Orr v. State of New York, et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
ALANA MARIE ORR, O/B/O her minor child,
O.O.,
Petitioner,
v. 	1:26-CV-00332
(BKS/PJE)
STATE OF NEW YORK, et al.,
Respondent(s).
HON. PAUL J. EVANGELISTA
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
APPEARANCES:
Alana Marie Orr
ACP 8752
P.O. Box 1119
Albany, New York 12201
Petitioner pro se
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION & ORDER
I. Introduction
Petitioner pro se Alana Marie Orr commenced this action on March 2, 2026, by
filing a petition and paying the filing fee. See Dkt. No. 1.1 On March 4, 2026, Chief
District Judge Brenda K. Sannes denied that portion of the petition that sought a
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, finding, inter alia, no
emergency relief was warranted under N.D.N.Y. Local Rule 65.1. See Dkt. No. 4. On
1 Cases 1:17-CV-1280 and 1:21-CV-860 have been deemed potentially related. See Dkt. No. 3. Plaintiff
paid the $5 filing fee in this action. See Dkt. No. 1-1.
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March 6, 2026, plaintiff filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction. See Dkt. No. 5.2 For
the reasons detailed herein, it is recommended that the petition be dismissed.
II. Petition
Petitioner contends that she seeks “A Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254, seeking the immediate release of her minor daughter, O.O. . . . , from
unlawful custody imposed by order of state court (Ulster County Family Court) in
violation of Plaintiffs’ fundamental constitutional rights.” Id. at 1. Petitioner further
contends,
[d]ue to discrimination, bias, collusion, fraud, racketeering, human rights
violations and other violations of the laws and the Constitution of the State
of New York and the United States, the abuser was awarded full and legal
physical custody in family court through an orchestrated series of events
that Ulster County Family Court manipulated in order to terminate the
mother’s rights without due process of law.
Id. at 2. Petitioner further provided that the Family Court determined “there was no
evidence of abuse because the evidence of abuse was not allowed on the record, and
the court terminated the mother’s rights, criminalized and penalized her, and seized her
property without her consent.” Id.
Petitioner contends that the minor child, O.O., “has been unlawfully detained . . .
into the custody of the perpetrating parent [] who is manifestly unfit for such custody in
violation of 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).” Id. at 2. Petitioner further contends that O.O. is
“detained under color of United States law to the extent that Defendant Kehoe [custodial
parent] wrong-fully claims the right to custody due to a series of void orders by state
actors under color of law which were issued in complete absence of all jurisdiction, as
they are in violation of the laws and treaties of the State of New York and United States,
2 This motion is before the Chief United States District Judge Sannes.
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and violate the Plaintiffs’ fundamental rights, civil rights, Constitutional rights, victim’s
rights, human rights, disability rights, and parental rights protected by the United States
Constitution and UN Declaration on Human Rights.” Id.
Plaintiff states that the “defendants/respondents” are the State of New York,
Ulster County Family Court, Anthony T. McGinty, Keri Savona, Amy Ingram, Matthew
Sean Kehoe, and Ulster County. Dkt. No. 1 at 3. She provides that the Court has
jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as O.O. is held in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a state court. 	Plaintiffs’ habeas corpus claims arise under
Section 1 of Amendment 13 to the United States Constitution. 	This Court
may grant relief pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. §1651. The Court
has authority to award costs and attorney’s fees under 28 U.S.C. § 2412.
Id. at 3.
Plaintiff also contends that she has been denied substantive due process in
custody proceedings and her and her minor child’s constitutional rights are being
violated. Dkt. No. 1 at 5. She also contends that the custodial parent, Kehoe, “is
violating the most recent order of the family court, since its issuance, dated
December 22, 2025 . . .”. Id. at 5
III. Analysis
“It is well established that a petition for habeas relief pursuant to section
2254 	is 	not 	an 	appropriate 	vehicle 	for 	challenging 	a 	child 	custody
determination.” Woolsey on behalf of R.M.R. v. Mitzel, No. 1:17-CV-0074
(TJM/DEP), 2017 WL 2241527, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2017), adopted,
2017 WL 2242953 (N.D.N.Y. May 22, 2017); Davis v. Baldwin, 594 F. App’x
49, 50 (2d Cir. 2015) (“As the district court observed . . . Davis cannot
challenge a child-custody determination pursuant to a habeas corpus
petition. Accordingly, we decline to grant a [certificate of appealability] and
dismiss the appeal from the denial of Davis’s habeas corpus petition for lack
of jurisdiction.”).
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Stumpf v. NYS Dep’t of Child Prot. Servs., 605 F. Supp. 3d 503, 505 (W.D.N.Y. 2022)
(additional citations omitted); see also Triestman v. Schneiderman, No. 1:16-CV-1079
(TJM/DEP), 2016 WL 6110489, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2016), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 1:16-CV-01079 (LEK/DEP), 2016 WL 6106467 (N.D.N.Y.
Oct. 19, 2016), aff’d, 715 F. App’x 97 (2d Cir. 2018) (dismissing habeas petition seeking
to challenge the constitutionality of, among other things, a child custody arrangement,
finding that the petitioner could not satisfy the “in-custody requirement” necessary to
pursue claims under sections 2241, 2254). As it is well settled that “federal courts do
not have jurisdiction to review by means of a habeas application a state court’s child-
custody determination,” the habeas corpus petition seeking this Court to “release” the
minor child, O.O., from her custody arrangement, must, therefore, be dismissed.
Lehman v. Lycoming Cnty. Children’s Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 512 (1982);
Middleton v. Attorneys General of States of N.Y., Pennsylvania, 396 F.3d 208, 209 (2d.
Cir. 2005) (same).
“If the [C]ourt determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the
[C]ourt must dismiss the action.” FED. R. CIV . P. 12(h)(3). Even if the undersigned
interpreted the petition as seeking review of the custody arrangement pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, such claim would also fail due to the Domestic Relations Abstention
Doctrine and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.3 The Supreme Court has
3 	It appears, from plaintiff’s petition that the custody proceeding is final as she includes language
indicating that there was a termination of her parental rights. See Dkt. No. 1 at 2. If the custody
proceedings are ongoing, any section 1983 action seeking review of the custody proceeding or
arrangement would be barred by the Younger abstention doctrine. See Stumpf, 605 F. Supp. 3d at 506
(first citing Davis, 594 F. App'x at 51 (“Because Davis does not dispute that the federal action here
involved an ongoing, state-initiated custody proceeding, the proper basis for the district court's dismissal
was the Younger abstention doctrine.”) then citing McIntosh v. White, No. 16-CV-6654 (PKC)(LB), 2017
WL 1533539, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2017)).
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[l]ong ago observed that the whole subject of the domestic relations of
husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and
not to the laws of the United States. So strong is our deference to state law
in this area that we have recognized a domestic relations exception that
divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child
custody decrees.
Gerken v. Gordon, No. 1:24-CV-00435 (MAD/CFH), 2024 WL 4608307, at *5 (N.D.N.Y.
Oct. 29, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:24-CV-435 (MAD/CFH),
2024 WL 5001402 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2024), aff’d, No. 24-3336, 2025 WL 2847429 (2d
Cir. Oct. 8, 2025). Under the domestic relations abstention doctrine, “[f]ederal courts
[must] abstain from exercising their federal-question jurisdiction over claims involving
domestic-relations issues” unless the plaintiff can show there is “an obstacle that
prevents him from receiving a full and fair determination of those issues in the state
courts.” Ganiyu v. Lopez, No. 1:19-CV-11605, 2020 WL 1467356, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25,
2020) (citing Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Block, 905 F.2d 12, 14 (2d Cir. 1990)); see also United
States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 766 (2013) (“‘[R]egulation of domestic relations’ is ‘an
area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States’”) (citing
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975)). “The domestic relations abstention doctrine
can apply even where the plaintiff ‘style[d] some of [the] claims as raising constitutional
issues, but the allegations stem from a state domestic relations matter . . . .’” Guichardo
v. Barraza, No. 16-CV-1222, 2016 WL 3541547, *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 23, 2016) (citations
omitted); Swinea v. Peters, No. 1:24-CV-1517 (MAD/PJE), 2025 WL 1819710, at *4
(N.D.N.Y. July 2, 2025) (dismissing section 1983 complaint that sought review of
custody and family court proceedings and, thus, review was barred by domestic
relations abstention doctrine).
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Here, it is clear that petitioner seeks this Court to review a matter that falls within
the area of “domestic relations” – child custody. She expresses no nonfrivolous
allegation that there was an obstacle preventing her from pursuing review in the state
courts. Accordingly, any review of her purported constitutional claims under Section
1983 is barred under the Domestic Relations Abstention doctrine. See, e.g., Ganiyu,
2020 WL 1467356, *3.
Similarly, review of plaintiff’s constitutional claims under Section 1983 also would
be barred under Rooker- Feldman.
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a district court lacks jurisdiction to
consider a plaintiff's claim when “(1) the plaintiff lost in state court, (2) the
plaintiff complains of injuries caused by the state court judgment, (3) the
plaintiff invites district court review of that judgment, and (4) the state court
judgment was entered before the plaintiff's federal suit commenced.”
Triestman, 2016 WL 6110489, at *3 (quoting McKithen v. Brown, 626 F.3d 143, 154 (2d
Cir. 2010) (citation omitted)). From the facts petitioner provides, it is clear that the four
factors apply to bar review of this matter under Rooker-Feldman. See also Gerken,
2024 WL 4608307, at *4 (stating that Rooker-Feldman provides that federal district
court lacks authority to review a final state court order or judgment, “includ[ing] when a
litigant seeks relief that invites a federal district court to reject or overturn a final decision
of a New York Family Court as to a child support dispute brought in that state court.”)
(quoting Sims v. Kaufman, No. 23-CV-7927 (LTS), 2024 WL 757338, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 14, 2024)).
Ordinarily, a court should not dismiss a pro se litigant’s petition without granting
leave to amend “when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid
claim might be stated.” Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991); see also
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FED. R. CIV . P. 15(a) (“The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”);
Littlejohn v. Artuz, 271 F.3d 360, 363 (2d Cir. 2001) (applying Rule 15(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to motions to amend habeas petitions). However, an
opportunity to amend is not required, where “the problem with [the petitioner's] causes
of action is substantive” such that “better pleading will not cure it.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu,
222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Cortec Indus. Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949
F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Of course, where a plaintiff is unable to allege any fact
sufficient to support its claim, a complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.”). Thus,
“[w]here it appears that granting leave to amend is unlikely to be productive, . . . it is not
an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend.” Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer & Co., 987
F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).
Here, “it is clear that any attempt by [petitioner] to amend [her] habeas petition or
convert the petition into a civil rights complaint challenging the orders of protection
would be futile. For this reason, I recommend against permitting petitioner an
opportunity to file an amended petition.” Triestman, 2016 WL 6110489, at *3.
IV. Conclusion
Wherefore, for the reasons set forth herein, it is hereby:
RECOMMENDED, that petitioner’s petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus, dkt.
no. 1, be DENIED and DISMISSED in its entirety with prejudice; and it is
ORDERED, that the Clerk provide petitioner with copies of the unpublished
decisions cited herein; and it is
ORDERED, that the Clerk serve this Report-Recommendation & Order on
Petitioner in accordance with Local Rules.
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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), plaintiff has FOURTEEN (14) days within which to file
written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the
Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL
PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. See Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993)
(citing Small v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a), 72.4
Dated: May 1, 2026
Albany, New York
4 If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Report-Recommendation and Order by mail, three
additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the
date the Report-Recommendation and Order was mailed to you to serve and file objections. See F ED. R.
C IV . P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal federal holiday,
then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal federal
holiday. See id. § 6(a)(1)(c).
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