Merritt v. Tioga County Department of Social Services et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
KATIE MERRITT
Plaintiff,
-against- 	3:25-CV-695 (LEK/MJK)
TIOGA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Katie Merritt files a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
“to challenge the unlawful removal and continued custody of her infant son S.H. . . . by the
Tioga County Department of Social Service.” Dkt. No. 1 (“Complaint”) at 1.1 She “alleges her
son was removed without a lawful court order, judicial determination, or sufficient evidence to
support imminent danger, in violation of her fundamental parental rights under the U.S.
Constitution.” Id. Per the Complaint, S.H. was born on September 26, 2024, and was removed
from Plaintiff’s custody on October 1, 2024. Id. at 2. The Petition names as Defendants the Tioga
County Department of Social Services, the Deputy Commissioner of Tioga Department of Social
Services, Broome County Foster Care, and Judge Adam Schumacher. Id. Plaintiff seeks the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus so that her son is released to her custody. See id. at 4.
This matter comes before the Court following a Report-Recommendation filed on July
18, 2025, by the Honorable Mitchell J. Katz, United States Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28
1 Citations to Plaintiff’s submissions refer to the pagination generated by CM/ECF, the Court’s electronic filing
system.
Case 3:25-cv-00695-LEK-MJK Document 8 Filed 12/16/25 Page 1 of 5

2
U.S.C. § 636(b) and L.R. 72.3(d) of the Northern District of New York.2 Dkt. No. 7 (“Report and
Recommendation”). In the Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Katz recommended
dismissing the Complaint, with prejudice and without leave to amend. R. & R. at 19. Plaintiff
objected. Dkt. No. 7 (“Objection”).
For the reasons given below, this Court approves and adopts the Report and
Recommendation in its entirety.
II. BACKGROUND
The Court assumes familiarity with the factual and procedural background detailed in the
Report and Recommendation, including its discussion of Plaintiff’s factual allegations. See R. &
R. at 4–5.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Within fourteen days after a party has been served with a copy of a magistrate judge’s
Report-Recommendation, the party “may serve and file specific written objections to the
proposed findings and recommendations.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). When the party’s objection is
proper, the district court judge reviews the objected-to portion of the Report a Recommendation
de novo. See Nambiar v. Cent. Orthopedic Grp., LLP, No. 24-1103, 2025 WL 3007285, at *2 (2d
Cir. Oct. 28, 2025). If there is not a proper objection, the district court’s review is for clear error.
Id. A proper objection must (1) be timely, (2) be specific, and (3) not raise arguments that had
not previously been made to the magistrate judge. See id. at *3. “To be ‘specific,’ the objection
must, with particularity, ‘identify [1] the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations, or
2 This Court follows the Report-Recommendation as referring to the Petition as a Complaint the Petitioner as
Plaintiff, and the Respondents as Defendants. See R. & R. at 1. As a result, the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation
is pursuant to L.R. 72.3(d), rather than L.R. 72.3(c), which applies to habeas petitions. However, no substantive
difference arises from how the “Updated Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241,” Dkt. No. 1,
is construed.
Case 3:25-cv-00695-LEK-MJK Document 8 Filed 12/16/25 Page 2 of 5

3
report to which it has an objection and [2] the basis for the objection.’” Nutt v. New York, No.
12-CV-385, 2012 WL 4006408, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2012) (quoting N.D.N.Y. L.R.
72.1(c)). Clear error “is present when upon review of the entire record, the court is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Rivera v. Federal Bureau of
Prisons, 368 F.Supp.3d 741, 744 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
IV. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff makes three objections to the Report and Recommendations. See Dkt. No. 7.
1. The Magistrate Judge erred in determining that the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction without addressing the full scope of Plaintiff’s constitutional and statutory
claims
2. The dismissal with prejudice improperly precludes Plaintiff from amending her
Complaint to clarify facts and legal grounds, which should be permitted in a pro se filing.
3. The doctrine of judicial immunity does not apply to acts taken outside the scope of a
judge’s jurisdiction or in clear violation of constitutional rights.
Id. at 1–2. The first and second objections are not sufficiently specific to merit de novo
review. The first objection is conclusory. It does not explain how “addressing the full scope of
Plaintiff’s constitutional and statutory claims” would change the outcome. See id. at 1. The
second objection is similarly conclusory, merely stating Plaintiff’s displeasure with the
conclusion of the Report and Recommendation, and does not explain why its reasoning is
incorrect. See id.
The third objection provides the Plaintiff’s interpretation of the doctrine of judicial
immunity. Construed liberally, the Court understands Plaintiff to be arguing that, due to the
stated legal rules and the (purported) facts that Judge Schumacher lacked jurisdiction and clearly
violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Judge Schumacher is not entitled to judicial immunity.
As a result, the Report and Recommendation’s conclusion that “any claim(s) against Judge
Case 3:25-cv-00695-LEK-MJK Document 8 Filed 12/16/25 Page 3 of 5

4
Schumacher in his personal capacity . . . [are] subject to dismissal on judicial immunity
grounds,” R. & R. at 16, is subject to de novo review.
Reviewing Plaintiff’s third objection de novo, the Court finds the Report and
Recommendation’s conclusion that Judge Schumacher possesses judicial immunity for all claims
in this Complaint to be legally correct and well-reasoned. See R. & R. at 15–17. Plaintiff claims
that “judicial immunity does not apply to acts . . . in clear violation of constitutional rights,” Obj.
at 2. “The only two circumstances in which judicial immunity does not apply is when [a judge]
takes action ‘outside’ his or her judicial capacity and when the judge takes action that, although
judicial in nature, is taken ‘in absence of jurisdiction.’” Coon v. Merola, No. 19-CV-394, 2019
WL 1981416, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2019) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 402 U.S. 9, 11–12 (1991).
Here, while Plaintiff alleges Judge Schumacher violated her constitutional rights, she has failed
to demonstrate how Judge Schumacher “was acting outside of his judicial capacity or in the
absence of jurisdiction.” McNair v. Utica Police Dep’t, 23-CV-699, 2023 WL 4935993, at *3
(N.D.N.Y. June 26, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. 23-CV-699, 2023 WL
4931609 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2023). Thus, this objection is overruled.
Other than the third objection discussed above, the Court reviews the Report and
Recommendation for clear error. See Nambiar, 2025 WL 3007285, at *2.
After carefully examining the record, the Court has determined that the rest of the Report
and Recommendation evinces no clear error or manifest injustice.
V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby:
ORDERED, that the Report-Recommendation, Dkt. No. 6, is APPROVED and
ADOPTED in its entirety; and it is further
Case 3:25-cv-00695-LEK-MJK Document 8 Filed 12/16/25 Page 4 of 5

5
ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s Complaint, Dkt. No. 1, is DISMISSED with prejudice and
without leave to amend; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk serve a copy of this Decision and Order on all parties in
accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 	December 16, 2025
Albany, New York
LAWRENCE E. KAHN
United States District Judge
Case 3:25-cv-00695-LEK-MJK Document 8 Filed 12/16/25 Page 5 of 5