Kweller v. The County of Broome et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
YARON KWELLER,
Plaintiff,
-v-
The COUNTY OF BROOME, et al.,
Defendants.
3:24-CV-1328 (AJB/ML)
Hon. Anthony Brindisi, U.S. District Judge:
DECISION and ORDER
I. 	INTRODUCTION
On October 30, 2024, plaintiff Yaron Kweller (“plaintiff”) filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983
action against defendants Hailey Demkovich, Samantha Herceg, the City of Binghamton, City
Police Chief Joseph Zikuski, City Police Captain Cory Minor, City Police Investigator Amanda
Miller, the County of Broome, the Broome County District Attorney’s Office, Broome County
District Attorney Michael Korchak, Broome County Chief Assistant District Attorney Mark
Loughran, Broome County Assistant District Attorneys Alyssa Congdon and Amanda Cronin,
Broome County District Attorney Investigator Jeff Wagner, and unidentified Broome County
District Attorney’s Office and Binghamton Police Department employees # 1–10. Dkt. No. 1.
In short, plaintiff alleges that Hailey Demkovich and Samantha Herceg falsely accused
him of rape, the Binghamton Police Department (“BPD”) inadequately investigated those false
allegations, and the Broome County District Attorney’s Office (the “BCDA”) deliberately
disregarded exculpatory evidence and chose to prosecute him anyway. See generally Dkt. No. 1.
Plaintiff was acquitted of all charges after a jury trial.
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The twelve-count complaint asserts 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for “False Arrest and
Malicious Prosecution” (Count I); “Due Process and Denial of the Right to a Fair Trial” (Count
II), “Failure to Intervene” (Count III), “Supervisory Liability” (Count IV), “Monell Liability”
(Counts V & VI), “Civil Rights Conspiracy” (Count VII), as well as related state law claims for
“False Arrest and Malicious Prosecution” (Count VIII), “Intentional, Reckless, or Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress” (Count IX), violations of Article I, Sections 6 and 12 of the
New York State Constitution (Count X), “Respondeat Superior” (Count XI), and “Abuse of
Process” (Count XII). Dkt. No. 1, ¶¶ 191–302.1
Defendants Hailey Demkovich and Samantha Herceg answered the complaint. Dkt. Nos.
37, 39. All other defendants, apart from BCDA Investigator Wagner (“Wagner”), moved to
dismiss the pleading pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). Dkt. Nos.
40, 57, 65, 67, 74. The Court granted those motions in part, and denied those motions in part, on
September 29, 2025. Dkt. No. 106. Thereafter, the County of Broome (the “County”) moved for
partial reconsideration of the Court’s decision pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54
and Local Rule 60.1. Dkt. No. 107.
Wagner originally defaulted. Dkt. No. 76. After the entry of default was vacated, Dkt.
No. 94, he, too, moved to dismiss plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Dkt. No. 101.
The Court did not address Wagner’s motion in its earlier decision because of this delay.
Wagner’s motion to dismiss and the County’s motion for partial reconsideration have
been fully briefed, Dkt. Nos. 101, 104–05, 107, 110, and will be considered on the basis of the
submissions without oral argument.
1 The complaint is sequentially numbered by line. Accordingly, citations to the pleading correspond with that
document’s internal pagination.
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II. 	BACKGROUND
The Court incorporates the factual background from the earlier decision and order on
defendants’ motions to dismiss. Dkt. No. 106 (the “September 29 Order”) at 3–15.
III. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. Motion to Dismiss
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit a party to move to dismiss a pleading for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive
dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, ‘to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.; see also Ginsburg v. City of Ithaca, 839 F.
Supp. 2d 537, 540 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[T]he ‘[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.’”) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
To assess this facial plausibility requirement, the court “must accept as true all of the
factual allegations contained in the complaint,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), and
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d
147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002). 	In doing so, the court generally confines itself to the facts alleged in
the pleading, documents attached to the complaint or incorporated into it by reference, and
matters of which judicial notice may be taken. Goel v. Bunge, Ltd., 820 F.3d 554, 559 (2d Cir.
2016).
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B. Motion for Reconsideration
Under this District’s Local Rules, “a party may file and serve a motion for
reconsideration or reargument no later than fourteen days after the entry of the challenged . . .
order.” N.D.N.Y. L.R. 60.1. Similarly, “Rule 54(b) [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure]
provides, in relevant part, that, prior to entry of a final judgment, an interlocutory ‘order or other
form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all
the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.’” Off. Comm. of Unsecured Creditors
of Color Tile, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, LLP, 322 F.3d 147, 167 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Fed.
R. Civ. P. 54(b)).
However, the availability of reconsideration under Rule 54(b) is limited, and “gives a
district court discretion to revisit earlier rulings in the same case, subject to the caveat that
‘where litigants have once battled for the court’s decision, they should neither be required, nor
without good reason permitted, to battle for it again.’” Off. Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of
Color Tile, Inc., 322 F.3d at 167 (quoting Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 953 (2d Cir.
1964)).
In other words, “the standard for granting a motion for reconsideration is ‘strict, and
reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling
decisions or data that the court overlooked—matters . . . that might reasonably be expected to
alter the conclusion reached by the court.’” Commerzbank AG v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 100 F.4th 362,
377 (2d Cir. 2024) (quoting Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995)), cert.
denied, 145 S. Ct. 279 (2024).
IV. 	DISCUSSION
The Court will address Wagner’s motion to dismiss before reaching the County’s motion
for partial reconsideration.
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A. 	BCDA Investigator Wagner’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff has asserted § 1983 claims against Wagner for false arrest, Dkt. No. 1
(“Compl.”) ¶¶ 191–97; malicious prosecution, id.; deprivation of liberty without due process and
denial of the right to a fair trial, id. at ¶¶198–205; failure to intervene, id. at ¶¶ 206–10; and civil
rights conspiracy, id. at 263–66. He also brings related state law claims against Wagner for false
arrest, id. ¶¶ 267–80; malicious prosecution, id.; intentional, reckless, or negligent infliction of
emotional distress, id. at ¶¶ 281–85; and violations of Article I, sections 6 and 12 of the New
York State Constitution, id. at ¶¶ 286–89.
Wagner has moved to dismiss all of the claims asserted against him, arguing that “[n]one
of [p]laintiff’s causes of action allege[ ]a legally viable claim against [him].” Dkt. No. 101-1
(“Wagner Mem.”) at 10. In opposition, plaintiff maintains that he has plausibly alleged that
Wagner’s conduct “materially contributed to the violation of [his] constitutional rights.” Dkt.
No. 104 (“Pl.’s Opp.”) at 5.
1. 	Section 1983 Claims
Wagner argues that plaintiff’s § 1983 claims must be dismissed because (1) plaintiff has
not plausibly alleged that he was “personally involved” in any constitutional deprivation, see
Wagner Mem. at 10–13; (2) the complaint does not plausibly allege all elements of plaintiff’s
§ 1983 claims against him, id. at 15–24; and (3) regardless, he is entitled to qualified immunity
for any allegedly violative conduct, id. at 13–15. Plaintiff disagrees. See Pl.’s Opp. at 10–27.
i. 	Personal Involvement
Because “personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a
prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983,” Moffitt v. Town of Brookfield, 950 F.2d 880,
886 (2d Cir. 1991), the Court addresses it first. “[I]n order to establish a defendant’s individual
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liability in a suit brought under § 1983, a plaintiff must show, inter alia, the defendant’s personal
involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d
133, 138 (2d Cir. 2013).
Wagner argues that plaintiff’s § 1983 claims must be dismissed because plaintiff has
stated “exactly one factual allegation against [him],” and that allegation does not plausibly
suggest that he was personally involved in violating plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Wagner
Mem. at 10–13. In opposition, plaintiff argues that the complaint plausibly alleges Wagner’s
personal involvement at this stage. Pl.’s Opp. at 10–14.
As an initial matter, plaintiff misstates the governing legal standard for personal
involvement. Pl.’s Second Opp. at 10–11. Plaintiff states that personal involvement does not
require active participation and can be found “‘when an official has actual or constructive notice
of unconstitutional practices and demonstrates gross negligence or deliberate indifference by
failing to act.’” Id. (quoting Nolan v. W. Re’l Off Track Betting Corp., 2024 WL 4555115, at
*11 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2024) quoting Meriwether v. Coughlin, 879 F.2d 1037, 1048 (2d Cir.
1989)). But that is no longer the rule.
In Tangreti v. Bachmann, the Second Circuit held that, “[f]ollowing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, . . .
[a] plaintiff must directly plead and prove that ‘each Government-official defendant, through the
official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.’” 983 F.3d 609, 612 (2d Cir.
2020) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676). Since Tangreti, the Second Circuit has reiterated that,
“[a] defendant is culpable only if his own conduct amounted to a constitutional violation.” Calix
v. United States, 2024 WL 3263361, at *2 (2d Cir. July 2, 2024) (citing Tangreti, 983 F.3d at
619) (emphasis in original); see also Kravitz v. Purcell, 87 F.4th 111 (2d Cir. 2023); Wiggins v.
Griffin, 86 F.4th 987 (2d Cir. 2023).
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As Wagner points out, plaintiff alleges only that Assistant District Attorney Alyssa
Congdon (“ADA Congdon”) directed him to retrieve the Saitta folder, but that he failed to do so.
Compl. ¶¶ 118–19. Notably, the pleading does not allege that Wagner had any other
involvement in plaintiff’s investigation or prosecution. See generally id.
Absent additional non-conclusory factual allegations tending to establish that Wagner
knew that the contents of the Saitta folder were exculpatory and intentionally suppressed them,
plaintiff has not plausibly alleged Wagner’s “personal involvement” in any of the constitutional
violations. Accordingly, plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Wagner must be dismissed, and the
Court need not reach Wagner’s qualified immunity arguments.
2. 	State Law Claims
Wagner argues that plaintiff’s state law claims must also be dismissed, because (1) he has
failed to plausibly allege the elements of any state law cause of action, Wagner Mem. at 15–19;
(2) plaintiff’s intentional, reckless, or negligent infliction of emotional distress claim is
improperly brought, id. at 24–27; and (3) plaintiff has no private right of action under the New
York State Constitution under these circumstances, id. at 27–28.
Plaintiff has voluntarily withdrawn his claim for intentional, negligent, or reckless
infliction of emotional distress, see Pl.’s Opp. at 27 n.4, but rejects Wagner’s arguments as to his
remaining state law claims, id. at 15–20, 27–28.
i. 	False Arrest
Plaintiff’s eighth cause of action is identified as a state law claim for “false arrest and
malicious prosecution.” Compl. ¶¶ 267–80. But false arrest and malicious prosecution are
distinct causes of action under state law. See Broughton v. State, 335 N.E.2d 310, 313 (N.Y.
1975) (“Although [false imprisonment and malicious prosecution] are kindred actions, each
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protects a different personal interest and is composed of different elements.”). Accordingly, they
will be addressed separately.
“Under New York law, the elements of a false arrest [or] false imprisonment claim are:
‘(1) the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the
confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not
otherwise privileged.’” Hernandez v. United States, 939 F.3d 191, 199 (2d Cir. 2019)
(McGowan v. United States, 825 F.3d 118, 126 (2d Cir. 2016)).
Wagner argues that this claim must be dismissed, in part, because “the complaint lacks
any allegations that Wagner played any role in [p]laintiff’s arrest.” Wagner Mem. at 15.
Plaintiff concedes that the complaint “does not allege that Wagner physically arrested him,”
arguing instead that Wagner’s failure to retrieve the Saitta folder “caused [p]laintiff’s arrest and
prosecution to proceed based on an incomplete and misleading evidentiary record.” Wagner
Mem. at 11–12.
Although the complaint alleges that plaintiff was arrested, Compl. ¶ 134, plaintiff’s only
factual allegation against Wagner is that he failed to retrieve the Saitta folder at ADA Congdon’s
direction. Id. ¶¶ 118–19. This is not enough.
A plaintiff cannot sustain a false arrest claim under New York law where there is “no
allegation that the defendant personally participated in the arrest or detention of the plaintiff.”
Levy v. Chasnoff, 245 A.D. 607, 610 (1st Dep’t 1935); see also Barr v. Albany Cnty., 69 A.D.2d
914, 915 (3d Dep’t 1979) (affirming dismissal of false arrest claim against sheriff where he
“neither ordered the raid resulting in the arrests, nor participated in the raid”), aff’d as modified,
406 N.E.2d 481 (N.Y. 1980); Du Chateau v. Metro-N. Commuter R. Co., 253 A.D.2d 128, 132
(N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1999) (“It is not enough that the defendant’s words or actions caused
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a police officer to confine him; plaintiff must [allege] that the defendant ‘directed an officer to
take [him] into custody.’” (quoting Vernes v. Phillips, 194 N.E. 762, 76 (N.Y. 1935)).
Plaintiff has alleged that ADA Congdon held “ultimate decision-making authority over
the investigation,” and that she “met . . . and decided with BPD to file criminal charges against
[p]laintiff.” Compl. ¶¶ 127, 133. Because plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Wagner
participated in or directed his arrest, see generally Compl., his state law false arrest claim must
be dismissed.
ii. 	Malicious Prosecution
Under state law, “[t]he elements of an action for malicious prosecution are (1) the
initiation of a proceeding, (2) its termination favorably to plaintiff, (3) lack of probable cause,
and (4) malice.” Colon v. City of New York, 455 N.E.2d 1248, 1250 (N.Y. 1983).
Wagner argues that plaintiff’s state law malicious prosecution claim must be dismissed
because plaintiff has not plausibly alleged the elements as to him. Wagner Mem. at 16–19.
Plaintiff maintains that, at this stage, his allegations sufficiently state a malicious prosecution
claim against Wagner. Pl.’s Opp. at 11–12, 18–20.
New York courts have held that the initiation element may be satisfied through
allegations that a defendant filed a charging instrument, Bonfante v. Golub Corp., 186 A.D.2d
343, 344 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1992), falsified or withheld information, id., or “played an
active role in the prosecution, such as giving advice and encouragement or importuning the
authorities to act.” Viza v. Town of Greece, 94 A.D.2d 965, 965 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep’t
1983).
Again, plaintiff has only alleged that ADA Congdon directed Wagner to retrieve the
Saitta folder, but he did not. Compl. ¶¶ 118–19. Absent any other non-conclusory factual
allegations, plaintiff has not plausibly stated that Wagner “initiated” plaintiff’s prosecution.
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Accordingly, plaintiff’s state law malicious prosecution claim against Wagner must be
dismissed.
iii. New York State Constitutional Violations
Plaintiff’s tenth cause of action alleges violations of Article I, sections 6 and 12 of the
New York State Constitution. Compl. ¶¶ 286–89.
Wagner argues that this claim must be dismissed because the New York State
Constitution does not provide a right of action where there are adequate alternative remedies
available, and regardless, plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Wagner violated his rights under
the New York State Constitution. Wagner Mem. at 27–28. Plaintiff argues that his state
constitutional claims are “are asserted in the alternative in the event the Court . . . conclude[s]
that [p]laintiff lacks a viable federal claim against Wagner.” Pl.’s Opp. at 28.
In Brown v. State, the Court of Appeals “recognized a private right of action to recover
damages against the State for violations of the Equal Protection and Search and Seizure Clauses .
. . Finding neither injunctive, declaratory, nor exclusionary relief adequate to protect against the
invasion of personal liberty interests suffered by the claimants.” Martinez v. City of
Schenectady, 276 A.D.2d 993, 996 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2000) (citing Brown v. State, 674
N.E.2d 1129, 1140–41 (N.Y. 1996)), aff’d 761 N.E.2d 560 (N.Y. 2001).
“[H]owever, the Court of Appeals made it clear that th[is] ‘narrow remedy’. . . was not
‘boundless.’” Lyles v. State, 2 A.D.3d 694, 695 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2003) (quoting
Martinez v. City of Schenectady, 761 N.E.2d 560, 563 (N.Y. 2001)), aff’d, 820 N.E.2d 860 (N.Y.
2004). For example, in Lyles, the Appellate Division for the Second Department held that:
recognition of the claimant’s State constitutional claims was neither necessary nor
appropriate to ensure the full realization of his rights, because the alleged wrongs
could have been redressed by an alternative remedy, namely, timely interposed
common-law tort claims for assault and battery, false imprisonment, and the
intentional and negligent injury to his property.
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Lyles, 2 A.D.3d at 695.
Wagner argues that, here, a private right of action to vindicate any alleged violations of
plaintiff’s state constitutional rights is unnecessary, because plaintiff’s alleged harms could be
redressed by § 1983 claims for “false arrest, malicious prosecution, and denial of fair trial,” or
state law tort claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution—both of which permit a damages
remedy. Wagner Mem. at 28. The Court agrees.
Plaintiff alleges that Wagner’s failure to retrieve exculpatory evidence—i.e., the Saitta
folder—caused him to be arrested and prosecuted without probable cause, in violation of his
rights under the New York State Constitution. See Compl. ¶¶ 118–19, 193, 201. State tort law
and § 1983 both provide a damages remedy for this alleged harm, thereby vitiating the need for a
private right of action under the New York State Constitution.
Even if a private right of action were appropriate here, Wagner is correct that any such
claim would “fail for the same reasons set forth above in connection with Plaintiff’s Section
1983 and other state-law claims.” Wagner Mem. at 28. Accordingly, plaintiff’s tenth cause of
action is dismissed.
3. 	Leave to Amend
Finally, the Court must address plaintiff’s request for leave to amend his complaint.
Plaintiff sought leave to amend through a single sentence in the “Conclusion” paragraph of his
opposition brief. Pl.’s Opp. at 28. Wagner argues that plaintiff’s request should be denied,
because “any request to amend must be made by motion.” Wagner’s Mem. at 14. The Court
agrees.
Under this District’s Local Rules of Practice, “[a] party moving to amend a pleading . . .
must attach an unsigned copy of the proposed amended pleading to its motion papers.” L.R.
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15.1(a). “[T]he proposed amended pleading must be a complete pleading, which will supersede
the pleading sought to be amended in all respects.” Id. A motion to amend “must set forth
specifically the proposed insertions and deletions of language and identify the amendments in the
proposed pleading.” Id.
Plaintiff has not complied with this Local Rule. His failure to attach a proposed amended
pleading is particularly frustrating, “as it precludes the Court from ‘examin[ing] the exact
amendment that it is being asked to permit[;] ... ensur[ing] that all of the allegations asserted . . .
are contained in a single document[;] ... [and] eliminat[ing] the confusing nature of piecemeal
amended pleadings.’” Wynn v. Lee, 2019 WL 13546213, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. May 1, 2019) (quoting
Cusamano v. Sobek, 604 F. Supp. 2d 416, 508 (N.D.N.Y. 2009)).
Plaintiff’s obvious non-compliance with the Local Rules is a sufficient basis on which to
deny his motion to amend. Reynolds-Sitzer v. EISAI, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 3d 123 (N.D.N.Y. 2022)
(denying motion for leave to amend where plaintiffs requested leave in a brief paragraph of their
opposition papers and failed to comply with the Local Rules); Webb v. Mentor Worldwide LLC,
453 F. Supp. 3d 550 (N.D.N.Y. 2020) (denying plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend, in part, for
noncompliance with the Local Rules); Braxton v. Bell, 2020 WL 13908846, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. July
7, 2020) (denying “motion to amend for failure to comply with the Local Rules for the Northern
District of New York and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
While plaintiff is correct that leave to amend should be freely given when justice so
requires, Pl.’s Opp. at 28 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2)), “a court need not always allow a party
to replead simply because it asked. In particular, denial of leave to amend is proper where the
request gives no clue as to how the complaint’s defects would be cured.” Noto v. 22nd Century
Grp., Inc., 35 F.4th 95, 107 (2d Cir. 2022) (internal quotation omitted); Murphy Med. Assocs.,
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LLC v. Yale Univ., 120 F.4th 1107, 1114 (2d Cir. 2024) (affirming denial of plaintiff’s request
for leave to amend where plaintiff failed to make formal motion or submit proposed amended
complaint); Solomon v. Flipps Media, Inc., 136 F.4th 41, 55 (2d Cir. 2025) (affirming denial of
request for leave to amend where plaintiff “waited until her opposition to the motion to dismiss
to request leave . . . and . . . did so only in a single footnote on the final page of her brief”).
Plaintiff was given extra time, Dkt. No. 102, to respond to Wagner’s motion to dismiss—
which raised the same or substantially similar legal issues as the earlier-filed motions in this
case—but the Court finds no indication anywhere in plaintiff’s briefing of what new or
additional, non-conclusory factual allegations he would raise to cure the deficiencies in his
complaint. See generally Pl.’s Opp.
Accordingly, plaintiff’s request for leave to amend his complaint is denied.
B. County’s Motion for Reconsideration
The County has moved for partial reconsideration of the September 29 Order, arguing
that (1) the Court erroneously permitted plaintiff’s state law false arrest and malicious
prosecution claims to proceed against the County under a theory of respondeat superior liability;
and (2) regardless, the Court should have dismissed plaintiff’s state law false arrest claim
because, based on the facts alleged, any claim for his unlawful detention “must be pursued as
malicious prosecution, not false arrest.” See Dkt. No. 107 (“County Mem.”) at 5–9.
In opposition, plaintiff argues that the County’s motion must be denied, because it is
“merely an attempt to relitigate issues the Court has already carefully considered and decided,”
and “the County identifie[d] no circumstances that establish either an error of law or the risk of
manifest injustice.” Dkt. No. 110 (“Pl.’s Opp. Recons.”) at 4.
As plaintiff correctly notes, “[r]econsideration under Local Rule 60.1 and Rule 60(b) is
an extraordinary remedy, available only to account for an intervening change in controlling law,
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address newly discovered evidence that could not previously have been presented, or to correct a
clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.” Pl.’s Opp. Recons. At 4. The County has failed
to demonstrate entitlement to reconsideration on any permissible basis.
First, the County argues that plaintiff’s state false arrest and malicious prosecution claims
must be dismissed, because ADA Congdon was acting on behalf of the State, rather than the
County, when the alleged misconduct occurred. County’s Mem. at 5–8.
The County is correct that:
[U]nder Second Circuit precedent, “[w]hen prosecuting a criminal matter, a district
attorney in New York State, acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, represents the State
not the county,” Baez v. Hennessy, 853 F.2d [73, 77 (2d Cir. 1988)], and therefore,
a “county c[annot] be held legally responsible for injuries that the prosecutor had
caused” in the context of a § 1983 Monell claim, see Bellamy v. City of New York,
914 F.3d 727, 757 (2d Cir. 2019).
Broadwater v. Cnty. of Onondaga, 2024 WL 1053351, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2024) (Sannes,
C.J.). But the Court already dismissed plaintiff’s § 1983 Monell claims, and only plaintiff’s state
law false arrest and malicious prosecution claims remain against the County.
Thus, “[t]he proper inquiry . . . is whether a county may be held liable for a state-law
claim under the theory of respondeat superior where its prosecutor faces liability for conduct
‘outside his quasi-judicial role’—that is, conduct that does not entitle the prosecutor to absolute
immunity.” Broadwater, 2024 WL 1053351, at *7 (quoting Claude H. v. Cnty. of Oneida, 214
A.D.2d 964, 965 (1995)).
“Under New York law, ‘[i]t is well established that a District Attorney is a local officer
of the county rather than of the State.’” Broadwater, 2024 WL 1053351, at *7 (quoting Claude
H., 214 A.D.2d at 966). “And under New York law, where a county prosecutor is potentially
liable—that is, where a prosecutor does not enjoy absolute immunity—‘the County may be held
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vicariously liable.’” Broadwater, 2024 WL 1053351, at *7 (quoting Claude H., 214 A.D.2d at
966).
The Court has already determined that, at this stage, ADA Congdon is not absolutely
immune from liability as a matter of law. See September 29 Order at 24–27. Because ADA
Congdon may be held liable under state law for her alleged conduct, the County may be held
vicariously liable. See Claude H., 214 A.D.2d at 966 (“Because of the District Attorney’s
potential liability, the County may be held vicariously liable.”). Accordingly, the County’s
motion for reconsideration is denied on this ground.
Second, the County argues that plaintiff’s false arrest claim should have been dismissed,
because plaintiff “admits that he was produced by counsel and charged and arraigned . . . on the
same date,” therefore, “any claim for unlawful detention must be pursued as malicious
prosecution, not false arrest.” County Mem. at 8–9 (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389–
90 (2007)).
At the outset, “a party may not advance new arguments or requests for relief in a motion
for reconsideration if they were ‘not previously presented to the Court.’” In re Furstenberg Fin.
SAS, 785 F. App’x 882, 886 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary order) (quoting Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co.
of Pittsburgh v. Stroh Cos., 265 F.3d 97, 115 (2d Cir. 2001)). As plaintiff points out, the County
could have, but “did not raise this issue in its motion to dismiss or its reply.” Pl.’s Opp. Recons.
At 9. Even setting that aside, the County’s late-breaking argument fails.
In Wallace v. Kato, the Supreme Court held that an unlawful imprisonment ends and a
§ 1983 false arrest claim accrues when an arrestee becomes held pursuant to legal process—
“when, for example, he is bound over by a magistrate or arraigned on charges.” Wallace, 549
U.S. at 389. “From that point on, any damages recoverable must be based on a malicious
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prosecution claim and on the wrongful use of judicial process rather than detention itself.” Id. at
390 (internal quotation omitted).
Contrary to the County’s contentions, the Court in Wallace did not hold that someone
who was unlawfully arrested but subsequently held pursuant to legal process could not bring a
claim for false arrest, rather, it held that an unlawful arrest ends upon arraignment, and damages
incurred after that point must be recovered through a malicious prosecution action, rather than a
false arrest action. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 389.
Regardless, Wallace is inapplicable here, because only state law claims remain against
the County, and Wallace concerned “the accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action,” which “is a
question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law.” Id. at 388 (emphasis in
original).
Lastly, to the extent the County argues that plaintiff did not plausibly allege his state law
false arrest claim because he was arrested pursuant to legal process, that argument is rejected,
because “[a] motion for reconsideration is not an opportunity . . . to ‘relitigate an issue already
decided’ or present arguments that could have been made” previously. Ethridge v. Bell, 49 F.4th
674, 688 (2d Cir. 2022).2
In sum, the County has failed to demonstrate that reconsideration of the Court’s
September 29 Order is warranted.
V. 	CONCLUSION
Therefore, it is
2 In any event, plaintiff has plausibly alleged that (1) ADA Congdon directed complainant Herceg to destroy
exculpatory electronic data during the investigation, Compl. ¶¶ 66, 171, (2) ADA Congdon “decided that [p]laintiff .
. . should be arrested,” id. ¶ 130; (3) “no probable cause existed to arrest plaintiff,” id. ¶ 132; (4) “BPD notified
[p]laintiff’s attorney that [he] would have to appear to be arrested,” id. ¶ 134; and (5) plaintiff’s attorney “produced
him on the same date,” id. Together these allegations state a plausible false arrest claim against ADA Congdon, for
which the County may be held vicariously liable.
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ORDERED that
1. 	Wagner’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 101) is granted; and
2. 	The County’s motion for reconsideration (Dkt. No. 107) is denied.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to:
a. 	Terminate BCDA Investigator Jeff Wagner from the docket report; and
b. 	Terminate moving defendants’ pending motions (Dkt. Nos. 101 & 107).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 25, 2025
Utica, New York.
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