Mattice v. Commissioner of Social Security

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________
NICCOLE M.,
Plaintiff,
5:25-cv-90
v. 	(DJS)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
____________________________________
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
OLINSKY LAW GROUP 	HOWARD D. OLINSKY, ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiff
250 South Clinton Street, Suite 210
Syracuse, New York 13202
U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN. 	FERGUS J. KAISER, ESQ.
Attorney for Defendant
6401 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, Maryland 21235
DANIEL J. STEWART
United States Magistrate Judge
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER1
Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking review of a
decision by the Commissioner of Social Security that Plaintiff was not disabled. 	Dkt.
No. 1. Currently before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
1 Upon Plaintiff’s consent, the United States’ general consent, and in accordance with this District’s General Order,
this matter has been referred to the undersigned to exercise full jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. Dkt. No. 5 & General Order 18.
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and Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Dkt. Nos. 13, 15, & 16. For
the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is granted
and Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is denied.
I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Plaintiff was born in 1969. Dkt. No. 8, Admin. Tr. (“Tr.”) at pp. 282 & 329. She
has at least a ninth-grade education. Tr. at p. 290. She has not worked since 2006. Id.
She has past work experience as a hotel dishwasher, a grocery store and event center
cashier, and a retail clerk. Id. Plaintiff alleges disability based on fibromyalgia, anxiety,
depression, pinched nerves in both shoulders, pinched nerves in neck, and lower back
pain. Tr. at p. 289.
B. Procedural History
Plaintiff applied for supplemental security income and disability insurance
benefits on December 17, 2015. 	Tr. at pp. 106 & 118. 	She alleged a disability onset
date of January 1, 2010. Id. Plaintiff’s applications were initially denied on April 14,
2016, 	Tr. 	at 	pp. 	127-32, 	after 	which 	Plaintiff 	requested 	a 	hearing 	before 	an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). 	Tr. at pp. 141-42. 	Two administrative hearings
were held before ALJ Robyn Hoffman, with one on May 16, 2018, and a second on
December 14, 2018, at which Plaintiff and a vocational expert testified. Tr. at pp. 1427-
80. On January 16, 2019, ALJ Hoffman issued a written decision finding Plaintiff was
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not disabled. 	Tr. at pp. 12-42. 	On October 18, 2019, the Appeals Council denied
Plaintiff’s request for review. Tr. at pp. 1-6.
In 2019, Plaintiff filed suit in the Northern District of New York seeking review
of that decision. 	Tr. at pp. 1408-14. 	The parties stipulated to remand the matter for
further proceedings, and the case was remanded in 2020. Tr. at pp. 1415-16; see also
Tr. at pp. 1419-26. 	On January 13, 2021, Plaintiff amended her alleged onset date of
disability to July 1, 2014. Tr. at pp. 1665 & 2202. Administrative hearings were then
held before ALJ Elizabeth Koennecke on February 16, 2021; May 5, 2021; and August
4, 2021. 	Tr. at pp. 1328-70. 	On August 18, 2021, ALJ Koennecke issued a written
decision finding Plaintiff was not disabled. Tr. at pp. 1263-91.
In 2021, Plaintiff filed another lawsuit in the Northern District of New York
seeking review of ALJ Koennecke’s decision. See Tr. at p. 2333. The parties stipulated
to remand the matter for further proceedings, and the case was again remanded in 2022.
Tr. at pp. 2333-34; see also Tr. at pp. 2337-42. 	A further administrative hearing was
held before ALJ Koennecke on February 1, 2023, at which Plaintiff and a vocational
expert testified. Tr. at pp. 2235-57. On April 20, 2023, ALJ Koennecke issued a written
decision again finding Plaintiff was not disabled. Tr. at pp. 2396-2420.
Plaintiff filed written exceptions to ALJ Koennecke’s April 20, 2023 decision,
and on December 4, 2023, the Appeals Council reviewed that decision and again
remanded the matter for further proceedings before a different ALJ. Tr. at pp. 2385-92.
An administrative hearing was held before ALJ Mary Pelton on October 28, 2024, at
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which Plaintiff and a vocational expert testified. Tr. at pp. 2258-90. On November 21,
2024, ALJ Pelton issued a partially favorable decision (the “2024 Decision”). Tr. at pp.
2202-16. This action followed.
C. ALJ Pelton’s 2024 Decision
In the 2024 Decision, ALJ Pelton made the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law. 	First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status
requirements of the Social Security Act through June 30, 2023. Tr. at p. 2205. Second,
the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 1,
2014, the amended alleged onset date. 	Id. 	Third, the ALJ determined that, since the
July 1, 2014 alleged onset date of disability, Plaintiff had the following severe
impairments: lumbar spine disorder, cervical spine disorder, fibromyalgia, obesity,
depressive disorder, and anxiety disorder. 	Id. 	Fourth, the ALJ concluded that, since
July 1, 2014, Plaintiff had not had an impairment or combination of impairments that
met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. §
404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Tr. at p. 2207. Fifth, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work, except:
she is unable to climb ladders/ropes/scaffolds. She can occasionally climb
ramps/stairs, balance (as defined in the SCO), stoop, crouch, kneel and
crawl. [She] can occasionally reach overhead, and she can frequently
reach in all other directions. She must avoid exposure to hazards such as
unprotected 	heights 	and 	dangerous 	moving 	machinery. 	[She] 	can
understand, remember and carry out simple instructions. She can use
judgment to make simple, work-related decisions. [She] should work at a
job with no more than occasional changes in the routine work setting. She
cannot perform work requiring a specific production rate or work that
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requires 	hourly 	quotas. 	[She] 	can 	have 	frequent 	interaction 	with
supervisors and coworkers and occasional interaction with the public.
Tr. at p. 2209.
Sixth, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has no past relevant work. Tr. at p. 2214. The
ALJ then found that, prior to the established disability onset date, Plaintiff was a
“younger individual age 18-49,” but that, on April 11, 2024, Plaintiff’s age category
changed to “an individual of advanced age.” Id. The ALJ also found that Plaintiff has
a limited education. 	Id. 	Next, the ALJ found that transferability of job skills was not
an issue because Plaintiff does not have past relevant work. Id.
The ALJ then determined that, prior to April 11, 2024, the date that Plaintiff’s
age category changed, based on Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC,
there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff
could have performed. 	Tr. at pp. 2214-15. 	However, the ALJ determined that,
beginning on April 11, 2024, the date that Plaintiff’s age category changed, based on
Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, there are no jobs that exist in
significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform. Tr. at pp. 2215-
16.
The ALJ, therefore, determined that Plaintiff was not disabled prior to April 11,
2024, but became disabled on that date and has continued to be disabled through the
date of the ALJ’s decision. Tr. at p. 2216. The ALJ also found that Plaintiff’s disability
is expected to last twelve months past the onset date. 	Id. 	Further, the ALJ concluded
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that Plaintiff was not under a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act at
any time through June 30, 2023, the date last insured. Id.
II. RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Standard of Review
A court reviewing a denial of disability benefits may not determine de novo
whether an individual is disabled. 	42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Wagner v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). 	Rather, the Commissioner’s
determination will be reversed only if the correct legal standards were not applied, or it
was not supported by substantial evidence. 	See Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986
(2d Cir. 1987) (“Where there is a reasonable basis for doubt whether the ALJ applied
correct legal principles, application of the substantial evidence standard to uphold a
finding of no disability creates an unacceptable risk that a claimant will be deprived of
the right to have her disability determination made according to the correct legal
principles.”); accord Grey v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1983); Marcus v.
Califano, 615 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 1979). 	“Substantial evidence” is evidence that
amounts to “more than a mere scintilla,” and has been defined as “such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Where evidence is deemed susceptible to more than
one rational interpretation, the Commissioner’s conclusion must be upheld. Rutherford
v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982).
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“To determine on appeal whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence, a reviewing court considers the whole record, examining evidence from both
sides, because an analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must also include that
which detracts from its weight.” Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988).
If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s finding must be sustained
“even where substantial evidence may support the plaintiff’s position and despite that
the court’s independent analysis of the evidence may differ from the [Commissioner’s].”
Rosado v. Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). In other words, this Court
must afford the Commissioner’s determination considerable deference and may not
substitute “its own judgment for that of the [Commissioner], even if it might justifiably
have reached a different result upon a de novo review.” 	Valente v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 733 F.2d 1037, 1041 (2d Cir. 1984).
B. Standard to Determine Disability
The Commissioner has established a five-step evaluation process to determine
whether an individual is disabled as defined by the Social Security Act. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520, 416.920. 	The Supreme Court has recognized the validity of this sequential
evaluation process. 	Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). 	The five-step
process is as follows:
First, the [Commissioner] considers whether the claimant is currently
engaged in substantial gainful activity. 	If he is not, the [Commissioner]
next considers whether the claimant has a “severe impairment” which
significantly limits his physical or mental ability to do basic work
activities. If the claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is
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whether, 	based 	solely 	on 	medical 	evidence, 	the 	claimant 	has 	an
impairment which is listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. 	If the
claimant has such an impairment, the [Commissioner] will consider him
disabled without considering vocational factors such as age, education,
and work experience; the [Commissioner] presumes that a claimant who
is afflicted with a “listed” impairment is unable to perform substantial
gainful activity. Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment,
the fourth inquiry is whether, despite the claimant’s severe impairment, he
has the residual functional capacity to perform his past work. Finally, if
the claimant is unable to perform his past work, the [Commissioner] then
determines whether there is other work which the claimant could perform.
Under the cases previously discussed, the claimant bears the burden of the
proof as to the first four steps, while the [Commissioner] must prove the
final one.
Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982); accord McIntyre v. Colvin, 758
F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 2014). “If at any step a finding of disability or non-disability can
be made, the SSA will not review the claim further.” Barnhart v. Thompson, 540 U.S.
20, 24 (2003).
III. ANALYSIS
In this case, Plaintiff presents a single issue for review. She argues that the RFC
contained in the 2024 Decision is legally deficient due to ALJ Pelton’s failure to
properly weigh the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physicians, Drs. Reid and Hegland,
and reliance on a vague consultative examination opinion rendered by Dr. Lorensen.
Dkt. No. 13, Pl.’s Mem. of Law. Defendant responds that ALJ Pelton properly assessed
the medical opinion evidence and that substantial evidence supports the 2024 Decision.
Dkt. No. 15, Def.’s Mem. of Law.
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In the 2024 Decision, ALJ Pelton discussed “the opinion at Exhibit D36F, which
contains an illegible signature.” Tr. at p. 2212. Plaintiff and Defendant both appear to
agree that the medical source statement referenced by ALJ Pelton as “the opinion at
Exhibit D36F” (hereinafter, the “Medical Source Statement”) was authored by Dr. Reid.
See Pl.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 14-15; Def.’s Mem. of Law at p. 8. Likewise, the parties
seem to agree that Dr. Reid was Plaintiff’s treating physician and that the treating
physician rule is applicable. See Pl.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 14-15; Def.’s Mem. of Law
at p. 8; see also Tucker v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2025 WL 1374660, at *1 (2d Cir. May
13, 2025) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.927) (“The treating physician rule applies to claims,
such as this one, that were filed before March 27, 2017.”). As such, Dr. Reid’s Medical
Source Statement “must be given controlling weight if it is well-supported by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the
other substantial evidence in the case record.” Tucker v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2025 WL
1374660, at *1 (quotation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The ALJ’s failure to identify the Medical Source Statement as one from a treating
physician makes it impossible for the Court to determine if the proper standard was
applied in evaluating that opinion. See, e.g., Brathwaite v. Barnhart, 2007 WL 5322447,
at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2007), report and recommendation adopted, 2008 WL
2669351 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2008) (“As the ALJ neither explicitly referred to Dr. Doshi
as a treating physician nor explicitly found that he was not a treating physician, the
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record is also unclear as to whether the ALJ considered the ‘treating physician rule’ to
apply to his consideration of Dr. Doshi’s report.”).
In any event, the ALJ also erred in her analysis of the Medical Source Statement.
As noted by ALJ Pelton, in the Medical Source Statement, Plaintiff was limited to less
than two hours of sitting and less than two hours of standing/walking in an eight-hour
workday. Tr. at p. 2212 (citing Tr. at p. 2928). ALJ Pelton explained that she afforded
“little weight” to the Medical Source Statement because it: (i) was one of several
opinions that was “based on limited evaluations” of Plaintiff, id.; (ii) amounted to a
“‘checkbox’ form[] without referral to clinical or diagnostic finding or narrative
explanation for the limitations that were provided,” Tr. at p. 2213; and (iii) identified
limitations “based primarily on [Plaintiff’s] subjective self-reports of symptoms and
functional limitations that are inconsistent with evidence,” including Plaintiff’s “overall
positive response to conservative treatment, her inconsistent statements about the
severity of her symptoms, and her engagement in activities consistent with a range of
light work.” Tr. at pp. 2213-14.
In describing the weight afforded to the Medical Source Statement, ALJ Pelton
grouped the Medical Source Statement together with the medical opinions of other
doctors, including Drs. Arienmughare, Lewis, and Hegland, and did not differentiate
between the opinions. 	Tr. at pp. 2212-14. 	Most notably, ALJ Pelton criticized the
Medical Source Statement and the opinions of Drs. Arienmughare and Lewis as all being
“based on limited evaluations” of Plaintiff. Tr. at p. 2212. However, since ALJ Pelton
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stated in the 2024 Decision that she could not read the signature on the Medical Source
Statement, id., and thus was presumably unaware of the extent of evaluations that
preceded the Medical Source Statement’s creation, it remains unclear to the Court how
ALJ Pelton determined that the Medical Source Statement was based on limited
evaluations. 	The Medical Source Statement itself states that the frequency and length
of contact between its author and the Plaintiff was every two to three months, Tr. at p.
2927, and the ALJ does not explain in the 2024 Decision why she seemingly rejected
that statement in forming her conclusion that the Medical Source Statement was based
on limited evaluations. 	Progress notes provided by the Syracuse Community Health
Center also indicate that Plaintiff treated with Dr. Reid for almost ten months prior to
the time that Dr. Reid rendered the Medical Source Statement. Compare Tr. at p. 2980
(progress note by Dr. Reid dated March 22, 2022) with Tr. at p. 2931 (Medical Source
Statement dated January 18, 2023).
Additionally, 	ALJ 	Pelton 	grouped 	together 	numerous 	opinions 	when 	she
characterized the Medical Source Statements and the opinions of Drs. Arienmughare,
Lewis, and Hegland as being “primarily based on the claimant’s subjective self-reports
of symptoms and functional limitations.” Tr. at pp. 2213-14. Initially, the Court notes
that the Medical Source Statement does not itself indicate whether it is based on
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints or objective medical findings. See Tr. at pp. 2927-31.
In light of this, and combined with the fact that the ALJ acknowledges that she did not
know who authored the Medical Source Statement, Tr. at p. 2212, and thus did not know
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what, if any, medical records formed the basis for the opinions contained therein, it is
not clear to the Court how ALJ Pelton came to the conclusion that the Medical Source
Statement was based on Plaintiff’s subjective complaints.
Nevertheless, while it is within an ALJ’s discretion to consider an individual’s
subjective complaints in light of medical findings and other evidence, the fact that an
opinion is based on subjective complaints is not a per se reason to reject it. 	Fuller v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2015 WL 5512383, at *6, 8, & 10 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2015) (“[I]t
was error for the ALJ to completely reject the treating physician’s functional limitations
solely because they were based upon subjective complaints.”). Rather, in determining
whether an individual’s subjective complaints are credible, the ALJ must “clearly
articulate[]” “specific reasons for the weight given to the individual’s symptoms” that
are “consistent with and supported by the evidence.” Joseph v. O’Malley, 772 F. Supp.
3d 265, 275 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) (quotation and internal quotation marks omitted). 	The
ALJ should also “specify any of [Plaintiff’s] statements that are inconsistent with
medical evidence in the record and explain why [s]he choose[] to discredit them” with
reference to the applicable statutory factors. 	Id. (citing 20 C.F.R § 404.1529(c)(3)(i)-
(vii)) (quotations and internal quotation marks omitted) (cleaned up).
Here, the ALJ does not specify which of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints she is
rejecting; she only vaguely refers to Plaintiff’s “subjective self-reports of symptoms and
functional limitations.” 	Tr. at p. 2214. 	Further, while ALJ Pelton explained that she
found Plaintiff’s subjective complaints inconsistent with Plaintiff’s “overall positive
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response to conservative treatment, her inconsistent statements about the severity of her
symptoms, and her engagement in activities consistent with a range of light work,” the
ALJ makes no reference to the record to support her conclusions, Tr. at p. 2214, and
fails to sufficiently analyze the remaining statutory factors.
ALJ Pelton’s rejection of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints to Dr. Reid is
especially concerning here given that Plaintiff argues, and Defendant does not seem to
dispute, that “fibromyalgia is the exclusive physical impairment that Dr. Reid’s opinion
is based on,” Pl.’s Mem. of Law at p. 17 (citing Tr. at p. 2927); see generally Def.’s
Mem. of Law, and other courts have found that fibromyalgia “is a ‘disease that eludes
objective measurement,’” Lisa E. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2021 WL 4472469, at *7
(W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2021) (quoting Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 108 (2d
Cir. 2003)), and “often does not result in objective findings or diagnostic tests.” Id. at
*10 	(quotation 	and 	internal 	quotation 	marks 	omitted). 	Thus, 	“a 	physician’s
measurements of limitations due to fibromyalgia are necessarily based, at least in part,
on a claimant’s subjective reporting of pain.” Id. at *8 (citations omitted).
Ultimately, it is the ALJ’s responsibility to “build a logical bridge between the
record evidence and her conclusions” to enable meaningful review. 	Sonia A. v.
Bisignano, 2026 WL 496922, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2026) (quotation, internal
quotation marks, and citation omitted). Here, ALJ Pelton failed to build a logical bridge
between the record and her conclusions that the Medical Source Statement was based
on limited evaluations and Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, thereby making remand
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appropriate to ensure that the full record is evaluated and proper consideration is given
to that record. 	Taken together, these issues also leave the Court unable to determine
whether the treating physician rule was properly applied in this case. Beth Marie N. v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2023 WL 6065309, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2023), report and
recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 6065945 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2023). Accordingly,
the Court remands the matter for reconsideration and further explanation.
In doing so, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s request that the matter be remanded
solely for a calculation of benefits. Pl.’s Mem. of Law at p. 25. “Reversal for calculation
of benefits is considered a rare case.” Lisa S. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2026 WL 111477,
at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2025) (quotation, internal quotation marks, and citation
omitted). 	The Court does not find this to be such a rare case and, for the reasons
explained in more detail above, the Court does not find that this is a case where remand
for further proceedings would serve no purpose. 	See, e.g., Mari Eli S.D. on behalf of
S.Y.C.S. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2024 WL 4204254, at *13 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2024),
report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 4203972 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2024)
(citing cases declining to remand for calculation of benefits where ALJ failed to properly
evaluate opinion provided by plaintiff’s treating provider).
The Court is sympathetic to the fact that Plaintiff filed her claims over a decade
ago, Tr. at pp. 106 & 118 (stating that Plaintiff applied for supplemental security income
and disability insurance benefits on December 17, 2015), and that this claim has been
remanded several times before. 	Tr. at pp. 1415-16, 2333-34, & 2385-92. 	“However,
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delay alone is an insufficient basis on which to remand for benefits.” Lisa S. v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 2026 WL 111477, at *1 (quotation and internal quotation marks omitted)
(citing cases); Butts v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 101, 103 (2d Cir. 2005) (quotation and
internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Black v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 4501063, at *7
(W.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2018) (remanding for further administrative proceedings rather
than for a calculation of benefits despite the fact that plaintiff’s application had been
pending for over nine years).
IV. CONCLUSION
ACCORDINGLY, it is
ORDERED, 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	Motion 	for 	Judgment 	on 	the 	Pleadings 	is
GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED, 	that 	Defendant’s 	Motion 	for 	Judgment 	on 	the 	Pleadings 	is
DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED, that Defendant’s decision denying Plaintiff disability benefits is
REMANDED pursuant to sentence four for further proceedings; and it is further
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ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court shall serve copies of this Memorandum-
Decision and Order on the parties.
Dated: March 6, 2026
Albany, New York
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