Hayton v. United Parcel Service et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________________________
ANTHONY J. HAYTON,
Plaintiff,
-v- 	3:23-CV-01054 (AJB/ML)
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC. and
JENNIFER LONG,
Defendants.
_____________________________________
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
LAW OFFICE OF EDWARD E. KOPKO 	EDWARD E. KOPKO, ESQ.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
202 East State Street, Suite 403
Ithaca, NY 14850
MORAN, KARAMOUZIS LAW FIRM 	ANDREW P. KARAMOUZIS, ESQ.
Attorneys for UPS Defendant
265 Sunrise Highway, Suite 61
Rockville Centre, NY 11570
SCHMOYER REINHARD LLP 	SHANNON BROWN SCHMOYER, ESQ.
Attorneys for UPS Defendant 	RICHARD L. CLIFTON, JR., ESQ.
8000 IH 10 West, Suite 1600
San Antonio, TX 78230
JENNIFER LONG
Pro Se Defendant
Hon. Anthony Brindisi, U.S. District Judge:
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DECISION & ORDER
I. 	INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Anthony J. Hayton (“Hayton”) seeks damages for gender discrimination, sexual
harassment, hostile work environment, and retaliatory discharge against defendants United Postal
Service, Inc. (“UPS”) and his former UPS supervisor Jennifer Long (“Long”) under the New
York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”).
UPS removed this case from New York Supreme Court, claiming federal question
jurisdiction. Before the Court is defendant UPS’s Motion for Summary Judgment. For the
reasons below, the Court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, UPS’s
summary judgment motion is DENIED AS MOOT, and the case is REMANDED to the
Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Tompkins.
II. 	BACKGROUND
In late September 2021, Hayton, a 33-year-old black man, began working for UPS as a
package driver out of its Ithaca, New York hub. See Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. F, Dkt. No.
50-9 at 3; Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. M., 50-15 at 2. Hayton asserts he was “an exemplary
employee” (Pl.’s Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J., Dkt. No. 60-1 at 4) yet alleges that two white
drivers, “hired three to four weeks after” him, were regularly assigned better-paying routes,
given more hours, and provided company trucks, while he was left to use a U-Haul. See Def.’s
Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. M, Dkt. No. 50-15 at 2. Hayton contends that he was subjected to
“different terms and conditions of employment” because of his race and in retaliation for
rejecting sexual advances from his supervisor, defendant Jennifer Long. Id. When Hayton
“expressed no interest[,]” he says Long “concocted a sham reason” to fire him. See Pl.’s Resp. to
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Mot. for Summ. J., Dkt. No. 60-1 at 4. Hayton’s employment ended on January 13, 2022. Def.’s
Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. M, Dkt. No. 50-15 at 2.
On May 26, 2023, Hayton filed suit in Tompkins County Supreme Court against UPS and
Long. See Compl., Dkt. No. 1-1. The complaint alleges five claims under the New York State
Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”): (1) gender discrimination and sexual harassment, (2) hostile
work environment, (3) retaliatory discharge, (4) aiding and abetting sexual harassment and
gender discrimination, and (5) sexual harassment and gender discrimination against a contractor
or consultant. See id. ¶¶ 51–105.
UPS removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of
New York on August 24, 2023. See Notice of Removal, Dkt. No. 1. UPS answered the
complaint on August 31, 2023 (Dkt. No. 8); Long answered on November 21, 2023. Dkt. Nos. 8,
19. Discovery closed on February 13, 2025. See Dkt. No. 45.
The parties met for mandatory mediation on March 19, 2025, but reached no settlement.
See Dkt. No. 46. UPS moved for summary judgment on April 25, 2025. Dkt. No. 49. Hayton
responded on May 30, 2025, and UPS replied on June 20, 2025. Dkt. Nos. 60, 62.
The case was reassigned to this Court on October 6, 2025. Dkt. No. 63. UPS’s Motion
for Summary Judgment is now before the Court. Yet before the Court can reach the merits of the
motion, it must first confirm that it possesses jurisdiction.
III. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. 	Subject Matter Jurisdiction
“Subject matter jurisdiction is the legal authority of a court to hear and decide a particular
type of case.” Kingston v. Deutsch Bank Nat. Tr. Co., 2013 WL 1821107, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr.
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30, 2013). “Federal courts are courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction; they may exercise
jurisdiction only if it is specifically authorized.” Id.
“It is incumbent on a federal court to determine with certainty whether it has subject
matter jurisdiction over a case pending before it.” Allard v. Lowe’s Home Ctr., LLC, 2022 WL
625730, at *2 (D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2022). “A federal court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction is
not waivable by the parties, and [the court] must address jurisdictional questions before reaching
the merits.” Holt v. Town of Stonington, 765 F.3d 127, 130 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Leveraged
Leasing Admin. Corp. v. PacifiCorp Cap., Inc., 87 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1996)).
If necessary, a federal court must consider its subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte. See
e.g., Weiss Acquisition, LLC v. Patel, 2013 WL 45885, at *1 (D. Conn. Jan. 3, 2013) (“Although
neither party has suggested that we lack appellate jurisdiction, we have an independent
obligation to consider the presence or absence of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte.”) (citing
Joseph v. Leavitt, 465 F.3d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 2006)).
B. 	Removal
“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the
district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such
action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Federal district courts are to “construe the removal
statute narrowly, resolving any doubts against removability.” Minaudo v. Sunrise at Sheepshead
Bay, 2023 WL 110359, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2023) (quoting Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Kentucky,
704 F.3d 208, 213 (2d Cir. 2013)). “The removing party bears the burden of establishing proper
jurisdiction.” Perez v. Foremost Ins. Co., 2018 WL 2473573, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. June 4, 2018)
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(citing United Food & Com. Workers Union, Loc. 919, AFL-CIO v. CenterMark Props. Meriden
Square, Inc., 30 F.3d 298, 301 (2d Cir. 1994)).
“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “When a federal court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a removed case, the proper remedy is to remand the case
to state court rather than to dismiss the claims.” Metro Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. FCA US LLC,
2022 WL 16834572, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2022) (citing Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home
Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 427 (2d Cir. 2014)). “That is because, in the absence of subject
matter jurisdiction, a federal court is powerless to adjudicate the removed case.” George v.
Credit Corp Sols. Inc., 2023 WL 7000964, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2023) (internal citations and
alterations omitted).
IV. 	DISCUSSION
Federal subject matter jurisdiction is typically based either on diversity of citizenship
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 or federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See White v.
Macaulay, 2012 WL 3470706, at *1 (D. Vt. Aug. 14, 2012).
Here, there is no diversity of citizenship. Both Hayton and Long were citizens of New
York at all relevant times. See Compl., Dkt. No. 1-1 ¶¶ 2, 4.
As for federal question jurisdiction, UPS offers two bases in its Notice of Removal.
1. 	Age Discrimination in Employment Act
The first basis is that Hayton’s complaint “expressly pled and swore under the penalty of
perjury that there is federal question jurisdiction.” Def.’s Notice of Removal, Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 3.
Hayton’s complaint—filed in state court—does appear to invoke the federal Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (“ADEA”). See Compl., Dkt. No. 1-1 ¶ 5 (“The jurisdiction of the [c]ourt
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over this controversy as to enforcement of the provisions of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626 is based
upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as the questions before this [state] [c]ourt are federal questions.”).
Yet 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is a federal statute granting federal courts original jurisdiction over
actions arising under federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331; see Jado Assocs., LLC v. Suffolk Cnty.
Sewer Dist. No. 4- Smithtown Galleria, 2014 WL 2944086, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 30, 2014)
(“[Federal] [d]istrict courts have original jurisdiction of all actions arising under federal law
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A case arises under federal law for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1331
if ‘a well[-]pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or
that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of
federal law.’”) (quoting Empire Healthchoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 678 (2006)).
Section 1331, as a federal procedural mechanism, has no bearing on whether Hayton’s complaint
may be brought in a state court.
Regardless, “[a] civil action filed in a state court may be removed to federal court if the
claim is one ‘arising under’ federal law.” Pratt v. JACC Healthcare Ctr. of Norwich LLC, 2022
WL 16855976, at *4 (D. Conn. Nov. 10, 2022) (quoting Beneficial Nat. Bank v. Anderson, 539
U.S. 1, 6 (2003)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c). But Hayton does not assert a claim under the
ADEA, or for that matter, any other federal law. The ADEA is mentioned only twice in Hayton’s
complaint: (1) In its assertion that the state court possesses jurisdiction under Section 1331 to
enforce the ADEA, and (2) in noting that UPS “qualif[ies] as an employer for purposes of the
ADEA and the New York State Human Rights Law.” See Compl., Dkt. No. 1-1 ¶¶ 5, 7.
That Hayton does not allege an ADEA claim is further evident not only because no such
claim is listed among the five causes enumerated, but also because the complaint contains no
facts suggesting age discrimination of any kind. See generally id. Nor, as pleaded, could Hayton
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have brought a facially plausible ADEA claim: The complaint states he is 33 years old. Id. ¶ 2.
The ADEA protects individuals over the age of 40. Delville v. Firmenich Inc., 920 F. Supp. 2d
446, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 631(a)).
Hayton offers no explanation for his seeming reliance on these federal statutes. In fact,
he does not acknowledge that the complaint mentions them. Instead, in opposition to the
pending motion, he states only what has been clear from the start: “Hayton . . . asserts claims
only under the New York State Human Rights Law[.]”1 See Pl.’s Resp., Dkt. No. 60-1 at 4.
2. 	Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
No matter, says UPS, as it offers its second basis for removal jurisdiction. According to
UPS’s Notice of Removal, one or more of Hayton’s state-law NYSHRL claims are completely
preempted by Section 301 of the federal Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), thereby
making this case one that arises under federal law. See Notice of Removal, Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 2.
Section 301 endeavors to ensure uniform interpretation of collective bargaining
agreements (“CBAs”) nationally. Guzman v. First Chinese Presbyterian Cmty. Affs. Home
Attendant Corp., 520 F. Supp. 3d 353, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2021). “Federal law preempts [some] state
claims to further the federal goal of developing a uniform federal common law to govern labor
disputes, ‘lest common terms in bargaining agreements be given different and potentially
inconsistent interpretations in different jurisdictions.’” Vera v. Saks & Co., 335 F.3d 109, 114 (2d
Cir. 2003) (quoting Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 122 (1994)).
Section 301 will completely preempt a state-law claim if the claim “is either (1) ‘founded
directly on rights created by collective-bargaining agreements’ or (2) ‘substantially dependent on
1 Hayton’s Charge of Discrimination, filed with the New York State Division of Human Rights prior to this
suit, asserts that the facts underlying this matter “were in willful violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act[.]” See
Dkt. Nos. 15-5. Yet no such claim appears in the complaint Hayton actually filed in state court. See generally
Compl., Dkt. No. 1-1.
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analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement[.]’” Guzman, 520 F. Supp. 3d at 359–360 (quoting
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394–95 (1987)). This “‘unusual pre-emptive
power’ . . . create[s] federal jurisdiction even when the plaintiff’s complaint makes no reference
to federal law and appears to plead an adequate state claim.” Vera v. Saks & Co., 335 F.3d 109,
114 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 122 n.16 (1994)).
Still, “[n]ot every suit concerning employment or tangentially involving a CBA . . . is
preempted by [S]ection 301.” Fernandez v. Pinnacle Grp. NY LLC, 2023 WL 2525996, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2023). “If a plaintiff brings an action to enforce a state[-]law rule or
established right or obligation that is independent of a labor contract, that claim is not
preempted.” Kaye v. Orange Reg’l Med. Ctr., 975 F. Supp. 2d 412, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing
Vera, 335 F.3d at 115) (internal alterations omitted). And “[e]ven if resolving a dispute under a
state-law claim and the collective-bargaining agreement ‘would require addressing the precisely
same set of facts, as long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the
agreement itself, the claim is ‘independent’ of the agreement for § 301 pre-emption purposes.’”
Severin v. Project OHR, Inc., 2011 WL 3902994, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2011) (quoting Lingle
v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 410 (1988)); see also Lingle v. Norge Div. of
Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 412–13 (1988) (“The operation of . . . antidiscrimination laws
does, however, illustrate the relevant point for § 301 pre-emption analysis that the mere fact that
a broad contractual protection against discriminatory—or retaliatory discharge may provide a
remedy for conduct that coincidentally violates state-law does not make the existence or the
contours of the state[-]law violation dependent upon the terms of the private contract. For even
if an arbitrator should conclude that the contract does not prohibit a particular discriminatory or
retaliatory discharge, that conclusion might or might not be consistent with a proper
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interpretation of state law. In the typical case a state tribunal could resolve either a
discriminatory or retaliatory discharge claim without interpreting the . . . language of a
collective-bargaining agreement.”).
In its Notice of Removal, UPS contended that “in all five of his NYSHRL causes of
action, Plaintiff Hayton incorporated his allegations about being denied seniority; the type of
vehicle he was assigned to drive; the amount of work he was given; changes in his work tasks;
being denied a helper; not being given days off; a union steward not being present at his
termination; the union not being notified of his termination; and about not being given a
termination notice in writing.” Notice of Removal, Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 19. According to UPS, these
assertions “require constructing provisions of the CBA and also make Plaintiff Hayton’s
NYSHRL claims predicated on rights founded in the CBA.” Id. ¶ 20. UPS further stated in the
removal notice that it “intends to dispute Plaintiff Hayton’s assertion of rights under the CBA to
color his claims regarding the ‘terms, conditions, and privileges’ of his employment.” Id.
Whatever those intentions were, UPS never followed through. Instead, it merely
appended the 266-page CBA as Exhibit D to its instant motion, offering no context for the CBA’s
relevance. See Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. D, Dkt. Nos. 50-4 – 50-7.
UPS cites to the CBA only three times in its Statement of Material Facts (“SOMF”). See
Def.’s Statement of Material Facts, Dkt. No. 50; see also L.R. 56.1(a) (“Any motion for
summary judgment shall contain a separate Statement of Material Facts. The Statement of
Material Facts shall set forth . . . a short and concise statement of each material fact about which
the moving party contends there exists no genuine issue.”). First, UPS notes that the company’s
“commitment to equal opportunity and non-discrimination” appears not only in its internal
policies, but also in the CBA. SOMF ¶ 2 (citing Ex. D, Art. 36). Second, it states that work
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performed between November 10 and January 15, under the CBA, does not count toward
seniority. SOMF ¶ 5 (citing Ex. D, Art. 57). Third, it points to a single instance—where Hayton
appears to have forgotten to punch out for lunch—as a potentially qualifying terminable offense
under the CBA. SOMF ¶ 10 (citing Ex. A ¶ 11 and Ex. H ¶ 8).
UPS’s briefs offer no further consideration of the CBA. Indeed, neither its memorandum
supporting summary judgment nor its corresponding reply mentions the CBA. See generally
Dkt. Nos. 49-1, 62. In fact, UPS asserts that Hayton was “a seasonal, non-union employee”—a
contention that, on its face, only further obfuscates any purported relevance of the CBA. See
Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Dkt. No. 49-1 at 17; see also Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. A, Brian
Hughes Decl., Dkt. No. 50-1 ¶ 8 (“These temporary employees are typically released at the end
of the peak period. They are not part of the bargaining unit represented by the . . . Teamsters (the
Union)[.]”).
The only three paragraphs in UPS’s SOMF that even remotely allude to the CBA are
barely germane.
In its reply, UPS cites SOMF Paragraph 5 to argue that Hayton’s “seasonal” status
explained his non-retention, as with “80% of other seasonal employees” hired for the holiday
period. See Def.’s Reply, Dkt. No. 62 at 9 (citing SOMF ¶¶ 5–6). And in its underlying motion,
UPS relies on the same paragraph to assert that Hayton was not an independent contractor or
consultant. See Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Dkt. No. 49-1 at 22 (citing SOMF ¶ 5).
Neither brief cites SOMF ¶ 2. Nor would it matter if UPS had: As the company
acknowledges, its “commitment to equal opportunity” is not dependent on the CBA. See
SOMF ¶ 2.
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UPS emphasizes Hayton’s alleged “time theft” in its briefs. See Def.’s Mot. for Summ.
J., Dkt. No. 49-1 at 4 (“Yet, after . . . being admonished for time theft for not clocking out for
breaks . . . Hayton was not retained at the end of peak season, along with 80% of other seasonal
employees.”); id. at 18 (“[Of] [t]he three seasonal drivers who were retained[,] none had . . .
timekeeping concerns[.]”); Def.’s Reply, Dkt. No. 62 at 1 (“[Hayton] was flagged for time
theft[.]”).
However, UPS provides evidence of merely a single instance—during Hayton’s first
month with the company—in which he and his helper did not clock out for a half-hour- to hour-
long lunch. See Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. A, Brian Hughes Decl., Dkt. No. 50-1 ¶ 11; Def.’s
Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. H, Jacob Smith Decl., Dkt. No. 50-11 ¶¶ 6–7; see also Def.’s Mot. for
Summ. J., Ex. G, Anthony Hayton Depo (“Yes[,] we stopped to get pizza and I forgot to clock
out.”).
Discussing this sole occurrence in SOMF Paragraph 10, UPS highlights that “[a]lthough
such failure to accurately report time is typically treated as a terminable offense under the
applicable collective bargaining agreement, [UPS] decided to handle the incident with retraining
due to Hayton’s seasonal status.” SOMF ¶ 10. Even assuming that such a time infraction would
be typically treated as a terminable offense under the CBA and that the single alleged instance
qualifies, UPS chose a different, unrelated remediation. One that—by UPS’s own framing of the
matter—indicates the irrelevance of the CBA here, “due to Hayton’s seasonal status.” Id.
Nowhere does UPS explain the role or relevance, if any, that the CBA plays in Hayton’s
claims or their adjudication. As UPS correctly notes, the Court need not comb through the
record to locate support for a party’s position. See Def.’s Reply, Dkt. No. 62 at 3 (citing Amerio
v. Gray, 2019 WL 5307248, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2019)). Similarly, “it is not th[e] Court’s
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responsibility to raise and make counsel’s arguments for them.” Flores v. Tryon, 2017 WL
3705124, at *3 n.4 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2017); see also Nqadolo v. Care at Home, LLC, 2025 WL
2432612, at *5 (D. Conn. Aug. 22, 2025) (“It is not enough merely to mention a possible
argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel's work, create the ossature for
the argument, and put flesh on its bones . . . Judges are not expected to be mindreaders.
Consequently, a litigant has an obligation to spell out its arguments squarely and distinctly, or
else forever hold its peace.”) (quoting United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990)).
Even so, the Court has thoroughly reviewed the record. Put simply, UPS has not shown,
and the Court has not found support in the record for the proposition, that any of Hayton’s claims
are either founded directly on rights created by a collective bargaining agreement or substantially
dependent on one’s interpretation.
Because Hayton’s claims arise solely under state law, complete diversity does not exist,
and neither Hayton nor UPS offers any other cognizable basis for federal jurisdiction, the Court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction and must remand this case without considering its underlying
merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”).
V. 	CONCLUSION
The Court concludes that removal of this action was improper. Thus, the action is
REMANDED to the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Tompkins County, and defendant
UPS’s Motion (Dkt. No. 49) is DENIED AS MOOT. The Clerk of Court is directed to send a
copy of this order to that court and to close the case. All pending matters are terminated.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 11, 2025
Utica, New York
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