Jarvis v. Wagner et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
HOLLY JARVIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
ANTHONY WAGNER and AMANDA TANNER,
Defendants.
5:25-cv-00647 (BKS/PJE)
Appearances:
Plaintiff Pro Se:
Holly Jarvis
Hon. Brenda K. Sannes, Chief United States District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. 	INTRODUCTION
In May 2025, Plaintiff pro se Holly Jarvis brought this action against Defendants
Anthony Wagner and Amanda Turner, who she says engaged “in a pattern of harassment,
property damage, physical threats, and unlawful surveillance.” (Dkt. No. 1, at 1). This matter
was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Paul J. Evangelista for an initial review pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and Local Rule 72.3(d). On January 27, 2026, Magistrate Judge
Evangelista issued a Report-Recommendation and Order granting Plaintiff’s motion to proceed
in forma pauperis and recommending that the complaint be dismissed without prejudice for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction and without leave to amend.1 (Dkt. No. 7, at 12). The Report-
Recommendation instructed Plaintiff that failure to object within 14 days would preclude
1 The Court notes that, despite recommending dismissal without leave to amend, the Report-Recommendation also
recommended that the Court afford Plaintiff 30 days to file an amended complaint. (Dkt. No. 7, at 12).
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appellate review. (Id. at 13 & n.13 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(d),
72)); see Small v. Sec’y Health & Hum. Servs., 892 F.2d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
Plaintiff failed to timely file objections, so the Court has reviewed the Report-Recommendation
for clear error. See Nambiar v. Cent. Orthopedic Grp., LLP, 158 F.4th 349, 359 (2d Cir. 2025).
Upon such review, the Report-Recommendation is rejected in part and adopted in part.
The Court adopts the Report-Recommendation’s description of the factual allegations in
Plaintiff’s two-page complaint. (Dkt. No. 7, at 5–6).
II. 	DISCUSSION
In reviewing the Report-Recommendation, the Court accepts as true the complaint’s well-
pleaded factual allegations to determine whether Plaintiff has “state[d] a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Hardaway v. Hartford Pub. Works Dep’t, 879 F.3d 486, 489 (2d Cir.
2018) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); Milan v. Wertheimer, 808
F.3d 961, 963 (2d Cir. 2015) (per curiam). And in light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court
liberally construes her complaint and other submissions. See, e.g., Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d
90, 101 (2d Cir. 2010).
A. 	The Report-Recommendation
As an initial matter, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Evangelista that, to the extent
Plaintiff intended to assert only state law claims, the Court lacks diversity jurisdiction. (Dkt. No.
7, at 9–11). “Two requirements must be met for diversity jurisdiction: (1) the amount in
controversy in the case must exceed $75,000 and (2) the case must be between ‘citizens of
different States’ . . . , such that there is complete diversity of citizenship between every plaintiff
and every defendant.” Windward Bora LLC v. Browne, 110 F.4th 120, 125–26 (2d Cir. 2024)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)). Here, Plaintiff’s complaint reflects that she is a New York
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citizen, and her request for service reflects that Defendants too are New York citizens.2 (Dkt. No.
1, at 1; Dkt. No. 2-2, at 1). Without complete diversity, the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over any state law claims. Accordingly, such claims must be dismissed without
prejudice. See Katz v. Donna Karan Co., 872 F.3d 114, 121 (2d Cir. 2017).
The remainder of the Report-Recommendation interpreted the complaint to request a
criminal prosecution and other relief related to a state order of protection. (Dkt. No. 7, at 6 n.8,
7–9). The magistrate judge recommended dismissal because federal courts lack jurisdiction to
“initiate a criminal investigation or criminal prosecution, arrest the defendants, issue an order of
protection, [or] direct a state court to enter or otherwise enforce an order of protection issued by
a state court.” (Id. at 9). The Court disagrees with that interpretation of the complaint.
To be sure, the complaint alleges that Wagner previously pleaded guilty to a crime and
had a protective order imposed against him, presumably in state court. (See Dkt. No. 1, at 1). But
the specific relief Plaintiff seeks is compensatory and punitive damages, “[i]njunctive relief
prohibiting future harassment or surveillance,” and costs. (Id. at 2). Nowhere does she request
that the Court initiate a criminal prosecution, a power it clearly lacks. (See id. at 1–2). And
construing the complaint to make that request would be inconsistent with the Second Circuit’s
instruction to interpret pro se “submissions to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.” Diaz
v. Kopp, 146 F.4th 301, 305 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting Harris v. Miller, 818 F.3d 49, 56 (2d Cir.
2016) (per curiam)). As to any protective order-related relief, the Court interprets Plaintiff’s
request for “court orders for protection and redress” as encompassed within her request for
“[i]njunctive relief prohibiting future harassment or surveillance.” (Dkt. No. 2, at 2). Thus, the
2 In assessing its subject matter jurisdiction, the Court may consider documents outside the complaint. See Makarova
v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000).
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Court does not lack subject matter jurisdiction for the reasons stated by the Report-
Recommendation.
Instead, the Court considers whether the complaint raises 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, over
which the Court has federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Report-
Recommendation declined to recognize any § 1983 claims, reasoning that the complaint did not
“not suggest that Wagner and Tanner violated [Plaintiff’s] constitutional rights, that she seeks to
proceed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or that Wagner or Tanner are state actors, acting under the
color of state law or conspiring with state actors.” (Dkt. No. 7, at 6 n.8). The complaint, the
Report-Recommendation concluded, made “clear that Wagner and Tanner are private parties,
acting alone, and their activities are not attributable to the state.” (Id.). But the sparse, two-page
complaint does not explain Plaintiff’s relationship with Defendants. And in any event, these
defects go to the merits—they do not implicate the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.3
Although the complaint did not specifically cite § 1983, Plaintiff checked the “Other
Civil Rights” box in the section of her civil cover sheet describing the nature of her suit. (Dkt.
No. 1-2, at 1). And the factual allegations—liberally construed—could theoretically constitute
non-frivolous § 1983 claims under the Fourth Amendment or other constitutional provisions, had
they been properly pled. See Tracy, 623 F.3d at 101; cf. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325
(1989) (explaining that a complaint is frivolous only “where it lacks an arguable basis either in
3 The Report-Recommendation further reasoned that:
even if, arguendo, plaintiff were able to amend to demonstrate that Wagner and Tanner are state
actors or are participating in a conspiracy with state actors and that their conduct violated a
constitutional right, plaintiff’s claims must still fail, because . . . the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction to initiate criminal investigations or prosecutions, issue or enforce orders of protection,
or direct a state court to do the same.
(Dkt. No. 7, at 6 n.8). But as discussed above, the Court does not construe the complaint to seek this relief. And even
were it to do so, Plaintiff’s requests for compensatory and punitive damages would remain. (See Dkt. No. 1, at 2).
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law or in fact”). But, as Magistrate Judge Evangelista noted, to state a claim under § 1983, a
plaintiff must allege that Defendants were “state actors or private parties acing ‘under the color
of’ state law,” and there are no such allegations in this complaint. See Betts v. Shearman, 751
F.3d 78, 84 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir.
2002)). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff intended to assert § 1983 claims, they do not survive
§ 1915(e)(2) review.4
However, the Court will afford Plaintiff an opportunity to submit an amended complaint
curing these deficiencies. There is some possibility, however unlikely, that Defendants were state
actors who violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights—the complaint does not shed light on this
issue, one way or the other. And courts “should not dismiss without granting leave to amend at
least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might
be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (emphasis added) (quoting
Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam)).
B. 	Instructions for Filing an Amended Complaint
The Court will allow Plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended complaint, clearly
setting forth the specific factual allegations underlying any § 1983 claims, within thirty (30) days
of the date of this Order. Should Plaintiff assert § 1983 claims, the Court may have supplemental
jurisdiction over related state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Accordingly, the Court will
also permit Plaintiff to include in her amended complaint any related state law claims she wishes
to assert in addition to her § 1983 claims. Cf. Long v. Byrne, 146 F.4th 282, 301 (2d Cir. 2025).
4 The Court also notes that the complaint’s bare and conclusory allegations that do not describe in detail the alleged
harassment, threats, and surveillance are insufficient to state a plausible claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678–79 (2009).
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Any amended complaint will entirely replace the existing complaint and must be a
wholly integrated and complete pleading not combined with any other document. See Shields v.
Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994). It also must not rely upon or
incorporate by reference any pleading or document previously filed with the Court, including the
existing complaint. Instead, the amended complaint itself must contain all the specific factual
allegations Plaintiff wishes the Court to consider in connection with her state and federal claims,
especially those relevant to whether Defendants were state actors or otherwise acting under color
of state law.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Report-Recommendation (Dkt. No. 7) is REJECTED in part and
ADOPTED in part as set forth above; and it is further
ORDERED that any state law claims Plaintiff sought to assert are DISMISSED without
prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; and it is further
ORDERED that any claims Plaintiff sought to assert under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are
DISMISSED without prejudice, and Plaintiff may file an amended complaint asserting those
claims, as well as any related state law claims, within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order,
in accordance with the instructions set forth above; and it is further
ORDERED that, if Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within that time, the
Clerk is respectfully directed to enter judgment and close this case without further order; and it is
further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion concerning discovery, seeking injunctive relief, and
requesting an expedited schedule (Dkt. No. 4) is DENIED as moot; and it is further
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ORDERED that the Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal at
this stage would not be taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
February 17, 2026
Syracuse, New York
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