of their shifts; (3) declarations
from various current employees; and (4) the collective bargaining agreement with the union
through which Defendant’s drivers are unionized. See generally Dkt. Nos. 41-1 through 41-15.
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Section 216(b) of the FLSA authorizes employees to bring so-called “collective” actions
through which “employees seeking to recover under FLSA’s substantive provisions may assert
claims on behalf of other ‘similarly situated’ employees.” Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 542
(2d Cir. 2010); see 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (providing that an action “may be maintained” by “any one
or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly
situated”). Unlike with traditional class actions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,
“plaintiffs in FLSA representative actions must affirmatively ‘opt in’ to be part of the class and to
be bound by any judgment.” Myers, 624 F.3d at 542 (citations omitted).
The Second Circuit has “endorsed” a two-step process for “certifying” FLSA collective
actions. Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528, 540 (2d Cir. 2016). “At step one,
the district court permits a notice to be sent to potential opt-in plaintiffs if the named plaintiffs
make a modest factual showing that they and others together were victims of a common policy or
plan that violated the law.” Id. (citing Myers, 624 F.2d at 555). At step two, after “additional factual
development,” the district court “determines whether the collective action may go forward by
determining whether the opt-in plaintiffs are in fact similarly situated to the named plaintiffs.” Id.
The “action may be ‘de-certified’ if the record reveals that they are not, and the opt-in plaintiffs’
claims may be dismissed without prejudice.” Myers, 624 F.3d at 555.
Plaintiff’s motion for “conditional certification and notice to putative collective members”
implicates step one of this process. The “certification” referred to here “is only the district court’s
exercise of the discretionary power, upheld in Hoffman-La Roche [Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165
(1989)], to facilitate the sending of notice to potential class members.” Id. at 555 n.10; see also
Glatt, 811 F.3d at 540 (noting that a “conditionally certified FLSA collective does not acquire an
independent legal status”). The named plaintiff must make “some showing that ‘there are other
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employees . . . who are similarly situated with respect to their job requirements and with regard to
their pay provisions.’” Myers, 624 F.3d at 555 (citation omitted). The “‘modest factual showing’
cannot be satisfied by ‘unsupported assertions’” but “should remain a low standard of proof
because the purpose of this first stage is merely to demonstrate whether ‘similarly situated’
plaintiffs do in fact exist.” Id. Plaintiffs may satisfy this requirement “by relying on their own
pleadings, affidavits, declarations, or the affidavits and declarations of other potential class
members.” Davella v. Ellis Hosp., Inc., No. 1:20-cv-726 (MAD/ATB), 2023 WL 5367791, at *3
(N.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2023) (citation omitted).
In deciding a motion for conditional certification, the Court “does not resolve factual
disputes, 	decide 	substantive 	issues 	going 	to 	the 	ultimate 	merits, 	or 	make 	credibility
determinations.” Robbins v. Premier Senior Living, LLC, No. 5:21-cv-1164 (AMN/ML), 2023 WL
7181678, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2023) (citation omitted). If the named plaintiffs and opt-in
plaintiffs 	“share legal 	or 	factual 	similarities 	material 	to 	the disposition 	of 	their 	claims,
dissimilarities in other respects should not defeat collective treatment.” Scott v. Chipotle Mexican
Grill, Inc., 954 F.3d 502, 516 (2d Cir. 2020) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Conditional FLSA Certification
As set forth below, the Court concludes that conditional certification of a collective under
FLSA Section 216(b) is warranted, but with a scope greatly reduced from Plaintiff’s initial request.
Plaintiff moved for conditional certification and notice to putative members of a collective
defined as
all hourly employees who worked for Syracuse Haulers Waste
Removal, Inc., throughout the United States in the past three years
through the present and who were subject to the automatic meal
break deduction.
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Dkt. No. 36 (bold formatting omitted).2 After Defendant objected to the scope of this proposed
collective, however, Plaintiff “clarifie[d]” that “he only seeks to send notice to those individuals
working as Drivers and/or Helpers on a full-time basis.” Dkt. No. 47 at 3 n.2.3 The Court therefore
limits its analysis in the first instance to whether Plaintiff has made a modest factual showing that
he is similarly situated to full-time “Drivers and/or Helpers,” rather than all hourly employees.
First, Plaintiff, who worked as a driver, has not met his burden of showing that he is
similarly situated to “Helpers.” With one exception, all the individuals who submitted declarations
in support of Plaintiff’s motion assert that they worked for Defendant as “Waste Disposal Drivers.”
Dkt. Nos. 36-2, 36-3, 36-4, 36-5, 36-6, 36-8. Mark Myers, in turn, refers to himself both as a
“Waste Disposal Residential Helper” and a “Waste Disposal Driver[].” See Dkt. No. 36-7. Even
assuming that Mr. Myers worked as a helper, nothing in Plaintiff’s submissions explains what the
helper position entails or otherwise alleges that helpers other than Mr. Myers were also “victims
of a common policy or plan that violated the law.” Glatt, 811 F.3d at 540; see Tay v. N.Y. &
Presbyterian Hosp., No. 22-cv-8379, 2024 WL 4286226, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2024)
(limiting scope of collective to certain specified positions where there was “no showing that all
hourly workers employed by Defendant are similarly situated”) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
As a second threshold matter, Plaintiff has not made the modest factual showing required
to certify a “companywide” or “nationwide” collective. Again with one exception, the declarants
supporting Plaintiff’s motion assert that they worked at Defendant’s Syracuse, New York facility.
2 Plaintiff’s memorandum of law defines the putative collective slightly differently. See Dkt. No.
36-1 at 12.
3 Unless otherwise noted, citations to page numbers refer to the pagination generated by the
CM/ECF system.
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Dkt. Nos. 36-2, 36-3, 36-4, 36-6, 36-7, 36-8. These declarants do not offer any evidence as to any
other of Defendant’s facilities. The one exception, Nathaniel Jefferson, states that he worked at
Defendant’s Syracuse, Rome, Dewitt, and Fayetteville facilities from August 2021 until January
2022. Dkt. No. 36-5 ¶ 2. But Mr. Jefferson did not work for Defendant within the statutory period
and therefore cannot offer evidence about policies at these facilities during the relevant time
period.4 Accordingly, any conditionally certified collective will be limited to Defendant’s
Syracuse, New York facility. See Sharma v. Burberry Ltd., 52 F. Supp. 3d 443, 457-58 (E.D.N.Y.
2014) (limiting conditional certification to two store locations and declining to include all
employees in New York where declarant’s “general assertions that it was routine for [employees]
to work off-the-clock ‘in every store’ [wer]e too conclusory . . . absent factual details of which
stores he is referring to and the basis for his knowledge”); Anjum v. J.C. Penney Co., No. 13-cv-
460, 2015 WL 3603973, at *8-9 (E.D.N.Y. June 5, 2015) (limiting scope of collective to employees
at two retail locations where plaintiffs did not demonstrate they were similarly situated to sales
associates who worked at all retail stores in New York).5
So limited, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has made the modest factual showing
necessary to demonstrate that Plaintiff and other potential plaintiffs who worked full-time as
drivers at Defendant’s Syracuse facility were “victims of a common policy or plan that violated
4 The Court also notes that, after briefing on Plaintiff’s motion was complete, Mr. Jefferson
withdrew his consent form to opt-in to this FLSA action. See Dkt. Nos. 55, 56.
5 Plaintiff argues in reply that his motion “provides sufficient evidence that [Defendant’s] auto-
deduction policy for meal-periods has been improperly applied at all locations,” without citing to
any evidence or even identifying what or where those locations are. Dkt. No. 47 at 3. Furthermore,
Plaintiff’s filings inconsistently describe the geographic area in which he claims Defendant
operates. See Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 25 (alleging that Defendant provides services “throughout the United
States”); Dkt. No. 36-1 at 3 (stating that Defendant operates “across the northeastern United
States” and citing in support a hyperlink to a nonexistent webpage); Dkt. No. 47 at 3 n.3 (changing
request from “nation-wide” to “company-wide” on the basis that Defendant “has no[t] certified
that it has no facilities/employees outside of New York”).
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the law.” Glatt, 811 F.3d at 540. Although “an automatic meal deduction, alone, is not ‘a common
violation of law’ sufficient to ‘bind the purported collective action,’” a modest factual showing
that employees were “routinely working through or during scheduled meal breaks, without
compensation, and with [the employer’s] knowledge” is sufficient. See Tay, 2024 WL 4286226,
at *11 (brackets and citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff and six other drivers all assert that Defendant automatically deducted a
thirty-minute meal period from their daily hours, that they regularly worked through their meal
breaks, and that Defendant knew that its drivers routinely did not take meal breaks. See Dkt. Nos.
36-2–36-8 ¶¶ 7-13. Plaintiff further declares that his manager “Jessica” told him he had to put a
lunch break on his time “regardless of whether” he took one. Dkt. No. 36-2 ¶ 11; see also Dkt. No.
36-7 ¶ 11 (Mr. Myers asserting that two named supervisors said he “needed to write down a lunch
time even if [he] didn’t actually take a break”). These drivers also state that their fellow drivers
had the same routine and issue with meal breaks and that the drivers “talked to [their] fellow co-
workers on a regular basis about this issue.” E.g., Dkt. No. 36-2 ¶ 9.
Defendant raises several arguments against conditional certification and submits a number
of declarations and exhibits in opposition. For example, Defendant relies on the declarations of
current employees who assert that drivers were not required to complete their routes by a certain
time and therefore had time to take meal breaks, and on time records showing that Plaintiff and
three other declarants regularly returned from their routes prior to their estimated end times. See
Dkt. No. 41 at 13-14. Defendant also argues that the drivers were unionized and entitled to time-
and-a-half pay for all overtime work but that none of the drivers submitted a grievance through the
union, and notes that the supervisors named in Plaintiff’s declarations deny having conversations
with the drivers about meal breaks. Id. at 15-16. But in resolving Plaintiff’s motion, the Court may
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not “resolve factual disputes, decide substantive issues going to the ultimate merits, or make
credibility determinations.” Robbins, 2023 WL 7181678, at *2. The “question at this stage is
whether the collective individuals are similarly situated, rather than the merits of the claims.”
Davella, 2023 WL 5367791, at *5 (internal citation omitted). The Court therefore finds that
Defendant’s “competing evidence and arguments that go to the underlying merits” are not
appropriate considerations at this stage and do not warrant denial of Plaintiff’s motion. See
Robbins, 2023 WL 7181678, at *5.
Finally, the Court must define the temporal scope of the conditionally certified collective.
Plaintiff variously requests that notice be sent to qualifying employees who were employed by
Defendant “in the past three years through the present,” Dkt. No. 36 at 1, or “at any time from
August 12, 2022, through the final disposition of this matter,” Dkt. No. 36-1 at 12. However, as
Defendant points out, the notice period “generally should be measured from the date of the court’s
order granting the motion for conditional certification, not from the date that the complaint was
filed.” Ritz v. Mike Rory Corp., No. 12-cv-367, 2013 WL 1799974, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2013)
(citation omitted); see also 29 U.S.C. § 256 (providing that an FLSA action “shall be considered
to be commenced in the case of any individual claimant” who opts in to a collective action “on the
subsequent date on which such written consent is filed in the court in which the action was
commenced”). Accordingly, the notice being authorized here will be directed to potential opt-in
plaintiffs who worked for Defendant during the three years preceding the date of this order.
Based on the foregoing, the Court conditionally certifies and will authorize notice to be
sent to the collective consisting of:
all full-time Drivers who worked for Syracuse Haulers Waste
Removal, Inc. at its Syracuse, New York facility in the three years
preceding the date of this Order and who were subject to the
automatic meal break deduction.
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As requested by Defendant, and not addressed by Plaintiff, this conditionally certified
collective does not include any employees who never worked more than 36.5 hours in a workweek.
B. 	Court-Authorized Notice
Plaintiff requests that he be allowed to send a Court-authorized notice to potential
collective members by U.S. mail, email, and text message, and that Defendant be required to post
the notice at its work sites “in a conspicuous location near the time clock.” Dkt. No. 36-1 at 10,
12. Plaintiff seeks to send the notice at the beginning of a sixty-day opt-in period and to send a
reminder notice thirty days prior to the end of the opt-in period. Dkt. Nos. 36; 36-1 at 11, 12.
Defendant objects to sending the notice by any manner other than regular mail and objects to the
sending of a reminder notice. Dkt. No. 41 at 19-24.
1. 	Method and Timing of Distribution
Plaintiff argues that dissemination of the notice by mail, email, and text message is justified
by the “practical reality of modern communication,” and indeed cites cases in which these multiple
methods have been authorized. Dkt. No. 36-1 at 10-11; Dkt. No. 47 at 10-11. Defendant counters
that Plaintiff “has not provided any explanation for why first class mail is not sufficient notice or
why notice by e-mail or telephone numbers is necessary in this case.” Dkt. No. 41 at 19-21. The
Court agrees.
Some courts in this Circuit have expressed concern about email notice, because “electronic
communication inherently has the potential to be copied and forwarded to other people . . . with
commentary that could distort the notice approved by the Court.” Spack v. TransWorld Ent. Corp.,
No. 1:17-cv-1335 (TJM/CFH), 2019 WL 192344, at *14-15 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 1, 2019) (citation
omitted). Further, Plaintiff has made no showing that distribution by regular mail is likely to be
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unsuccessful for a significant number of potential opt-in plaintiffs. See id. at *15. The Court thus
finds that dissemination of the notice via email is not necessary at this stage.6
Sending a notice via text message is most commonly approved where the “nature of the
employer’s business facilitates a high turnover rate among employees.” Davella, 2023 WL
5367791, at *8 (brackets and citation omitted). Courts have declined to approve text message
notice “where the plaintiff fails to ‘sufficiently demonstrate[] that turnover and relocation by
potential members of the collective [would] render mailed notice ineffective.” Id. (citation
omitted); see also Mikityuk v. Cision US Inc., No. 21-cv-510, 2021 WL 1750370, at *9 (S.D.N.Y.
May 4, 2021) (declining to authorize text message notice where the plaintiffs made “no argument”
that “turnover is such that text messaging is required or appropriate”). Here, Plaintiff has made no
argument or showing that the nature of Defendant’s business facilitates a high rate of turnover and
relocation, and the Court therefore declines to authorize dissemination of the notice via text
message.
Last, Plaintiff requests that Defendant be required to post the notice at its work sites in a
“conspicuous location near the time clock.” Dkt. No. 36-1 at 10. Defendant argues that Plaintiff
has not justified the need for a workplace posting that would potentially cause “workplace
disruption.” Dkt. No. 41 at 22. Here, where there has been “no suggestion that there will be any
problem reaching current employees through mail,” where the collective has been limited to the
position of driver only, and in recognition of the “potential disruption that can occur in the
employer-employee relationship when an employer is required to post a notice in the workplace
announcing that one or more employees have accused it of violating the law,” the Court denies
6 For similar reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff’s request, raised in a footnote, that potential
collective members be given the option to execute their consent forms online through an electronic
signature service. Dkt. No. 36-1 at 10 n.5.
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Plaintiff’s request for a workplace notice. See Knox v. John Varvatos Enters. Inc., 282 F. Supp. 3d
644, 667-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
Accordingly, Plaintiff may disseminate the notice to potential collective members via first-
class mail. The Court approves of the requested sixty-day opt-in period. The Court further
authorizes a reminder notice to be sent to potential collective members who have not yet returned
a signed opt-in consent form in this case thirty days after notice is initially sent.
2. 	Disclosure of Potential Collective Members’ Information
Plaintiff requests that Defendant be ordered to provide “a list, in electronic and importable
format, of the names, dates of employment, positions of employment, locations of employment,
last-known mailing addresses, last-known cell phone numbers, and email addresses of all Putative
Collective Members who worked for Syracuse Haulers during the Relevant Time Period.” Dkt.
No. 36-1 at 12. Defendant objects to the provision of all this information as unnecessary and
private. See Dkt. No. 41 at 19-24.
Because the Court authorizes dissemination of the notice by mail, Defendant is directed to
provide in electronic format the names and last-known mailing addresses of individuals falling
within the scope of the conditionally certified collective. Plaintiff will know that the individuals
identified worked as full-time drivers at Defendant’s Syracuse facility. The Court declines to order
Defendant to produce the remainder of the information requested at this time, as it is not necessary
to contact the potential plaintiffs. See Spack, 2019 WL 192344, at *10 (noting that email addresses
are generally not publicly available); Iriarte v. Café 71, Inc., No. 15-cv-3217, 2015 WL 8900875,
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2015) (declining to order defendants to produce certain personal
information and noting that the plaintiff “suggest[ed] no reason why he requires all this
information in order to send § 216(b) notice”).
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3. 	Content of the Notice
Plaintiff submitted a proposed “Notice of Collective Action Lawsuit” and “Consent to Join
Wage Claim Against Syracuse Haulers” form with his motion (Dkt. No. 36-9) to which Defendant
raised numerous objections. In reply, Plaintiff states that he is “willing to adopt the Notice and
Consent Form used in” Rodney v. Casella Waste Systems, Inc., No. 2:21-cv-196, 2023 WL 313929
(D. Vt. Jan. 19, 2023). Dkt. No. 47 at 4. The parties have not provided the Court with the form
used in Rodney.
In light of Plaintiff’s apparent willingness to address Defendant’s objections to the
proposed notice, the parties are directed to meet and confer to attempt to reach agreement as to the
form and content of a proposed notice. The parties are directed to submit the agreed-to proposal,
or three-page letter briefs attaching their competing proposals if they are unable to agree, by May
27, 2026.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	motion 	for 	conditional 	certification, 	Dkt. 	No. 	36, 	is
GRANTED in part as set forth in this Memorandum-Decision and Order; and it is further
ORDERED that the issuance of notice to the collective, once approved by the Court, is
authorized, limited as set forth in this Memorandum-Decision and Order; and it is further
ORDERED that within twenty-one (21) days of this Decision, Defendant shall produce in
electronic format the names and last known mailing addresses for all full-time drivers employed
by Defendant from May 6, 2023 to the date of this Decision; and it is further
ORDERED that the parties meet and confer regarding the particular form and substance
of the notice, consistent with this Decision, and submit the proposal, or three-page letter briefs
attaching their competing proposals if the parties are unable to agree, by May 27, 2026.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 6, 2026
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