Automotive Lift Institute, Inc. v. Autokato Engineering, LTD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
__________________________________________
AUTOMOTIVE LIFT INSTITUTE, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v. 	5:25-CV-106
(FJS/TWD)
AUTOKATO ENGINEERING, LTD
doing business as Katool,
Defendant.
___________________________________________
APPEARANCES 	OF COUNSEL
THE LAW OFFICE OF SHARON 	SHARON M. SULIMOWICZ, ESQ.
M. SULIMOWICZ
118 North Tioga Street, Suite 202
Ithaca, New York 14850
Attorneys for Plaintiff
AUTOKATO ENGINEERING, LTD 	NO APPEARANCE
doing business as Katool
Defendant
SCULLIN, Senior Judge
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's motion for entry of a default judgment against
Defendant in the amount of $58, 791.53, comprised of $45,029.00 in actual damages, $11,617.42
for attorney's fees and costs, and $2,145.11 in pre-judgment interest. See Dkt. No. 10-4,
Attorney's Affidavit in Support of Default Judgment Motion, at 4.
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II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff commenced this action on January 22, 2025, by the filing of a Summons and
Complaint. See Dkt. Nos. 1-2. On March 27, 2025, Plaintiff filed a request for entry of default
against Defendant. See Dkt. No. 7. The Clerk entered that default on the same day. See Dkt.
No. 8. Plaintiff filed its motion for entry of a default judgment against Defendant on April 28,
2025, and served that motion on Defendant on April 29, 2025. See Dkt. Nos. 10-11.
III. DISCUSSION
A. 	Standard of review
Rule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs the procedure for
entry of a default judgment, provides that, "[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for
affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by
affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party's default." Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Thus,
courts in the Second Circuit have established a two-step process: "first, the entry of a default, and
second, the entry of a default judgment." City of N.Y. v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114,
128 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing New York v. Green, 420 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2005)). "The entry of
default 'formalizes a judicial recognition that a defendant has, through its failure to defend that
action, admitted liability to the plaintiff.'" Pasatieri v. Starline Prods., Inc., No. 18-CV-4688
(PKC) (VMS), 2020 WL 207352, *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2020) (quoting [Mickalis Pawn Shop,
LLC, 645 F.3d at 128]); (citing Vt. Teddy Bear Co., Inc. v. 1-800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241,
246 (2d Cir 2004) (noting that default judgments "track[] the ancient common law axiom that a
default is an admission of all well-pleaded allegations against the defaulting party"); United
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States v. DiPaolo, 466 F. Supp. 2d 476, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("[A] party's default is deemed to
constitute a concession of all well pleaded allegations of liability." (internal quotation and
citations omitted))).
"[T]he decision to grant a motion for a default judgment lies in the sound discretion of
the trial court." O'Callaghan v. Sifre, 242 F.R.D. 69, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing Shah v. New
York State Dep't of Civil Serv., 168 F.3d 610, 615 (2d Cir. 1999)). When deciding a motion for
default judgment, the court "is required to accept all of the [plaintiff's] allegations as true and
draw all reasonable inferences in its favor." Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir.
2009) (citing Au Bon Pain Corp. v. Artect, Inc., 653 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting that,
where a party moves for a default judgment after another party's default, the moving party is
"entitled to all reasonable inferences from the evidence offered")). However, "a district court
'need not agree that the alleged facts constitute a valid cause of action.'" Mickalis Pawn Shop,
LLC, 645 F.3d at 137 (quoting Au Bon Pain, 653 F.2d at 65). Therefore, the court must
"determine whether [a plaintiff's] allegations establish [a defendant's] liability as a matter of
law." Finkel, 577 F.3d at 84 (citation omitted).
B. 	Liability
Plaintiff brings this action for copyright infringement under Section 501(a) of the
Copyright Act. See Dkt. No. 1, Complaint, at ¶ 39. To establish infringement of a copyright
under the Act, a plaintiff must prove two elements: "'(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2)
copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.'" BWP Media USA Inc. v.
Polyvore, Inc., 922 F.3d 42, 61 (2d Cir. 2019) (Newman, J., concurring in the result) (quoting
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Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361, 111 S. Ct. 1282, 113
L. Ed. 2d 358 (1991)).
Ownership of a valid copyright "'can be established by the introduction into evidence of a
Copyright Office certificate of registration,'" which "'if timely obtained "constitute(s) prima facie
evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate."'" Sheldon v.
Plot Commerce, No. 15 CV 5885 (CBA) (CLP), 2016 WL 5107072, *11 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 26,
2016) (quotation omitted), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 5107058 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 19, 2016).
To establish the second element, a plaintiff must meet a "minimal" burden to show that
the safety labels in question are its original work and allege a violation of its exclusive right
under § 106. See id. "The requirements for originality are 'modest.'" Gym Door Repairs, Inc. v.
Young Equip. Sales, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 3d 869, 896 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Weissmann v.
Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1321 (2d Cir. 1989)). As used in copyright cases, the term "'original . .
. means only that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from
other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.'" Id. (quoting
Feist, 499 U.S. at 345, 111 S. Ct. 1282 (citation omitted)).
Although Plaintiff stated in its complaint that the Copyright Registration Number for the
safety labels in question is U.S. Copyright Registration No. VA0000634769, see Complaint at
¶ 13, Plaintiff did not submit the Certificate of Registration for these safety labels either with its
Complaint or with its motion for entry of a default judgment. Therefore, the Court finds that
Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the first element of its copyright infringement claim, i.e., its
ownership of a valid copyright. Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff's motion for entry of a
default judgment. However, the Court does so without prejudice and with leave to renew the
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motion to include the necessary documentation to establish its claim for copyright infringement
under the Copyright Act.
C. 	Actual damages, attorney's fees and costs
Since the Court has denied Plaintiff's motion for entry of a default judgment, it does not
need to address the issues of damages, attorney's fees, and costs. However, because there are
some problems with Plaintiff's submissions regarding these issues, the Court will address them
here so that, if Plaintiff decides to renew its motion, it is aware of and can cure the problems that
exist with regard to these issues.
1. Actual damages
An award of actual damages "undertakes to compensate the [copyright] owner for any
harm [it] suffered by reason of the infringer's illegal act." On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d
152, 159 (2d Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). Section 504(b) of the Act, which applies to actual
damages, provides, in relevant part, that "[t]he copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual
damages suffered by him or her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer
that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing the actual
damages." 17 U.S.C. § 504(b).
In its complaint, Plaintiff alleges that, "[w]hile attending [the Specialty Equipment
Marketing Association ("SEMA") in or about October 2023], [its] President, Robrt W. Gorman,
noticed that Defendant had automotive lifts that contained unauthorized copies of ALI copyright
protected labels affixed thereto, specifically the labels: Copyright Registration No.
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VA0000634769." See Dkt. No. 1, Complaint, at ¶¶ 23-24. Upon Defendant's default, Plaintiff's
counsel, in her affidavit in support of Plaintiff's default judgment motion, stated as follows:
Although a representative of Defendant admitted to having sold
2,500 to 3,000 automotive lifts with the infringing Safety Labels,
without being permitted to perform discovery in this case, Plaintiff
can only document in writing an admission by a representative of
Defendant on or about April 12, 2024, that it had sold 700
automotive lifts with the infringing Safety Labels and destroyed an
addition [sic] 40 Safety Labels. See O'Gorman Aff., Exh. B. Had
Defendant purchased the Safety Labels directly from Plaintiff,
Plaintiff would have received $45,029.00 in revenue calculated as
follows: $60.85 per kit, multiplied by 740 Safety Labels.
See Dkt. No. 10-4, Attorney Affidavit, at ¶ 8.
"Courts have adopted a wide range of methods by which to measure actual damages in
copyright infringement actions . . . ." Antenna Television, A.E. v. Aegean Video Inc., No. 95-CV-
2328 ERK, 1996 WL 298252, *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 1996) (citations omitted). A claim for
actual damages must be "reasonable according to typical market values." Sheldon, 2016 WL
5107072, at *14 (citation omitted); see also Renna v. Queens Ledger/Greenpoint Star Inc., No.
17-CV-3378 (DRH) (SIL), 2019 WL 1061259, *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2019) (stating that "'some
reasonable basis for computation [of actual damages] has to be used, even though the calculation
may only be approximate'" (quotation omitted)). Thus, an award of actual damages "'may not be
based on "undue speculation."'" Renna, 2019 WL 1061259, at *4 (quotation omitted).
2. Costs
In Plaintiff's attorney's affidavit, she states that Plaintiff is seeking out-of-pocket costs for
filing fees, service of process, photocopies and postage and/or FedEx charges. See Dkt. No. 10-4
at ¶ 15. Since this is a copyright infringement action, "the Court's discretion to award costs is
governed by § 505 of the Act rather than the more general cost-shifting provision." Pasatieri,
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2020 WL 207352, at *5 (citing Barrera v. Brooklyn Music, Ltd., 346 F. Supp. 2d 400, 404-05
(S.D.N.Y. 2004)).
Section 505 of the Act provides as follows:
In any civil action under this title, the court in its discretion may
allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party other than
the United States or an officer thereof. Except as otherwise
provided by this title, the court may also award a reasonable
attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.
17 U.S.C. § 505.
Since the Court has denied Plaintiff's motion for entry of a default judgment and its
request for damages, the Court declines to exercise its discretion to award Plaintiff costs at this
time. The Court will re-evaluate this request if Plaintiff renews its motion and submits evidence
to establish its claim for copyright infringement and to support its request for an award of actual
damages. Furthermore, if in its renewed motion, Plaintiff includes a request for out-of-pocket
costs, it must provide adequate documentation, such as receipts, demonstrating that it expended
funds for these items.
3. Attorney's fees
Plaintiff requests an award of attorney's fees in the amount of $11,367.50. In support of
this request, Plaintiff's counsel asserts in her affidavit that she was duly admitted to practice in
the State of New York and in the Federal District Courts for the Northern and Western Districts
since 1996 and has been practicing law for almost 30 years. See Dkt No. 10-4, Attorney
Affidavit, at ¶ 11. Plaintiff's counsel also states that her current rate is $325.00 per hour and her
legal assistant's current hourly rate is $125.00. See id. at ¶ 12. Plaintiff's counsel asserts that she
had expended 30.4 hours on this case between November 2023 and the date on which she filed
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the motion for entry of a default judgment and anticipated billing an additional three hours on the
motion. See id. at ¶ 15. She also stated that her legal assistant had expended 3.1 hours on the
litigation and anticipated billing one additional hour on the motion. See id. Based on these
numbers, Plaintiff requests an award of $11,367.50 in attorney's fees.1
"'There is no automatic right to an award of attorney's fees to prevailing parties in
copyright cases.'" Barsch v. Modern Boss Mktg. LLC, No. 1:24-CV-820 (AMN/DJS), 2025 WL
1424254, *6 (N.D.N.Y. May 16, 2025) (Nardacci, J.) (quoting Stokes, 681 F. Supp. 3d at 243).
"Instead, such awards are a matter of discretion in which courts consider '(1) the frivolousness of
the non-prevailing party's claims or defenses; (2) the party's motivation; (3) whether the claims
or defenses were objectively unreasonable; and (4) compensation and deterrence.'" Id. (quoting
Mango, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 379 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). "'Particularly in
cases of default and willful infringement, courts have found it appropriate to award attorney's
fees both for purposes of compensation and deterrence.'" Id. (quoting Stokes, 681 F. Supp. 3d at
243-44).
If the court determines that attorney's fees are warranted, "the Court must determine the
proper figure." Id. To do this, the Court turns to the "lodestar" calculation, "'which is the
number of hours expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.'" Id. (quoting [Stokes, 681 F.
Supp. 3d] at 244 (citing Healey v. Leavitt, 485 F.3d 63, 71 (2d Cir. 2007))). "In the Second
Circuit, 'the lodestar . . . creates a presumptively reasonable fee.'" Id. (quoting Millea v. Metro-
1 Plaintiff did not separate its request for attorney's fees from its request for costs, instead seeking
a total of $11,617.42 in attorney's fees and costs. Based on the figures that Plaintiff's counsel
provided in her Affidavit, however, the Court has calculated that Plaintiff is seeking attorney's
fees in the amount of $11,367.50 comprised of 33.4 hours of attorney time at a rate of $325 per
hour plus 4.1 hours of paralegal time at a rate of $125 per hour.
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North Railroad Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted)).
The Court cannot calculate the appropriate amount of attorney's fees to award to Plaintiff
because its counsel did not submit any documentation, such as contemporaneous time records
that show the number of hours she and her paralegal expended on the various tasks they
performed in litigating this case. Nor has Plaintiff's counsel provided any information to support
her argument that the hourly rates that she seeks are reasonable in this District for this type of
action.
If Plaintiff renews its motion for entry of a default judgment and seeks attorney's fees as
part of that motion, it must provide the appropriate documentation, as described above, so that
the Court can determine, if it decides to grant Plaintiff's request for attorney's fees, what is an
appropriate award using the lodestar method.
4. Costs
In her affidavit in support of Plaintiff's motion for entry of a default judgment, Plaintiff's
counsel also seeks costs to reimburse Plaintiff for out-of-pocket expenses for filing fees, service
of process, photocopies and postage and/or Fed[E]x charges." See Dkt. No. 10-4 at ¶ 15.
Plaintiff, however, has not submitted any documentation as proof that Plaintiff actually incurred
such costs. If Plaintiff renews its motion for entry of a default judgment and seeks costs for
these out-of-pocket expenses, it must provide the appropriate documentation.
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5. Prejudgment interest
Finally, Plaintiff seeks prejudgment interest. "First, '[t]he Copyright Act neither allows
nor prohibits an award of pre-judgment interest, and the issue of the permissibility of pre-
judgment interest is unresolved in this Circuit.'" Hart v. Kitchen Infinity, Inc., No. 24-CV-05031
(JMA) (AYS), 2025 WL 2576675, *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2025) (quoting Capitol Recs., Inc. v.
MP3tunes, LLC, No. 07-CV-09931, 2015 WL 13684546, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2015)). "As
the authority to grant prejudgment interest is not clear -- and Plaintiff did not address the issue in
its brief -- the Court is not inclined to grant that relief." Id. "Second, even if the Court were
inclined to consider the request, Plaintiff would not qualify for pre-judgment interest under either
of the two methodologies applied by courts in the Second Circuit." Id. "Under one regime,
applications for 'pre-judgment interest should be reserved for "exceptional" circumstances.'" Id.
There is nothing about this case that is exceptional.
Under the second method, "courts rely on prejudgment interest as a tool 'to help deter
willful copyright infringement.'" Id. (quotation omitted). In this case, the Court concludes that
an award of actual damages is sufficient to deter any further infringement. Therefore, the Court
denies Plaintiff's request for prejudgment interest.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having reviewed the entire file in this matter, Plaintiff's submissions and the applicable
law, and for the above-stated reasons, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Plaintiff's motion for entry of a default judgment, see Dkt. No. 10, is
DENIED without prejudice and with leave to renew consistent with the guidance set forth
herein; and the Court further
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ORDERS that, if Plaintiff does not renew its motion for entry of a default judgment
within thirty (30) days of the date of this Memorandum-Decision and Order, the Clerk of the
Court shall close this case for failure to prosecute without further Order of the Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 3, 2026
Syracuse, New York
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