"Jenny" et al v. Leonardis

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
“JENNY” and “MARIA,”
Plaintiffs,
v.
MARC L. LEONARDIS,
Defendant.
5:24-cv-01407 (BKS/ML)
Appearances:
For Plaintiffs:
Margaret Elizabeth Mabie
Marsh Law Firm PLLC
31 Hudson Yards, Floor 11
New York, New York 10001
For Defendant:
Julie A. Nociolo
Hacker Murphy LLP
28 Second Street
Troy, New York 12180
Hon. Brenda K. Sannes, Chief United States District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. 	INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs Jenny and Maria1 bring this 18 U.S.C. § 2255 action against Defendant Marc L.
Leonardis, who previously pled guilty to one count of receipt of child pornography depicting
Plaintiffs. (Dkt. No. 1). Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to strike three affirmative
defenses from Defendant’s answer. (Dkt. No. 43). The motion is fully briefed. (Dkt. Nos. 43, 44,
47). For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.
1 In May 2025, Magistrate Judge Lovric granted Plaintiffs’ request to proceed using pseudonyms. (Dkt. No. 31).
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II. 	FACTS2
In 2021, a grand jury in the Northern District of New York indicted Defendant on one
count of receipt of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A).3 (See Dkt.
No. 1, at 3). The underlying conduct “was alleged to have been committed on or about April 29,
2021, through June 12, 2021.” (Id.). Defendant eventually pled guilty to that count; he was
sentenced to terms of incarceration and supervised release and ordered to pay restitution. (Id.; see
also Amended Criminal Judgment at 2–3, 7).
Plaintiffs are both adults “who were sexually abused as [children] and whose sexual
abuse is depicted in images of child pornography seized from [D]efendant’s possession.” (Id. at
2). The two “first received notice from [the United States Department of Justice Victim
Notification System] that their child pornography images were among those possessed by
Defendant” on July 12, 2022. (Id. at 3). In November 2024, they commenced this civil action
pursuant to § 2255(a), at the outset requesting only statutory “liquidated damages in the amount
of $150,000”—as well as costs, attorney’s fees, and pre- and post-judgment interest—not “actual
damages.” (See id. at 4–5).
Defendant timely answered. (Dkt. No. 30). In his answer, Defendant admitted to the
above allegations concerning his conviction. (See id. at 1–2). He also asserted the following four
affirmative defenses: (1) “[t]he complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted”; (2) “[t]he Court lacks jurisdiction over this matter”; (3) “[t]he actions set forth in the
2 Except as otherwise noted, the facts are drawn from the complaint.
3 Although in another section of the complaint Plaintiffs cite a statute proscribing, inter alia, possession of child
pornography, (Dkt. No. 1, at 4 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B)))—and in his opposition, Defendant states that he
pled guilty to that offense, (Dkt. No. 44, at 1)—he in fact pled guilty to receipt of child pornography under
§ 2252A(a)(2)(A) and was so adjudged. See Amended Judgment, United States v. Leonardis, No. 5:21-cr-00346
(N.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2025), ECF 89 (“Amended Criminal Judgment”).
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Complaint are barred in whole or in part by the applicable [s]tatutes of [l]imitation”; and (4)
“[t]he Plaintiffs have received payment from [D]efendant.” (Id. at 3).
III. 	DISCUSSION
The federal rules permit a court to “strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). The Second
Circuit has explained that “an affirmative defense is improper and should be stricken if it is a
legally insufficient basis for precluding a plaintiff from prevailing on its claims.” See GEOMC
Co. v. Calmare Therapeutics Inc., 918 F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 2019). Additionally, “the plausibility
standard of Twombly applies to determining the sufficiency of . . . the pleading of an affirmative
defense, but with recognition that . . . an affirmative defense, rather than a complaint, is at issue.”
Id.; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (discussing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). In certain circumstances, prejudice to the plaintiff may also be a relevant
consideration in determining whether to strike such defenses. GEOMC Co., 918 F.3d at 98–99.
Plaintiffs here request that Defendant’s first, second, and third affirmative defenses be
stricken. (Dkt. No. 43, at 4). The Court addresses each in turn.
A. 	Failure to State a Claim
The first affirmative defense Plaintiffs seek to strike is failure to state a claim. (See Dkt.
No. 43, at 4). The Court declines to do so. The text of §2255(a) provides: “Any person who,
while a minor, was a victim of a violation of [§ 2252A] and who suffers a personal injury as a
result of such violation, regardless of whether the injury occurred while such person was a
minor, may sue [and] recover the actual damages such person sustains or liquidated damages,” as
well as costs, attorney’s fees, and other relief not now relevant. See Elden v. Nirvana L.L.C., 88
F.4th 1292, 1295–96 (9th Cir. 2023); Doe v. Hesketh, 828 F.3d 159, 167–68 (3d Cir. 2016). The
Second Circuit does not appear to have addressed § 2255(a) at length. At least two other circuits,
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however, have held that victim plaintiffs inherently “suffer ‘personal injury’ that is analogous to
injuries caused by defamation and other dignitary torts upon the publication or distribution of the
pornographic material depicting them.” Elden, 88 F.4th at 1296; Doe v. Boland, 698 F.3d 877,
880–82 (6th Cir. 2012).
But as the Ninth Circuit recently explained, the statute “includes two time frames”—the
“violation of the criminal laws must have occurred while the plaintiff was a minor,” but the
“personal injury could occur when the plaintiff was an adult.” Elden, 88 F.4th at 1295. So “[t]he
‘violation’ that forms the basis for the claim . . . described in [the text of] § 2255(a) [is] a
specified predicate offense that occurred when the plaintiff was a minor.” Id. at 1296. On that
understanding, the court “reject[ed] [a plaintiff’s] argument that he [could] bring an action based
on violations that occurred when he was an adult.” Id. at 1296 n.5. This Court finds this reading
of the statutory text persuasive in the absence of Second Circuit guidance. See United States v.
Gayle, 342 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Statutory construction begins with the plain text and, if
that text is unambiguous, it usually ends there as well.”); Springfield Hosp., Inc. v. Guzman, 28
F.4th 403, 418 (2d Cir. 2022) (same).
Here, the complaint asserts that Plaintiffs were victims of Defendant’s § 2252A(a)(2)(A)
violation but sheds no light on how old Plaintiffs were at the time he committed that violation. It
states only that they were adults at the time they filed the complaint. (See Dkt. No. 1, at 2). Thus,
the Court cannot determine whether “the violation of the criminal laws . . . occurred while
[Plaintiffs were] minor[s].” Elden, 88 F.4th at 1295. Plaintiffs assert that, having elected to
pursue only liquidated damages, they will suffer prejudice from unnecessary discovery
precipitated by affirmative defenses. (See Dkt. No. 43, at 10–11). But they also acknowledge
“their own burden of proof as to their claims.” (Id. at 10). Under these circumstances, the Court
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declines to strike Defendant’s failure to state a claim defense at this stage. See GEOMC Co., 918
F.3d at 98 (“A factually sufficient and legally valid defense should always be allowed if timely
filed even if it will prejudice the plaintiff by expanding the scope of the litigation.”); cf. Lucente
v. IBM Corp., 310 F.3d 243, 260 (2d Cir. 2002) (similar).
B. 	Jurisdiction
Plaintiffs next seek to strike Defendant’s second affirmative defense, that “[t]he Court
lacks jurisdiction over this matter.” (Dkt. No. 30, at 3; see Dkt. No. 43, at 4). They interpret this
defense as implicating the Court’s personal jurisdiction over Defendant. (See Dkt. No. 43, at 11–
12). But had Defendant contested personal jurisdiction, he would have questioned the Court’s
authority over him, not its authority over this matter. See, e.g., Am. Girl, LLC v. Zembrka, 118
F.4th 271, 276 (2d Cir. 2024) (noting that the personal jurisdiction inquiry concerns whether
“jurisdiction exists over the defendant” (emphasis added)). So the Court construes this defense as
a challenge to its subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556
U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (“Subject matter jurisdiction defines the court’s authority to hear a given
type of case; it represents the extent to which a court can rule on the conduct of persons or the
status of things.” (cleaned up)). That defense, however, is legally insufficient. Plaintiffs’ sole
cause of action in this matter arises out of federal law, see § 2255(a), so the Court has federal
question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Accordingly, the Court will strike this defense. See
GEOMC Co., 918 F.3d at 98.
C. 	Statute of Limitations
Finally, Plaintiffs seek to strike Defendant’s third affirmative defense, that their claims
are barred by the statute of limitations. (Dkt. No. 43, at 4). The current version of § 2255, in
effect when Plaintiffs filed this action, provides that “[t]here shall be no time limit for the filing
of a complaint commencing an action under this section.” See § 2255(b). The version in effect at
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the time Defendant committed the § 2252A(a)(2)(A) violation provided that any such action
would be barred unless filed: (1) “not later than 10 years after the date on which the plaintiff
reasonably discover[ed] the later of . . . the violation [forming] the basis for the claim” or “the
injury [forming] the basis for the claim”; or (2) “not later than 10 years after the date on which
the victim reache[d] 18 years of age.” See Protecting Young Victims from Sexual Abuse and
Safe Sport Authorization Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115–126, § 102, 132 Stat. 318, 320 (2018)
(amended 2022).
The Court need not decide which version applies. Under the current version, Plaintiffs’
claims are not subject to a statute of limitations, and the limitations period under the prior
version has not lapsed. As explained above, Defendant admits pleading guilty to the underlying
§ 2252A(a)(2)(A) offense alleged to have occurred in 2021, and Plaintiffs learned of that offense
in 2022. Plaintiffs commenced this action in 2024, well within 10 years of the date on which they
could have reasonably discovered the violation forming the basis of their claims. Accordingly,
the Court will strike this defense too. See GEOMC Co., 918 F.3d at 98.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion to strike, (Dkt. No. 43), is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part as set forth above; and it is further
ORDERED that the second and third affirmative defenses, concerning jurisdiction and
the statute of limitations, respectively, are STRICKEN from Defendant’s answer, (Dkt. No. 30).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 19, 2026
Syracuse, New York
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